

Third Edition

Understanding the Olympics

John Horne and Garry Whannel



UNDERSTANDING THE OLYMPICS

How did the Olympics evolve into a multi-national phenomenon? How can the Olympics help us to understand the relationship between sport and society? What will be the impact and legacy of the Olympics after Tokyo in 2020? *Understanding the Olympics* answers all these questions by exploring the social, cultural, political, historical, and economic context of the Games.

This thoroughly revised and updated edition discusses recent attempts at future proofing by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in the face of growing global anti-Olympic activism, the changing geo-political context within which the Olympics take place, and the Olympic histories of the next three cities to host the Games – Tokyo (2020), Paris (2024), and Los Angeles (2028) – as well as the legacy of the London (2012) Olympics. For the first time, this new edition introduces the reader to the emergence of ‘other Games’ associated with the IOC – the Winter Olympics, the Paralympics, and the Youth Olympics. It also features a full Olympic history timeline, many new photographs, refreshed suggestions for further reading, and revised illustrations.

The most up-to-date and authoritative textbook available on the Olympic Games, *Understanding the Olympics* is essential reading for anybody with an interest in the Olympics or the wider relationship between sport and society.

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Also by the authors

By both authors

Understanding the Olympics, 2nd edition, London: Routledge, 2016

Understanding Sport: A Socio-Cultural Analysis, London: Routledge, 2013 (with Alan Tomlinson and Kath Woodward)

Understanding the Olympics, London: Routledge, 2012

Understanding Sport: An Introduction to the Sociological and Cultural Analysis of Sport, London: E&FN Spon, 1999 (with Alan Tomlinson)

By John Horne

Sport and Social Movements from the Local to the Global, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014 (with Jean Harvey, Simon Darnell, Parissa Safai, and Sebastien Courchesne-O'Neill)

Sport in Consumer Culture, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006

Edited by John Horne and Richard Gruneau

Mega-Events and Globalization, London: Routledge, 2016

Edited by John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter

Sports Mega-Events: Social Scientific Analyses of a Global Phenomenon, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006

Football Goes East: The People's Game in China, Japan and Korea, London: Routledge, 2004

Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup, London: Routledge, 2002

By Garry Whannel

The Trojan Horse: The Growth of Commercial Sponsorship, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013 (with Deborah Philips)

Culture, Politics and Sport: Blowing the Whistle Revisited, London: Routledge, 2008

Media Sport Stars: Masculinities and Moralities, London: Routledge, 2002

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UNDERSTANDING THE OLYMPICS

THIRD EDITION

JOHN HORNE AND GARRY WHANNEL

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TIMELINE

A selective timeline of the modern Summer and Winter Olympic Games: 1896–2028

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Host cities for Summer and Winter (W) Olympics</i>	<i>Continent</i>	<i>Olympic President</i>
1896	I	Athens	Europe	Demetrias Vikelas
1900	II	Paris	Europe	Pierre de Coubertin
1904	III	St Louis	N. America	Coubertin
1906 ¹		Athens	Europe	Coubertin
1908	IV	London	Europe	Coubertin
1912	V	Stockholm	Europe	Coubertin
1916 ²	VI	Berlin	Europe	Coubertin
1920	VII	Antwerp	Europe	Coubertin
1924	VIII	Paris/Chamonix (W)	Europe	Coubertin
1928	IX	Amsterdam/St Moritz (W)	Europe	Henri de Baillet-Latour
1932	X	Los Angeles/Lake Placid (W)	N. America	Baillet-Latour
1936	XI	Berlin/Garmisch-Partenkirchen (W)	Europe	Baillet-Latour
1940 ³	XII	Tokyo; Helsinki/Sapporo; Garmisch-Partenkirchen (W)	E. Asia Europe	Baillet-Latour
1944	XIII	London/Cortina d'Ampezzo (W)	Europe	J. Sigfrid Edstrom
1948	XIV	London/St Moritz (W)	Europe	Edstrom
1952	XV	Helsinki/Oslo (W)	Europe	Edstrom
1956	XVI	Melbourne ⁴ /Cortina d'Ampezzo (W)	Australasia/Europe	Avery Brundage
1960	XVII	Rome/Squaw Valley (W)	Europe/N. America	Brundage
1964	XVIII	Tokyo/Innsbruck (W)	E. Asia/Europe	Brundage
1968	XIX	Mexico City/Grenoble (W)	N. America/Europe	Brundage

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Host cities for Summer and Winter (W) Olympics</i>	<i>Continent</i>	<i>Olympic President</i>
1972	XX	Munich/Sapporo (W)	Europe/E. Asia	Brundage
1976	XXI	Montreal/Denver, Innsbruck (W) ⁵	N. America/Europe	Lord Killanin
1980	XXII	Moscow/Lake Placid (W)	Europe/N. America	Killanin
1984	XXIII	Los Angeles/Sarajevo (W)	N. America/Europe	Juan Antonio Samaranch
1988	XXIV	Seoul/Calgary (W)	E. Asia/N. America	Samaranch
1992	XXV	Barcelona/Albertville (W)	Europe	Samaranch
1994		Lillehammer (W) ⁶	Europe	Samaranch
1996	XXVI	Atlanta	N. America	Samaranch
1998		Nagano (W)	E. Asia	Samaranch
2000	XXVII	Sydney	Australasia	Samaranch
2002		Salt Lake City (W)	N. America	Samaranch
2004	XXVIII	Athens	Europe	Jacques Rogge
2006		Torino (W)	Europe	Rogge
2008	XXIX	Beijing	E. Asia	Rogge
2010		Vancouver-Whistler (W)	N. America	Rogge
2012	XXX	London	Europe	Rogge
2014		Sochi (W)	Europe	Thomas Bach
2016	XXXI	Rio de Janeiro	S. America	Bach
2018		PyeongChang (W)	E. Asia	Bach
2020	XXXII	Tokyo	E. Asia	Bach
2022		Beijing-Zhangjiakou (W)	E. Asia	? ⁷
2024	XXXIII	Paris	Europe	?
2026		Milan-Cortina d'Ampezzo (W)	Europe	?
2028	XXXIV	Los Angeles	N. America	?

Sources: adapted from Chappelet and Kubler-Mabbott (2008: 23); Greenberg (1987: 9); Hampton (2008: 20–22); Toohey and Veal (2007: 49, 199); IOC (2010a).

NOTES

- 1 This event celebrated the tenth anniversary of the first modern Games; while officially intercalated by the IOC, it is not numbered as an Olympic Games.
- 2 The VI Games (scheduled for Berlin) was not held due to the First World War, but the IOC officially counts it.

- 3 The XII and XIII Summer Olympic Games (scheduled respectively for Tokyo, then Helsinki before finally being called off in May 1940; and London in 1944) were not held due to the Second World War, but are officially counted by the IOC. The Winter Olympics in 1940, scheduled for Sapporo, were relocated to Garmisch-Partenkirchen even after the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, before finally being called off.
- 4 Because of Australian quarantine laws, the equestrian events were held in Stockholm, Sweden.
- 5 Initially awarded to Denver in Colorado, the Winter Olympics were transferred to Innsbruck when Colorado residents rejected the hosting decision.
- 6 The IOC decided in 1986 to reschedule the Summer and Winter Games, so a new four-year cycle for the Winter Games began in 1994 with the Summer and Winter Olympics staggered two years apart.
- 7 Elected for eight years, Bach will have to stand down in 2021 unless re-elected for one more four-year term.



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PREFACE

This is the third edition of our attempt to map out and understand the development of the contemporary Olympic Games. When we began writing the first edition of this book ten years ago, our birthplace, London, was next in line to host the Summer Olympics and Paralympics. Since then we have continued to research and write about developments such as the first Olympics in the Global South (Rio de Janeiro in 2016), the increasing number of protests and ‘no games’ verdicts in referenda held in potential host cities, and the changing geo-political context within which the Olympics take place. We are currently at the midway point of what can be called an ‘East Asian era’ since the last Winter Olympics were held in PyeongChang in South Korea in 2018, the Summer Olympics are in Tokyo in Japan in 2020, and then the next Winter Olympics will take place in Beijing (strictly speaking three areas – Beijing, Yanqing, and Zhangjiakou) in 2022.

In this edition we reflect on attempts at future proofing by the IOC in the face of the growth of global anti-Olympic activism. Between 2012 and 2028, four of the five host cities of the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games have already been awarded the Games at least twice before. In a period when it has become harder to attract credible bids from potential host cities, the IOC has been turning to reliable hosts with a track record, and with some existing facilities. We focus in the first part of this third edition on those cities.

As we wrote back in 2012, most books on the Olympics will feature accounts of the great moments and stars, repeating oft-told tales of Olympic mythology. Our book offers an understanding of the Olympic movement in its broader social, political, historical, cultural, and economic context. It provides ways of understanding the politics, economics, and cultures within which the Olympic Games was forged and within which it grew to become the pre-eminent sports mega-event. We hope it will answer most of the questions that someone who wants to understand the Olympic Games in its social and cultural context will ask.

That we are both from London and that the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games were held there in 2012 is one reason – but not the only one – why we collaborated in writing this book. As social and cultural analysts we have been observing and commenting on sporting cultures for 40 years, and we wanted to explore the continuing fascination with the Olympic Games – neither as a celebration nor as an outright condemnation, but as a critical reflection. In particular we wanted to examine aspects of the Games that, we suspect, many other books will neglect.

One of the changes, and challenges, that we have encountered since writing the first edition is the huge growth in the volume of scholarly and trade book material as well as breadth of disciplinary interest in the Olympics and sports mega-events more generally. As well as sociology, and cultural and media studies, we have tried to include Olympic research from anthropology, geography, history, international relations, law, political science, and urban planning, to name just a few disciplines. We offer selections of this material in the indicative reading but cannot be comprehensive without exceeding the limits of the publisher's guidelines for book length!

Additionally, reviewers of the second edition wanted to see inclusion of many more topics than we could comfortably fit into this revision. This edition of *Understanding the Olympics* does, however, contain four completely new chapters, two substantially refocused chapters and six thoroughly revised and updated chapters that we hope go some way to meeting the challenge. In a new concluding section we also consider Olympic futures and the future of Olympic research. Reflections on London 2012 (in Chapter 4) trigger consideration of other debates about legacy and regeneration that also appear elsewhere in the book. The impact of London 2012 on the Paralympics and ideas about disability sport are also taken up in chapters 8 and 11. The book contains many new photographs taken by the authors, refreshed suggestions for further reading, and all the boxes and figures have been revised and updated where required. Inevitably with all this new material we have had to make some omissions from previous editions. For anyone wanting to read a more detailed discussion of the build up to Rio 2016, urban development, world's fairs and expos, and spectacle we recommend you look at the second edition of this book, published in 2016.

In previous editions of the book we have not explicitly referred to one of our overarching theoretical concepts but it is worthwhile here stating that we find the notion of 'vortextuality' most helpful in framing an understanding of the contemporary Olympics (Whannel 2002: 206). The growth in the range of media outlets, alongside the speed with which information can circulate, creates a vortex effect. Vortextuality suggests that the Olympic Games are one of the rare occasions when the lightning rod of publicity, public discussion, and mass media interest in them can reach truly global proportions. The Olympics are an ambulatory mega-event caught up in a vortex of intertextual discourse. These discourses can be positive or negative, focusing on the rhetorical claims about Olympism bringing about world peace and harmony, or the corruption and scope for cheating through the use of drugs to gain advantage. As the world's most watched sports mega-event the Olympics provides a spectacular global soap opera at a time of economic, political, and environmental disorder and uncertainty. However, in recent years newspaper stories and academic articles have included references such as 'Tarnished gold – popping the Olympics bubble', 'Clean games boast in ruins', and protest is the 'new normal'. Three underlying themes concerning those protesting the Olympics today are the hosting of mega-events in the context of massive global social inequities, the role of sport in social development, and debates about mega-events and sustainability.

This was especially apparent before, during, and after the first ever Olympics to be staged in the Global South, in Rio de Janeiro in 2016 (Omena 2019). These Games have not left a positive material legacy, with many of the facilities in the Olympic Park, and elsewhere

in Rio, lying unused, underused, and showing signs of decay three years on. The IOC regularly talks about legacy and sustainability but the evidence from many Games is of Olympic waste. Hence the IOC face accusations of ‘greenwashing’, for example describing cost-cutting exercises as sustainable action. Recognition of the mismatch between Olympic rhetoric and reality has led to attempts to change several of the IOC’s processes, but the impact and results of these changes are not yet evident. There remains a need to approach the Olympics critically, and this is what we aim to do in this book.

As noted above we focus in the first part of the book – ‘A Tale of Four Cities’ – on the future three hosts of the Summer Olympic Games, Tokyo, Paris, and Los Angeles. In this part we also reflect back on London as host of the 2012 Olympics, especially as much writing since then has focussed on both its legacies’ apparent triumphs and failings.

The second part – ‘From there to here’ – examines the historical formation of the modern Olympics, and the IOC, the political context, and ideologies that have shaped it and continue to shape it. New to this edition is a chapter that maps out the emergence of other Games associated with the IOC – the Winter Olympics, the Paralympics, and the Youth Olympics. This part also considers the politics of the Olympic Games, and in particular the argument that protest has become the ‘new normal’.

In the third part – ‘Running the Games’ – we analyse several issues in the contemporary Olympics, including consideration of IOC governance and management of the Olympic movement in the twenty-first century, and the commercial environment in which, due to advertising, sponsorship, and developments in various forms of media, it now exists. The extent to which the Olympics provides an inclusive environment for athletes is considered once more in the chapter on level playing fields. The final chapter in this part returns to the ‘dark side’ of the Olympics and the issues and controversies that continue to be associated with them – including doping, corruption, and its environmental impacts.

The book concludes with a section drawing out comparisons and differences between the Olympic Games that have been staged so far in the twenty-first century, suggesting what might be the future of the Olympics, and identifies areas for further research.

John Horne and Garry Whannel
Edinburgh and Tokyo; London and Paris
October 2019



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ON COVID-19 AND THE TOKYO 2020 OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES

There is an old saying in Britain about waiting a long time for a bus and then two come along in quick succession. This year the same applies to two sports mega-events, the UEFA EURO 2020 and the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games 2020, which, due to the novel coronavirus or COVID-19, have both been postponed for the first time ever. Uncertainty still surrounds the precise dates of the events in 2021, although both will retain the names EURO 2020 and Tokyo 2020 respectively, to save on rebranding costs as much as anything else.

As the authors of *Understanding the Olympics*, which features a chapter about Tokyo and the Olympics specifically, as well as one of us currently being a resident of Tokyo, we have watched with growing interest and alarm as the COVID-19 virus took hold. It became clear that of the three possible options – carry on, cancel or postpone – only the latter would be seriously entertained by the Tokyo 2020 organizing committee and the International Olympic Committee. Although some have argued for it, few expected the 2020 Games to be cancelled outright. The economic, political and reputational fall out from that would have simply been too great, not just for the organizers and the Olympic movement, but also for Japan as a whole.

In the opening chapter of the third edition of *Understanding the Olympics* we offer a broadly historical account of the Olympics in Japan, and Tokyo specifically. At the time of going to press in February we still expected the Games would take place in 2020 as planned, and we believe that there are no significant inaccuracies in what we discuss. The 2020 Games were heralded as a recovery or reconstruction Games but no one was expecting it to have this additional significance.

By postponing the 2020 Games until 2021 some commentators have suggested the possibility exists for the event to act as a boost to the reputation of each of the main stakeholders involved. It will be at a considerable financial cost but the decision to delay and stage the event a year or so later could provide an upturn in the attraction of the global spectacle. At present this will remain as one of the many unknowns about the current state of the world.

John Horne, Tokyo
Garry Whannel, London
March 2020

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As we noted in the previous two editions, in a list like this there are inevitably omissions – apologies to any other people we should have included!

ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	Amateur Athletic Association
AAC	Amateur Athletic Club
AIOWF	Association of the International Olympic Winter Sports Federations
ANOC	Association of National Olympic Committees
ANOCA	Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa
ASOIF	Association of Summer Olympic International Federations
BINGOs	business-oriented international non-government organizations
BME	black and minority ethnic
BOA	British Olympic Association
BOB	Beijing Olympic Broadcasting
BOC	Brazilian Olympic Committee
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
BRT	bus rapid transit
BSIA	British Security Industry Authority
CBD	<i>Confederação Brasileira de Desportos</i>
CBF	<i>Confederação Brasileira de Futebol</i>
CCTV	China Central Television
cctv	closed circuit television
CDA	Community Development Association
CIPFA	Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accounts
CO ₂ e	carbon dioxide equivalent
COHRE	Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
CND	National Sport Council (Brazil)
CPSS	Command Perimeter Security System
CSL	Commission for a Sustainable London 2012
DCLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
DCMS	Department of Culture, Media and Sport
DWP	Department for Work and Pensions
EBU	European Broadcasting Union
EC	Evaluation Commission
EOC	European Olympic Committees
EOM	Municipal Olympic Company (Brazil)
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association

GAISF	Global Association of International Sports Federations
GANEFO	Games of the New Emerging Forces
GEACPS	Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere
GFP	Games Foundation Plan
GLA	Greater London Authority
HASC	Home Affairs Select Committee
IAAF	International Amateur Athletic Federation
IABA	International Amateur Boxing Association
IF	International Federation
IJF	International Judo Federation
ILTF	International Lawn Tennis Federation
IOA	International Olympic Academy
IOC	International Olympic Committee
IPC	International Paralympic Committee
ISL	International Sport and Leisure
LA21	Local Agenda 21
LAIU	Los Angeles Inter-Urban
LAP	Legacy Action Plan
LDA	London Development Agency
LOCOG	London Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games
LSI	Lucerne Sports International
MCC	Marylebone Cricket Club
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MENASA	Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia
MPC	Main Press Centre
NGO	non-governmental organization
NOC	National Olympic Committee
OAG	Olympic Advisory Group
OCA	Olympic Council of Asia
OCOG	Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games
ODA	Olympic Delivery Authority
ONOC	Oceania National Olympic Committees
OPSU	Olympic Programme Support Unit
PASO	Pan-American Sports Organization
PPP	public-private partnership
PR	public relations
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSA	Public Service Agreement
RSI	Red Sports International
SANOC	South African National Olympic Committee
SANROC	South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee
SCSA	Supreme Council for Sport in Africa
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SDP	Sport for Development and Peace
TCC	transnational capitalist class

TMG	Tokyo Metropolitan Government
TOP	The Olympic Partner Programme
UPP	police pacifying units
WADA	World Anti-Doping Agency
WCA	Work Capability Assessment
ZHA	Zaha Hadid Architects



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PART I

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CHAPTER 1

TOKYO AND THE OLYMPICS

(1940)–1964–2020

INTRODUCTION

In July 2020 Tokyo will join the ranks of cities that have actually hosted the Summer Olympic Games more than once, although it is the third time that a Tokyo Summer Olympics has been officially recorded by the IOC. Tokyo was named as host for the 2020 Games in 2013, as host for the 1964 Olympics in 1959, and in 1936 was selected as host for the 1940 Olympics (see Timeline and Table 1.1). The 1940 Olympics did not take place due to war. The aim of this chapter is to provide some background to this quirk of Olympic history, discuss the city of Tokyo's involvement in staging the Olympic Games, and illustrate Japan's involvement with modern sport and sports mega-events more generally. Discussing Japan and Tokyo also enables us to highlight several of the general features we have come to associate with the Olympics in recent years: historical and legacy discourse, campaigning, staging, and resisting the Games.

The first part of the chapter provides a brief introduction to the history of sport and events in Japan and the creation of memorable occasions or 'lieux de memoires' in association with the Olympics (Niehaus and Tagsold 2013). In the second part we outline Japanese involvement in the Olympic Games. Next we consider the activities of boosters that have sought to host the Olympic Games and mega-events in Japan. Following this the chapter surveys the use made of the Olympics and other mega-events to facilitate urban redevelopment in Japan, to showcase technological advances, and to promote not just the host city as 'World Class' but the region and nation as a whole via the Games (Whitson and Macintosh 1996). Finally, we consider resistance to the hosting of the Olympics and other sport-related developments in Japan. One of the distinctive features of Japan's involvement with the Olympics is that many of the forms of resistance and challenges to hosting the Games that have appeared in the past 60 years arguably developed there first.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN SPORT IN MODERNISING JAPAN

Japanese society does not usually follow the models of social and economic development created by Western academics, even though the 'modern history of Japan has been inseparable from a larger modern history of the world' (Gordon 2019: xi) and specifically that of its near neighbours, China and Korea. The typologies

and classification systems created by sociologists to make sense of Japanese social development generally are problematic (Lie 1996). Japan appears to destabilize the neat correlation between the West/East and modernity/pre-modernity; Japan helps to de-centre the West, calling into question the centrality of the West as the cultural and geographical locus for the project of modernity (Morley and Robins 1995: 160). Recognition of the political dimension especially places limits on notions of the convergence of industrial capitalist societies and leads to recognition of the diversity of such societies and their social policies, including those with regards to sport. At the same time, it is crucial not to view Japan's history as uniquely unique or esoteric. As Gordon (2019) notes, modernity and connectivity are two central themes in understanding Japanese history.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Socio-Political Events</i>	<i>Sport-Related Developments</i>
1851	Coup d'état by Louis Napoleon in France	The 'Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations' held in Crystal Palace, London: the first international exposition
1853	American Commodore Matthew Perry arrives in Japan	
1854	Japan is forced to end its seclusion policy (<i>sakoku</i>) and restrictions on maritime travel and trade (<i>kaikin</i>) introduced in the seventeenth century and submits to unequal treaties with Western colonial powers	
1858	Commercial treaty with the United States	
1861–1865	The American Civil War	(1862) A diplomatic mission from Japan visits the London Great Exhibition, where Rutherford Alcock, the first British diplomat in Japan, exhibits Japanese artifacts
1867		The Tokugawa shogunate (or <i>bakufu</i>), the Satsuma domain, and Saga domain present exhibits at the Paris Universal Exposition: the first Japanese involvement in an international exposition
1868	Proclamation of the Meiji Restoration, end of the Tokugawa shogunate; capital city moved from Kyoto in west Japan to Edo, renamed Tōkyō, or 'eastern capital'	
1870–1871	Franco-Prussian War (France's defeat is a major influence on Coubertin as a proponent of sport, and his desire to resurrect the Olympic Games)	(1871) Ministry of Education established in Japan: physical education institutionalized in schools
1872		First men's baseball club established in Japan

<i>Year</i>	<i>Socio-Political Events</i>	<i>Sport-Related Developments</i>
1873		Japan exhibits at the Vienna Universal Exhibition
1874	Japan invades and occupies Formosa (modern day Taiwan)	
1878		Japan exhibits at the International Exhibition in Paris
1879	Ryukyu islands become Okinawa Prefecture	
1882		Judo is developed by physical educator Kanō Jigoro; a modernization of traditional Japanese <i>jujutsu</i> styles of fighting
1894–1895	Sino-Japanese War: Japan established as a colonial power in Asia	(1894) 23 June: formation of the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
1896		First Modern Olympic Games held in Athens
1900		Paris World's Fair and Second Olympic Games in Paris: four Japanese participate in the International Congress of Physical Education within the World's Fair and first formal Japanese connection with the IOC is established
1904–1905	Russo-Japanese War: Japan's victory establishes it a place among the Western powers	(1904) Louisiana Purchase Exhibition in St Louis and Third Olympic Games: Japanese Ainu participate in the 'Anthropological Days', part of the exhibition
1908	Fourth Olympic Games in London	
1909		Kanō Jigoro joins the International Olympic Committee as the first Japanese member
1910	Annexation of Korea (until 1945)	
1911		<i>Dainihon Taiiku Kyokai</i> (Japan Amateur Sports Association) established as Japan's National Olympic Committee with Kanō as president
1912	Death of Emperor Meiji, accession of son, Yoshihito	First two male Japanese athletes take part at the Fifth Olympic Games in Stockholm: a delegation of four included Kanō.
1913		Japan and five other nations take part in the First 'Oriental Olympic Games' held in Manila (later renamed the Far Eastern Championship Games)
1914–1918	World War I: Japan involved as one of the Allied Powers	(1916) Olympics in Berlin cancelled due to WWI but still recognized as VIth Olympics
1917	Russian Revolution	Japan becomes an official member of the Far East Asian Athletic Association: hosts the 3rd Far Eastern Championships in Tokyo (the first international games hosted in Japan)
1919	Korean independence movement ('First of March') develops	
1920	Japan is a founder member of the League of Nations	Japan participates at the VIIth Olympics in Antwerp: gains first two (silver) medals

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Socio-Political Events</i>	<i>Sport-Related Developments</i>
1922		Establishment of Japan Women's College of Physical Education in Tokyo
1923	Great Kantō Earthquake around Tokyo and Yokohama: an estimated 120,000 victims	6th Far Eastern Championships held in Osaka
1924	The US Immigration bill excludes all Japanese	Japan gains 1 bronze medal at the VIII Olympics in Paris; The First Japan Ladies' Olympic Games are held in Tokyo with 1,800 athletes taking part
1926	Death of Emperor Taishō, accession of son, Hirohito	Hitomi Kinue takes part in the Second Annual Women's Olympic Games in Gothenburg, Sweden – wins prize for outstanding overall athlete
1928		Hitomi Kinue wins silver medal in 800m as first Japanese female at the Olympic Games in Amsterdam; Japan's first gold medals (in triple jump and swimming); Japan sends first male delegates to the Winter Olympics in St Moritz
1932	Japan creates a puppet 'independent' state of Manchukuo in north-eastern China	Japan participates in the 3rd Winter Olympics in Lake Placid and the X Olympics in Los Angeles; Submits a bid to host the 1940 Olympics
1933	Japan withdraws from the League of Nations	
1934		Far Eastern Championships end due to confrontation between Japan and China over Manchukuo
1936		Japan sends first female delegate to the Winter Olympics in Garmisch-Partenkirchen; First gold medal won by a Japanese woman (swimmer Maehata Hideko) at Berlin Summer Olympics; The 36th IOC Session names Tokyo as the host for the XII Olympics and the Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee is established
1937	Outbreak of war with China	
1938		Kanō Jigoro dies; The Tokyo Olympic Organising Committee notifies the IOC of its decision to decline to host the Summer and Winter Olympics (scheduled for Sapporo) in 1940
1940		1940 Tokyo Olympics cancelled, but still recognized officially as the XIIth Olympiad
1941	Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; start of the Pacific War	

<i>Year</i>	<i>Socio-Political Events</i>	<i>Sport-Related Developments</i>
1945	Massive bombing of Tokyo in March, and nuclear bomb attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August; The emperor declares via radio that Japan surrenders unconditionally	
1945–1952	Allied (mainly US) Occupation of Japan	
1948		Japanese Olympic Committee is reestablished, but like Germany, is not invited to take part in the Olympic Games in London or the Winter Olympics in St Moritz
1950–1953	Korean War: benefits Japan economically and allows development of a Self-Defense Force	(1951) Japan participates in the 1st Asian Games in New Delhi
1952	End of the Allied Occupation	Japan sends delegates to first post-WWII Olympics in Oslo (Winter) and Helsinki (Summer)
1955		Tokyo's bid to host the 1960 Olympics fails
1956	Japan admitted to the United Nations	Japan sends delegates to the Olympics in Cortina-d'Ampezzo (Winter) and Melbourne (Summer)
1958		The 3rd Asian Games and 55th Session of the IOC are held in Tokyo
1959		At the 56th Session of the IOC in Munich, Tokyo is named as the host of the 1964 Summer Olympics and the Organizing Committee is formed
1960	The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (known as <i>Anpo</i>) between Japan and the US is renewed; met with nationwide protests – maintains American military bases in Japan, including one-fifth of Okinawa	Japan participates in the Winter Olympics in Squaw Valley and XVII Olympics in Rome; Judo is accepted as an Olympic sport
1961		A 'Sports Promotion Act' lays the foundation for building of sport facilities in Japan
1964		Japan participates in the 9th Winter Olympics in Innsbruck; Tokyo hosts the XVIII Summer Olympics, becoming the first Asian country to do so; gold medal win for Japanese women's volleyball team (the 'witches of the east'); Sapporo bid to host the Winter Olympics in 1968 fails
1966		Sapporo named as host city of the 11th Winter Olympics; 10th of October is made a national holiday (Health and Sports Day) to commemorate the opening day of the 1964 Olympics

(continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Socio-Political Events</i>	<i>Sport-Related Developments</i>
1968		Japan participates in the 10th Winter Olympics in Grenoble; and the Summer Olympics in Mexico City
1970		Osaka hosts the first world's fair in Japan (Expo '70, or 'Osaka Banpaku')
1972	The island of Okinawa returns from US to Japanese administration	Sapporo hosts the Winter Olympics and Japan wins a first gold medal (ski jump)
1975		The island of Okinawa hosts a World Expo
1977		Sapporo bid to host the Winter Olympics in 1984 fails
1979		First annual Tokyo International Women's Marathon held
1980		Japan and 64 other nations boycott the Moscow Summer Olympics
1981		Nagoya bid to host the Summer Olympics in 1988 fails
1985		The city of Tsukuba hosts a World Expo
1986		The 1st Asian Winter Games are held in Sapporo
1988		Japan participates in the 15th Winter Olympics in Calgary and the Summer Olympics in Seoul (with medal results below those of the host and China for the first time)
1989	Death of Emperor Shōwa, accession of son, Akihito	
1991		Tokyo hosts the 3rd World Championships in Athletics
1992		First medals won by Japanese women at the Winter Olympics in Albertville
1994		Hiroshima hosts the 12th Asian Games
1995	Massive earthquake strikes Kobe	
1996		At the Summer Olympics in Atlanta, Japan finishes in 23rd place in the medal table
1998		Nagano hosts the 18th Winter Olympics
2000		Japan participates in the XXVII Summer Olympics in Sydney; The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) publishes a 'Basic Plan for the Promotion of Sports' Sports Advancement Lottery tickets (<i>toto</i>) go on sale;
2001	'9/11' – hijacked airplanes crash into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September	Osaka bid to host the Summer Olympics in 2008 fails
2002		Japan co-hosts the men's FIFA Football World Cup Finals with South Korea
2005		Seto city and Toyota city in Aichi Prefecture co-host a World Expo
2007		Osaka hosts the 11th world championships in athletics
2009		Tokyo's bid to host the Summer Olympics in 2016 fails

<i>Year</i>	<i>Socio-Political Events</i>	<i>Sport-Related Developments</i>
2011	‘3/11’ - 9.0 magnitude earthquake hits north-eastern Japan (Tohoku), with subsequent tsunami and nuclear crises, on 11 March	The Japanese women’s football team (nicknamed ‘Nadeshiko’) become world champions
2012		The Japanese women’s football team win the silver medal at the London 2012 Olympics
2013	Prince Naruhito becomes emperor after the abdication of his father	Tokyo’s revised bid to host the Summer Olympics in 2020 is successful
2016		Japan’s Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, appears at the handover ceremony in Rio de Janeiro dressed as video games character ‘Super Mario’
2019		Japan hosts the Rugby World Cup
2020		Tokyo 2020, or the XXXII Olympiad, is scheduled to start on 24 July until 9 August, with the 16th Summer Paralympic Games to follow from 25 August until 6 September
2021		Kansai Prefecture is to host the 10th World Masters Games (for athletes over 30 years)
2025		A World Expo is to be hosted by Osaka and Kansai Prefecture
2026		The XX Asian Games are to be hosted by the city of Nagoya

Table 1.1 Socio-Political Events and Sport-Related Developments in Modern Japan (1851–2026)

Sources: Adapted from Kietlinski (2011) and Niehaus & Seinsch Eds. (2007).

Socio-Political Events and Sport-Related Developments in Modern Japan

Table 1.1 reveals the close connection that often occurs between socio-political developments and sport. Japan’s distinctive route to modernity has involved key people in the Japanese government, its armed forces, and central educational institutions in the selective acceptance, incorporation, and promotion of ideas and practices, including forms of sport and leisure, from elsewhere from the second half of the nineteenth century and especially after the Meiji ‘Ishin’ (or Restoration) in 1868. This enabled Japan to develop a route to modernity that positioned it as part of the Asian ‘Other’ (from the point of view of the modernizing West) and yet simultaneously distinct (and superior) to its neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region (Horne 1998).

The route to modernity adopted by Japan meant that it was ‘opened’ to Western culture, technology, and science in order to benefit from it but without succumbing to complete Western cultural domination (Harding 2019). For example, in 1868 the city of Edo (also spelled ‘Yedo’) became the centre of government and was renamed Tōkyō, or ‘eastern capital’.¹ Since then Japan has had five different ‘Tennō’, or emperors. The era names or *genko* (see Table 1.2) correspond to the periods of reign of an emperor. Like many

features of Japanese society, such as the written language, this practice is derived from China and has had a longstanding significance in Japan. Dates in Japan are still officially recorded according to the year of the imperial era. In 2019 (or ‘Heisei 31’) Emperor Akihito abdicated at the age of 85 and henceforward is referred to as the ‘Heisei’ emperor. When his son, Crown Prince Naruhito, acceded to the throne on 1 May 2019, year 1 of a newly named era, *Reiwa*, was adopted for official purposes. Some commentators suggest that this abdication, unprecedented in modern Japan, was partly driven by the hosting of the 2020 Olympics, which would have added further to the duties of a frail emperor.

The adoption and transformation of traditional sports, such as sumo wrestling and judo, and the ‘Japanisation’ of baseball, is another of the ways in which this balancing of insider and outsider influences on Japan has been achieved (Edo-Tokyo Museum 2019). At the same time, involvement in international Western sports-based competitions – notably the Olympic Games from 1912 and after 1913 the Far Eastern Games with China and the Philippines – enabled Japan to establish a form of sporting hegemony over its Asian neighbours from the beginning of the twentieth century.

As in other nation states, political and economic leaders in Japan used sport for their own purposes of external promotion on the international stage and internal control. Social and economic elites also retained some status distinction through participation in privileged sports and cultural activities. Viewed from this perspective, then, the history of sport in modern Japanese society can be seen as underpinned by two major themes:

First, from the beginning of organized society in Japan political and economic leaders have augmented their prestige and power by supporting a succession of sporting styles, fashions and practices. Imperial courtiers, medieval warriors, the rising merchant class, the westernized elite of the nineteenth century and modern companies have all demonstrated their status by importing, inventing and re-shaping major forms of sport, training and physical exercise. Second, sport has played a vital if intermittent role in Japan’s long struggle for international recognition. Early emperors adopted Chinese pursuits to signify civilization and significance, and nineteenth- and twentieth-century leaders saw success in Western sports as a pathway towards international dignity. This complex process reached its climax in the Tokyo Olympics of 1964...(Daniels 1991: 186–187).

The history of sport is thus connected to three key features of the development of modern Japan (i.e. since the 1860s): the creation of a national education system; the commodification of the mass media and popular culture; and the ambition to rival the West as an imperial power, with sport to support this as a technology of imperial control (Guttman

<i>Period</i>	<i>Emperor Name</i>	<i>Era Name</i>
1868–1912:	Mutsushito	Meiji
1912–1926:	Yoshihito	Taishō
1926–1989:	Hirohito	Shōwa
1989–2019:	Akihito	Heisei
2019–	Naruhito	Reiwa

Table 1.2 Japanese Emperor (‘Tennō’) and Era Names Since 1868

and Thompson 2001; Kelly 2019). Organized sport in Japan began to take off in elite boys' schools, similar to its development in Britain, and then moved into universities and downward to secondary and eventually primary schools as the twentieth century progressed. Certain sports were favoured – especially the team sport of baseball – and these gained character-building and school reputation symbolism. The growth of the media and the leisure industries developed as newspaper and transport companies promoted spectator sport and recreation through stadia, facilities, and event sponsorship (Horne, 2006). The growth of nationalism, and political, economic, and military rivalry with the West, led to increased engagement with the Olympic movement and the use of sport in the Japanese colonies of Korea, Formosa (present-day Taiwan), and Manchuria, and gave meaning to the phrase 'Tokyo: Sports Center of the Orient', used as the title of a promotional brochure circulated during Tokyo's bid to host the 1940 Olympic Games (see Collins (2007) on the 'missing Olympics'; sometimes referred to as the 'phantom Olympics' in Japan).

The association between sport and education, the media, and corporate and economic nationalism in Japan continued even after defeat in the Pacific War and the emperor's broadcast announcing unconditional surrender in August 1945. The most powerful interests – educational authorities, political elites, and corporate powers – focused on those sports that best served their interests and promoted ideologies of sacrifice, team play, deference to authority, and team sports that best embodied national virtues.



Figure 1.1 Tokyo 1940 Banner.

To illustrate this further we can look at Japanese involvement in modern sport during the reigns of the emperors since 1868. The Meiji Restoration saw the introduction into Japan of many Western scientific and technological developments after a period of relative self-exclusion from the outside world of 250 years. Although the Tokugawa period of rule by 'shogun' or military dictators (1603–1853) is often depicted as one of self-imposed seclusion from the rest of world society, in fact the Japanese did remain informed of international developments through their contacts with the Dutch in Nagasaki and their dealings with the Chinese. The tightness of Japan's two-and-half-centuries of 'isolation' has often been exaggerated, by Japanese and non-Japanese scholars alike. From the early eighteenth century foreign books, except those relating to Christianity, became available (Robertson 1990: 196). At this time Dutch merchants put on displays of fencing, dance, and horseback riding for the shogunate. Another report states that in 1787 foreign, probably Dutch, seamen were seen playing badminton near Nagasaki (May 1989: 171). Nonetheless amongst the educational and medical ideas introduced into Meiji Japan were new forms of physical education and recreation, including modern forms of sports.

According to May (1989) Hiraoka Hiroshi returned to Japan in 1877 and in two years had established Shimbashi Club Athletics – a collection of railway employees from Shimbashi and their US advisors. Sport was also brought to Japan by foreign merchants and missionaries at this time (Tanada 1988). Baseball had firm roots before 1879, although debate surrounds where it began exactly. The new educational code of 1872 made no provision for physical education beyond primary level, but the Ministry of Education had established an Institute of Physical Education by 1878. Dr George Leland, of Amherst College, Massachusetts, was selected to develop a programme of physical fitness for Japanese schoolchildren. Because Leland believed that the Japanese were physically incapable of rigorous physical exercise and, in apparent contradiction, that competitive sports might foster an athletic elite within a 'samurai' legacy, he designed a scheme of 'light calisthenics' (*kei-taiso*) only (Roden 1980: 515).

Modern sports, and especially baseball, rowing, judo, kendo, archery, tennis, and track and field sports, largely became the preserve of the student elite. In the 1890s and early 1900s certain sports, for example baseball, became linked with the growing Japanese nationalism, or new *bushido* ('samurai spirit') based upon a prominent emphasis on the values of manliness and a nostalgic understanding of the pre-Meiji past (Roden 1980: 520). Thus in May 1896 when Japanese students defeated the Americans of the Yokohama Athletic Club (YAC) by 29–4 in the first baseball game between Japanese and American teams it was hailed by contemporary observers as a landmark in inter-Pacific relations. Roden (1980: 529) argues that engagement in baseball was an attempt to 'compel westerners to reconsider fictitious stereotypes about the unmanly Japanese'. Baseball was thus used fairly early on as an instrument for the 'rectification of the national image'.

The victory over the Americans provided symbolic fuel for the nationalist identity growing in Japan towards the end of the nineteenth century and which was to develop further during the first half of the twentieth century. This was marked militarily by the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895 (in which neighbouring Korea and Formosa (Taiwan) were annexed as satellite states) and the defeat of Russia in 1905. The development of sumo wrestling

at the same time can be seen as an attempt to mark out a distinctive Japanese identity through sport and leisure activities in the face of changes brought about by modernization and the introduction of Western sports cultures into Japan (Reader 1989).

The Japanization of sport for nationalist purposes included the development of the Far Eastern Games from 1913 after the suggestion of an American member of the YMCA, Elwood S. Brown based in the Philippines (Roscoe 1933). The subjection of other societies in the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' created by the Japanese government included the pursuit of physical and sporting hegemony. Japan made use of the sporting performance of Koreans in their own Olympic teams – for example in winning the marathon at the 1936 Olympics and in the Olympic football team of the same year. This also contributed to the use of sport in the struggle for Korean independence from the beginning of the twentieth century. Newspapers that attempted to use the marathon success as a symbol of Korean achievement, by erasing the Japanese symbol from the photograph of the champion, were closed down by the governing Japanese authorities.

In the first years of the Taisho era (1912–1926), generally considered to be a more liberal period, Japan entered the Olympic Games for the first time. Kano Jigoro, founder of judo, had been nominated as a member of the IOC in 1909. He helped to establish the Japanese Amateur Athletic Association (JAAA), although owing to financial constraints it could only send two athletes to the Stockholm Olympic Games in 1912. For the 1920 Olympic Games, held in Antwerp, the JAAA could only raise enough money for 15 one-way tickets. The participants left for the Games to force a resolution of the issue and two giant groups of companies (or *zaibatsu*), Mitsui and Mitsubishi, sponsored the return leg of the trip. Japan had gained its first Olympic (two silver) medals after all. For the rest of the Taisho period Western sports became further integrated into modern Japanese culture, mainly because the Japanese state became more involved in its organization and direction. The state began to subsidize the JAAA financially in 1921, established a National Institute for Research in Physical Education, and in 1924 proclaimed the third of November as 'National Physical Fitness Day'.

Despite the rise of a nationalistic and military government, the workers' sports movements also grew in Japan in the 1920s and 1930s (see Kruger and Riordan 1996: 177). The basis for trade unions in Japan had been established in 1896 with *Rodokumiai-Kiseikai* ('Union to Achieve Trade Unions') and in the same year the first worker sports festival was held. The police outlawed it, but the entire 1000-strong workforce of one printing shop (management and owners) participated in another sports meeting. A division over sport emerged among the Left in Japan. The social democrats were in favour of company sport, while the more radical leftists wanted to act against the perceived oppression, military preparation, and indoctrination cultivated through company-based sport, by preparing their own system of sport. Those left-wing intellectuals open to questions of sport favoured Western sports for modernization and democratization. The first summer Spartakiad (or 'Workers Olympics') organized by the Red Sport International (RSI) which was held in August 1928 in Moscow greatly impressed them. In 1932 the Japanese Federation of Proletarian Cultural Organizations (KOPF) founded the Proletarian Sport Federation of Japan, which joined the RSI and was immediately outlawed by the Japanese government. Clandestine activities were possible until the beginning of

World War Two but little evidence of opposition activity is reported during the war (see Abe *et al.* 1992).

The heyday of the two international worker sports associations – the RSI and the Socialist Workers Sports International (SWSI) – was between the two world wars. They faced three major problems – ideological differences resulting from arguments in the labour movement; the existence of two separate, often rival, worker sports organizations; and differences over the importance of competitive, record-breaking sport (‘bourgeois sport’). The RSI, increasingly Soviet Union dominated, pursued the slogan of closing the gap with others and taking on the sports performances of the bourgeois nations from the early 1930s (see Chapter 9 and Kruger and Riordan (1996) for further documentation of the workers sports movement).

The long Showa era (beginning in 1926 and ending in 1989) is best considered in terms of consisting of a pre- and a post-World War Two period. Nationalism and militarism grew rapidly in the late 1920s and 1930s and sport was used to give support to these developments. The annexation of Korea in 1910 was an early indication of the imperial ambitions of militarized Japan, in which it was argued that Japan was to revive and lead the rest of Asia to salvation through its own form of (non-Western) imperial control. This was further developed in the 1930s by invasions of China, Korea, and other neighbouring states under the policy of creating a ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere’ (GEACPS; see McCormack 1996: 153ff). The military aimed at the mass mobilization of the population as part of these efforts and this affected different levels of physical activity and recreation. Abe (1988) notes for example how Japanese physical education underwent four stages of development between 1917 and 1945. The more liberal and democratic styles of school-based physical education in the Taisho era gradually disappeared as government control over education in general increased. No wonder that some considered this better described as the development of an East Asian ‘coercion sphere’ (Harding 2019: 204).

Japan at the Olympic Games

In the midst of this increasing militarization the 1928 Summer Olympics held in Amsterdam are often remembered for being the first at which women were allowed to compete in track and field events (albeit in five events only). For Japan, Hitomi Kihue won the silver medal in the women’s 800m (Kietlinski 2011: 53–65). But the Games were also marked by significant Japanese swimming successes. Tsurata Yoshiyuki won their first gold medal in the breaststroke while Japanese officials made extensive notes on Johnny Weismuller’s crawl (Sprawson 1993: 282). These achievements in swimming were greatly improved upon in the 1932 Games held in Los Angeles, intended as a show piece for the Americans, when the Japanese won five out of a possible six events. Of the 18 medals awarded in the men’s events 11 went to the Japanese team (see Chapter 3). For Sprawson (*ibid*) the Japanese produced ‘the greatest team of male swimmers the world had seen’ in the 1930s. Only Japan among the Asiatic and African nations had ever won an Olympic swimming medal until the 1990s. At the Nazi (Berlin) Olympics in 1936 the Japanese again excelled in swimming competitions, winning ten medals against America’s five (Sprawson 1993: 283). It is for these reasons that Sprawson (1993: 9)

suggests that the three leading swimming nations of the twentieth century were America, Australia, and Japan.

While Japanese achievements at the Olympic Games were noted in the West, Japan had also been involved in the creation of a Far Eastern Games – initially with China and the Philippines – since 1913. As in the Olympics, Japan gained increasing success, especially in track, field, and swimming events (Daniels 1991: 180–181). In these terms then the declaration that Tokyo was the ‘Sports Center of the Orient’ as in the title of a glossy booklet distributed to IOC members in 1934, while tied into the imperialist ambitions of the military, had an element of accuracy (Collins 2007: 53). The decisions that led to the IOC awarding Tokyo the Summer, and Sapporo the Winter Olympic Games scheduled for 1940 reveal the myth of the political independence of the Olympic movement for what it is.

Growing international concern about the war being waged against neighbouring countries – especially China (since 1931) – led to the expulsion of Japan from the League of Nations in 1933. Nonetheless in 1936 when Tokyo, Helsinki, and London applied for the 1940 Olympics – Rome already having agreed to withdraw the year before (Tahara 1992: 468) – the British Government exerted pressure on the British Olympic Association and the City of London to withdraw their bid in favour of Tokyo (Polley 1992: 169). This intervention was consistent with the policy of reconciliation and appeasement conducted with Japan throughout the 1930s which sought to secure British interests in Malaya, Hong Kong, and Borneo, and protect the trade routes to Australasia (Polley 1992: 170–171). Anthony Eden, future Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in 1936, even said about the Tokyo bid ‘...for heaven’s sake let us encourage it. I could even run in the mile myself’ (quoted in Polley 1992: 176)!

With the war in China escalating, and the demand for materials used in the construction of sports facilities such as steel in short supply, the Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee decided to withdraw its acceptance to host the 1940 Games in 1938 (Collins 2007: 143–176). In a remarkable document the organizing committee produced following this decision (in English as well as Japanese) the detail of planning and expectations aroused by the potential event are clear to see (TOC 1940). However, in the build-up to the outbreak of war with the United States in 1941 physical recreation was increasingly placed in the service of the military in Japan (Daniels 1991). As Abe (1988: 132) notes:

In the 1940s fascist physical education reached the high point of its development. The Ministries of Education and Public Welfare were amalgamated and the administration of physical education was integrated. The governing body of sports, *Dainippon-Taiiku-Kyokai*, was reorganised as *Dainippon-Taiiku-Kai*, with the result that considerable power was given to the state to control amateur sports. In schools, at both elementary and secondary levels, *tairenka* (combining gymnastics and traditional martial arts) was introduced, youth sports movements in schools were reorganised and became mechanisms for promoting uniform behaviour and beliefs. A strongly centralised system of physical education subservient to the demands of the fascist state was the result.

After the war, in the second period of the Showa era, and during the Allied Occupation from 1945–1952, ‘Americanization’ might be considered the most appropriate phrase to describe Japanese development, economically, socially, and culturally. Strategically as well, Japan was seen as a bulwark against communism in the Pacific. Called upon to be a supplier of equipment and supplies during the Korean War the Japanese economy was given the vital fillip it required after the ravages of war and rebuilding under the Allied Occupation, and essentially American administration of General Douglas MacArthur. Abe (1988: 132) notes, however, that while the defeat and occupation of Japan swept away the fascist system of physical education, formerly ‘fascist physical educators, converted to an American democratic perspective, remained in positions of influence’.

In the years of economic growth up to 1960 Japan was gradually invited back into the international sports community. Both (West) Germany and Japan were allowed to compete at the 1952 Helsinki Olympics. By the end of the 1950s the ambition to be the first Asian host for the Olympics came to fruition when Tokyo was awarded the 1964 Summer Games. Along with acceptance back into the international community and the ranks of the advanced industrial societies that this event symbolized, Japan developed some of the sports and pastimes of affluent societies – most notably golf, skiing, tennis – and continued to develop its professional sports under the influence of the USA – notably baseball, horse racing, and motor racing.

Tokyo 1964 is held up as one of the key moments in the history of modern Japan. The country became the first to host an Olympics outside of the British Commonwealth, Europe, and North America; the 1964 Games were the first to utilize satellite broadcasting to enable people thousands of miles away to see live sport, and at the time it was the most expensive Olympics ever staged. In sporting memories three stand out in Japan: the judo competition defeat by Anton Geesink, from the Netherlands; the victory in the final of the women’s volleyball competition by the so-called ‘witches of the east’; and the men’s marathon in which the Japanese runner gained the bronze, only to commit suicide shortly before the Mexico Olympics four years later (Goldblatt 2016: 252–261; Guttmann and Thompson 2001). As with most great events therefore (and mega-events especially) even in the blaze of glory there is a darker side (see Abel 2011; Tagsold 2002, 2007, 2009; Whiting 2014).

The 1964 Olympics played a key part in the reconstruction of Japan, and Tokyo especially, after the end of World War II, and the Allied Occupation from 1945–1952 (and in the case of Okinawa, until 1972). Helped by the outbreak of war in Korea, Japan became an economic powerhouse, both symbolic and actual, in the 1950s and 1960s, and the city of Tokyo was transformed and modernized in advance of the Games. There were, however, over 100 deaths and 2000 injuries from Olympic building projects, Yakuza (gangster) control of the building industry increased, corruption to secure contracts occurred, and so did the displacement of residents whose homes were in the way of Olympic building projects (Whiting 2014). Environmental destruction, financial extravagance, and for some misery, were the end result.

The high-speed ‘bullet train’, or shinkansen, one emblem of the modernity of Japan, that began service just before the Games started on 10 October 1964, featured all three of these elements. The cost was \$1 billion, twice the original budget, and diverted money

from other projects, such as the monorail from Haneda International Airport, which still today terminates short of reaching the city centre. To save money lines were built over water – rivers, canals and sea areas – with landfill and concrete. The shinkansen linked Tokyo with the city of Osaka in the west, but there were no specific Olympic related events that required this. The rounding up and killing of an estimated 200,000 stray dogs and cats also took place a year before the start. The media promoted the Games and anyone who opposed them was branded as ‘hikokumin’, or traitors to the nation. Despite this, as Tagsold (2009) notes, 1964 gave rise to groups resisting the Olympics in Japan, for reasons similar to those that we find in more recent times.

Campaigning for the Games

This chapter is a tale of three Olympic Games – 1940, 1964, and 2020 itself. The 1940 Olympics did not happen, the 1964 Olympics did, and the 2020 edition of the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games are scheduled to start on 24 July 2020. Each of these events occurred in very different socio-political and economic contexts but there are similarities as well. First, all three have been portrayed by the hosts as signalling efforts to respond in some way to a disaster: the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake in which over 100,000 people died, the bombing and razing to the ground of much of Tokyo in 1945, and the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami in the Tohoku region of north-east Japan on 11 March 2011 – hereafter referred to as ‘3/11’. ‘Recovery’ and ‘reconstruction’ have become especially dominant tropes in the build-up to the 2020 Games (Ichii 2019). Second, the Olympics were to be or have been used as an opportunity to promote Japan to the rest of the world as the leading nation in Asia. Third, in each case the Olympics have become a forum for political symbolism as the nation is displayed through the city of Tokyo.

While Tokyo as the ‘eastern capital’ city came into being in 1868, administratively the present-day metropolitan area of Tokyo-tō, its official name, was only created in 1943 (Seidensticker 2010). Tokyo is governed by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG), a regional government, that consists of 23 wards and 39 other municipalities (26 cities or ‘shi’, five towns or ‘machi’, and eight villages or ‘mura’) stretching for approximately 60 miles from east to west where it has expanded since 1945, and has a population of over 37 million people. It is the largest city in the world. The renaming is only part of the story of the city, however. Another aspect is the way in which it has been reinvented at different times following natural and military disasters – in 1923 and 1945 especially (Shea 2019).

Japan has been a champion of non-West / non-European countries in the Olympic movement for over 100 years, ever since Kano Jigaro became a member of the IOC in 1909. Japan’s position within the IOC has assisted the latter in its claims for universalism when it comes to sport, and a long established and strongly held belief in ‘Olympism’ has been a part of Japan’s sport culture in return. Japan has also been a crucial funder of the IOC since the 1980s, through companies that have been members of the TOP sponsorship programme, such as Panasonic (see Chapter 10 for more details of this), and through one-off donations from some of the richest men in the world to assist with special projects such as the Olympic Museum in Lausanne (see Downer 1995: 393–396).

<i>Year</i>	<i>Candidate City</i>	<i>Host City</i>
1960	Tokyo	
1964		Tokyo
1988	Nagoya	Seoul
2000	Beijing	
2008	Osaka	Beijing
2016	Tokyo	
2020		Tokyo

Table 1.3 East Asian Candidate and Host Cities for Summer Olympic Games, 1960–2020

<i>Year</i>	<i>Candidate City</i>	<i>Host City</i>
1968	Sapporo	
1972		Sapporo
1984	Sapporo	
1998		Nagano
2010	PyeongChang	
2014	PyeongChang	
2018		PyeongChang
2022		Beijing

Table 1.4 East Asian Candidate and Host Cities for Winter Olympic Games, 1968–2022

It can be seen therefore that the potential for sports mega-events in projecting an image of the nation-state to the rest of the world – a form of ‘soft power’ strategy (Nye 1990) – was realized very early on by the Japanese authorities when they sought to achieve the hosting of the 1940 Olympic Games. As noted above, the Tokyo bid for the Games in the 1930s was partly secured through the British policy of appeasement but Japan’s bid was underpinned by a long-term strategy. After the Pacific War Japan was not accepted into the international sports community again until 1952 but attempts to regain international recognition and host the Olympics began in earnest as soon as the Allied Occupation ended. A bid was launched to host the 1960 Olympics almost immediately, but this was discouraged by the then President of the IOC, Avery Brundage, as somewhat premature, and it eventually failed to garner enough support within the IOC. In 1958 the Asian Games were held in Tokyo, however, and a year later the IOC agreed that the 1964 Olympics should be in Tokyo (Huebner 2016). The 1972 Winter Olympics in Sapporo, the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, and the 2002 World Cup Finals (co-hosted with South Korea) are further signs of the continued interest of boosters in Japan being involved in the staging of major international sports events. This interest in hosting sports and other mega-events is not confined to Japan in East Asia (see Tables 1.3 and 1.4). That the bids in Japan also involved struggles with local residents over specific sites and issues (e.g. Nagoya in 1981 for the 1988 Olympics and Nagano in the 1990s over the 1998 Winter Olympics) reveals that the process was not without contestation, as we note later in this chapter.

Towards the end of the Showa era and at the commencement of the Heisei era in 1989 (which lasted from 1989 until 2019) a key word in Japanese society was ‘internationalization’. Culturally this tried to signal that Japan had begun to throw off dependence upon US popular culture and ‘Americanization’. With this came an interest in developing sports on a professional basis which had not been so closely associated with the USA – the most notable being association football, soccer (or *sakka*). In 1993 the first full-time professional football (J.) League was launched. Many have noted that the J.League’s launch was timed to boost the bid to become the first Asian World Cup Finals hosts in 2002, as well as provide opportunities for Japanese construction companies and associated businesses to cash in on a new fashionable spectator sport activity. The decision taken by FIFA in 1996 to allow South Korea and Japan to co-sponsor the 2002 World Cup Finals may be seen as much a product of the organizational politics of the world game’s governing body as an indication of the quality of each of the respective Football Association’s bids and campaigns. It could certainly also be seen as a knock-back for the Japanese ambitions in ‘the world game’ (see for example Horne and Manzenreiter 2002, 2018; Manzenreiter and Horne 2004).

Since the Olympic Games share many of the elements of (Western) modernity – industrialization, capitalism, urbanization, the consolidation of the nation-state, secularization, colonization, rationalization, individualization, and globalization – each of the East Asian Summer Olympics can be seen as an opportunity for power play in this context. Japan has been awarded the hosting of the Summer and Winter Olympic Games more than any other non-Western nation (1940, Summer and Winter Games; 1964 Summer Games; 1972 Winter Games, 1998 Winter Games, and 2020 Summer Games). Tokyo 1964 saw ‘Modern “Exotic” Japan Normalized’, according to Collins (2007: 362). The Winter Olympics in Nagano in 1998, meanwhile, were a blend of ‘Eclectic Exoticism’ (Collins 2007: 366) evoking difference and sameness in equal measure. Seoul 1988 was conceived as a reconciliation Games. Beijing 2008 was viewed as part of China’s grand ‘coming out party’ as a global economic and political power. Staging a mega-event can thus be seen as an opportunity to catch up or modernize (politics), an opportunity to challenge (Western) modernity (protest), and an opportunity to project distinctive forms of hybrid modernity (promotion). Each mega-event staged in East Asia involves elements of each of these.

In addition to the successful bids for the Summer and Winter Olympics (outlined in Tables 1.3 and 1.4) Tokyo also applied to be host of the Summer Olympic Games to be held in 1960 and 2016, Nagoya for the 1988 Summer Games, Osaka for 2008, and Beijing for 2000. Sapporo was a candidate city for the 1968 and 1984 Winter Olympics while PyeongChang was unsuccessful twice in bids for 2010 and 2014 before being awarded the 2018 Winter Olympic Games.

Interest in hosting the Olympics in East Asian countries, and Japan in particular, remains strong while it is heavily contested in many others (Manzenreiter and Horne 2017). The main attraction catching the attention of decision-makers in East Asia is, Manzenreiter and Horne (2017: 6) contend, the supposed ‘soft power’ benefits of hosting global spectacles. Linked to this arguably overrated faith in soft power, in Japan and other East Asian neighbours, is the collective memory of the experience of the first Tokyo Summer Olympics in 1964.

One of the springboards in the final stages of the bid for the 1964 Olympics was the hosting of the Asian Games in 1958. Even before this, in 1956 when the Melbourne Olympics ended, Tokyo set up a special bureau with the aim of gaining the 1964 Olympics (Seidensticker 2010: 495ff). Following the announcement in 1959 that Tokyo would be host in 1964 the Japanese government enacted a Sports Promotion Act in 1961, which established an organizational and funding framework for sport (Yamamoto 2008). However, at this time most of the resources went into the development of the infrastructure for sport, rather than ‘a long-term commitment to the development of elite athletes and the pursuit of international sporting success’ (Yamamoto 2008: 59).

The priority then was on the development of ‘Sport for All’ rather than elite athletes. However, concern with performances in comparison with other Asian countries (especially South Korea and China) at the Olympic Games and other sports events, coupled with the withdrawal of corporate support for elite sport in the 1990s, led to a shift in Japan’s sports policy. Since then a neoliberal, ‘value for money’, approach to sports policy, as in so much else, has been developed. This has led to the privatizing of public sports facilities previously managed by municipal authorities to reduce public expenditure (Uchiumi 2019, personal communication). Additionally, this has involved policy learning and transfer primarily from Australia, Canada, the USA, and the UK. Learning from the UK, and the experience of organizing the London 2012 Olympic Games especially, has seen the creation of a London office, close connection with Loughborough University, the leading university of sport in England, and the establishment of several sports agencies, including the Japanese Institute of Sports Sciences (JISS) in 2001. JISS operates in conjunction with the Japanese Olympic Committee in the promotion of research and support for athletes, including the provision of performance-enhancing training facilities and talent identification and development (TID) processes.

Three factors then explain the emergence in the past 30 years of the priority given to elite sport policy in Japan (Yamamoto 2008: 79): consecutive poor performances in international sport, the stimulus this gave to the Japanese government to play a dominant role in sport policy, and the pursuit of information gathering and sport policy learning from around the world. As with similar developments in other countries, such a policy shift and redirection of investment in elite sport, as opposed to Sport for All, is justified with the argument that international success can boost enthusiasm for wider sports participation. Investment in elite sport has become about two-thirds of government spending on sport (Uchiumi, 2019, personal communication). While increasing general participation in sport is one of the aims of the 2020 Olympics, spending on the city’s infrastructure, rather than public sports facilities, may not lead to the outcome desired.

Staging the Games

In addition to the Summer Olympic Games, Japan has hosted the Winter Games twice (in 1972 and 1998), various World Expos (in 1970, 2005, and will do so again in 2025), and the FIFA men’s Football World Cup Finals, co-hosted with South Korea in 2002. The Olympic Games, however, appear to be the preserve of Tokyo. Like London in the UK it

would seem that other Japanese cities are not seen as quite ‘Olympic’ enough. In 1964, with Tokyo being the first non-Western city to host an Olympics, there was not only a desire to be acknowledged as thoroughly and progressively technologically advanced and modern, but also to redirect memory from Japan as a war-maker to Japan as a peace-loving nation. Nakaji (2019) discusses the shaping of public memory further through the 1964 Tokyo Olympics official film documentary, ‘Tokyo Olympiad’, directed by Kon Ichikawa. With Tokyo 2020 once again, Japan is seeking to re-establish and assert its position (even though it will remain the third largest economy in the world after the USA and China) as a leading innovative, creative, and diverse place to live, work, and visit.

Direct expenses for the 1964 Olympics were a small fraction of the indirect expenditure. For example, the building of the ‘shinkansen’ or ‘bullet train’ line connecting Tokyo with Osaka accounted for approximately one-third of the total expenditure and was not necessary for the Olympics which occurred in Tokyo but is often cited as a memorable feature of the event. In Tokyo, new streets, subways, and sewage works were installed, especially in the south-west of the city which benefitted from the construction most (Seidensticker 2010: 495ff). As in more recent times, homeless people who lived in the parts of the city under development were cleared away; some to a new apartment building in Kasumigaoka, not far from the national stadium. For various reasons then 1964 is still regarded as one of the most momentous years in the history of the city, alongside 1867, 1923, and 1945.

The Tokyo Summer Olympic Games of 1964 also saw Tange Kenzo’s gymnasium buildings, built on what had been known in the immediate post-war period as ‘Washington Heights Occupation Forces housing estate’, as it housed US army personnel (Coaldrake 1996: 259), symbolically announce to the world that Japan had risen from the aftermath of the Pacific War and occupation by the Allied Forces. The president of the 1964 Tokyo OCOG, Yasukawa Daigoro, declared that the Tokyo Olympics would ‘not only be a display of sportsmanship by the world’s athletes, but will also highlight the continuing efforts of the Japanese people as a worthy member of the world family of nations’ (quoted in Coaldrake 1996: 256–257).

Tange’s gymnasium buildings, alongside the new technology of the shinkansen, allowed Japan to project national self-confidence to the rest of the world. Tange had appealed for funding from the Japanese Treasury: ‘Since the Olympics would be the first major international event Japan had sponsored, halfway measures would not do’ (quoted in Coaldrake 1996: 258). Great importance was placed on the symbolic meaning of the buildings. Tange wrote, ‘I wanted the space to have an exhilarating influence on the people participating in sports events within it, while promoting a sense of excitement and union with the spectators...’ (quoted in Coaldrake 1996: 259). Yoyogi Park, the location chosen for the Olympic buildings, as a former major location for the occupying US troops, would be transformed and on the ground a stunning new building would stand.

The national stadium (‘Kokuritsu Kyogijo’) was built for the 1958 Asian Games and staged the opening and closing ceremonies for the 1964 Olympics, as well as track and field events. It was demolished in May 2015 and the site was then developed for the




Figure 1.2 Opening ceremony 10 October 1964: The Japan Air Self-Defense Force aerobatic team ‘Blue Impulse’ create the Olympic Rings.

New National Olympic Stadium (‘Shin Kokuritsu Kyogijo’), although actual construction work did not begin until December 2016. The Prince Chichibu Memorial Sports Museum and Library was demolished along with the old stadium and a new, smaller Olympics museum opened close to the rebuilt stadium in September 2019.

There are several challenges for hosts of sports mega-events in East Asia as elsewhere. The first is the tendency for the overestimation of benefits and the underestimation of costs. Potential gains are contradictory – benefits, costs, and burdens of hosting mega-events such as the relocation of residents, commercial spin-offs, jobs, housing after the event, and the possibility that newly built state-of-the-art facilities will turn into ‘white elephants’ – and unevenly distributed. The second challenge is that risks and the ‘uncertainty of outcomes’ is an ever-present feature of mega-events. The outcomes of sports and sports events are uncertain – responses to media coverage, lower than expected audiences in the stadia or on the screens and, in non-Western societies especially, media treatment of events is often negative (Manzenreiter 2010). A third challenge is that hosts especially have to balance patriotic promotion, xenophobic nationalism, and internationalism – one of the values meant to underpin the Olympic Games. Sport may be ‘war minus the shooting’, as George Orwell once wrote, but sport as a means to non-sporting ends, as soft power, is a risky business.

Sport has the power to change the world and our future. The Tokyo 1964 Games completely transformed Japan. The Tokyo 2020 Games, as the most innovative in history, will bring positive reform to the world by building on three core concepts:

- “Striving for your personal best (Achieving Personal Best)”
- “Accepting one another (Unity in Diversity)”
- “Passing on a legacy for the future (Connecting to Tomorrow)”

Figure 1.3 Tokyo 2020 Vision.

Source: *Tokyo 2020 Games Foundation Plan*, pp. 3ff (<https://tokyo2020.org/en/games/plan/data/GFP-EN-a.pdf> [accessed 11 February 2020]).

The bidding activities for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games were undertaken by a consortium of the TMG, the Japanese government, the Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC), and business corporations, under the umbrella idea of an ‘All Japan Regime’. As noted earlier, a policy for elite sport had been developed to improve performances, and the notion of legacy that was developed was inherited from a previous failed bid for the 2016 Games – to use hosting the Olympic Games to complete the task of the former Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara and develop Tokyo as a city that could compete with other global cities (see Holthus *et al.* 2020).

This vision of the Olympics fits well with the urban strategy of the TMG launched in December 2014, *Creating the Future: The long-term vision for Tokyo 2014–2024* (<http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/english/about/vision/index.html>, accessed 30 July 2019). The TMG is looking to use event-led regeneration as a catalyst to develop the transportation network, a more disaster-resilient infrastructure, open up more green spaces, and brand the city as a cosmopolitan capital city.

Yet since the election in July 2016 of Yuriko Koike, as the first female Governor of Tokyo, several issues have arisen. In the original bid Tokyo 2020 was to cost 700 billion yen and be a compact Games with 85 per cent of the venues within 8 kilometers of the Olympic village – a ‘Bay Zone’ and a ‘Heritage Zone’. A new national stadium would be built in the heritage zone and several new facilities would be built on the waterfront. Concerns about the spiralling costs – of both the stadium and other Olympics-related projects – led Koike to pledge to improve Olympic and Paralympic-related budgeting and management. In September 2016 she announced that she would review the use of three of the proposed competition facilities – the Olympic Aquatics Center, Ocean Forest Water Sports Stadium, and Ariake Arena – even though these facilities had already started to select suppliers. Yet with one year to go the budget has risen again and 40 per cent of the venues will be outside of Tokyo – a cost of 1.35 trillion yen or \$12 Billion (*Nikkei Asian Review* 24 July 2019 ‘Tokyo Olympic budget swells to \$12 billion a year before the games’, accessed 3 August 2019).

Governor Koike also sparked controversy during her election campaign by using the phrase ‘Olympic Games for Reconstruction’. This generated expectations of greater direct benefits from the Olympic Games for people living in the Tohoku region of north-east Japan, where the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred in March 2011. In addition to showing the possibility of hosting some aspects of the competition in the disaster area, this also gave an impetus to the discussion of a review of the competition sites. However,

at the IOC Session in Lima in September 2013, when the hosting decision was made, in order to try to ensure that the bid was successful, the narrative that linked the 3/11 earthquake reconstruction with the Olympic Games was strategically and intentionally played down by the bid committee, even though the Olympic Games had been emphasized as ‘a symbol of reconstruction’ during the candidacy stage and shortly after 3/11. Emphasizing the connection between the Olympic Games and earthquake disaster reconstruction might connect a very negative and potentially damaging image to the hosting campaign (Ichii 2019). Although recovery and reconstruction remain major features of the official vision for the 2020 Olympics, this is also one feature of the campaign against the staging of the 2020 Olympics.

‘The 2020 Olympics may lift the spirit of the Japanese people, but there will certainly be a price to pay for the privilege. Let’s hope it is not too much,’ wrote long-time resident journalist Robert Whiting (2014). Learning from the ‘London 2012’ model has meant attempting to rebrand the city/ country by seeking to attract youth – for example through Prime Minister Abe ‘arriving’ in Rio de Janeiro in 2016 for the Olympic Games hand-over ceremony dressed as ‘Super Mario’, the video game character, and the inclusion of surfing and skateboarding as events – and regenerating parts of the city (around the Bay Zone especially), while relocating those people seen as undesirable (i.e. poorer or homeless residents) from both the Bay Zone and the Heritage Zone. As we note in Chapter 4, London 2012 was not the unalloyed success that some commentators suggest it was. For example, London’s ‘clean Games’ boast is largely in tatters since failed doping tests have been mounting, the stadium centre stage of the Games had to be taken over by the London Mayor, and the promised legacy of increasing sporting and physical activity participation can be regarded as a myth. Through Tokyo 2020, are Japanese politicians and mega-event boosters going to achieve what they hope for or will there be a repeat of the failings of the model they seek to follow?

The Tokyo 2020 bid file stated that there would be no ‘adverse effect on local communities, natural or cultural resources’ (Goldblatt 2016: 430). Yet ‘learning from London 2012’ takes on a rather sinister connotation when the displacements of residents, similar to those that impacted on the Clays Lane residents in London, have taken place. Homeless people were evicted from their shelters and TMG built Kasumigaoka Apartments were demolished and the evacuation of their residents took place. There were many elderly people living in these apartments, and some of them had previously been forced to relocate due to urban redevelopment undertaken for the Tokyo Summer Olympic Games in 1964 (Suzuki *et al.* 2017). Research-based evidence of similar examples of displacement have been available ever since the Center on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) first produced its report on the negative impacts of mega-events in 2007 (COHRE 2007). The homeless, derelict, or simply ‘uncool’ get swept away, or hidden, or both (Broudehoux 2016; Kennelly 2017).

Resisting the Games

As noted in the Preface and other chapters in this book, the Olympic movement has begun to be considered in crisis, in recent times. Boston, Hamburg, and Rome, amongst

other cities, have abandoned bids due to financial unease and citizens' opposition over the hosting of sports mega-events. The agreement to treat both Paris and Los Angeles bids together at the IOC meeting in September 2017 and thus determine which would host 2024 and which the 2028 edition of the Olympics and Paralympics demonstrated for many people the concern in Olympic circles about the prevailing appetite for hosting global spectacles. Partly in response to this developing situation, the IOC adopted the Olympic Agenda '20/20' in December 2014 and hopes by instituting a 'new norm' to develop a more sustainable Olympic movement (see Chapter 9 for further, more detailed discussion of this). However, the key partners that the IOC seeks to promote the Olympic movement in conjunction with are arguably nations with leaders who are strongly motivated to create a 'state of exception' for the IOC and to induce profits for global companies (Boykoff 2016a; Vainer, 2016). In that respect, the current Japanese government and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo are important partners for the IOC. The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) officially decided to revise party regulations to extend their leader's term of office from the previous maximum of two consecutive terms (six years) to three consecutive terms (nine years). In other words, as a re-elected Prime Minister, Abe remains in charge of government affairs until after the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games. Such an LDP decision will have been welcome news for the IOC looking for political stability.

Elsewhere we have discussed the way in which familiar questions about sports mega-events have often been ignored if not also repressed (Horne 2007a: 86–91). Yet for many decades now there have been debates over: the benefits of consumption-based development versus redistributive social policies; regeneration and 'gentrification'; the displacement (more accurately expressed as 'replacement') of local communities; the effects of hosting on employment and tourism; the manufacturing of consent by boosters; and the emergence of 'opposition coalitions', often on a global scale. With the 2020 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games, as with other mega-events and mega-projects, various problems have already arisen (for more on this see Holthus *et al.* 2020).

Tokyo has faced these and other more specific challenges in the build-up to 2020: IAAF bribery claims; scrapping the design of the main stadium in July 2015 that delayed rebuilding; withdrawing the Games logo after claims of plagiarism; and a doubling of the anticipated cost from the bid stage to December 2016 (700 billion yen to 1.8 trillion yen). In addition, the JOC had to select a new chief after the resignation of Tsunekazu Takeda in 2019, who is being investigated for alleged corruption related to the Tokyo 2020 bid. Another of the more local challenges any host seeks to deal with is gaining the support of domestic public opinion, and in recent years this has been contained by reference to mega-event 'legacies' (Horne 2014b). So what is the vision of Japanese society expressed in the idea of a legacy for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games primarily for an internal, domestic audience? Although it is mixed up with developing Tokyo as a great welcoming and diverse city, the legacy message is consistent with the national reconstruction policy adopted after 3/11, and arguably equally problematic.

Contrary to some stereotypes about Japan and the Japanese people, the society has a long tradition of radical citizens' movements acting against and resisting unwanted urban developments, corporate activities, and pollution (Andrews 2015; Harding 2019). In relation to sport and the Olympics in particular, two previous moments stand out: the formation of



Figure 1.4 NOlympics in Tokyo July 2019.

the group ‘TROPS’ (the English word ‘sport’ backwards) in the 1980s and the involvement of many activists in the Global Anti-Golf Movement (GAG’M) in the 1990s (for details see Tagsold 2009; Horne 1998). While these activities were not specifically responsible for, on the one hand, the failure of Nagoya to secure the Olympics in the 1980s, or disruption to the hosting of the Winter Olympics in Nagano 1998, they did arguably contribute to a growing anti-Olympic sentiment that has emerged today on a global scale.

In July 2019, alongside the ‘1 year to go’ celebrations planned by the Tokyo 2020 organizing committee a coalition of activists from Japan, Korea, LA, Rio, Paris, and other Olympic host cities met in Tokyo. One of the Japanese organizers of this gathering, ‘Hangorin no Kai’ (‘Anti-Olympics Group’), provided 18 reasons for saying ‘No!’ to the 2020 Games, including displacement, increasing costs to the public, and damage to local and national environment identified in connection with the construction of the new national stadium. Together the activists produced a joint statement calling for ‘NOlympics Anywhere’, concerned academics have published books criticizing the Olympics, and journalists have written articles with academics predicting that ‘The 2020 Olympics are likely to be a disaster’ (Zirin and Boykoff 2019).

Other social scientists have contributed to our understanding of the build-up to Tokyo 2020 by noting for example how the urban development projects required by hosting

(or planning to host) each of the Olympic Games in Tokyo (in 1940, 1964, and 2020) each provided not only a means to signal recovery from some disaster but also to reaffirm, commemorate, and celebrate the emperor system (Tomotsune 2019). As previously noted, in the 1930s it was recovery from the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923. In the late 1950s and early 1960s it was recovery from the bombing which devastated large parts of the city in 1945. In 2020 the connection with recovery after 3/11 is both an element of the organizers' discourse and one that is downplayed lest too much investigation reveals all is still not well with the region affected (Ichii 2019).

CONCLUSION

Lash and Urry (1994: 290) argued that 'economies of signs and spaces', the concept they coined to explain the contemporary world economy, requires 'world cities' such as Tokyo, New York, and London to act as hubs for the new flows of capital and finance. One of the elements of these world cities is a requirement to constantly adjust to changing economic conditions, diversify its population, and find room to redevelop areas of the city no longer deemed up-to-date. It is not surprising that these are some of the goals of Tokyo with the hosting of its second Summer Olympic (and Paralympic) Games in 2020. Renewal after economic deflation, the 3/11 catastrophe, and being overtaken by China



Figure 1.5 The T2020 Mascots and the Countdown clock (365 days to go) at Mitaka railway station.

as the world's second largest economy are all features that influence Tokyo 2020 as a political project.

When Prime Minister Abe Shinzo appeared dressed as Super Mario in Rio de Janeiro in 2016, he was hoping to connect with the idea of 'cool Japan' and continue to promote Japan as a character superpower. Tokyo 2020 mascots Miraitowa and Someity are just the latest in a wide array of characters, whether from anime, manga, informational, or commercially driven, that form an everyday part of life in Japan and are not merely aimed at children. The mascots and other characters relate to two distinct themes in Japanese culture: first, a *kawaii* ('cute'), cool and winsome style, also manifest in cosplay and maids' cafés; and second, a fantasy/sci-fi/fairy tale repertoire of folk legends that are re-rendered in the form of superhero, manga, and/or graphic novels. 'Yuru-chara' or 'yuru kyara' refers to a category of mascot character in Japan long used to promote a place, region, event, organization, or business. They are characterized by their unsophisticated designs, often incorporating elements that represent local culture, history, or produce. They can be created by local government and other organizations to stimulate tourism and economic development, or by commercial companies, including sports clubs, to build on their corporate identity. They also appear as costumed characters at sports events and festivals (Kuhn 2020). Whether Miraitowa and Someity will gain wide international recognition or join the ranks of forgettable Olympic mascots is difficult to predict.

At the time of writing construction of nearly half of the facilities is completed, and the world's media has begun to turn its attention to 'things Japanese', both positive and negative. Concerns over corruption in winning the bid to host 2020, the displacement of vulnerable people, the impact on the environment of associated urban developments, the hot weather expected in Tokyo in July and August 2020, how the hosting of the Olympics may add fuel to the growth of new nationalistic discourse, and the 'ghosts of the tsunami' from 3/11 and the Fukushima disaster, all remain key elements in the story of Tokyo 2020 that is unfolding (on the last of these especially see Lloyd Parry 2017). Indeed one Tokyo-based journalist noted in October 2019:

Not too long ago, domestic media organizations would rarely have anything negative to say about the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, but as the actual games draw nearer, there's been a greater willingness to find fault with preparations and even raise a bit of alarm. Everything from Tokyo's deadly summertime heat to the out-of-control budget is now up for discussion.

(P. Brasor 2019 'Creating a barrier-free transport environment',
The Japan Times on Sunday, 20 October p. 17)

Brasor (*ibid*) went on to add that the 'most pointed criticism has probably been in the area of services for visitors with disabilities'. Although this chapter has not discussed the 2020 Paralympic Games, see chapters 8 and 11 and the work of Mark Bookman (<https://bookmanresearch.com/>).

Japan is undisputedly a modern, some might argue hyper-modern, society, but its modernity is the product of a different combination of political, economic, and cultural forces than

European or North American ones. Hence it often looks a little different to the English-speaking world. Historian Christopher Harding explored some of these differences in the BBC broadcast ‘Misunderstanding Japan’ (<https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b064ww32> [accessed 13 October 2019]). So the ‘East Asian Olympic Era’ (2018–2022) is playing its part in the development of what Urry (2008: 294) once referred to as ‘the development of a global stage’ across which tourists travel to compare, contrast, and collect experiences.

In addition to the Olympics other ‘tier 2’ mega-events, such as the first Asian Rugby World Cup in Japan in September–November 2019 and the Asian Games (in Hangzhou, China in 2022 and Nagoya, Japan in 2026) are also being staged. Both Tokyo and Beijing are preparing to act as hosts for the next Summer and Winter Olympic Games in 2020 and 2022 respectively, following PyeongChang hosting the 2018 Winter Games. Adding to this list of mega-events to be staged in Japan alone is the 2025 World Expo, awarded to Osaka and Kansai Prefecture in November 2018. Kang and Kim (2019) remind us of the wider regional context and international political debates within which Tokyo 2020 is taking centre stage. The East Asian era of hosting the Olympics, that began in 2018 and will end in 2022, is raising several new questions about the future of the Games as well as illustrating some of the previously identified issues relating to the use of the Olympics as a platform for city, national, and regional promotion.

NOTE

- 1 This chapter adopts the following conventions. (1) Unless a person is routinely reported in the Western style, Japanese names will be presented in the following order: family name, given name. (2) Macrons, straight line marks that indicate long vowel sounds, will generally not be used, but are illustrated here in *Tōkyō* and *Tennō*. (3) Currency values can alter a lot, especially at times of economic and political turbulence, but at the time of writing in October 2019, £1.00 = 135 Yen; \$1.00 = 107 Yen.

FURTHER READING

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CHAPTER 2

PARIS AND THE OLYMPICS

1900–1924–2024

INTRODUCTION

In a collection of essays, anthropologist Susan Brownell poses the questions: ‘Why do Olympic Games now attract much greater global attention than world’s fairs, when a century ago they were only a minor side event? and what does this tell us about the world in which we now live?’ (2008: 1). One of the aims of this book is to respond to this question by accounting for the growing importance of the Olympic Games. The architect of the modern Olympic Games, Pierre de Coubertin, was a Frenchman and a patriot, and always conceived Paris as an early host, and Paris was, as it turned out, to be the host city for two of the first seven Games. After 1924, though, it was to be a century before they were again nominated as hosts for 2024. Plans are well advanced, there are only three major building projects, and site clearing has commenced. France in the twentieth century became very centralized – it is not easy to see how any French city other than Paris could mount a credible bid. After staging the Games of 1924, Paris has tried hard in recent years to get it again, bidding for the Games of 1992, 2008, and 2012 before being awarded 2024. In 1924 few would have guessed that a whole century would pass before Paris was once again the host, a much longer interval than is the case with the other cities who have staged or been offered the Games on multiple occasions.

Despite the Tour de France final stage, the French Open Tennis Championship, and the Prix de L’Arc de Triomphe horse race, Paris is not really a sport-mad city – even when the football club Paris Saint-Germain win a tournament the public excitement is muted compared to a similar event in, say, Barcelona or Liverpool. However, as is the case with London and Los Angeles, it has accrued considerable experience in the staging of spectacular public events. This chapter outlines organizational issues of the 1900 and 1924 Olympic Games before proceeding to a more detailed account of the processes that led to the awarding of the 2024 Games to Paris and the subsequent issues of planning and preparing.

PARIS 1900

The 1900 Exposition Universelle was another step in the process of rebuilding French self-image and self-confidence after its traumatic military defeat in the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. This defeat of France led to a united Germany, whose power posed a threat

to France, great enough to prompt the entente cordiale deal with the UK (signed in 1904), after centuries of Franco-British enmity. The military defeat also had a shaping influence on Coubertin's thinking about sport, and physical education, and accounts for the tensions between the nationalist and internationalist aspects of his character (see chapters 5 and 6). The establishment of the Third Republic, and gradual re-stabilization of the French economy and French society, led to a period dubbed the 'belle époque', in which the arts, especially literature, music, and painting, flourished, and France regained a sense of cultural self-confidence. World's Fairs were staged in Paris in 1878, 1889, and 1900, and the latter included the staging of the second Olympic Games.

Were the 1900 Games a mere adjunct to the World's Fair? The anglophone commentators mostly suggest at shambles, incoherence, and chaos, with many competitors not even knowing they were in the Olympics, but a French account (Devron 2000) offers a more positive picture. From the 1894 IOC congress onward it had been the plan to stage the 1900 Games in Paris. However, at the conclusion of the 1896 Olympic Games in Athens, the Greeks made a strong case, supported by the Americans, for Athens being the permanent site. Inwardly appalled, Coubertin sent a congratulatory letter to the Greek organizers in which he studiously ignored the proposal. By the time 1900 came round, the Greeks had begun to reconcile themselves to the failure of their proposal, and were increasingly registering the problem of the (even in those days) significant costs associated with hosting.

In 1900 in Paris the Olympic Games were, unquestionably, overshadowed by the World's Fair, and, at an early stage, Coubertin lost control of the staging of the Games. At first, Coubertin's committee was welcomed enthusiastically in Paris. Offers of help were received from magazine publishers and sports promoters, such as Henri Desgrange, director of the cycle-racing stadium of the Parc des Princes stadium, Pierre Girard of *Le Petit Journal*, and Pierre Lafitte of *La Vie au Grand Air* (Mallon 1998). However, the plans of Coubertin and the IOC for Paris 1900 were abruptly derailed. In 1898, the Union des sociétés françaises sports athlétiques (USFSA), of which Coubertin was secretary-general, claimed the exclusive right to all sport included in the 1900 Exposition Universelle. Coubertin and the IOC relinquished control, possibly too readily, to Alfred Picard, the director of the Exposition, a conservative official who, according to Mallon (1998), believed sport to be a useless and absurd activity. Picard appointed Daniel Mérillon, president of the French Shooting Association, to head the sport programme in 1899. The term 'Olympic Games' was discarded and replaced with 'Concours internationaux d'exercices physiques et de sport'. (Mallon 1998) The Games were advertised as the 'Competition of the Exhibition', as, in effect, a sideshow.

A velodrome built in the Bois de Vincennes in 1894 became the principal stadium, used for cycling, cricket, rugby union, football, and gymnastics (see Figure 2.1). The velodrome was also used in 1924, for track cycling. It subsequently provided the finish line of the Tour de France between 1968 and 1974 when Eddy Merckx won five times. The track and field events were held in the grounds of the Racing Club of France in the Bois de Boulogne; swimming was at Asnières in the Seine; and fencing at the Tuileries Gardens in the Palais des Expositions (Mallon 1998).



Figure 2.1 Municipal Velodrome, as it was in 2019. A charming stadium, with an illustrious history, on the edge of woodland.

The Paris 1900 poster features a woman holding fencing épées and a helmet. This image was certainly at odds with the hostility of the IOC and Coubertin personally to women competitors. French Olympic historians Charpentier and Boissonnade (1999: 54) write ‘this intrusion of women in the sporting domain, till now reserved for men, provoked arguments involving some talented writers’. French intellectuals such as Emile Zola, Sully Prudhomme, and Léon Bloy were, though, disdainful of sport in general; Bloy commenting that sport was the best way to produce ‘a generation of cripples and dangerous cretins’. Sports were distributed into sections of the Exposition. Rowing was part of ‘life saving’; gymnastics was grouped with school sport. More bizarrely, athletics was in the provident society section, while skating and fencing were in the cutlery section! Under Mérillon’s plans, sporting events were scattered around the city in diverse venues. This was not unlike later Olympic Games, but without the advantages of tailor-made transportation links between venues. (Mallon 1998)

The conventional story was that 1900 (like the subsequent 1904 Games in St Louis) was an embarrassing and chaotic Olympics. Events were spread over several months, labelled in all sorts of ways. Many competitors did not know they were in ‘Olympic’ events; the facilities were inadequate, proper records were not kept, there was no consistency of display. Coubertin called the 1900 Olympics a ‘humiliated vassal’ to the World’s Fair

(Keys 2006: 207 n. 22). Young (2004: 154) says that athletes did compete sporadically on the outskirts of Paris, but ‘there were no crowds of spectators and apparently most athletes did not even know they were in the Olympics. It was a total failure.’

Cashman stresses the improvisatory and informal nature of the staging. In athletics, for example, a line of trees meant that the discuses and javelins often ended up in wooded areas. The 1900 Games, Cashman argues, ‘were lost in a world’s fair, left no footprints on Paris, there were no monuments, and little memorabilia’. (Cashman 1998: 108).

According to Mallon (1998), ‘years later many of the competitors had no idea that they had actually competed in the Olympics, but only that they had competed in an international sporting event in Paris in 1900’. Although the IOC subsequently accepted the Games as a proper Olympics, many have disagreed. Mallon (1998) performed a mighty feat in managing to compile a comprehensive list of events and results but acknowledges the lack of consistency and coherence that made his task so hard. Zarnowski refers to the Games as ‘an appendage to the World Exhibition...an athletic and æsthetic disaster’. No separate report of the Olympics was provided and all expenses were subsumed into the cost of conducting the International Exposition (Zarnowski 1992: 19). Coubertin regretted that the Games were ‘taken over by a big fair where their philosophical value vanished into the thin air’ but conceded that such alliances with international exhibitions (1900, 1904, 1908) were necessary for budgetary reasons (Borgers 2003).

This judgement, which has become the common sense in anglophone accounts, is a little harsh, and Devron (2000) offers a more positive perspective. Competitions happened, results were recorded, and spectators were present. Despite the perceived chaos, there were many events and competitors, competing at identifiable venues and the events can be regarded as a multi-sport spectacle within the framework of the World’s Fair (Exposition Universelle). The Municipal Velodrome stands as an attractive, if under-valued, memento of the event. Sadly, having lost control, and then regretted ceding it so easily, Coubertin set about ensuring that a negative image of the 1900 Games would be painted.

PARIS 1924

The 1924 Olympic Games, it could be argued, mark the start of the second phase of the Olympic Games. The period from 1896–1912 was one of establishment, against the odds, of the Games as a regular four-yearly event. By 1920, much of the ceremonial protocol had been developed, such as the Olympic flag, the Olympic oath taken by athletes in the opening ceremony, the release of doves during ceremonies, and the official closing ceremony (IOC, 2007a). At Antwerp in 1920, another ritual, in which the IOC president officially declared the end of the Games and the Olympic flag lowered, was established (Lattipongpun 2010: 110–111). The Antwerp Games, though, were a hasty, rather poorly financed and organized, but necessary, effort at resumption after the First World War.

By 1924, the Games were acquiring more efficient organizational routines. The 1924 Paris Olympics were subsequently rendered into film in the form of *Chariots of Fire* (UK 1982). The film portrays the rising power and professional approach of the USA, and it is notable that a delegation from Los Angeles were already studying how their city might

bid to be a future host. Paris 1924 represented the first occasion on which the growing prestige of the Olympics led to serious international competition among cities to act as hosts. (Gold and Gold 2011: 31)

Paris 1924 also saw the birth of the Olympic village, conceptualized as an innovative construction that would be built to last and used after the Games, and one commentator at the time described it as ‘a beautiful village, with all modern comforts installed’ (see Charpentier and Boissonnade 1999: 118). The barrack-like accommodation with few services, though, was not accepted by some historians as the first ‘real’ village, not established, in their view, until Los Angeles in 1932 (see Munoz 2006 in Horne and Manzenreiter; Munoz, 1997, 30–32, quoted in Gold and Gold 2011: 31) On a research visit to the area in 2005, we could find no remaining traces of the village.

The 1924 Olympics established the Olympics as a ‘spectacle’, with a closing ceremony, an athlete village, and over one thousand journalists in attendance. Forty four nations and over 3000 athletes competed in Paris; and the medals were distributed across nine different nations, including for the first time medals for the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, Poland, and Portugal (de Haan and Dumbell 2016: 18). Paris also witnessed the first significant dissatisfactions about the growing size of the Games, given that the scatter of the Olympic venues around the Paris region necessitated long bus journeys for most competitors (Gold and Gold 2011: 31).

The organizing committee had decided in 1922 to construct the Stade de Colombes, in north-west Paris. The architect imagined ‘the most beautiful stadium in the world’ (Gravelaine 1997: 13). Subsequently renamed Stade Olympique Yves-du-Manoir, it had a capacity of 45,000 in 1924. It hosted the athletics, some cycling, equestrian, gymnastics, tennis, football, and rugby. It was later expanded to hold over 60,000, and was the venue for the 1938 World Cup Final between Italy and Hungary. Colombes hosted French Cup finals and French national football and rugby union home Games into the 1970s.

It remained the country’s largest stadium until the renovation of Parc des Princes in 1972. It was intended for use in the unsuccessful Paris bid for 2012, but when 2012 arrived it was fenced off and in a poor state of repair. Since renovated, it will be used in 2024 for hockey.

The Piscine des Tourelles, the swimming pool for 1924, was where Johnny Weissmuller (subsequently the star of feature films including Tarzan!) won the 400m freestyle. In 1989, it underwent extensive renovation, and reopened as the Piscine Georges Vallerey, although it is still widely known by its old name. It is planned to be used as a practice arena for 2024.

Polo was staged at the Parc de Bagatelle, in the Bois de Boulogne, in one of four botanical gardens (ParisInfo undated). The rowing was staged in the Bassin D’Argenteuil, famously painted by Monet, but not so pretty now, on the Seine, downstream from the docks. Versailles and Fontainebleau were among the historic sites used. Yachting was at Le Havre and Meulan. Among the many stadia utilized for football was Stade Bergeyre, on top of a hill in the nineteenth district. The stadium was demolished just two years later, to make land for housing.



Figure 2.2 Stade de Colombes in 2005.

Unlike the first Paris Olympics, the second was well attended, as a record 44 nations competed, although the Germans were still barred. Crowds ranged up to 60,000 daily. But the preparation costs were high, so French insurance companies insured receipts up to 10,000,000 Francs. The figure indicates the approximate costs of hosting the Games. In August the *New York Times* noted that the total receipts came in at 5,496,610 Francs, indicating a huge loss (Zarnowski 1992). In the context of an unsettled domestic political environment, with divisions on the left and the rise of the hard right group Action Française, a weak economy, and German reluctance to pay the full amount of war reparations imposed in the post-war settlement, the Olympic Games did not make a huge impact, and were still some decades from assuming the cultural power they gained in the television age.

THE LONG ROAD TO 2024

In 1986 Paris submitted a bid for the 1992 Games, which featured a brilliant presentation, but poor logistics. The presentation, an inspiring piece of oratory by the late Jacques Chirac (then Mayor of Paris) with video interludes, went down very well with the IOC delegates in Lausanne (GW was present in the hall, working for a television production company). The transport, village, and security plans were less impressive, but the IOC's



Figure 2.3 Piscine Georges Vallerey, in 2019, with the Olympic Rings displayed.

President Samaranch was very keen that the Games be awarded to his home country and so Barcelona was, as expected, the winner.

Subsequently a 2001 Paris bid for 2008 lost out to Beijing. In 2005, the Paris bid for 2012 came much closer. It was the front-runner for a long period, only to be pipped at the post by London, leaving a legacy of bitterness that lasts to this day, and some accusations of foul play. It is always hard to interpret IOC votes, given the small unrepresentative electorate, and the secret ballot. It is clear that a lot can happen behind the scenes, which

does not become public. The line at which hard-nosed political dealing becomes corrupt can be a blurred one, not least because of the non-representative and secret nature of the decision-making process. London produced a credible plan, and staged an impressive presentation. London has become an attractive city – but so is Paris. The well-planned use of Tony Blair, then Prime Minister, had a last-minute impact. The Olympic Session came at a very awkward time for world leaders, coinciding as it did with the G8 Conference in Scotland, and Jacques Chirac (by then President of France) paid only a fleeting visit to Singapore.

Tony Estanguet, co-president of the successful bid for 2024, was part of the earlier Paris bid, in 2001, that lost out to Beijing for the 2008 Games, and also part of the Paris delegation in Singapore in 2005 when Paris was beaten by only four votes by London in the ballot for the 2012 Summer Games. ‘When we entered into the room for the final result, we were quite confident, and then it was, waaaah, cold shower,’ Estanguet said, shivering at the memory (Clary 2017). Chastened after the defeat, but determined to learn from London, Estanguet was subsequently part of a Paris delegation who went to London in 2013 to meet with the chairman of those Olympics, Sebastian Coe, and his team. Estanguet said that insiders have told him that Paris’s 2012 bid had too many politicians in the forefront and not enough athletes, and that the bid was too inwardly focused on France rather than on the issues facing the Olympic movement as a whole (Clary 2017). The disappointment felt amongst the French sport establishment took a while to dissipate, and, even now, some Parisians believe 2012 would have been a better moment for a Paris Games, but the bid for 2024 was a well-planned and coherent one, with better consolidation of sites, reducing potential transport and security problems. In its development stage the Paris 2024 bid also benefited from the good relations between two socialists, the president, François Hollande, and Parisian mayor Anne Hidalgo.

From the 2000s, it was becoming clear that there was a growing reluctance to bid, and, where bids were planned, a growing tendency for citizens to mount successful campaigns to prevent the bid proceeding. Krakow, Lviv, Oslo, and Stockholm all withdrew bids for the 2022 Winter Olympics, leaving Beijing and Almaty (Kazakhstan), Beijing being chosen. In September 2015, the International Olympic Committee announced five candidate cities for the 2024 Games: Budapest, Hamburg, Los Angeles, Paris, and Rome. Budapest, Hamburg, and Rome subsequently withdrew, leaving only Los Angeles and Paris.

The French bid featured, as has become common, a vision, cast in terms that were vague, generalized, and aspirational:

*Here in Paris, we want the Games with a passion.
Games for the athletes.
Games with Parisians; with the people of France, and the world.
Games in the very heart of the city...
That are Games for everyone.
That help to respect people and the planet.
And that inspire us to sport, and support us as we do it.
Breath-taking Games, which bring us together...
And where everyone can share their emotions...
In a city where sharing is a way of life.*

*Sharing of emotions, ideas and passion.
Sharing to drive progress and innovation.
Sharing to unite us – and to strengthen sport.
A way of seeing things, of living.
A way for young people to make their mark in the world.
A way to put the Olympic Spirit into action like never before.
Paris 2024 will be about sharing the best that we have to offer:
Our city, its soul and its passion.
About sharing the spirit of human achievement seen in the Games.
About sharing a vision for a better future.*

And who could disagree with that? The key word is ‘sharing’ but sharing what exactly?

The French bid proposed two main zones, one in and around Saint-Denis, and one along the Seine. The city’s many landmarks will feature, with beach volleyball in the shadow of the Eiffel Tower and equestrian events held at Versailles. The total organizing budget for Paris 2024 was estimated at about \$4 billion (Wharton 2017). Possibly to counter the reputation of Paris with its long history of public protests, the bid book made its position clear from the outset:

As a progressive democratic nation, France permits peaceful protests. However, the national intelligence services anticipate and prepare for protests with potential public security implications. The law requires authorities to be informed of planned demonstrations, and the timing and route must be negotiated with them. Specially trained and equipped police forces maintain public order while allowing citizens to exercise their rights to public assembly and protest. Even in cases of illegal protests, preventive measures will ensure restoration of order and smooth delivery of the Games.

(Paris Candidature File for 2024 Olympic Games, Part One, 69).

The 2015 attacks

Protests are one thing, organized terrorism quite another. The Paris bid was progressing well, as other candidates withdrew, until November 2015. Dramatic and terrifying terrorism attacks on one night in Paris, resulting in 129 deaths, including the slaughter of people at the Bataclan nightclub, and an explosion at the Stade De France, made headlines around the world. The IOC president, Thomas Bach, was quick to assert that the incident would not influence the city’s chances of hosting the 2024 Olympic Games, saying, ‘IOC members know terrorism is not a French or a Parisian problem, it is a global challenge... We must be united and firm, especially with the Olympic Games’ (BBC Sport 2015a). Nevertheless, the atmosphere in the city remained tense for some weeks, and platoons of armed soldiers became, and remain, a familiar sight on the streets.

Another threat to the bid came from the unsettled nature of French politics, with the socialist party in disarray, disunity on the left generally, the decline of the old centre right parties and the rise of the Front Nationale under Marine le Pen. In 2016, Parisian mayor

Anne Hidalgo called for all French presidential candidates to support the Parisian bid to host the 2024 Olympics, and asked French senators to build ‘national unity’ around the bid. *Forbes Magazine* regarded this as nationalism and pride wishfully evoked through a major sporting event to display French unity and social cohesion, and suggested that the Games would not solve France’s problems (Brennan 2016). In February 2017, Hungary’s government withdrew Budapest’s bid to host the 2024 Summer Olympics, citing a lack of political and national unity behind the application, and blamed it on its opposition. Local opponents of the bid had submitted a quarter of a million signatures in a petition demanding a local referendum. According to a survey in Budapest, 56 per cent of voters were against the bid (*The Guardian* 2017).

So with only Los Angeles and Paris as options, the IOC began the delicate process of keeping both on board. In March 2017, a leader of Paris’s 2024 Olympic bid firmly rejected the idea of waiting until 2028 to host the Summer Games, telling the International Olympic Committee, ‘It’s now or never.’ Tony Estanguet, an IOC member and co-chair of the Paris bid committee, told reporters in London that rights to the land earmarked for the Olympic village did not extend beyond 2024 (*The Guardian* 2017). In April 2017 IOC officials met the LA and Paris bid committees to make an unprecedented suggestion that both the 2024 and 2028 Games be awarded at the same time. In July the IOC approved the idea and a process of negotiation, between Paris, LA, and the IOC, to determine which city be awarded 2024, commenced. Paris emerged as the preferred host; the IOC declared Los Angeles to be the sole candidate for the 2028 Games (annoying some cities who had planned to bid) and by the end of July, the two cities were penciled in as hosts for 2024 (Paris) and 2028 (Los Angeles).

During 2017, sensing that the IOC were leaning towards Paris for 2024, Los Angeles began dropping hints that it could be persuaded to accept IOC concessions in exchange for waiting four more years for 2028. Paris, lobbying hard for 2024, said 95 percent of its Olympic venues were already built, and it was lacking only the aquatics centre and the Olympic village (and of course, the media centre). For Paris, 2024 would be a centennial celebration, even if that was hardly a persuasive argument on its own (Clary 2017). In September 2017, Paris and Los Angeles were officially named as hosts of the 2024 and 2028 Summer Games respectively, confirming what everyone already knew (BBC Sport 2017a). The French president Emmanuel Macron said the Olympics would be crucial for France, describing the award of the Games as ‘a gesture that shows that in our long-term battle against terrorism, we don’t stop big events’ (Chrisafis 2017). The LA Mayor, Eric Garcetti, congratulated Paris, saying that ‘fraternité’ is the most important word in French, and he invited French president Macron to visit LA. (RFI 2017). The Mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo, said that everyone had worked together to construct an innovative and positive accord, which enabled three winners – the Olympic Family, Paris, and Los Angeles (Vingt Minutes 2017a). Suddenly, all was harmony in the Olympic Family, which is the way the IOC like it. The unprecedented move by the IOC, to award two Games at the same time, will not solve all the problems of a flawed bidding process. The compromise is a stop-gap measure, providing time to see if The New Norm can induce greater interest from bidding cities (Keating 2017). See Chapter 9 for a fuller exploration of these issues.

For France, whose tourism numbers have shrunk after the string of major terror attacks since 2015, the chance to host is an opportunity to show the world a lighter, vibrant side, resilient to the recent horrors. The socialist Mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo, intends to promote the environmental issue, showcasing Paris as a resilient city which knows how to overcome challenges. ‘We’re proud to be a world leader in environment issues and sustainable development. Climate change is the greatest challenge of this century,’ Hidalgo said in her speech (Nordstrom 2017). President Macron recently regretted that a French enterprise, Total, had withdrawn from sponsoring the Games under pressure from Hidalgo, but Deputy Mayor Emmanuel Grégoire declared that Paris 2024 was not obliged to make ‘one of the great polluters’ a major partner for the Olympic Games (*FranceInfo* 2019).

Some are more cautious about long-term benefits – Tom Jenkins, CEO of the European Tour Operators Association (ETOA), said, ‘It is a magnificent, lavish party, and should be regarded as such. It has no virtue other than people enjoying themselves. It has no further function’ (Nordstrom 2017). Jenkins said that although the Games are marketed as a way to drive up tourism numbers, increase employment, and give a boost to a city’s infrastructure – both before and after – they seldom turn out to fulfil that promise. Jenkins argues that estimates of attendees are always exaggerated. Including athletes, their immediate entourage, Games officials, the press, and some international sport fans, it



Figure 2.4 Stade de France.



Figure 2.5 Parc des Princes.

is about 30,000 to 40,000 people, no more. They don't come to see the sights, Jenkins asserts, and they don't spend a lot of money. Hosting the Games, according to Jenkins, can actually negatively affect a city's tourism revenues as the regular tourism dips during the Games (Nordstrom 2017). This analysis by Jenkins is, in our view, rather more astute and realistic than the rose-tinted predictions characteristically circulated by Olympic apparatchiks and city boosters.

The main venues already constructed include: Stade de France (athletics, opening and closing ceremonies); Parc des Princes (football); Roland Garros (tennis and boxing); Jean Bouin (rugby); Bercy (judo and basketball); and l'Arena-92 (gymnastics, trampoline). Golf will be at Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, rowing, canoeing, and kayaking at Vaires-sur-Marne, and yachting at Marseilles. The temporary sites include the Champ de Mars for beach volleyball; the Eiffel Tower for the start of the Triathlon, the marathon, and swimming in open water; the Champs-Élysées for a section of road cycling; Versailles for show jumping; and the Esplanade at Invalides for archery. The major new constructions will be the Olympic village on the Seine in Pleyel-St Denis, the Aquatic Centre on the Plaine Saulnier at Saint-Denis, and the International Media Centre at Le Bourget. A proposed second arena at Bercy to stage wrestling and part of the basketball, will now it was announced in December 2017, be built at Porte de la Chappelle. After the Games it will provide a venue for the PSG handball and Paris basketball teams (*Vingt Minutes* 2017).



Figure 2.6 Stade Roland Garros.

The seven years before the Games take place constitutes a difficult task in media management and expectation management for the organizing committee. Usually there are two big stories that will not go away. The first is that the costs will escalate, and the second is that facilities will not be ready in time. Typically, the costs almost always do escalate, and the facilities are almost always ready in time. Paris-2024 currently estimate the cost of staging the Games at 6.6 billion euros (*Vingt Minutes* 2017b). The French economic minister, Benjamin Griveaux, a close ally of President Macron, has stressed that France must be vigilant, because public money is scarce, and invest wisely in an intelligent economic model



Figure 2.7 Stade Jean Bouin.

for the Olympic Games (RMC/BMFTV 2017). The French capital has to face a budget deficit in the seven years to come, and opponents of the Olympic Games fear an escalation of costs. The economic mechanism, which causes overspending, is the curse of winning, according to Vladimir Andreff, a sports economist at the Sorbonne. Andreff is one of three international experts who contributed to an impact study commissioned by the Paris Bidding Committee. The city that wins is the one that is the most optimistic, ready to bid higher right to the end, Andreff says. To attract the IOC, the candidate cities have a tendency to under-estimate some costs, as London 2012 did with security, and to over-estimate the economic returns. The explosive growth in costs at previous Olympic Games is one of the principal arguments of the opponents of the Paris Olympics. Bernard Lapasset, co-president of the Paris bidding committee, though, believes that the project is sheltered from financial excess because around 93 per cent of the venues already exist. There are only three major building projects: the Olympic village (the largest single investment at around 1.3 billion euros), the aquatics centre, and the media centre (*L'Ouest-France* 2017).

It is certainly true that Paris has only three major building projects, but they are large-scale construction projects which can be prone to escalation of costs. Consultant and expert on Olympism Armand de Rendinger argues that the final bill can easily be larger than the provisional budget. The exorbitant costs of the Games are always sliding out of control (Le Meneec 2017). In a major change of plan, it emerged in 2018 that, to guard



Figure 2.8 Palais Omnisport, Bercy, now renamed AccorHotels Arena.

against escalating costs, the aquatics centre would no longer involve a permanent 15,000-seat stadium, but instead, temporary seating, with the pools remaining, after the Games as a communal resource.

The one-hundredth anniversary of the Olympic Games in Paris is a historic symbol and it will be tempting to spend money marking this fact. Contrary to Los Angeles 2028, financed by the private sector, the Games of Paris will be largely supported by the state. After the splendour of Beijing 2008 (30 billion euros) and Sochi 2014 (45 billion euros), could we be passing into an era of more modest Games? *Le Journal du Dimanche* argues that in the future Games should be integrated into the political development of a country. Populations will no longer support the organization of the Games without long-term gain. Paris 2024 can show that with public power and without an explosion of costs, the Games can still have credibility. *Le Journal du Dimanche* asks if, to remain within budget, it is time to make the Games a little less ‘marvelous’ (Le Meneec 2017).

Poverty, spectacle, and regeneration

The city is now under pressure to prove it can deliver its promised new style of organizing the event: cheaper, greener, with no white-elephant building projects and able to change the



Figure 2.9 Five years till 2024, and Saint-Denis is Ready!

fortunes of local communities. The Mayor of Saint-Denis says the 2024 Games are a chance to shake off the town's bad image. Saint-Denis was promised sporting transformation 20 years ago when the Stade de France was built there for the 1998 men's football World Cup, but still has far higher rates of poverty and unemployment than the capital. Local politicians hope the Games bring back tourists who have stayed away after terrorist attacks and reconcile the thriving capital with its poorer, deprived northern suburbs (Chrisafis 2017). In a striking paradox, Saint-Denis is home to the Basilica de St Denis, where almost all the French monarchs were buried, in a strange non-church, in

the middle of a poor town, with a communist council! Politicians promise the pools of the aquatics centre will subsequently serve residents in an area where half of pre-teens do not know how to swim. The Olympic village will be turned into housing. France is keen to move on from its reputation for building ghetto housing estates and will allocate half to social housing and the rest to private sales. Some fear these developments may lead to gentrification (Chrisafis 2017).

In 2017 GW visited the area that will be the site of the Olympic village, a strange and nondescript place sandwiched between the Seine, as it loops back north towards Saint-Denis, and the northbound motorways, and the massive width of tracks servicing Gare du Nord. So you cannot easily go east or west. There is a large tract of land seemingly owned by EDF, with lots of power-related structures. A fair amount of building is going on, and it was difficult to find a way down to the bank of the Seine. Down one street, overgrown with weeds, there is an interesting derelict complex, with the remains of elegant walkways, bus shelters, and globe lights. It may have been a Seine-side sport complex – interesting how the dreams of the future are built on the decaying remnants of the broken dreams of the past. One road is called Rue Ampere and another road crossing it is Rue Volta, while just around the corner is Avenue James Watt. So there is a distinct sense of power in the air, while, one suspects, the local inhabitants have very little power.



Figure 2.10 Power in the air.



Figure 2.11 Broken dreams of the past?

Metro access between the village and the main Olympic sites in 2024 will be magically enhanced by the greatly expanded Saint-Denis Pleyel station, just 800m from the village (Paris Candidature File). This is due to the grandiose Grand Express Paris plan which involves several new metro lines and expansion of existing ones. These plans have developed over a decade, and one suspects subtle pressures have led to Saint-Denis Pleyel becoming a major hub with five lines. Yet at least one of these lines (Ligne 17) is not scheduled for completion until between 2025–2030.

A committee has been established by Saint-Denis citizens, to monitor progress and pressurize the organizing committee to keep their promises. The Comité de Vigilance JO 2024 à Saint-Denis (The Saint-Denis Vigilance Committee for the 2024 Olympic Games) does not oppose the Paris Olympic Games as such, but is concerned about the effects of hosting on the Saint-Denis neighbourhood and the broader Seine-Saint-Denis department, which is one of the poorest counties in France. The intention is to monitor progress and ensure housing, community, and environmental promises are kept. Opposition to the Games in Paris has, it seems fair to say, been somewhat muted. The Association NON Aux JO2024 à Paris (No to the 2024 Paris Olympics Association) is a collective of citizens opposed to the Games on the basis they will be a ‘fiscal, economic, and ecological disaster’. When Paris was bidding for the Olympics, the group launched a petition demanding the public be able to weigh in on the decision to host via a referendum.

Danielle Simonnet, a city councillor from Paris's twentieth arrondissement, who belongs to Jean-Luc Mélenchon's left-wing France Insoumise party, has been pushing for a referendum to let Parisians decide. NON aux JO 2024 à Paris, which has about 50 members, got 20,000 signatures on a petition calling for a referendum. The main complaint is the potential cost. Simonnet said that, 'Instead of improving transportation to low-income neighbourhoods, Paris will focus on creating a rapid link between the airport, the Olympic village and other large infrastructures.' Frederic Viale, of NON aux JO 2024 à Paris, said that the Games would be far from environmentally friendly, and criticized mayor Anne Hidalgo for abandoning her opposition to the Games since her election (*France 24* 2017).

Simonnet again called for a referendum in 2019, citing a survey by mobile phone company Orange, which suggested 62 per cent of Parisians favoured cancellation. The sample was only just over 6,000, with no protection against people voting more than once, and the organizers of Paris 2024 dismissed its validity, citing the latest official survey showing that 92 per cent of young people aged 15 to 25 were in favour of the Games being held there, and another survey suggesting 67 per cent of French people intended to follow the Games, either in stadia or in the media. Simonnet made the proposal as part of her La France Insoumise candidature in the following year's municipal elections and argued that the cancellation of Paris 2024 was an ecological necessity. Paris 2024 point to their sustainability strategy; the commitment to organize carbon-neutral Games, in accordance with the Paris Agreement, and the commitment to use 100 per cent renewable energy for the organization of the Games (Etchells 2019a).

In recent years legacy has moved from being largely an ideological gloss to justify the large costs of staging a Games, to a set of programmatic intentions, in which many social actors and stakeholders will be involved in developing policies, monitoring their progress and assessing their impact. For example, in 2019, discussions on how Paris can build a lasting legacy after the 2024 Paralympic Games were held during an event at the British Embassy in the French capital. The keynote speech was delivered by Lord Chris Holmes, Great Britain's most successful Paralympic swimmer, director of Paralympic Integration, responsible for the organization of the London 2012 Paralympics, and a member of the House of Lords since 2013. The Paris organizing committee established an endowment fund to help to finance legacy projects for the Olympics and Paralympics. The fund will seek donations from Olympic sponsors (Etchells 2019b).

Urban youth, breakdancing, and inclusion

Up to the time of this book going to press, one of the biggest stories has been the proposal to include breakdancing in the Olympic programme. As new sports (formerly called demonstration sports) Paris proposes to retain skateboarding, sport climbing, and surfing, which will all feature in Tokyo 2020, and, controversially, to add breakdancing, but reject baseball-softball, squash, and karate. These plans will not be officially confirmed until the IOC Executive Board meeting in December 2020, after the Tokyo Olympics.

International Federations representing sports rejected by Paris 2024 have reacted with disappointment and in a joint statement, the World Squash Federation and the Professional

Squash Association claimed the proposed list of four sports ‘leads to a belief that Paris 2024 and the IOC favoured sports already in the Olympic programme, leaving practically no opportunity for other sports’. The World Karate Federation (WKF) admitted it was ‘deeply saddened... We believed that we had met all the requirements... however, we have learned today that our dream will not be coming true.’ (Morgan 2019)

Squash has been seeking inclusion ever since its worldwide boom in the 1970s and 1980s, but was rejected for London 2012, Rio 2016, and Tokyo 2020, and may well now have missed its moment. Other sports campaigning for inclusion include snooker, chess, and the electric motorcycling format Trial-E (Pavitt 2019). After baseball-softball was rejected, WBSC President Riccardo Fraccari requested a meeting with IOC president Thomas Bach. Baseball was included for Barcelona 1992 and softball at Atlanta 1996; both were dropped after Beijing 2008, but included again for Tokyo 2020. It seems highly likely that baseball-softball will be included for Los Angeles 2028, with the baseball final held at Dodger Stadium (MacKay 2019a).

The proposal to include breakdancing, promoted by the French Dance Sport Federation, triggered a row about who represents the sport. The World Dance Sport Federation (WDSF) is the recognized body, which enabled the inclusion of breakdancing at the World Youth Games of 2018, but Erwin Mahroug, president of breakdancing media company bboyworld, claims that, despite having 5 million subscribers, they have not been consulted, and that the breakdance community has not been involved in attempts to include it. There were similar disputes, over who represented skateboarding in the campaign for its inclusion in Tokyo 2020, between the International Roller Sports Federation (FIRS), the International Skateboarding Federation (ISF), and the World Skateboarding Federation. FIRS and ISF later merged to form World Skate, who will supervise the sport’s debut at Tokyo 2020 (Pavitt 2019).

The inclusion of these new sports, seemingly driven by a need to recruit the young, who may not be interested in many of the ‘traditional’ Olympic sports, had been broadly well received. Iain Borden, Professor of Architecture and Urban Culture, at UCL UK, mounted an impassioned eulogy for skateboarding, arguing that skateboarding defies the logic of the city, by making it a playground for all. Professor Borden argues that our dominant work ethic should be accompanied by an equivalent ‘play ethic’, and that skateboarding suggests that our lives and cities should be full of mobility, pleasure, and joy – and not just of sedentary labour and earnest endeavour. The result is, or should be, a city not of passive shopping malls but of vibrant bodily life. He proposes a pleasure ground carved out of the city, as a continuous reaffirmation of one of the central slogans of the 1968 strikes and student protests in Paris: that ‘sous les pavés, la plage’ (beneath the pavement, the beach) (Borden 2019). Borden lets his rhetoric run away a bit here – a beach is no place to skateboard, while pavements are ideal. His claims to the universal inclusiveness of the skateboard community (‘for everyone, everywhere’) are a little spurious too – figures typically suggest over 70 per cent are male and around 80 per cent are under 18.

In the UK Karam Singh, who at age 10 was the youngest breaker to perform at the World Championships and winner of the 2018 Street Dance World Cup in China, welcomes the proposed addition of breakdancing, saying, ‘To represent my country at that level would be incredible, it would be a dream come true.’ Olympic inclusion will attract sponsorship,

enabling commercial growth. Paco Boxy, the director of the British Breaking League, believes the Olympics would bring ‘credibility’ to the sport, and says, ‘Breakdancing being an Olympic sport and allowing someone to say they are from Team GB gives them a name and a platform, allowing people to take them more seriously...From there, the opportunities and sponsorship would come naturally’ (Falkingham 2019).

Paris 2024 officials said a total of 248 athletes would compete in the four extra sports proposed by organizers. This number would be included in the 10,500-limit outlined by the IOC. (For Tokyo, the 474 new athletes in the five new sports will not be included in the overall total.) Paris 2024 has proposed a men’s and women’s breakdancing event at the Games, with 16 competitors in each. Skateboarding will have four events and 96 athletes split equally between men and women. The same amount of events have been put forward for sport climbing, with 36 women and 36 men. Breakdancing will feature head-to-head ‘battles’ in a similar format to the 2018 Summer Youth Olympic Games in Buenos Aires. The success at Buenos Aires 2018 is thought to have been one of the main reasons behind its inclusion at Paris 2024. French organizers claim breakdancing was an ‘obvious choice’ for inclusion given France has the second-highest number of participants in the discipline behind the United States (Morgan 2019a).

The Conversation (22/2/19) offered strong support for the choice of breakdancing. The Stade de France, the aquatics centre, the village, and the media centre are all in or close to Seine-Saint-Denis, a part of Paris’s suburban fringe, said to be the birthplace of hip hop in France. Including breakdancing would not just be a big moment for urban culture worldwide, but important for French culture in the capital too. Hip hop culture is big in France overall – the French market is second only to that of the USA. And since the 1980s, breakdancing, rap music, and graffiti have been particularly popular in the often-impooverished ‘banlieues’ outside many major French cities (Ervine 2019). However, French politicians have often been suspicious of breakdancing. Within some French rap music, there is a strong critique of French politicians and the police. Professor Dayna Oscherwitz has argued that hip hop culture has become the dominant vehicle for urban youth from the banlieues to articulate their vision of the world. She says that it allows them to describe the reality of life in the banlieues, and to highlight the problems they face (Ervine 2019).

The choice of sports fits in with a long drift whereby emergent cultural elements, particularly associated with young participants – those that have variously been dubbed lifestyle sports, adventure sports, activity sports, extreme sports (see Thorpe and Wheaton 2011) are gradually being incorporated. Conversely, some sports with a much longer history, established participant and spectator bases, such as squash and karate are being declined. In the process, the IOC are still not able to grasp the issue of size and reduce the programme – they remain very reluctant to remove established sports like boxing, shooting, and modern pentathlon. Clearly some sports seeking inclusion are pushing at the boundaries of what constitutes sport. There is no neat taxonomic definition that will resolve this philosophical conundrum. Definitions of sport vary from country to country (note that Russia excludes ‘cricket’ from a list of sports), and have changed over the years – activities such as bear-baiting and cock-fighting are no longer accepted as sport in most countries; field sports like hunting, shooting, and fishing are marginal to the concept of sport in most modern societies. In the end definitions, as the work of Foucault

(1975, 1977) demonstrates, are made by the practices of those institutions with the power to ensure their definitions dominate. So if television or the Olympic movement decrees an activity such as shooting, snooker, or pro wrestling comes within the category of sport, well then, it does.

Prior to London 2012, sports activist Mark Perryman argued that the Olympics can, and should, become more inclusive. Crucially, Perryman argued that the Olympics would be more successful if more events were free for spectators to attend. He cited the Tour de France as an example of a highly profitable major sporting event that is free for spectators. Perryman also argued that the Olympics should favour sports which are accessible to participants because they do not require expensive equipment. This last point provides a good argument for the inclusion of breakdancing. No specialist equipment or professional training is necessarily needed to begin breakdancing (Ervine 2019).

However, it is important to add a note of caution. If Olympic breakdancing is to successfully engage young people from Paris's banlieues, this will partially depend on them being able to buy tickets. The distribution and pricing of tickets for some Olympic events attracted criticism at Rio 2016 and London 2012. Empty seats were visible at several venues, notably due to tickets remaining unsold or being given to sponsors who did not use them. On one hand, the symbolic importance of including breakdancing in the Paris 2024 Games should perhaps not be overstated. However, this one event could help anchor the Games within the areas in which many venues will be located, as well as re-energize the Olympic movement for a young, urban audience both in France and worldwide (Ervine 2019).

Paris 2024 will also open the Olympic experience up to the general public, allowing them to compete in events on the same course and in the same conditions as the Olympic athletes. For example, members of the public will be able to run the marathon course on the same day as the elite event. Organizers have also proposed a series of 'virtual and connected' events that would allow the public to become further involved. According to a French Institute of Public Opinion survey, 79 per cent of French people have a positive opinion of the four proposed sports, which increases to 89 per cent among 15 to 25-year-olds (Gillen 2019).

Nation, religion, gender, and the hijab

The inclusion agenda of Paris 2024 contrasts with France's troubled relation with multiculturalism, which has condensed on to highly visible symbols like head covering. The classic Hermès headscarves, launched in 1937, became a French style icon during the 1950s, but in the 2000s head covering became a focus for Islamophobic campaigns on the far right. In secular France, civil servants cannot now wear hair-covering veils during working hours and face-covering veils are banned for everybody in public spaces. In 2016, several French seaside towns banned the body-covering burkini swimsuit worn by some Muslim women, arguing that the garment – which leaves only the face, hands, and feet exposed – defied French laws on secularism and was causing public unrest. There are growing signs of opposition among some French groups, in the build-up to the Games, to the hijab and other items of Islamic clothing. French group, the International League

for Women's Rights (ILWR), which claims to be feminist, called on Paris 2024 to ban the hijab and other forms of Muslim clothing. ILWR founder Annie Sugier called for Islamic nations to be prevented from forcing female athletes to cover their entire bodies during competition as it is, she asserted, against the Olympic Charter.

French sports chain store Decathlon had introduced a 'hijab de running' – a nylon hood designed to allow Muslim women to cover their hair while exercising. The decision by Decathlon to stock the item provoked an angry debate in which social media criticism, arguing that the item represented a violation of French secularism, forced the sports retailer to suspend sales. Politicians from both the right and the left sharply criticized Decathlon for selling the sports hijab. 'Decathlon disowns the values of our civilization on the altar of market and communitarianism marketing,' Lydia Guirous, an Algerian-born spokeswoman of the conservative Les Republicains party, said on her Twitter feed. Budget minister Gerald Darmanin of President Emmanuel Macron's centrist government spoke out against the hijab. In response, though, French Justice Minister Nicole Belloubet confirmed there were no legal objections to stores selling the running hijab and regretted that the debate had become hysterical (MacKay 2019b).

It is certainly the case that the issue is complex, producing divisions amongst socialists, feminists, and conservatives. It is clear, though, that the restrictions are against the direction of travel in international sport. Female sportswomen are increasingly competing in hijabs. American-born and raised Sarah Attar ran in the 2012 Olympic Games in London with her hair covered. At Rio 2016, fencer Ibtihaj Muhammad became the first Muslim American woman to wear a hijab while winning a fencing bronze medal for the USA. The International Boxing Association has now allowed female boxers to compete in international competitions while keeping their heads covered (MacKay 2019b). In 2017, after a long campaign around the highly publicized case of Bilqis Abdul-Qaadir, FIBA, the basketball governing body, announced it would no longer ban the hijab. So, given the hostility to the veil and even the headscarf in some sectors of French society, it would not be surprising if this issue resurfaces again between now and 2024.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

France is currently a troubled society; the gilets jaunes (yellow jackets) being a prominent symptom. The gilets jaunes are a diffuse and loose knit group, with a range of discontents, who have avoided the clarity of leadership, while resorting to a variety of forms of direct action. They voice similar anger and anti-elitism as have surfaced around the rise of Trump in the USA, and the issue of Brexit in the UK. The left is fragmented, the right not strong enough to gain a decisive foothold, and President Macron, facing an election in 2022, is currently unpopular. The continuing stress on an integrationist approach to ethnic and religious minorities has made it hard for France to cope with its multicultural urban populations. Youth unemployment is high, especially among African and North African communities. Islamophobia is manifest. Poverty, racism, exclusion, and disadvantage has in the past provided a seedbed for terrorist plots to germinate. Can the run up to the Games act as a mood-changer? France is still a strongly corporatist country,

with powerful unions and significant worker protection principles – but all this is under assault from neo-liberals, populists, and the authoritarian nationalist right. Who will capture the 2024 Games to their narrative?

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CHAPTER 3

LOS ANGELES AND THE OLYMPICS

1932–1984–2028

INTRODUCTION

A line from the film *Chinatown* catches the paradoxical nature of Los Angeles constantly caught between the sunshine and the noir: ‘Middle of a drought, and the water commissioner drowns. Only in LA!’ (*Chinatown* USA 1974). No city has bid to stage the Olympics more often (nine times). Los Angeles will be staging the Games for the third time in 2028. Detroit, the next most frequent bidder (seven), has yet to be awarded a Games. This is not because Los Angeles is an especially passionate sporting city, but rather because its elite citizens have established a long tradition of being enthusiastic promoters of the city. Bidding for an Olympic Games always involves power brokers and city boosters; often in alliance with architects, builders, town planners, property developers, sport developers, and politicians with their own agendas. In a city like Los Angeles, still small in 1900, and then growing rapidly, in the context of a capitalist system, with a relatively weak public sector, boosters and power brokers have been central to development. Los Angeles, as a combination of conservatism and free market enterprise, was never likely to have a vibrant public sector, although recent city governance has instigated some productive developments, especially in urban transport.

The creation of Los Angeles involved a series of power struggles over the land, the water, the media, the oil, transport, and military hardware production. In its growth, the city became central to global entertainment, through Hollywood and the record industry. All these sectors are enmeshed. Los Angeles is big, complex, and sprawling. LA is currently the largest of 88 cities in Los Angeles County and greater Los Angeles covers 160 cities and parts of four other counties. It is hard to generalize – almost any statement can be challenged. If London (and the UK) knows how to do pomp and circumstance and stage royal pageants, Hollywood certainly knows how to put on a spectacular show, as the one hundred grand pianos featured in the opening ceremony for the 1984 Olympics testified.

For non-LA residents the city is, more than most cities, a construction of signs; it exists in representation more vividly than it exists on the ground. Even the usual iconic representation of a city, is in the case of Los Angeles and the Hollywood Sign, precisely that – a sign. Not only that but its referent is the factory of dreams – the primary generator of globally circulated imagery. So it is no wonder that it is a city hard to get into focus. Its history comes to us in traces through films like *Chinatown*, *Singing in the Rain*,

Sunset Boulevard, *LA Confidential*, *Roger Rabbit*, *The Long Goodbye*, and many others. And these films are mostly made, of course, in Hollywood. It is worth noting here that the supposedly iconic tall palm trees, that are characteristic elements of images of Hollywood, are not indigenous to the area, but were introduced into LA precisely as set dressing for the 1932 Olympic Games.

It is an area that has been populated by the displaced and rootless. Architect Frank Lloyd Wright, who said, ‘Tip the world over on its side and everything loose will land in Los Angeles,’ claimed to be referring to the city’s ability to absorb people and influences (Breese 2007). However his remark also catches the transient, drifting, and insecure character of a city to which people gravitate with dreams of stardom. Composer and musician Oscar Levant once said, ‘Behind the phony tinsel of Hollywood lies the real tinsel.’ (Ziff 2013). One famous quote ‘there is no there there’, often thought to be about Los Angeles, is actually Gertrude Stein’s reflection about her childhood home in Oakland (Stein 1937). The error is understandable, as the quote seems to catch the decentred character of Los Angeles. Land was dry, cheap, and, without irrigation, not good for much (except as it transpired, oil extraction), so, rather than grow up, like New York, Los Angeles grew outward until its suburbs and satellite cities spread for over 50 miles.

Hunter S. Thompson (1967: 162–165) wrote of the way in which drifters, uprooted characters, like Dove Linkhorn, in Nelson Algren’s novel *A Walk on the Wild Side* (1956), would often end up in LA. Los Angeles is the end of the road west: the long colonization of native America by colonizing Europeans ends at the ocean, and the ‘bloody red sun of fantastic LA’, as Jim Morrison of The Doors described it on the album *Morrison Hotel*. The unsettled provisional quality of LA is caught elegantly in Gavin Lambert’s *The Slide Area*, the title of which is derived from the area of hills between Santa Monica and Malibu, prone to regular land-slips; and also in Nathaniel West’s *The Day of the Locust*. Writing about Los Angeles, from Raymond Chandler to James Ellroy, is full of rootless and disconnected characters, not fully embedded in their social world.

In representations of Los Angeles the light and the dark struggle for pre-eminence. This is the city of sun, surfing, beach boys, and California girls, but also of film noir, scandal, corruption, and murder mysteries. In non-fiction accounts, Reyner Banham’s positive celebration (Banham 1973) contrasts with Mike Davis’s (2006) forensic dissection of its grim character. Sullivan (2016) argues that both are wrong. For most of its existence, light and dark appear locked together in a yin yang relation, both always present.

By 1908 when both London and Paris had staged the Games and had populations of 8 million and 4 million respectively, LA was still a relatively small city with around 250,000, up from 100,000 in 1900. In 1920, Los Angeles was still only the tenth largest American city and hardly qualified as a cosmopolitan international locale (Riess 1981: 53). Even by 1932 it was only just over 1 million. From this point, however, it became the major growth region in the USA, reaching 13 million by 2010. Indeed it had long since outgrown the old city boundaries and by 2015, the greater Los Angeles area had a population of over 18 million. Comparison of such statistics poses considerable problems as to the definitions of city, metropolitan area, and region, all of which change over time and vary from city to city

Population growth puts pressure on infrastructure. The opening of the Los Angeles Aqueduct in 1913 guaranteed a water supply, but forced local towns and settlements to become incorporated into Los Angeles, a story that forms part of the narrative of the film *Chinatown* (1974). One such town, Hollywood, became part of Los Angeles, and by the 1920s, over 80 per cent of global film making happened in LA. Crime writer Raymond Chandler utilized his detective Philip Marlowe to voice a nostalgia for the past:

I used to like this town...A long time ago. There were trees along Wilshire Boulevard. Beverley Hills was a country town, Westwood was bare hills and lots offering at eleven hundred dollars and no takers. Hollywood was a bunch of frame houses on the interurban line.

(Chandler (1955: 140))

Images of LA freeways are so ubiquitous, but in the early twentieth century, it had a very good public transport system, based on electric streetcars, interurban trains, and buses, and by the 1920s had the largest electric railway system in the world. Between 1903 and 1910, Los Angelenos depended upon the LAIU. However the system was past its peak and in the period that the idea of staging the Olympic Games was being hatched, plans were underway for the network of freeways that eventually got built in the 1940s and 50s (ERHA undated). The interurban line became a casualty of the rapid growth of freeways and car ownership, a story element of *Who Framed Roger Rabbit* (1988). For the world beyond Southern California, Hollywood was the public face of Los Angeles, and just three years before the hosting of the 1932 Los Angeles Olympic Games, the introduction of sound catapulted Hollywood cinema up to a whole new level of spectacle, later beautifully parodied in the musical *Singing in the Rain* (1952).

1932: CITY BOOSTERS TRIUMPHANT

The idea of hosting the Olympic Games emerged gradually, amongst a group of city boosters whose main concern was the funding and construction of a large stadium, which, as the LA Memorial Coliseum, was, as things turned out, to be the centre piece of the 1932, 1984, and 2028 Games. As an instance of legacy usage, this is by far the greatest single success of the Olympic Games. By contrast, by the time the London bid to stage the 2012 Olympic Games was being planned in 2003, neither of the two previous stadia existed, White City having been demolished in 1985, and Wembley having just being knocked down prior to the building of a new stadium on the same site.

The local power elite in Los Angeles were typically WASPS (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants), linked by shared ownership in major local institutions such as banks and the press, and families were also often linked by marriage. After the First World War, a group within this elite decided to use sport to boost the city's reputation, and hence promote tourism, commerce, and migration. The proposed stadium was central to their plan (Riess 1981: 50). The major figures were Harry Chandler and William May Garland. Chandler, the publisher of the *Los Angeles Times* was, at the time of his death in 1944, worth \$200 million. As a press baron, he had considerable influence in the selection of public officials. The value of his extensive real estate holdings was likely to benefit from further growth

in LA (Riess 1981: 51). William Garland was a real estate developer (Barney 1996: 149). In 1918, the publishers, of the *Times*, the *Evening Express*, the *Herald*, the *Examiner*, and the *Record* had agreed to work together on boosting Los Angeles. In 1919 the Mayor set up an association of one hundred leading citizens which, slimmed down to 22, became the Community Development Association (CDA) (Riess 1981: 51).

At the first meeting it was proposed that LA should apply to stage an Olympic Games, but the board members did not understand the necessary process or appropriate protocol (Riess 1981: 52–53). They had to spend some years learning and negotiating, but their sports-led focus in turn led to the building of the Coliseum (Riess 1981: 56). The IOC awarded 1924 to Paris and 1928 to Amsterdam but Garland kept in touch with Coubertin, politely but persistently pressing the LA claim. These developments took place during a period when the Federal Government was utilizing sport to promote American culture as a way of advancing the interests of American commerce. The iconic Johnny Weismuller, a gold medal winner in the Paris Olympics of 1924, suited their purpose. Weismuller, in progressing from a multiple swimming medal winner, to being the model for BVD swimwear, and onward into the movies as Tarzan, was the prototype for subsequent sporting celebrities such as Michael Jordan (Dyreson 2008).

While the long-term goal of the CDA was to secure an Olympic festival, the immediate priority was a stadium for athletic meets, conventions, festivals, football games, and the anticipated Olympics. Municipally operated stadia in America were rare. The only one of any consequence built before 1920 had been constructed in San Diego in 1914. In November 1919, the executive board of the CDA announced that a stadium seating about 75,000 was essential for Los Angeles (Riess 1981: 53–54). The site, Exposition Park, was close to the University of Southern California, the leading athletic power in the region. It had close ties to the local power elite who sent their children to USC for their education. When the Coliseum was finished in 1923 it was the most expensive sports facility in the country apart from the privately financed Yankee Stadium and was the largest sports arena in the United States. The main criticisms came from the Municipal League, a good governance watchdog, which complained about private control of a publicly financed facility. The League, mostly middle-class WASPS, had campaigned for civil service reform since 1900 (Riess 1981: 56). However, the CDA was given nearly complete control over what was in reality a public facility. The city and county were each paying for the privilege of using the Coliseum for 15 days in alternate months. USC football completely dominated the use of the Coliseum in the 1920s. Control over the Coliseum was scheduled to pass from the CDA to the city and county in 1931, but this was eventually extended until after the Games (Riess 1981: 57–62).

Staging the Games

In November 1924, Calvin Coolidge had won the US presidential election, and Garland had reported to Coubertin that the Republican victory represented ‘the conservative safe and sane element of our citizenship’ (Barney 1996: 152). However, just five years later came the 1929 Wall Street Crash, after which things became more difficult for the LAOC. In Sacramento, protesters waved banners with slogans like: Groceries Not Olympic

Games! Olympics Are Outrageous! One critic in *The Crisis* commented that, ‘12m of us have no jobs and we’re holding Olympic games at Los Angeles.’ (Dyreson 1995: 29). When 1932 arrived, wary of association with the costs of staging the Games, in the wake of the Wall Street Crash, President Hoover said he was unable to attend the opening ceremony, and sent Vice President Charles Curtis instead (Barney 1996: 156).

With the 1932 Games, Los Angeles instigated an approach central to their subsequent hosting of the 1984 and 2028 Games – use existing facilities as much as possible. Even where, as with rowing and swimming, new facilities had to be constructed, the organizing committee were shrewd in minimizing expenses. In the case of the new swimming stadium, the committee calculated the cost of a temporary facility and offered to donate this sum to the City of Los Angeles if they would build a permanent swimming pool with all necessary facilities for international competitions, such as dressing rooms, official and press headquarters, and seating for 10,000. In the case of rowing, after some difficulty in finding an adequate body of water, a lagoon at Long Beach was chosen, which needed to be lengthened by 500m. The organizing committee persuaded the City of Long Beach to provide this, in exchange for which the committee, charged with building spectator facilities, undertook to make them permanent, so that the City of Long Beach would gain a long-term benefit (Olympic Games Organizing Committee 1933).

The LA Olympics featured many innovations that have since become standard. For the first time, winners received their medals in a ceremony at the now-familiar victory podium. The 1932 Olympics used electric photo-timing devices as back-ups to hand-timing. Although female athletes stayed in Los Angeles’s Chapman Park Hotel, all of the male competitors stayed in the 321-acre ‘Olympic village’, which had more than 500 bungalows, 40 kitchens, a hospital, and a post office. Overlooking the entire spectacle was the first Olympic torch, which burned above the Coliseum (Welky 1997: 27).

Dyreson (1995: 23) says the Games marked a watershed in American self-definition through sport. The Olympics served as a nexus for producing cultural images and myths. Far from the realities of the Great Depression lay a magical landscape where a special village was under construction. *New York Times* reporter Duncan Aikman discovered the village perched on the hills ‘overshadowing the vast motion picture factories of Culver City’. This magical kingdom existed far enough from Los Angeles’ ‘business centre’ that the disaster of America’s economic slump could not tarnish it (Dyreson 1995: 23–24).

White argues that the Olympic village played a key role in the Olympic-based promotion of Los Angeles. The mission of the CDA, White says, was to ‘apply their energies and creativity towards the making of a metropolis on par with the great cities back east’ (White 2002: 82). The village had four functions. First to persuade national Olympic committees that the long trip to Los Angeles would be economically viable. Second to manifest fair play and harmony; third to stimulate local interest in the Games, and fourth to generate interest in the United States in LA as a tourist destination (White 2002: 79).

‘For once in a lifetime you and your children can see the Olympic Games in a 2 week vacation or less,’ trumpeted an advertisement for the ‘Red, White and Blue Dealers’ of Standard Stations, Inc. ‘Last time in the US for 50 years!’ warned the commercial (Dyreson 1995: 26). This 50-year guesstimate was, as it turned out, an uncannily accurate

<i>Olympic City</i>	<i>Year as Host</i>	<i>Next Year as Host</i>	<i>Gap in Years</i>
Athens	1896	2004	108
Paris	1900	1924	24
Paris	1924	2024	100
London	1908	1948	40
London	1948	2012	64
Los Angeles	1932	1984	52
Los Angeles	1984	2028	44
Tokyo	1964	2020	56

Table 3.1 Gap in years between hosting for selected Olympic cities

prediction. Other gaps between Games in the case of multiple Games hosts vary between 24 years (Paris 1900 and 1924) and 108 years (Athens 1896 and 2004).

In 1929 California voters approved a \$1,000,000 bond issue for construction of Olympic facilities, hoping profits from the Games would increase public funds. *Every Week Magazine* reported that the total cost of the Games would exceed \$2,000,000. The Olympic village cost \$500,000. The Los Angeles Coliseum, built in 1924 for \$800,000, had received a \$900,000 face-lift which would allow it to seat 125,000 spectators for ‘the greatest show on earth’. The city-built Olympic auditorium cost \$500,000, a marine stadium in Alamitos Bay cost \$250,000, as did the swimming stadium, and an equestrian site at the Riviera Country Club near Santa Monica (Dyreson 1995: 30).

The Games were regarded as enormously successful. New records were established in 19 of 22 track and field events, and the Games actually made a profit of approximately \$150,000, most of which was used to pay a debt on the \$1 million bond loan, from the state of California, and to make partial reimbursement to the city and county (Barney 1996: 156). The 1984 Olympic Games is often portrayed as the commercialized one, but sponsorship itself was nothing new. Pep Bran Flakes from Kellogg’s, Weiss Binoculars, Safeway, and many other products and corporations launched major Olympic campaigns. Piggly Wiggly offered Olympic emblems for 50 cents each, which they boasted were ‘sold at no profit to us’, in order to underwrite the United States Olympic team (Dyreson 1995: 27). In New York governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared a ‘national boys’ week and Olympic week’ in order to stimulate enthusiasm, and to produce future Olympians. He declared that: ‘In no better way can we emphasize our expectations that they always conduct themselves as men and maintain the traditional American valuation of sportsmanship and fair play’ (Dyreson 1995: 27).

The 1932 Olympics were extensively broadcast, and the power of the press created a global audience. More than 900 reporters attended the Games. Correspondents wired more than 4 million words from the Coliseum office alone. Hundreds of ultra-modern teletype machines printed results from every venue within seconds. Despite this global exposure, the many Olympic traditions that began in Los Angeles, and the incredible feats of athleticism that took place, the 1932 Olympics have been rather neglected by historians (Welky 1997: 28). Press hyperbole surrounding the Games was greater than previous Olympics. A local gossip columnist reported that three Olympic gala balls had been planned and revealed that many socialites would be returning from California’s

beaches and mountains to help with the festivities. Gender and racial stereotypes were in play. Despite Babe Didrickson's athletics medals, press accounts always reassured the public that her talents were more than merely muscular, praising her feminine qualities and her cooking and sewing skills. African-American competitors were often referred to in the press as America's 'dusky' Olympians' or the 'sable cyclones'. Tolan, Metcalfe, and others were congratulated for their 'quiet, polite demeanor'. Will Rogers made fun of these stereotypes, commenting that 'every winner is either an American Negro or an American white woman.' He mused: 'Wait till we get to golf, bridge or cocktail shaking, then the American white man will come into his own' (Dyreson 1995: 32–40).

China participated for the first time. Dr C.T. Wang of China had become an IOC member in 1922, but China did not send any participants to 1924 or 1928. However, as Japan had invaded China and attempted to set up Manchuria as a separate state, it was believed that they would seek to establish Manchuria by sending competitors on its behalf. So China sent one competitor, Liu Cheng-Chen. Encouraged by this, they sent a large team to Berlin in 1936 (Hsu 1995: 374–375). The earliest roots of the Beijing Olympic Games, with its symbolic ushering of China onto the world stage, lay in the Chinese experience of LA 1932.

Japan's interest in the Olympics had grown in proportion to its militarization. In 1930, of the 140,000 Japanese in the USA, 70 per cent were in California, and 35,000 lived in the LA area. The USA regarded Imperial Japan as a military threat. The Japanese American community in LA were 'swept up by fervent nationalism' and 'earnestly supported Japan'. Asians living in the USA were excluded by legislation from 'citizenship' (Yamamoto 2000:402–404). The Japanese team were praised by Mayor Porter for their high standard of sportsmanship. At the docks 10,000 Japanese-Americans saw their compatriots off with shouts of 'see you in 1940' since Tokyo had been selected as the site of the Games of the Twelfth Olympiad (Dyreson 1995: 36–37; see Chapter 1 for more details). But the Japanese also took some unpleasant memories home with them. According to an editorial in the *Japan Times*, when Japanese Olympians tried to enter dance halls or first-class restaurants they were met at the door with assertions of 'Mexicans are not admitted.' When they protested that they were Japanese it simply made matters worse. The newspaper lamented that the Japanese athletes were gravely distressed by American bigotry and that the 'matter of racial prejudice is perhaps the profoundest impression carried in the hearts of the Japanese team' (Dyreson 1995: 37).

In the eyes of much of the public America's Olympians, of all races and genders, had once again proved that their nation was specially blessed. The Los Angeles Games had been a financial success and a grand spectacle. Hollywood itself could not have produced a better version of the Tenth Olympics. The Games also gave a major impetus to the growth of Olympism. The American press coverage of the Games was filled with references to the friendship between nations that the Olympics produced. The Olympics appeared the most essential institution ever created for promoting world peace (Dyreson 1995: 41).

US-Japanese relations provide a stark illustration of the illusions of brotherhood and the idea that Olympism can build understanding between nations and help prevent wars. Dr T. Yamamoto, the Waseda University professor in charge of the Japanese track and field team, insisted that 'in sport the man is naked. His real character comes out, in victory and defeat. We get a clear picture of each other. We are face to face. We become

truly friends in battle. There is brotherhood in this.’ Yamamoto announced that because of the competition at Los Angeles ‘our Japanese men know your men now. We admire them. Japan is now closer to you...we do not care what statesman say: we know you now’ (Dyreson 1995: 41). This was just a decade before Pearl Harbour and the mass internment of Japanese-Americans. ‘That’s how groovy we were, we locked them all up,’ as comedian Murray Roman commented drily in his 1960s record, *You Can’t Beat People Up and Have Them Say I Love You*.

Similarly Dr John Snape told his congregation at Temple Baptist Church in Los Angeles on the day the Olympics ended:

The hands extended had in them not bayonets but the proffer of a linked fraternity pledged to noble ends...The Olympiad has left a residuum of good will that will make it difficult for forty-eight nations ever again to engage in war.

Not only did the Olympics make the world a safer place, believed the *Christian Science Monitor*, but ‘it is quite possible there may be a connection between this movement and the wider acceptance of democratic government in recent years’. Avery Brundage (IOC president 1952–1972) proclaimed that ‘amateur sport with its shining ideals of friendly courtesy and fair play stands firm and the Olympic torch lights the way to mutual respect and understanding and international good will’ (Dyreson 1995: 41–43).

American Olympic chroniclers preached to a choir which in the main believed that they were the ‘good guys’ and that the rest of the world was governed by social systems which produced some not quite so ‘good guys’ and some ‘bad guys’. The national identity marketed by the Los Angeles Olympics fueled patriotic visions of providential superiority. It also confirmed the idea that sport, particularly Olympic sport, provided a crucible in which to cast a world-beating citizenry to people the American republic. The triumph of nationalism in American ideas about the Olympics would have important consequences at the next Olympic celebration, scheduled to be held in 1936 in Germany (Dyreson 1995: 43). Just seven years after the Los Angeles Games and these noble sentiments, Germany, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy were at war, a global conflict that soon involved Japan and the USA.

William Garland, president of the Olympic organizing committee, credited the entire nation for making the Tenth Olympic Games a success. ‘Without boasting and without fear of criticism I feel that I can say that the games were the finest ever held,’ proclaimed Garland. *New York Times* correspondent Chapin Hall labelled the Games the ‘flop that failed’. Californians had forgotten local and state politics and even the ‘alleged depression’ when Olympic fever overtook them, reported Hall. Newspapers estimated more than 1,000,000 people had attended the Games generating \$2,000,000 in gate receipts (Dyreson 1995: 35–36). The sun was shining in happy valley.

1984: THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL SPONSORSHIPS

The USA emerged from the Second World War as the dominant economic power, with its political ascendancy only challenged by the much weaker Soviet Union. Los Angeles had

benefited enormously from the war economy, with hundreds of ships being built, and six of the country's major aircraft manufacturers based in the area. For the next 45 years international geopolitics was dominated by the Cold War, which was reaching a new intensity in the five-year period culminating in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. The dark fears of the 1950s were presaged by the golden age of film noir, exemplified by Hollywood classics such as *Double Indemnity* (1944), *The Big Sleep* (1946), and *In a Lonely Place* (1950). Evelyn Waugh cast a mordant eye over the city in *The Loved One* (1948). New freeways generated new suburbs and the demise of the city's rail system. By the 1960s, when the sprawling car-oriented city was well established, and the urban dream had begun to sour somewhat, *Rowan and Martin's Laugh In* developed the catch phrase 'beautiful downtown Burbank' to refer, with heavy irony, to the location of their studio.

Against the darkness of crime and corruption, here comes the sun: in the late 1950s a sunshine culture gained national traction, centring upon surfing and surf music – culminating in the rise of The Beach Boys, the band who both represented the cult of surfing and transcended it. The west coast had the sunshine and the girls all got so tanned.

Tom Wolfe (1966) celebrated the brash decorative culture which featured elaborately decorated cars, surf boards and vans in a style which, once adopted by more mainstream artists, became known as hyper-realism. Director Robert Altman managed to make a sunlit film noir in *The Long Goodbye* (1973) based on the Raymond Chandler novel. The architect Reyner Banham composed a television love letter, *Reyner Banham Loves Los Angeles* (1972), and a book, *Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies* (1973), that celebrated the streamlined and the ephemeral, and gloried in over-the-top architectural flourishes such as The Brown Derby restaurant. Far from the beach, the black community in Watts rioted in response to the everyday racism and their treatment as second-class citizens. The 1960s Watts riots resulted in 34 deaths and over 1,000 injuries. The celebrity culture of LA was rocked by the brutal murders committed by followers of Charles Manson in 1969, the same year that Los Angeles became the birthplace of the Internet, as the first ARPANET transmission was sent. Los Angeles is where the sun sets and the dystopian future of *Blade Runner* (1982) starts.

Critical scholars have identified LA84 as a key turning point introducing a new more commercialized era, although, as we suggest above, the 1932 Games were also thoroughly commercial. The powerful myth of American capitalism – crass and commercial, meant that LA84 was always likely to be taken up as an exemplar of commercialization and thus it became dubbed by journalists the 'hamburger Olympics'. Gruneau and Neubauer (2012) place this in the context of the undermining of Keynesianism and rise of neo-liberalism in the 70s and so LA84 is also the neo-liberal Games – heavily referenced by Reagan in his 1984 election campaign. The growing commercialization of sport in the television era prompted critical interventions (Hoch 1972; Vinnai 1973; Brohm 1978; Whannel 1983; Tomlinson and Whannel 1984). These critical views began to become part of public discussion on the Olympic movement.

In 1978 the Games had been provisionally awarded to LA. The bid was a joint one from SCCOG (Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games), attorney John Argue, Mayor Tom Bradley, the City of Los Angeles, and private financial backers. The city voted

not to cover any losses and so there had to be a private organizing committee, which the IOC only agreed to because, once Teheran withdrew, in the build-up to the 1979 Iranian revolution, Los Angeles was the only candidate. The Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) appointed Peter Ueberroth to keep control of costs. His key strategy was to limit costs, and maximize revenue (Llewellyn *et al.* 2015).

It was certainly true that the Games were the most profitable to date, if they were also provocative and polarizing. They generated a \$232 million surplus (Llewellyn *et al.* 2015). The IOC dislikes the word profit, although since the 1980s they have been remarkably effective in generating and retaining ‘profits’. Ueberroth ran the committee and the organization very strictly, involving long hours, alleged bullying, and rigorous cost control, with a great degree of centralization and micro management. As it turned out the Los Angeles Olympics made a large profit (Reich 1986). Revenues of \$768 million came mainly from television rights, commercial sponsorship, and ticket sales. More cities began bidding for future Games (Zarnowski 1992: 25). So the LA Games are often proclaimed for making a surplus, but of course as with other Games, extensive infrastructural costs – policing, transportation, security, logistics – were kept off the books.

The Games were popular, regarded as successful, and LAOOC commissioner Peter Ueberroth kept a tight rein on purse strings while selling endorsements and ‘official’ sponsorships for the Games. The LAOOC, comically called ‘Lost and out of control’ by the press, was, in fact, anything but. They relied on existing facilities, built little, and spread the Games over the entire Southern California region. The weather was perfect, there were no terrorists, and few cared that the Eastern Bloc countries were absent. Ueberroth is the only individual to be *Time*’s Person of the Year for involvement in sport (Llewellyn *et al.* 2015).

In the early 1980s, the marketing of major sporting events to sponsors was becoming far more sophisticated. Two principles in particular, developed in the 1982 World Cup and the 1984 Olympic Games, were central – limited product categories and sponsor exclusivity. Horst Dassler, of Adidas, established the sport agency ISL, which represented the IOC, FIFA, and the IAAF, negotiating sponsorships and television deals (Smit 2006).

These tactics proved so adept at generating competition between corporations, and heightening the exclusive appeal of sponsorships, that they became media sport industry standard techniques. Global sport organizations became closely linked as a result.

The Boycott

When, in 1979, the USSR sent troops into Afghanistan, the USA had led a multi-nation boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. The Soviet Bloc returned the boycott favour four years later (see Chapter 10). The Soviet Union and 14 other communist countries stayed away (Llewellyn *et al.* 2015: 1). Despite this, more than 7,300 athletes from 140 nations competed. Due to the boycott, some medals were won more easily. But, as with Moscow 1980, no one recalls the athletes who were not there. Western commentators have assumed that the Soviet Union always intended to boycott the 1984 Games in LA as revenge

for the USA-led boycott of Moscow 1980. But in a revisionist account, Edelman (2015) argues that in fact they originally intended to attend. Yuri Andropov, Soviet leader from 1982–1984, was originally keen that a USSR team compete in 1984. However, in 1983, the USSR shot down a Korean airliner that had strayed into Soviet airspace, subsequently stating that they did not identify it as a commercial airliner. There has been speculation that the airliner deliberately flew into Soviet airspace, at the behest of figures in USA intelligence, in order to prompt the USSR to turn on their radar system, enabling spy planes to identify ground sites, and even now, 35 years later, there is no clear consensus and questions are still unanswered. A new wave of anti-Soviet sentiment had already been growing in the USA since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were broadcasting into communist territory, angering the Soviet Union (Rider 2015). The anti-Soviet mood was further inflamed by the Korean incident. When Andropov died in February 1984, he was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko, who was far less enthusiastic about the Olympics. Edelman (2015) suggests that the USSR withdrawal from LA 1984 was sparked partly by fear of retribution against their team (see Edelman 2015).

Assessments

The basic success of the Games is often seen as a watershed in the slide into commercialism. But from its earliest days the organization of Olympic Games has never been innocent of commerce. It has been argued that LA84 revitalized and re-energized the modern Olympic movement at a key moment (Llewellyn *et al.* 2015). A stronger case can be made for Barcelona (1992), which is much more of a significant watershed – the first Games for almost 25 years not to have the shadow of political violence and boycotts hanging over it. Significantly, China re-emerged from four decades of self-imposed exile to enjoy Olympic involvement (Llewellyn *et al.* 2015). Susan Brownell links the Chinese participation with their new ‘capitalist road’ economic direction, and suggests that China’s participation heightened their awareness of the value of hosting the Games as a form of soft power (Brownell 2015). Nearly 100 sport facilities were established in Southern California in the three decades following the Games. The LA84 Foundation was established with an endowment from LAOOC (Llewellyn *et al.* 2015). The Los Angeles Games were also the site of the continuing battle between drug users and drug testers, with new developments in performance enhancement through chemistry (Gleaves 2015). The efficient organization and financial economy of the two Games, 1932 and 1984, helped underpin the reputation of Los Angeles as a safe pair of hands when it came to hosting.

2028: BACK TO THE FUTURE

As this book went to press in 2020, it was still very early days for LA 2028.

Given an unprecedented 11 years to plan, there has been less urgent pressure than for any previous Games. So once the bid was won, the size of committee was cut back – in effect it goes into semi-slumber mode till 2022. As with previous Games in LA there will be extensive use of existing facilities. In our view the main problems they are likely to face

are security (the budget is far too low), transport, and logistical problems, which could be considerable, and unpredictable environmental challenges (fires, drought, earthquakes, air quality, pollution) exacerbated by climate change.

The organizers benefit at present from a socially conscious mayor who wants to boost transport infrastructure and has a plan – 28 by 28, in which 28 transport projects will be developed. However the normal well established Olympic timetable works over a longer time span than national and local governance does. President Trump had not taken office when the bid was planned, and even if he serves eight years, will be gone four years before the 2028 LA Games. Los Angeles mayor Eric Garcetti was elected in 2013, re-elected in 2017, and will not be able to run again in 2021 (Tom Bradley, mayor at the time of the 1984 Olympic Games was first elected in 1973 and served five terms, a total of 20 years, but a two-term limit has subsequently been introduced). So Olympic organizing committees have to be prepared for at least one change in city government in the seven years between award of the Games and their staging. In the case of Los Angeles, of course, this period is an unprecedented 11 years.

Since the 1984 Olympic Games, Los Angeles has continued to make headlines periodically for various reasons. In 1992, the acquittal of four LAPD officers captured on videotape beating up Rodney King led to large-scale riots. In 1994, the Northridge earthquake (6.7 on the Richter scale) shook the city, causing \$12.5 billion in damage and 72 deaths. In 1999 the Rampart scandal involved extensive and documented cases of police misconduct. When the Metro Blue Line commenced commuter service in 1990 from downtown Los Angeles to Long Beach, electric rail passenger train services began to return to Los Angeles, using much of the Pacific Express routes that ceased in 1961, and new routes and stations have been added since.

The light and the dark continue to battle in representation for the soul of LA. The ‘urban jungle’ populated by ethnic others is the dystopian setting of the Michael Douglas film *Falling Down* (1993). Dark dystopian moods pervade James Ellroy’s *LA Quartet*, and *The Informers* by Bret Easton Ellis (1994). Throughout the 1990s, there were a series of LA-based films unlikely to win endorsement from the tourist board: *Boyz in the Hood* (1991), *Short Cuts* (1993), *Pulp Fiction* (1994), *Heat* (1995), and *LA Confidential* (1997). The mood was possibly lightened in *Devil in a Blue Dress* (1995), and *Clueless* (1995). It could be said, though, that LA has an image problem. In the 2000s the darkness persisted in *Mulholland Drive* (2001), *Drive* (2011), and *Straight outta Compton* (2015). Somewhat lighter were *Inherent Vice* (2015) and *The Bling Ring* (2013)

Perhaps the most iconic image of LA in recent years, though, was the sublime traffic jam dance sequence from *LA LA Land* (2016) which beautifully captures both the dystopian city in which movement is stalled on the freeway, and the utopian yearning, which breaks out in jousissant style as Angelenos abandon their cars to dance on top of them. The sequence illustrates Richard Dyer’s concept of the utopian sensibility of the musical which evokes the qualities of energy, abundance, intensity, community, and transparency, in sharp contrast with the everyday life experience of exhaustion, scarcity, dreariness, fragmentation, and manipulation (Dyer 1978). It would not be surprising if the whole scene is re-created in the 2028 opening ceremony (you read it here first!).

The bidding process

One remarkable feature of the three Olympic Games hosted by LA is that none of them had direct opposition. Los Angeles submitted a bid for 2024 (the bidding process for 2028 was originally scheduled to begin in 2019, with the winner announced in 2021). After several cities pulled out of the bidding for the 2022 Winter Olympics and the 2024 Summer Games, IOC decided to award both the 2024 and 2028 Games in July 2017. Confronted by two bids from ‘reliable’ places that had hosted before, the IOC awarded both Games at the IOC session in 2017. This caused considerable disquiet amongst those who had been planning on bidding for 2028, but bought the IOC valuable time to rethink the organization of the bidding process (Livingstone 2017).

In April 2017 Olympic officials met bid committees from both Los Angeles and Paris to discuss the possibility of naming two winners. In July the IOC resolved to select the 2024 and 2028 host cities at the same time, and then met the LA and Paris 2024 bid committees again, to persuade one city into delaying until 2028. In July 2017, the IOC announced LA as the sole candidate for the 2028 Games. In August, the Los Angeles City Council voted unanimously to approve the bid, which was then formally approved by the IOC in September. According to the BBC (31/7/2017) Los Angeles gained significant financial benefits in exchange for agreeing to the later date. These included money to pay for the extended planning period and to support youth sports programmes leading up to the Games. Under the terms of the Host City Contract, the IOC contribution to Los Angeles will be £1.4 billion and could exceed £1.5 billion. Los Angeles will also be allowed to keep all surpluses they make (Butler 2017). The following year, in October 2018, a movement called NOlympics LA released poll results stating that 45 per cent of respondents from Los Angeles County and 47 per cent from across California opposed bringing the 2028 Summer Games to Los Angeles. However, a different poll cited by the organizing committee suggested that more than 88 per cent of Angelenos were in favour of the city hosting the Games.

The Bid

The opening passage of the Bid Book, *Our Narrative: A City Re-imagined*, foregrounds unity, diversity and inclusion, newness and change: ‘The world in one place, the new Los Angeles is a showcase of diversity and inclusion of the people and cultures of the world... The people and leadership of Los Angeles are united.’

Newness is emphasized: ‘everywhere you look: new neighborhoods, a new transit system, all new airport terminals, a revitalized river, and new stadiums and arenas...a city reimagined’.

The opening tells us nothing really about LA. But we are subsequently told that it: ‘...is a city of reinvention and constant motion...revitalization ... restoration’. It will ‘continue to transform over the next decade...We are dreaming of a new Los Angeles and we are building it every day.’

The emphasis on the city reinventing itself betrays an unease that our image of it, and its nature, needed extensive ideological work: ‘LA is undergoing an urban reinvention, and our spectator experience will reflect this transformation from the moment they arrive.’

The diverse population is mobilized as evidence of a spectator appeal, cleverly converting difference into positivity: ‘the largest Asian and Latin American populations outside of their home countries...With 18 million Angelenos, from 115 countries, speaking 220 languages, and with 42 million visitors in 2013, in Los Angeles, every athlete will have a home field advantage.’

The opening passage concludes with the classic expression of neo-individualism – if you can dream it, you can do it– the deceit at the heart of late capitalism: ‘Like the Olympic Movement, we believe anything is possible. That if you can dream it, you can do it.’

And more neo-individualism – combining the work ethic, and hints of the great American Dream:

Angelenos understand and embrace the struggle and the journey to success and we have the resources to help anyone become their very best...giving every athlete the greatest stage to showcase their hard work and dedication in pursuit of their dreams.

As for the environment, why, you would think a car had never belched exhaust in the city! They must be planning on masking the many oil pumps that are all too visible on the city’s skylines:

reliable sunny weather, scenic coastline and a mountain range within city limits, the Games will celebrate our natural environment sustaining it for future generations. Los Angeles has set the national standard in environmental protection – the largest US city with a solar Feed-In-Tariff and a commitment to no coal power by 2024, the largest municipal green building ordinance in the nation and more LEED-certified square feet than any other city in the world.

The notable can-do spirit is writ large:

In response to California’s historic drought, Los Angeles is a model of water conservation, using the same amount of water as we did 40 years ago with 1 million more people, and with a plan to cut water consumption 20% further by 2017.

The art of bid book writing consists of ringing all the right bells (investment, innovation, memorability, iconic, sustainable, communal benefit) and then adding the unique selling point (USP) of your city, which, not surprisingly, in the home of Hollywood, is partly to do with narrative. Los Angeles, after all ‘knows how to put on a show’:

Angelenos are investing in our future and raising our game. As we reinvent our city, we are eager to share our dream of delivering an innovative and memorable Games with a new generation. Our iconic venues and infrastructure improvements combined with our experience hosting major events will ensure a sustainable Games that directly benefits our community. Mix in the world’s top storytellers and Los Angeles is the ideal host to elevate the Olympic movement and inspire the world.

Once the preamble is over, attention can be drawn to the sorts of detail the various stakeholders will be interested in. Page 17, for example, addressed to sponsors, has a large picture of downtown LA, showing how many large flat building surfaces can be used as giant billboards for the Olympic Family sponsors. According to the bid book, the community are fully behind the project. Polling evidence is presented to show that 77 per cent of Angelenos support hosting the Games in 2024, 85 per cent said they would remain in the city during the Games, and nearly 50 per cent of 18–34 year-olds said they want to volunteer for the Games.

And in summary to the intro, putting the local together with the global:

Together, we will proudly represent our nation, creating the greatest stage on earth for the greatest global event. With our diversity, every athlete from around the world will have a home field advantage. The focus of the Games will be on sport, the athletes and their incredible stories – memorable moments against iconic backdrops without distractions. With world-class infrastructure consisting of internationally recognized venues and the top storytellers in the world, Los Angeles will elevate the Olympic and Paralympic movement to inspire the next generation.

The bid book acknowledges the crimes of the past: ‘In 1984, LA was a car culture with no rail system. We continued to invest in freeways, starting construction on the Century Freeway, the last we have built.’

However, LA, which more than any other twentieth-century city, defined and was defined by the car, now proclaims that it is ‘defining the future of mobility, with the largest transit construction program in the country’. It is expanding subway, light rail, commuter rail, and bus rapid transit. There is a certain amount of truth in this, although given the IOC insistence on Olympic Lanes to speed their air-conditioned limousines from hotel to venue and back, one wonders how many of the Olympic Family will be seen on commuter trains.

The Los Angeles bid relies on existing facilities and other venues being built independently of the Olympic plans. The new Los Angeles Stadium, opening in 2020 for the Los Angeles Rams and Los Angeles Chargers, will stage part of the opening ceremony. This state-of-the-art LA stadium could become the most expensive sporting venue in the world. The estimated cost of the venue, £2 billion, is financed by Rams owner Stan Kroenke, who also owns Arsenal FC in London (Ettchells 2019b). The Bank of California Stadium opened in 2018 for Los Angeles FC, and will now be an Olympic venue for football. The LA 2028 organizing committee have an innovative, if bizarre, plan to stage the opening and closing ceremonies at two stadia. The opening ceremony would commence at the Coliseum, but the torch would then travel on to Inglewood for the parade of nations and lighting of the flame. The closing ceremony will start at Inglewood, but the extinguishing of the flame will be at the Coliseum. It is hard to see what this delivers, apart of course from the lucrative commercial opportunity to sell two stadia worth of tickets at top of the range prices. It is not clear if prospective punters will be thrilled by this concept, nor if the IOC have sanctioned it.

Anti-Olympic movements and the Stop the LA Games movement

Often anti-Olympic protest movements get up and running too late. The best time to stop a bid is before it has been awarded the Games. Once the contract is signed, it becomes much harder, and once significant expenditure has been committed it is all but impossible. Both the IOC and the host have too much at stake, and any cancellation by either side would involve complicated and expensive litigation. By contrast, well organized protest movements in the early stages of a bid can tarnish and embarrass the image of the bid. This was achieved with great effect in the early 1980s, by a small but well organized group in Amsterdam who were able to cause terminal damage to the Amsterdam bid to host the 1992 Summer Games. In normal circumstances it would be too late for a protest movement to succeed in preventing the forthcoming Los Angeles Games, awarded in 2017. However, the fact that the Games were awarded unusually 11 years in advance, rather than the more conventional seven of recent years, gives a small window of opportunity. Protest movements and anti-Olympic groups are becoming more organized, are networking with each other, and in 2019 staged an impressive transnational event in Tokyo (see chapters 1 and 9).

Until recently, opposition from residents to bidding for or holding an Olympics has been rather minimal. Often, opposition has centred on mitigation of the impacts (Andranovich and Burbank 2018). In one exception, Denver, awarded the 1976 Winter Olympics in 1970, had to withdraw after voters passed amendments preventing state and city from spending public money on the Games (Andranovich and Burbank 2018).

Chicago's bid for the 2016 Olympics prompted the establishment of No Games Chicago, focused on the use of public money for the Games and the impact of Olympic development on Chicago neighborhoods and parks. Public opposition to Boston's Olympic bid for the 2024 Games helped to derail that bid soon after the city won the endorsement of the USOC (Andranovich and Burbank 2018).

NOlympics LA, spearheaded by the Democratic Socialists of America's Los Angeles chapter, is campaigning against the Games not simply on grounds of expense. Instead they argue that there is no such thing as a good Olympics. Their principal issues are the housing crisis, widespread homelessness, and police violence. They argue that hosting the Games would further exacerbate those issues for the benefit of the already wealthy and elite. They believe the Games are profitable for a small number of people, at the expense of the wider community benefit (Gordon 2017). They are in favour of rethinking law enforcement so the most vulnerable are not criminalized or the focus of harsh policing practices; and a more transparent and accountable local democracy (Andranovich and Burbank 2018).

So far NOlympics LA has focused on protest actions on the streets around LA and at the institutions supporting LA 2028. They hosted a public forum, Stop Playing Games, in August 2017 as a culmination of four months of protest activities around the bid. Although invited, neither the mayor of Los Angeles nor any members of the bid committee attended. The visit of IOC president Thomas Bach in 2017, after the award to LA of the 2028 Games, was greeted by NOlympics members chanting, 'IOC go away, no Olympics in LA,' and displaying an anti-Olympics banner (Andranovich, and Burbank 2018).



Figure 3.1 NOlympicsLA website.

Image used by kind permission of NOlympicsLA.

In 2018, the group hosted a protest event called Disasterpiece Theatre, organized a bike tour of skid row in downtown LA called the Ride for Justice, and a screening of films capturing the evictions and displacement of communities at the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Games. They have been involved in protest public art, educational outreach in colleges and universities, and gathering information by making requests through the Freedom of Information Act. They also attend council meetings and work on behalf of tenants. NOlympics LA maintains a web site in English, Spanish, French, and Portuguese (<https://nolympicsla.com>) (see Andranovich and Burbank 2018).

It is unlikely that they entertain serious thoughts of stopping the Games, but rather are using it as a platform for their social justice programme. Given the apparent local support for the Games, the aura of professional efficiency of the organizing group, the successful track record of the city as a two times Olympic host, and the lack of any great controversy around which to mobilize, exploiting this window to force a cancellation would be a major challenge for any anti-Olympic group. However, the IOC are concerned about the emergence of broad-based transnational anti-Olympics movements, which may have helped prompt their award of two future Games in 2017.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

After a deal with United Airlines in 2018, the Memorial Coliseum will be renamed the United Airlines Memorial Coliseum. The deal, worth \$69 million over 16 years, contributes to the \$270 million cost of renovations (Pimental 2018). It is at present not clear that the IOC will allow this name change to be used during the Games. The renovations include a new press box, box suites, premium lounges, a viewing deck, VIP section and

other hospitality facilities, a new sound system, video screens, and scoreboards. The capacity will drop from 93,000 to about 77,000 (Barragan 2019). The stadium had no roof in 1932 nor 1984, and there is no mention of a roof in news of the renovations, so the majority of spectators who do not have access to executive level hospitality can expect to roast, as they must have done in 1932 and 1984.

Environmental threats to Southern California include fires, drought, earthquakes, air quality, and pollution. Unusual weather patterns experienced by parts of California in recent years impacted in 2018 on Lake Casitas, used for rowing and canoeing in 1984. The lake was less than one-third full in late 2018, after years of drought conditions. More recently storms have helped water levels recover, but huge wildfires have left a canal feeding the lake blocked with ash and debris (Owen 2019). The LA28 Games are still eight years away, and leading environmentalists argued in 2018 that we had only 12 years to take the forms of drastic action necessary to avoid reaching a fatal tipping point in climate change. At the time of writing, it seems unlikely that the major nations of the world will have instigated such drastic measures, and by the time of LA28, ten of those 12 years will have passed. There seems a significant likelihood that the Los Angeles Olympic Games of 2028 will be affected by climatic instability.

Like Paris, LA is not especially a sporting town. But it does like a big show and spectacle and LA may well cement a reputation for doing the Games in style despite the lack of investment in facilities, a formula the IOC are now keen to promote. Given that LA is notoriously a city without a strong sense of place (as Gertrude Stein once said of Oakland, there is no 'there' there) it will be interesting to see how the city comes across during the televising of the Games. As for the USA and geopolitics, with Trump challenging free trade with national boundaries, tariffs, and trade wars, this period may mark the start of a managed decline in geopolitical terms, as China rises remorselessly. Will LA28 be fated to be a tombstone for the American Empire? By then Trump will have been gone for four years, or maybe eight years. Climate change will be having more dramatic impacts. If Los Angeles gets a real heat-wave, it is worth recalling that it is, after all, the place where the bloody red sun sets.

FURTHER READING

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CHAPTER 4

LONDON AND THE OLYMPICS

1908–1948–2012

INTRODUCTION

London was the first city to stage a third Olympic Games, which marks the significant role the UK played in the development of modern sports. Yet, the UK has a strange relation to the international governing bodies of sport. The English established some of the first sporting national governing bodies. The MCC, the Jockey Club, the Royal and Ancient Golf Club, formed in the eighteenth century, were in effect aristocratic gentleman's clubs. In the nineteenth century, the upper class were more concerned to reinforce their authority through associations that marked control of a sport – the Football Association; the Amateur Rowing Association, the Amateur Athletic Association. These bodies codified and unified rules, and imposed amateurism (Whannel 1983). The British were less to the forefront in the establishment of international governing bodies – playing a role without leading (the IOC, IAAF, ILTF) or staying aloof at first (FIFA). The situation was complicated in that the four nations of the UK functioned largely as separate nations who played each other; so whereas in some international bodies it is the UK that is a member, in others the four nations have separate membership (for example, FIFA).

The UK was a keen enough supporter of Coubertin and the Olympic project that, when Rome pulled out of staging the 1908 Games, the British Olympic Association (BOA) was quick to step in. Similarly, when, amidst the wreckage and economic devastation of the Second World War, it was decided at short notice to stage an Olympic Games in 1948, London again, despite post-war austerity, shouldered the burden of organization. The third London Games, awarded in 2005 in the midst of economic boom times, was constructed and staged after the 2008 financial crash, when the UK was once again in austerity. At the time of writing, the UK is in the midst of crisis, triggered by a 2016 referendum, which voted to leave the European Union. The joyous multicultural notes of 2012 seem a long way away already.

1908 WHITE CITY

After centuries of antipathy between Britain and France, mutual fear of the rise of Germany from 1870 triggered a reconciliation, expressed in the Entente Cordiale, signed in 1904. Coubertin was an anglophile, whose project of reviving the ancient Olympic Games was significantly influenced by the sporting practices of English public schools

(see Chapter 5). After the problems of the 1900 and 1904 Games, Coubertin's whole Olympism project was not in great shape. Coubertin was no economist, and the lack of a clear financial strategy for supporting the nascent Olympic Games forced him to attach the Games of 1900 and 1904 to the World's Fairs in, respectively, Paris and St Louis.

In 1906, the nominated host for 1908, Rome, withdrew (Llewellyn 2012: 45–46). This was attributed to the impact of the Vesuvius eruption, but in fact the Italian prime minister was opposed to the project and prevented funding, which he wanted to spend on other projects like the Simplon tunnel (Mallon and Buchanan 2000) The IOC accepted with alacrity the offer of London to step in. From 1908 in London the Games began to be taken more seriously in their own right, and the 1908 Games did much to steady the ship. The 1908 Olympics, although again held in conjunction with an exhibition, were not totally upstaged by it (Keys 2006: 207 n. 22). Maurice Roche (2000) highlights ways in which international exhibitions reflected the development of capitalism, nationalism, and imperialism, and were part of the emergence of an international dimension in modern public culture. Clearly there is a contradiction here, manifest in the person of Baron de Coubertin – a committed internationalist who inscribed internationalism into the founding documents, practices, and rituals of the Olympic Games. He was also a patriot, concerned about the poor physical state and discipline of French youth, and worried about the decline of his country. The tension between nationalism and internationalism continues to be a significant feature of the Olympic Games (see Chapter 6).

One striking feature of mega-events is how rarely they utilize the sites of previous events, almost as if they wanted to avoid taking on the ideological detritus of a former conjuncture. In 1908 the London Olympics had close links – and shared a site (the 'White City') – with the Franco-British Exhibition near Shepherd's Bush. The 1924–1925 British Empire Exhibition shunned the option of the White City site from 1908, and established itself at Wembley Park. In 1934 the Empire Games used the newly constructed Empire Pool at Wembley, yet used White City for athletics. In 1948 the hastily arranged and financially pressed London Olympic Games did utilize the Wembley site, constructed for the Empire Exhibition, but in 1951 the Festival of Britain rejected both Wembley and White City, in favour of Battersea Park and the South Bank in Central London. The Millennium Dome, rejecting all other options, was built to celebrate the year 2000 on a derelict industrial site in North Greenwich. In many cases these sites subsequently suffered years of decline, neglect, and decay. The White City stadium was demolished in 1985 and there is no easily visible memorial proclaiming its moment of glory as the 'Great Stadium' of the 1908 Olympics.

Wembley stadium has been demolished and rebuilt, and the Empire Pool renovated and renamed the 'Wembley Arena'. The rest of the site has been crumbling for years, and is only now undergoing substantial redevelopment. On the south bank, few traces of the Festival of Britain remain, aside from the Festival Hall. But after the 2012 Olympic Games, a vast privately owned shopping mall at Stratford in East London became the beneficiary of the massive public investment in infrastructure that has seen the creation of Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park (Los Angeles, by contrast will have used the same stadium for three Olympic Games – 1932, 1984, 2028). This section explores the significance that we can read into these events, crossing as they do concepts of nation and

internationalism; past and future, heritage and tradition, public and private, production and consumption, festival and spectacle.

The Franco-British Exhibition had its roots in late nineteenth-century diplomacy and was planned to celebrate the *Entente Cordiale*. It attracted 8 million visitors, and only included goods and produce of Britain, France, and their respective colonies. Founded on the imperatives of trade and diplomacy, it was structured around an imperial ideology of civilization, brought to ‘savage’ peoples, for their betterment. Like previous such events, it combined displays of technological mastery, educative rational recreation, and popular amusement. It was clear that no government funding would be available for a stadium, but the Franco-British Exhibition organizers agreed to build the stadium complete with running and cycling tracks and a swimming pool, in return for 75 per cent of the gate receipts. The stadium was projected to cost £44,000, but some estimates suggest it was a lot higher (e.g. Zarnowski 1992). The exhibition organizers also agreed to give £2,000 to the BOA, but this was later increased to £20,000 (Mallon and Buchanan 2000: 4). The organizers were prepared to accept a loss on the stadium in return for the benefits of extra visitors to the exhibition, and they retained the use of the stadium after the Games. The BOA made £6,000 and the Franco-British Exhibition £18,000 from gate receipts (Mallon and Buchanan 2000: 5). The key exhibition organizing figure was a Jewish Hungarian showman and promoter, Imre Kiralfy, who had learned his craft with Barnum and Bailey.

The 140-acre site was eight times larger than the Great Exhibition of 1851. A total of 123,000 people visited on the opening day, and the caterers, J. Lyons & Co., planned for 100,000 per day (Knight 1978: 4). The site benefited from transport investment – the Central London Railway was extended from Shepherd’s Bush to Wood Lane Station in 1908 (Abandoned Lines and Railways, undated). The site featured elaborate white-walled palaces and waterways. The central court had a lake and illuminated fountains. There were 20 palaces and 120 exhibition halls. Orientalism was a dominant stylistic motif. Rickshaw drivers were brought to London from Asia to work on the site (20th Century London, undated). It is clear that, despite the large investment in the site, it must have been lucrative. The rides and attractions alone generated around £200,000 – over £20 million in 2019 terms (Measuring Worth, <https://www.measuringworth.com/> [accessed 24 October 2019]).

The site was a viable exhibition venue for some years. In 1909, the Imperial International exhibited the imperial achievements of the Triple Entente powers: France, Russia, and Britain. In 1910 the Japan–British Exhibition emphasized the suitability of Japan as a worthy ally of Britain. The 1911 Coronation Exhibition, the 1912 Latin–British Exhibition, and the 1914 Anglo-American Exhibition followed these. During the First World War, the army used the site. From 1921 to 1929, it became the venue for the British Industries Fair. In 1927 the Greyhound Racing Association leased the stadium for greyhound racing. The Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) Championships were held there from 1932–1970. The BBC bought part of the site in 1949 and built the Television Centre, which opened in 1960. Athletics moved to Crystal Palace in 1971, the last greyhound racing took place in 1984 and the Great Stadium was demolished a year later (Mallon and Buchanan 2000: 6). The stadium disappeared with no trace and no proper commemoration of its historic role. The White City was virtually obliterated from history. With the exception of a plaque hidden away inside the courtyard of the BBC building occupying the site, there is no proper memorial to the ‘Great Stadium’

or to the 1908 Olympic Games. Martin Polley (2015: 63) notes that a small street behind the remaining BBC media village, named Dorando Close after the Italian marathon runner Dorando Pietri, is one of the few signs that the 1908 Olympic Games ever took place here.



Figure 4.1 This Plaque, on the wall of the BBC complex, partially hidden by building work when this picture was taken in 2015, is at the far end from the street, and only visitors to the BBC would be likely to see it. There is also an unobtrusive strip in the pavement marking the position of the finishing line in the Great Stadium of 1908.

1948 WEMBLEY

The first post-war Games, the first to be broadcast by television, remained pre-televisional era in modes of presentation. The story of the 1948 Games has been re-inscribed in terms of austerity, emphasizing British pluck, make do and mend, and the Dunkirk spirit, and so has become part of the ideological substructure of the Brexit moment. In 1908 the empire was still dominant, by 1948 the empire was being dismantled. The UK was originally interested in bidding for the 1940 Games, but in 1936, the government forced the BOA to drop its bid because of its desire to maintain good relations with Japan, who were also bidding (Beck 2008: 624). By the end of the Second World War, the USA was the new global hegemonic force. The old Empire Exhibition site at Wembley had already fallen into decline; a poignant visual metaphor for Britain's war-weakened economy. Post-war reconstruction, of which the relaunch of television and broadcasting of the Games was a part, was only just beginning to make an impact.

The 1948 Games, like the 1908 Games, had to be organized in less than two years. But, unlike the 1908 Games, this was done by a country recovering from the impact of the war, with shortages, rationing, and a severe fuel crisis. To limit Britain's responsibility to feed the athletes, it was agreed that the participants would bring their own food. No new facilities were built, but Wembley Stadium had survived the war and proved adequate. The male athletes were housed in a Royal Air Force camp in Uxbridge and the women were housed at Southlands College (now part of Roehampton University) in dormitories. The Olympic Report emphasizes economy, pointing out ways in which costs were controlled, and no new facilities built. The organizing committee chose as a symbol the clock tower of the Houses of Parliament, with the hands of Big Ben pointing to 4pm, the hour at which the Games were declared open (Official Olympic Games Report 1948: 22). Led by bastions of the establishment, the organizing committee was concerned to do things properly and not tamper unduly with tradition – there was little innovation in the staging of the Games. The torch relay, first held in 1936, was included in the plans (Official Olympic Games Report 1948: 22).

There was, however, an excitement around the engagement with emergent technologies – particularly television, still only two years into its post-war relaunch. Very few people in Britain yet owned sets. If post-war austerity made for a pragmatic approach, the Olympic movement itself was ill-equipped for both modernity and austerity. The IOC was then – and to a degree remains – dominated by European aristocracy. In 1948 only 41 countries were represented on the IOC, 24 of them European. The 66 members, all male, included three princes, five counts, two barons, a marquis, a duke, two his excellencies, two lords, two generals, and a colonel. As for the London organizing committee, the president of the Games was the Rt Hon The Viscount Portal, DSO, MVO; and the chairman of the organizing committee was the Rt Hon The Lord Burghley, KCMG. By the early 1980s, this aristocratic IOC body had become firmly wedded to commercialization, but in 1948 the official report stated that because the IOC had to ensure that the Games were promoted 'not so much as a commercial venture but in the best interests of sport', many means of raising money were not permissible, such as the inclusion of advertisements in the brochures and programmes. Receipts were £761,688 and expenditure was slightly less, leaving a surplus of £29,420. The IOC received £5,000. Wembley Stadium was paid £92,500, around 12 per cent of the total revenue.

This Olympic Games was on the cusp of the transformation from a pre-media event to a global spectacle. From today's perspective, the media management strategy has a fascinating quaintness about it. The press department policy in the build-up to the Games was that 'The Press Officer' would tackle every individual critic and persuade him (sic) of the rightness of the course. Those with influence on the sports side of the newspapers were encouraged and those hoping to intrude with political opinions avoided or completely ignored (Official Olympic Games Report 1948: 105). As far as legacy was concerned, £1,000 was to be allocated for the establishment of a permanent record of winners at the main stadium (Official Olympic Games Report 1948: 29). There is a picture of two plaques on the external wall of the stadium, either side of the circular entrance gate between the two towers. Wembley subsequently established itself as the home of English international football, the twin towers were mythicized and the stadium was the venue for the 1966 World Cup Final. The Olympics appeared to retreat from view. The lack of any real commemoration at either White City or Wembley Stadium is striking, and the London 2012 bid chose not to make a lot of the 1908 and 1948 Games.

2012 STRATFORD

In 2005 London beat Paris in the race to stage the 2012 Games, by 54 votes to 50. In 2012 London staged the Olympic Games for the third time, the first city to do so. The facilities were built, in time and under budget, the transport systems worked smoothly, the sun came out, and the host country won a large number of medals. Two organizations were involved – the London Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (LOCOG) and the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA). LOCOG was responsible for running the Games, while the ODA was responsible for the provision of the infrastructure. The budget for running the Games assumes that a share of revenue from television, sponsorship, ticket sales, and merchandising will cover running costs. Infrastructure spending is provided by the host city and country.

Running an Olympic bid is a lengthy, expensive operation, requiring the cooperation of national and city governments. Obtaining such support requires delicate diplomacy and extensive lobbying. In the process, interest groups with divergent agendas are drawn together. It is increasingly hard to justify infrastructural expenditure just for hosting a 15-day event, however global. So long-term legacy claims have to be developed. Urban planners perceive an Olympic project, even if the bid is ultimately unsuccessful, as a means of uncorking funding for strategic projects – new road and rail links, industrial development, and housing developments. Architects will be attracted by the possibility of commissions for iconic stadiums and other buildings. Builders and associated contractors will see the potential for large contracts. Local politicians will sense an opportunity for new parks and sporting facilities and for local employment. Most significantly, the establishment of new transport infrastructure and the high profile of the Olympic project attract associated development – speculative housing, industrial development, and shopping malls. A well-managed Olympic bid will endeavour to bring together, sometimes in teeth-gritting harmony, all these elements.

Since the Thatcherite revolution, neoliberalism and globalization have been at the core of British politics. The big bang freed the City of London to become a global financial

centre. This involved a major recomposition with financial capital decisively dominating over the declining industrial, merchandising, and agrarian sectors of the economy. The Blairite rebranding of the Labour Party in the 1990s enabled Labour to become the governing party in 1997, and the economic management of Gordon Brown instigated a period of stability, full employment, and low inflation. During the 1990s, a greater national self-confidence, symbolized by some grand projects – Tate Modern, the Wheel on the Thames, the Globe Theatre, Hungerford Bridge pedestrian walkways, the Millennium Bridge, and the completion of the channel tunnel rail-link, enhanced the appeal of the city. Only the Millennium Dome, of these projects, badly misfired. The re-establishment of a London-wide authority in 2000, and development strategies for East London and the Thames estuary region, were key to London's Olympic bid. The socially deprived area of East London had poor transport links and extensive derelict industrial sites. One of the biggest sites in the area, in Stratford, contained a disused railway yard, largely disused derelict industrial sites, and a tangle of rivers, canals, streams, sewer pipes, and other waterways. The government had established the Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) in 1981, and in the 1990s, the 'Thames Gateway' regeneration project was established. By 1995 the Thames Gateway Task Force had drawn up plans for 30,000 new homes and 50,000 new jobs by 2021 (Poynter 2005).

A BOA feasibility study in 2001 proposed sites in the west and east, and London mayor Ken Livingstone opted for the East London option because of the regeneration agenda. In Stratford, a stadium and village could be built close together and near good transport links (*Daily Telegraph* 9 October 2003). The proposed bid appeared to be popular, with 82 per cent support in 2002 (Karamichas 2013: 171). In 2003, the government backed the London bid, and in June Livingstone appointed Barbara Cassani as Chair of the 'Bidding Committee' (*Daily Telegraph* 9 October 2003). In 2004 Barbara Cassani was replaced by ex-Olympic medallist Sebastian Coe, now Lord Coe. It proved to be a key turning point. Coe's knowledge of the world of sport organization and the IOC was a considerable asset, and ex-president of the IOC, Samaranch, had great affection for him. As an ex-Conservative MP, he knew how to operate in Westminster circles. The political context made for tensions, best embodied in the three figures of Coe, Tessa Jowell (Labour MP and Olympic Minister), and Ken Livingstone (left-wing maverick Mayor of London). These three found a way of working together despite political differences. At the IOC Session in 2005, Blair devoted a day to an exhausting series of 15-minute meetings with key IOC members. London beat the strong favourites, Paris. It was strangely like a Seb Coe race – a few problems at the beginning, then gradually becoming well positioned, and putting in a devastating late sprint.

Running the Games

At the closing ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the flag passed from the Mayor of Beijing to the (new) Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, the world financial crisis was unravelling and the impact of incalculable levels of toxic debt forced governments around the world to allocate unprecedented sums to prop up the banking system. The London 2012 Olympic Games encountered relatively little opposition from protest groups. Their main concerns were the high cost; the role of corporate sponsors; seizure of space for

Olympic purposes; and excessive Olympics-induced security (see Boykoff 2014b). The few diverse groups that were active had a range of issues but never found an effective common framework. Protests over the Manor Farm Allotments and the Clays Lane housing estate gained some exposure. The more imaginative protests, generated by local artists and documented in *The Art of Dissent* (Powell and Marrero-Guillamón 2012), took place along and in relation to the 11-mile blue fence that encircled the site during construction.

In the days before the Games, the sun came out, the opening ceremony was widely admired, transport systems coped admirably, and once Team GB started winning medals the mood became euphoric. The Games were broadly seen as a success – facilities produced on time and under budget, systems all worked properly, organization was smooth, the volunteers won warm praise and the UK won plenty of medals. In a subsequent government review, the London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games were pronounced:

a resounding success. . .the construction programme was delivered on time and within budget, and the Games themselves ran extremely smoothly. . .the opening and closing ceremonies were very well received and the contribution of tens of thousands of volunteers has been widely and rightly praised.

(House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2013)

The main problematic issue highlighted by the review was security, described as a ‘notable blemish’ and ‘a sorry episode’. G4S were supposed to provide 10,400 staff, and only on 11 July did they admit they would be unable to reach this number, and the army had to be brought in (Rosemont 2012). G4S had to pay around £70 million in compensation, and their chief executive resigned (*Daily Telegraph* 21 May 2013). The House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts judged that security costs were originally massively under-budgeted (House of Commons 2013).

The mantra that the Games came in on time and under budget was repeated so often that it became accepted common sense. Official estimates of the cost had in fact more than doubled since the original bid (House of Lords Library 2012). In 2003 the total costs were estimated at £4 billion – £3 billion core Olympic costs plus £1 billion for infrastructure on the Olympic Park. It was planned that these costs would be covered by a public sector funding package of £2.3 billion for the core Olympic costs, £1 billion Exchequer funding for the infrastructure, plus an anticipated £738 million from the private sector. However, in 2007 the revised budget totalled £9.3 billion. The National Audit Office noted that public sector funding had almost tripled, while private sector contributions had fallen to less than 2 per cent. In October the government calculated that the final costs of the Olympics would be £8.9 billion, a saving of £377 million on the £9.3 billion budget (House of Lords Library 2012).

However, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee report in 2012 suggested that the overall cost to the public purse would be £11 billion due to significant public sector costs not included in the public sector funding package (House of Lords Library 2012). Sky Sports (January 2012) estimated a £12 billion cost, based on including a range of extra public spending, more anti-doping control officers, the torch relay, paying

Tube workers not to strike, the cost of the Olympic Park Legacy Company, legal bills over the stadium tenancy decision, extra cash to UK Sport, and legal costs associated with land purchases. In addition, including additional policing costs, transport projects, and counter-terrorism efforts, the Olympics actually cost over £24 billion, ten times the original calculation (House of Lords Library 2012).

Olympic accounting presents problems – for over 40 per cent of the Games staged since 1960 there is no clear final budget figure: ‘for 41 per cent of Olympic Games between 1960 and 2010 no one asked how well the budget held for these Games, thus hampering learning regarding how to develop more reliable budgets for the Games’ (Flyvbjerg and Stewart 2012). One thing is clear, though; every Games, without exception, has experienced cost overruns, averaging 179 per cent in real terms. In fact, Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) say cost overruns in the Olympic Games are substantially higher than in other mega-projects. The claim that the London 2012 Games were brought in under budget is questionable.

The troubling question of legacies

Are there long-term benefits in return for the expenditure, and if so, what are they and how might they be assessed? Although many central and local government organizations have responsibility for projects in the legacy programme, the Cabinet Office is responsible for coordinating and assuring delivery of the legacy as a whole. The Commons Accounts Committee declared that it is important that the Cabinet Office provides strong leadership to maintain momentum and focus (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2013).

The most important thing to understand about ‘legacy’ is that it is a profoundly ideological term – it has become necessary, when hosting mega-events, to claim that *there will be a legacy*. It is politically difficult to justify spending £10–20 billion for a month-long party, however lavish – there have to appear to be long-term benefits too. Coe himself was quite clear on the issue in 2006, when he declared: ‘Legacy is absolutely epi-central to the plans for 2012.’ However, by 2012 he was also clear that deliverance of legacy was not his responsibility (Coe 2006, 2012).

Here is the dilemma – for all the fine promises of legacy, when the circus leaves town, the organizing committee shuts up shop, the budget for staging the Games has been spent, and all too often no public bodies are prepared to shoulder the responsibilities, and more significantly the costs, of ensuring that legacy promises can be fulfilled. By the time any meaningful judgements can be made, the original proponents have left the stage. Vijay (2015: 441) refers to ‘the stark contradiction between the *temporary* nature of the Games and the supposed *permanence* of their effects’. Horne (2017) argues that London was the first true ‘legacy’ Olympics. The IOC had not used the concept widely before, staging its first conference on legacy in 2002, just two years before London submitted its bid book. Since then, though, a bidding city has to spell out how legacy will be implemented.

The first problem is to establish precisely what legacy promises were made, which involves distinguishing between firm and specific commitments, for which it might well eventually be possible to assess the degree of success; and the more vague, ill-defined

rhetorical claims, which can rarely be neatly assessed. There are the promises made in the bid book, those made during the campaign, and those outlined in the framework as redefined by the government. These were the five legacy promises that the government declared, in the government's Legacy Action Plan (LAP), which constitute one yardstick by which we might assess post-Games developments:

- making the UK a world-leading sporting nation;
- transforming the heart of East London;
- inspiring a new generation of young people to take part in volunteering, cultural and physical activity;
- making the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living;
- demonstrating that the UK is a creative, inclusive, and welcoming place to live in, visit and for business.

An additional sixth legacy promise, added later, was 'to develop the opportunities and choices for disabled people' (see Cashman and Horne 2013: 54–55). How can generalized statements be falsified – how, for example, might evidence clearly indicate that the UK is or is not 'a creative, inclusive and welcoming place'? There was a 2013 report, *Meta-Evaluation of the Impacts and Legacy of the London 2012 Olympic Games*, offering an assessment to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), with extensive detail. However, you only have to read the relentlessly upbeat tone of the chapter headings to sense that the whole enterprise was geared to search for positive evidence (Grant Thornton UK 2013).

In 2014 National Public Radio published a rather devastating critique. Peer reviewer Stefan Szymanski (Professor of Sports Management and Economics at the University of Michigan, and Dean of the Cass Business School in London) called the report a white-wash which offered a very bullish view, refused to comment on negatives, or to qualify any of the results. Szymanski was sent the final draft with one week to make comments, and was not allowed to access the underlying economic model, which he described as 'extremely unusual'. Szymanski was uncomfortable about 'the triumphalist tone of the report, which does not reflect what the data is saying', and described the report as a 'political document' that ignored extensive economic research showing that the Olympics are almost always unprofitable (Shapiro 2014).

Some promises are unsuccessful or fail to transpire, while others simply disappear from discussion. The London Olympic Institute, proposed in 2005, had, by 2013, been air-brushed from history. The Olympic Museum plan was dropped (Owen 2013). The London Pleasure Gardens, an entertainment complex on the Royal Albert Dock, into which Newham Council invested £3 million, went into liquidation on 3 August 2012, less than five weeks after opening (*Newham Recorder* 3 August 2012).

Once the Games concluded, responsibility for legacy was handed to a new body – the London Legacy Development Corporation, formed in April 2012. This body was responsible for 'the long-term planning, development, management and maintenance of the Park and its impact on the surrounding area after the London 2012 Games' (LLDC, undated). The Mayor of London indicated that the Games, and their legacy, were London's most important regeneration project for the next 25 years (DCLG 2015). One of the problems

of assessing legacy is that so many people seem to be doing it – the London Development Agency (LDA), Greater London Authority (GLA), and the DCMS, as well as the London 2012 Host Boroughs. It is possible, sometimes, to get the sense that beneath the grandiose talk and endless maze of evaluations, frameworks, and overviews, nothing much is happening to transform the lives of the local community. The following snapshots offer brief appraisals of the London 2012 legacy.

The Main Stadium

According to the IOC, most Olympic venues were expected to be available for elite and community sporting events after the Games (IOC 2012). On the face of it, then, this is a very positive scenario. The swimming pool has indeed been opened to the public for reasonable prices. It is a beautiful design; but elegant though it is, the building may not be without flaws – the LLDC had to arrange anti-glare blinds for the west side. The high roof and resultant extra heating costs may mean that it is expensive to maintain – only time will tell (Delta ESourcing, undated).

One of the biggest problems of Olympic legacy over the years has proved to be the subsequent use of the major facilities, and especially the main stadium, the centrepiece of any legacy plan. The London stadium has an end-user, West Ham United Football Club, but only after a process that caused substantial extra public expenditure, and a commitment to extensive annual expenses. The private tenant, by contrast, benefits from a remarkable deal that substantially increases their income while reducing their expenditure; and




Figure 4.2 Olympic Pool: elegant design, but high maintenance costs?

enabling them to make a large capital gain from disposal of their previous ground. There were massive failures in public policy and legacy planning from the very start. A flawed model, involving the promise of an athletics stadium, was pursued, when it should have been clear that this was not viable. The eventual private stakeholder (West Ham) exploited the second round of bidding brilliantly – recognizing that there was a desperate landlord and only one possible tenant.

The original plans gave little thought to viability. The plan for a largely temporary structure, to be reduced to a 25,000-seat stadium after the Games, for athletics, did not get proper scrutiny. Athletics events could not provide sufficient regular revenue to offset maintenance costs. In the UK, athletics is not a major spectator sport, and there are at best six meetings a year that might fill a 25,000-seat stadium. Once a football end-user was finally agreed, a long, elaborate, yet poorly considered tendering process ended in litigation. Subsequently, the tenancy was handed to West Ham at a bargain basement cost, in circumstances that would require extensive and expensive modifications to remake the stadium.

In January 2007 the ODA, realizing the 25,000 legacy stadium would be too small to host events like the World Athletics Championships, considered an alternative expansion to 50,000 (ODA Board Minutes 25/1/07). West Ham would not accept a stadium with an inadequate roof and permanent running track (Olympic Board minutes 7/2/07). In 2008



Figure 4.3 London main Olympic Stadium under construction in 2010.

work commenced, and the stadium was completed in April 2011. In 2010, the OPLC decided the stadium should, post-Games, have 60,000 seats (Moore Stephens 2017: 14). But it was too late to build in many of the requirements of a football stadium – with regard to executive suites, hospitality areas, catering, and changing rooms

A competitive bidding process was established in 2010, and the two shortlisted bids were from consortiums led by football clubs, West Ham United and Tottenham Hotspur (Moore Stephens 2017: 14). In February 2011, the OPLC announced that the joint bid by West Ham and the Borough of Newham was their preference. Tottenham Hotspur and Leyton Orient each opened legal proceedings disputing the decision. There was also an anonymous state aid complaint (the source of which is still not clear). OPLC decided that while these legal complaints were live, no final decision could be taken (Moore Stephens 2017: 14)

In July *The Sunday Times* (2011) revealed that during the bidding process West Ham United had paid, in instalments, a total of £20,000 to a director of corporate services for the OPLC. The payments were arranged by a director of West Ham involved in developing the West Ham bid, who was at the time in a relationship with the OPLC employee. It was claimed the payments were for consultancy work. OPLC had been informed of the relationship, but not the consultancy. West Ham denied that the ‘consultancy’ payment was improper and announced they would be taking legal action against Tottenham Hotspur for alleged illegal actions in obtaining the information (Kelso 2011).

The organizations involved (OPLC, West Ham Utd, Newham Council) seemingly closed ranks and by August an independent investigation determined that the procedure surrounding the bid had not been compromised (Hackett 2011). The case, however, seems to have been the final straw for the OPLC. Faced with several legal actions and the danger of the whole project stalling, in October 2011, they scrapped the tendering process, and opened a new process based on a tenancy model.

In March 2012, the OPLC, now renamed the London Legacy Development Corporation, became a Mayoral Development Corporation. The chair and chief executive left, and within months the new chair also left, to be replaced by the then-mayor, Boris Johnson. The Moore Stephens Report (2017:17) noted that it was reasonable to ask whether in the course of these changes, key knowledge and understanding was lost. While Boris Johnson was London mayor (2008–2016) he promoted several grand schemes that either did not work, or cost the London tax-payer, or both (Weaver 2017, Hodge 2017).

The concession agreement with WHU was approved and signed in March 2013. There are a number of striking features of this contract. First, the owners (and therefore the public) are responsible for all the costs of maintenance, repairs, and for providing virtually everything necessary to stage a football match. This includes heating, power, light, water, a prepared pitch including goals and corner flags, manager and player seating, changing rooms, lavatory facilities, cctv surveillance, signage, medical facilities, ticketing, public address systems, banqueting and hospitality areas, catering outlets, policing, stewarding, and pest control (Concession Agreement 2013). Second, West Ham pay a rent (commencing at £2.5 million per year) insufficient to cover these costs, and get a rent reduction if they get relegated. The lease is for 99 years. Third, Newham Council are given around 100,000 tickets a year for ‘residents and/or community groups, clubs,



Figure 4.4 The reconfigured London Stadium, ready for Premier League Football. Photo courtesy of Stephen McCubbin.

charities and similar organizations’. Despite an FOI request, Newham have not provided any details about how these tickets are distributed (What Do They Know 2017).

The capacity of West Ham’s former ground, Upton Park, was 35,345, and in 2014–2015 the average crowd was 34,871. An average crowd of 54,000 at their new venue could generate extra annual revenue of £12 million against rent of £2.5 million. As David Conn has argued, ‘The real Olympic legacy winners, of course, are West Ham United’ (Conn 2015a). Conversion work on the stadium cost £323 million. The conversion to athletics for just a few summer weeks is immensely expensive, and on the various websites, there is scant evidence of the stadium being used for any community-related events. The Moore Stephens Report found that the agreement would not recover from West Ham United a sum sufficient to cover the running costs of the stadium, nor a return on the capital cost of the transformation. Presently, the investment by the public purse is unlikely ever to be recovered, and the debt will grow due to expected operating losses. The cumulative forecast deficit over the first ten years is now expected to be in excess of £140 million (Moore Stephens 2017: 14). The report does not enquire into why West Ham were awarded a 99-year lease. At the end of 2017, the new Labour London Mayor Sadiq Khan, elected in 2016, took over control of the stadium, with the hope of renegotiating some of the deals (BBC News 2017a). Mutual recriminations have continued between Khan, Newham Mayor Robin Wales, Boris Johnson (now UK Prime Minister at time of writing), and Karren Brady, Vice Chair of West Ham United (see BBC News 2018).

The Park

The park is impressive, especially now waterlands and wildlife areas have matured, and bars and restaurants have begun to open in East Village. On several visits to the park, it seemed to have a wide range of users including family groups. It looks to be very high maintenance, and it is not clear how the long-term care of the park can be adequately funded. Big promises were made for Olympicopolis, now rebranded as East Bank, which will include a new branch of the Victoria and Albert Museum in partnership with the Smithsonian Institution, a BBC presence, UCL, the London College of Fashion, and a new theatre for Sadler's Wells. Yet work has only just begun and as this requires more than £1 billion of funding, it is hard to regard it as an Olympic legacy. The London mayor is providing £385 million, and the Government £151 million. Westfield are contributing £10 million (about 1 per cent of the total needed) towards jobs and apprentices (Evening Standard 2019). It is not yet clear where the rest of the money is coming from. UK citizens might well wonder why more hundreds of millions are being spent on this one small area of London, when all over the country libraries are closing and local authorities have suffered a decade of savage cuts. Meanwhile, the media centre at Here East is still seeking tenants to fill its considerable floor space, and the ArcelorMittal Orbit, a tower-like viewing platform, built at the insistence of the then London mayor, Boris Johnson, lost £520,000 in 2014–2015, a loss of £10,000 per week (LLDC 2015).



Figure 4.5 Get Living: homes were marketed as part of a lifestyle.



Figure 4.6 Quality of life was a prime selling point.

The local community

Impacts can be hard to assess accurately. The inner-city boroughs were among the poorest in the country. The UK showed up as worse than most other developed countries in the Gini co-efficient, which measures degrees of equality/inequality. The OECD says the UK has the worst social mobility of developed nations (Karamichas 2013: 169). So plenty needed doing. Newham had the highest overcrowding rate in the country at 25 per cent, the third highest child poverty rates in London, the second highest unemployment rates and one-third of its residents were in low-paid work – the highest proportion of any London borough (Kwei 2014). There is a chronic shortage of social rental housing in the area (Watt 2013). Two ‘Olympic Boroughs’ – Newham, and Dagenham and Redbridge – have the lowest physical activity rates in the whole of England, with 39 per cent and 38 per cent of people physically inactive (Campbell 2014). Julia Jastrzabek (2019) compares



Figure 4.7 The promised cafés, restaurants, and bars were slow to arrive but are now up and running. Efforts appear to have been made to encourage start-ups and single premise businesses and avoid the usual chains.

host boroughs and other London boroughs, drawing on data such as the Giri index, and finds little difference between them. Similarly Gavin Poynter (in Cohen and Watt 2017) found no convergence of income between host boroughs and others. Zimbalist says gentrification just relocates wealth and doesn't reduce inequality (Zimbalist 2015).

Housing

East Village offers a well-designed and landscaped development. It certainly benefits from a higher than average number of maintenance staff and security personnel, who keep the area clean and crime low. The housing ecology is of a complexity we do not have space to expound on here, and readers are recommended to consult Phil Cohen's detailed and



Figure 4.8 Village image as imagined.

nuanced ethnographic works (2017a 2017b). As so often, promises of affordable and social housing were not fully fulfilled. The bid claimed ‘the legacy would lead to the regeneration of an entire community for the direct benefit of everyone who lives there’, but commitments and details were vague (see Bernstock 2014: 195). The IOC proclaimed



Figure 4.9 A pleasant landscape delivered.

that the Olympic Village would be converted into more than 2,800 flats, and five new neighbourhoods would be established around the Park, to include 11,000 residences, one-third of which would be affordable housing (IOC 2012). The figure of 2,800 marked a significant reduction from the 2004 GLA plan for up to 4,600 homes. Bernstock (2014) said that the actual legacy linked to the Olympic village had been substantially reduced. The East Village development is divided between social and private housing, but the other developments are mostly private: in Chobham Manor, only 28 per cent of homes will be ‘affordable’ and as the government’s definition of affordable is 80 per cent of the market rent, few locals will be able to afford it (*The Economist* 2015).

The poorest residents have little hope of benefiting from new homes in the Olympic Park, and are more likely to be victims of the growing class cleansing being forced by government policies, driven by a chronic shortage of cheap housing, sharp rent increases in the private rented sector, and changes to the welfare system. Councils in affluent areas routinely arrange to house their homeless in poorer boroughs. This increases the pressure on housing stock and poorer boroughs resort to moving families out of London altogether. During 2015, at least 20 London boroughs moved poor families out to places such as Luton, Basildon, Thurrock, and Milton Keynes (Cawley and Precey 2015).

There has been a spectacular growth in investment in luxury apartment blocks in the area. Speculative building, and property value increase made it more attractive to affluent



Figure 4.10 The playground in publicity.



Figure 4.11 Swings on site.

outsiders. Kavestos estimated that properties in host boroughs are sold between 2.1 per cent and 3.3 per cent higher, depending on the definition of the impact area. Bernstock says that ‘the real risk is that the area will be regenerated but with very little benefit to those existing communities’ (Bernstock 2014: 202). Julian Cheyne argues that targets have continuously been revised downward. A 2016 Freedom of Information request revealed that the LLDC had already lowered the affordable target to 31 per cent and taking viability into account this affordable element could fall as low as 20 per cent (Cheyne 2018a).

Shops

One legacy is all too clear: no one who visited the Olympic Park will have failed to notice the large Westfield Shopping Mall, through which it was necessary to walk to get to the Olympic Park. Its up-market ambience contrasts dramatically with the shabby but cheap indoor mall across the street. In a survey conducted by the Association of Foreign Investors in Real Estate, London was named top city for foreign property investors and was the only non-US city in the top five (De Peyer 2014: 43). In the rest of Stratford, it is very hard to see any upgrading of retail facilities at all.



Figure 4.12 Water features.

Employment

The six host boroughs close to the Olympic Park provided nearly one-quarter of the workforce throughout the project. But a 2013 UKTI report found employment programmes failed to deliver long-term Olympic jobs for the capital (Donovan 2013). Much Olympic-related employment was temporary, part of what Ameeth Vijay (2015: 439) termed the ‘pop-up culture’. This temporariness is part of a longer trend, with temporary job placements rising 7 per cent every year.

The Olympic Games, despite its enormous revenues, makes extensive use of volunteers; 70,000 people served as Games Maker volunteers – 40 per cent of whom volunteered for the first time ever. The ‘Games Makers’ were a feature of the 2012 Games that attracted considerable positive feedback from the public. However, as social analyst Ameeth Vijay



Figure 4.13 Wilderness areas with wildlife.

(2015: 440) recognized, there are wider implications in the volunteer movement, for our attitudes to labour in this age of the growth of the zero-hours contract.

Niloufar Vadiati (2019) found that employment practices for skilled professional jobs ignored the educated population of East London. The Olympic Employment Programme provided no significant skill uplift for locals. There was a tendency to employ at high level people already in network contact with major contractors, who in turn hired their contacts and that the East End was utilized mainly as a source of unskilled labour. In 2016 the LLDC claimed 992 non-construction jobs in the Olympic Park, including 222 in Here East, which was supposed to create 7,500 jobs, with 5,300 on site. Before the Olympics in excess of 5,000 people were working in the area now known as the Olympic Park, whereas it now may be less than 1,000 (Cheyne 2018b).

National legacies

Increasing participation, inspiring the young, and enhancing the health of the nation was a significant theme of the London 2012 bid. Ambitions were high, claims enthusiastic. Funds were committed and organizations established (for example *International Inspiration*, the *Join In Trust*, *Places People Play*, *Sportivate*, the *London Mayor's Participation Programme*, and *Get Set*). So the lack of significant growth in sport participation, despite



Figure 4.14 It was hoped that the Here East building, which was the media centre for the 2012 Games, would subsequently house some major media companies. Tenants include BT Sport and the data company Sports Interactive, as well as UCL, University of Loughborough, and Staffordshire University. On the rear side, small shed-style units designed as studios for artists and craftspeople are not yet fully let.

all these schemes, organizations, and funding is discouraging. The strategy of nurturing elite sport, in the hope medal success leads to participation increases, is flawed. In return for almost £1 billion given to 46 national governing bodies since 2009, just five – athletics, boxing, cycling, mountaineering, and table tennis – achieved a statistically significant increase in the numbers playing every month since the bid was won (Sedghi 2015: 8–9).

Almost 250,000 people stopped taking part in regular activity in the first six months of 2015. In total, 144,200 fewer people visited their local pool in the same period. According to Sport England, the percentage of those on the lowest incomes participating in sport has hit the lowest level since records began in 2005 (Roan, D. 2015). The number of Britons exerting themselves at least once per week fell by 200,000 between 2012 and 2014. The numbers playing sport for at least 30 minutes per week dropped by 125,100 to 15.6 million. The gender gap remains wide – 1.75 million more men than women participate. There has been a decline of 121,700 to 1.58 million in participation in sport for the disabled (*The Guardian* 2015). Meanwhile, Owen Gibson wrote that childhood

obesity rates continue to rise, PE in schools continues to decline, provision of facilities remains frustratingly patchy and participation figures suggest a widening gap between the sporting haves and have nots. (Gibson, O 2015d)

The government austerity programme and curbs on local authority spending have impacted on sport provision. CIPFA (Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accounts) calculates that the local authority budget specifically for sport has fallen by 25 per cent in 5 years. In 6 years Newcastle's budget was cut by 45 per cent, with more to come. In ten years there has been a drop of 729,000 people regularly swimming. After years of growth in physical education fostered by the Labour government, one of Education Secretary Michael Gove's first acts was to abolish the School Sport Partnership, ending £162 million of ring-fenced funding. Gove also removed the requirement for schools to document the amount of time spent on sport, which will make it considerably harder to track developments in future (Sedghi 2015: 8–9). Only 7 per cent of UK children go to private schools, but these schools provided 41 per cent of Team GB in the 2012 Games.

It has been clear for 30 years that sport participation relates to structural aspects – class patterns, gender relations, income inequalities – that are not so easily changed. Campaigns to encourage greater participation place far too much confidence in the ability of medal success to inspire (Conn 2015b).

Once you have declared that there will be a legacy, reports and documents have to be created to confirm that the legacy is happening. To read these reports is to enter an *Alice in Wonderland* world – they have the formal style of impartial and evidence-based studies, yet their rhetorical style is that of the PR company. They are not exercises in rational and independent assessment, but rather exercises in self-delusion, denial, and sleight of hand. As Crompton (2006: 67) has commented, 'most economic impact studies are commissioned to legitimize a political position rather than to search for economic truth'.

Staging a mega-event is not a magic panacea that can resolve problems borne out of long-term structural inequalities. Sport participation for at least the last 30 years has been an uneven process – the affluent participate at higher rates than the poor, the young participate more than the old, men participate at higher rates than women. A succession of government and sport organization initiatives have done little to alter these patterns, which are rooted in social structures, relations, and cultural habits that are not easy to transform. Less visible factors, such as the reduction in local council budgets and school sport, can have a greater impact. For the last 30 years casual exercise (walking, swimming, cycling for leisure) has attracted far greater participation than most organized competitive sport. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this, if the key policy goal is to foster a physically active population. Yet faced with budget reductions of up to 50 per cent over five years, local councils have been cutting to the bone – with libraries, leisure centres, and pools perceived as less damaging cuts than the essential social services. Clearly this will be likely to impact upon swimming participation rates.

Environment

The IOC was slow to adapt to environmental concerns, but in 1996 environmental protection was added to the Olympic Charter and is now incorporated into planning

(Karamichas (2013: 2). Ambitions were high and substantial commitments made, and without doubt, some of the achievements have been impressive. The Stratford site in 2005 was predominantly ramshackle, full of decaying and abandoned industrial structures, disused railway lines, and toxic waste. The River Lea was so polluted that in the memorable words of comedian Rich Hall, ‘you can develop film in it’. In the wake of the Games there is landscaped parkland, with river walks, playgrounds, and trees.

Demolition waste from decrepit buildings that were torn down was recycled. Around 300,000 plants were planted. Over 1,000 new trees were planted in East London (IOC 2012). The Copper Box reduces water use by 40 per cent by recycling rainwater. The velodrome was built with sustainably sourced timber. The building is naturally ventilated, eliminating the need for air conditioning. The Energy Centre employed innovative biomass boilers that burned sustainable fuels. The Commission for a Sustainable London 2012 rated the overall effort ‘a great success’ (IOC 2012). It is hard, though, to have full confidence in the effective and questioning oversight that is provided by a body that defines its own mission as ‘providing assurance’. The commission was hosted by the GLA and was based at City Hall, and was funded by the ODA (30 per cent), GLA (20 per cent), GOE (20 per cent), and LOCOG (30 per cent). So it was housed by and funded by the very bodies for which it is supposed to function as a watchdog. These same bodies decided to wind up the commission in March 2013, a year earlier than originally scheduled. So, this is a watchdog that never had much bite, and has now been put to sleep. The approach to sustainable development is top-down; its operational scope is limited, and civic engagement is narrow. A six-year scheme of construction for a four-week festival of sport cannot lay claim to being the most sustainable Games ever. The concept of a ‘sustainable Games’ is a ‘systemic contradiction of advanced late-modern capitalist democracies’ (Hayes and Horne 2011: 759–761).

Business opportunities and economic impact

Grand claims of economic benefits are made. VISA projected the economic impact of the Games would total £5.3 billion by 2015 (IOC 2012). An Oxford Economics (2012) study estimated that the Games would generate £16.5 billion for the British economy from 2005 to 2017. The IOC claimed expenditure from overseas visitors in August 2012, including Games ticket sales, totalled £4.5 billion, although a rough calculation suggests this makes no sense (IOC 2012). In July 2013, a government report suggested that the Games had already boosted the UK economy by £9.9 billion (BBC 2013a). In 2013, UKTI (government trade and investment), given the task of realizing £11 billion of economic benefit from the Games within four years, announced it had already hit the target. The figures included £130 million supplying goods and services to Brazil and Rio – but how do we know with certainty that these are directly due to London hosting the Games (Hill 2013)?

These claims have been met with scepticism by some economists. Stefan Szymanski said it was impossible to tell how much of the economic activity could be put down to the Games. Jonathan Portes, Director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research and a former Chief Economist at the Cabinet Office, said attributing the economic benefits to the Olympics was ‘a little far-fetched to say the least’. The Federation of Small

Businesses said the impact of the Games had been a disappointment. ‘The contracts we were expecting really didn’t materialise’, said National Policy Chairman Mike Cherry (BBC News 2013b).

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

According to a poll by Freeview for the British Pride Index, three-quarters of UK residents felt proud to be British at the end of the Games. Many speculated that the UK’s success at the Olympics, which 88 per cent of the UK’s population is thought to have watched, was responsible for the surge of national pride (IOC 2012). The feelgood factor is both intangible and short lived. The national unifying euphoria of the Games gave way, within just four years, to the bitter and angry divisions produced by austerity policies, pay freezes, spending cuts, and the 2016 Referendum campaign on EU membership. Seven years have passed and the agenda has moved on. Other issues dominate public discussion and these intangible effects are less significant than they seemed in 2012. The long-standing English failure to understand the loss of empire, to mourn, to comprehend, and to move on, has left the nation in the grip of a post-imperial melancholia, and plunged it into a toxic divide over its relationship with the European Union. For a while it seemed as if the Blairite modernization project might sweep away nostalgic longings, especially around the time of 2012, but it was not to be. Just four years later, the shock vote to leave the EU revealed that post-imperial melancholia was still a significant discursive element in the British political landscape. Jonathon Coe’s (2018) novel *Middle England* catches the process well.

That promises of legacy are not being fully realized are not due to a lack of will, although lack of funds is a problem. The main reasons for inadequate delivery lie in the nature of the promises themselves; for example, the belief that staging an Olympics might magically transform participation patterns that have been relatively stable for 40 years. The low levels of, and unequal patterns of, participation in active physical leisure have proved remarkably resistant to the nudging and urging of social policy and Sport Council campaigning. These patterns have been produced by deep-rooted social and historical forces, not readily dealt with, and certainly not through the impact of a single mega-event.

The Olympic site in 2005, notwithstanding Iain Sinclair’s rather wistful nostalgic desire for the rough chaos of what used to be, could fairly be described as a ruin. It was a tangle of old railway lines, waterways, decaying industrial detritus, and small-scale light industry, heavily polluted with toxic waste. The Olympic Park marks an improvement. If money was targeted at environmental improvement rather than at staging a mega-event, then would it have been more cost effective? Probably. Would the money have been forthcoming? Probably not. East London was and is one of the most socially and economically disadvantaged areas of the country. Aside from the establishment of a pleasant park and a lot of housing, which is largely not affordable by, or designed for, the disadvantaged citizens of the local boroughs, has the Olympics really left a significant impact on the area? Readers who want to explore these complex issues in more detail should turn to the remarkable multi-dimensional study of the area and the Olympics by urban ethnographer Phil Cohen (2013, 2017a, 2017b).

FURTHER READING

Cohen, P. (2013) *On the Wrong Side of the Track? East London and the Post Olympics*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Cohen, P. and Watt, P. (eds) (2017) *A Hollow Legacy? London 2012 and the Post Olympic City*, London: Palgrave.

Sinclair, Iain (2011) *Ghost Milk*, London: Hamish Hamilton.



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PART II

FROM THERE TO HERE



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CHAPTER 5

THE ORIGINS OF THE OLYMPICS

INTRODUCTION

The establishment of the modern Olympic Games in 1896 involved an invention of tradition, in which elements of the Ancient Greek Games, English public school education, nineteenth-century sport festivals, emerging cultures of physical education, and a contemporary French perspective were grafted together. This took place in the context of late nineteenth-century European politics, and particularly the attempts of France to cope with the humiliation of its defeat by German forces in 1870, the year before a united Germany became a nation-state.

The ancient Olympic Games were held every four years for more than 1,000 years, between 776 BC and AD 260, in Olympia in the state of Elis. They continued to be held with some interruptions until AD 393, when the Christian Emperor Theodosius banned pagan festivals, including the Games. They were not the only such events in Ancient Greece – there were Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian games, and many smaller-scale events, but the Olympic Games were the most important and longest lasting (Finley and Pleket 1976: 13). All these games were sacred and religious in character, staged to please the gods such as Apollo and Poseidon; the Olympic Games were dedicated to the god Zeus. They were held at the religious shrine of Olympia, the site of a temple to Zeus with a 40-foot-tall gold, silver, and ivory statue, which was one of the Wonders of the Ancient World. Competitors, trainers, and judges all took an oath before the statue that they would obey the rules. Oxen were sacrificed and victors crowned in front of the statue (Kidd 1984).

The Games were attended by thousands of spectators. Initially only a single sprint of 190m was staged, but the programme gradually expanded to include more foot races, boxing, wrestling, pankration (unarmed combat), and the pentathlon (discus, javelin, jumping, running, and wrestling). There were no team events. Contrary to their mythologizing in the nineteenth century, the Games were not amateur in character – the Ancient Greeks knew no such concept (see Young 1984, 2004: xi). The immediate rewards were limited to the olive wreath of victory, but winners received rich rewards, both in cash and in privileges, when they returned home. An Olympic victory could form a platform to launch a career in politics (Kidd 1984). Some, such as Young, believe this was always the case; others, such as Pleket, maintain that this only became the case in the later era of the ancient Games. Others again attribute growing professionalism to the Roman influence. Evidence is limited and inconclusive (Hill 1992: 7).

Some events would appear extremely violent to us. Combat often continued till death. The events grew out of military training in the context of the warlike and combative culture of Greek life. The Games lasted as long as they did in part because of the principle of the Olympic truce. This required safe passage to be given to all competitors and spectators. It also forbade other states from attacking Elis during the Games, and barred Elis from attacking its neighbouring states. The truce did not prevent wars but it did protect the Olympic Games from disruption by them (Kidd 1984). The economic and political system of Greek city-states was rooted in slavery and patriarchy. They were ruled by small, elite male groups, whose power and wealth were sustained by a slave-based economy. Women, many of whom were slaves, had no political rights. Even when more elaborate forms of 'democracy' began to evolve, most notably in Athens, the dependency on slave labour remained. In the Games, only free males could enter, and women were barred as spectators (Kidd 1984). There were, though, also female sporting contests, such as those honouring the Goddess Hera. Since the excavations of the site of the ancient Games at Olympia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the ancient stadium has become a site of 'pilgrimage', an appropriate term for a movement so committed to ritual and religiosity.

It is important to be wary of generalizations about events which lasted a long time. The most striking and consistent feature which marks the ancient Games as distinct from their modern revival was their pagan religious character, as opposed to the secular ritualized form of the modern Olympic Games. The modern Olympics too, though, do feature elements of reworked neo-pagan ritual, most notably the lighting of the 'sacred' flame from the rays of the sun, the conveying of this flame, by means of a torch relay, to the Olympic site, and the burning of the flame throughout the 15 days of the Games.

REDISCOVERY AND REVIVAL

The collapse of the Roman Empire meant that, in the Western world, knowledge and understanding of the classical world of Greece and Rome declined for many centuries. During the Renaissance there was a period of rediscovery and re-appropriation of Roman and Greek cultures that placed the Latin language and Greek philosophy at the heart of humanist education. Once inscribed at the core of Western education and philosophy, the classical influence remained strong through the Enlightenment and into the nineteenth century. In particular, the reformed English public schools of the mid-nineteenth century placed emphasis on the need to develop mind and body in harmony, inspired by Ancient Greek philosophy. It was out of this that the cult of athleticism developed.

Contrary to myth, the ancient Olympic Games did not disappear from memory until the nineteenth century. Bill Mallon cites a multi-volume book on the Olympic Games, published in 1419, and points out that Shakespeare and Milton both mention the Olympic Games in their work, as do Goethe, Rousseau, and Byron (Mallon, undated). Voltaire referred to the *jeux olympiques* and Flaubert and Gide both used the word *olympique*, although not referring to sport (Mandell 1976: 29; see also Polley 2011). Festivals involving sporting activity had been common across Europe from medieval times. Indeed, multi-sport festivity, far from dying out in the fourth century, had continued to thrive in medieval fairs and festivals (see Brailsford 1969; Malcolmson 1973).

In the seventeenth century, Robert Dover established the Cotswold ‘Olympick Games’, which occurred, with some gaps, for the next 250 years. Robert Dover staged the events, in part, in order to combat the ‘joyless moralism of the Puritans, whom he loathed’ (Kidd 1984). Robert Dover was born in Norfolk, sometime between 1575 and 1582, and died around 1652. He was a barrister, possibly Catholic, but there are few firm facts about his life. It is not clear whether Robert Dover founded or revived the Cotswold Games, but his involvement dates from 1612. The games owed more to the festive traditions of medieval England than they did to any knowledge of the Greek Games. They included singlestick combat, wrestling, cudgelling, dancing, jumping in sacks, and shin-kicking (Williams 2009).

In staging such an annual event, Dover was provoking a puritan backlash, but was able to draw on the support of *The Book of Sports*, an official proclamation, which defended the right of respectable leisure after worship. It was first issued in May 1618 by James I, and reaffirmed in 1633 by Charles I (Williams 2009). The games were terminated during the civil war, but reinstated after the Restoration. They were certainly staged in 1725, and carried on into the nineteenth century. In later years they apparently became quite rowdy and were again terminated, this time by Act of Parliament in 1851. They were revived once more in 1951 in conjunction with the Festival of Britain, and by 1972 were being invoked in discussion as part of a case for the importance of England in reviving the concept of the Olympic Games (Williams 2009: 150–170).

However successful Coubertin’s establishment of the IOC and the modern Olympic Games at the end of the nineteenth century was, it has to be considered in context. It was with the emergence and development of organized sport in its modern forms, from the eighteenth century onwards, that the term ‘Olympic’ began to enter into wider usage. From the mid-eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century, various forms of multi-sport festival were developed – in Greece, Scandinavia, North America, and not least in the UK. The Highland Games tradition of Scotland was revived during the 1820s and spread to North America by the 1850s. Circus-style entertainment incorporating elements of the Roman circus were developed in Paris from the 1820s and in New York in the 1850s. Use of the terms ‘Olympic’ and ‘Olympian’ occurred in Scandinavia in the 1830s, and in Liverpool in the 1860s. More significantly, the Much Wenlock Games were established in Shropshire in 1849 by Dr William Penny Brookes, a significant influence on Coubertin. The Greeks made several attempts to revive Olympic Games from 1859 onwards. So Coubertin’s own project did not develop in a vacuum. Only from the late eighteenth century, with the onset of the industrial revolution, did the rather informal popular sporting cultures of the fair and festival begin to die out, to be replaced in the second half of the nineteenth century by the more organized and regulated games of the reformed public schools (see Bailey 1978; Cunningham 1980).

European sporting cultures

The process by which sport took on organizational forms only developed through struggle and contestation between competing notions of ‘sport’. In eighteenth-century English dictionaries, ‘sport’ meant the field sports of hunting, shooting, and fishing. By 1900, in

Europe the term typically denoted organized sporting contests, with the team games of football, rugby, and cricket prominent. Yet in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the term would either have had no social currency or very different connotations. In the twentieth century, international sport governing bodies, including the IOC, would play a key role in establishing a new dominant understanding of ‘sport’.

Two of the most influential sporting cultures, based partly on different conceptions of gymnastic exercise, were to emerge in Germany and Sweden during the nineteenth century. In the German countries public gymnastic games had been recommended by the hygienic pioneer Johann Peter Frank (1745–1821) as early as 1783 (Borgers (2003)). By the nineteenth century this German gymnastic tradition became the basis for the Turnen Societies, and their pioneering figure Friedrich Jahn, and involved apparatus-based exercises. Johannes Guts-Muths, the father of German gymnastics, who was a formative influence on Friedrich Jahn, wrote about the ancient Games in his *Gymnastik für Jugend* (1793).

In Sweden, the key figure, Ling, favoured free-standing exercise performed in disciplined unison. These two variants of gymnastics, along with the culture of athleticism and team games developed in English public schools from the 1840s, constituted, by the mid-century, three major European traditions of sporting exercise. When Coubertin began his own investigations into the subject of physical education, deeply influenced by his childhood reading of *Tom Brown’s Schooldays*, he favoured, right from the start, the English model. One of the earliest instances of the explicit use of an imagined and idealized ancient Olympism as a model was in Drehberg, outside Wörlitz in eastern Germany. Between 1777 and 1799, Prince Franz staged a festive competition supposedly based on the Olympic Games of antiquity. The games included horse races and gymnastic contests. The contests were based on a model of progressive, child-oriented education, *Das Philanthropin*, devised by the prince. The event also included celebration of Saturnalia, the Roman festival of wild joy (*Industrielles Gartenreich*, undated).

Gutsmuths mentions these festivals as ‘revived Olympic Games’ Borgers (2003). According to Gary Schwartz, the games were part of a pedagogic and social ideal, played by schoolchildren to give ‘a competitive edge to the physical training that was part of their humanistic education’. Schwartz says that the Drehberg fair became famous, drawing thousands of visitors and serving as propaganda for Wörlitz as a model for the world. Goethe attended and recommended it to the entire court of Weimar (Schwartz 2004).

In France in 1796, during the Revolution, ‘Jeux Olympiques’ were staged on the Champ de Mars in Paris (Kidd 1984). ‘Olympic’ games were organized for the students of a Dominican seminary near Grenoble in 1832, and continued to be held every two years until the twentieth century. An early winner, in 1846, was Henri Didon, who subsequently became a priest and, many years later, gave Coubertin the Olympic Motto ‘Citius, Altius, Fortius – Faster, Higher, Stronger’ (Durry, undated). In Sweden, in 1834 and 1836, Gustav Johan Schartau organized sporting events, which he referred to as ‘Olympic Games’, in Ramlosa. Schartau was a disciple of the Swedish gymnastics pioneer Ling and was professor at the Royal Charles Academy in Lund. There was also an ‘Olympic’-styled event in Hungary. Vermes Lajos from Subotica, a landowner, sport enthusiast and athlete, organized sports competitions in which the best sportsmen took

part at Lake Palic between 1880 and 1914, and several sports grounds were specially built (About Palic, undated).

In popular entertainment, as well as in education, the term Olympic was in circulation. In the early nineteenth century, the Cirque des Champs-Élysées, also known as the Cirque Olympique, was an enclosed hippodrome off the Champs-Élysées. The Cirque Olympique subsequently established itself in a building near Temple in 1827. The manager, Louis Dejean (1797–1879), then acquired a new permanent building, the Cirque d’Hiver, to provide a winter base for his touring circus, selling the old Cirque Olympique building in 1847. Located near the Place de la République, the Cirque d’Hiver is the world’s oldest functioning extant circus building, and the company is also the world’s oldest circus still active (Cirque Olympique, undated).

Franconi’s Hippodrome, established in New York in 1853, staged Roman chariot races and Roman circus events. The arena, which held 6,000, was built by American showmen and named after the Italian horseman Antonio Franconi, who, with family members, performed in the Cirque Olympique in Paris. It included an indoor auditorium and an open-air course, around 300m long. As well as horse and chariot races, it featured gymnastics, ostrich races, monkeys, deer, camels, and elephants. Although quite successful, it was demolished in 1859 to make way for the Fifth Avenue Hotel (Franconi’s Hippodrome, undated).

An Olympic Club was created in Montreal in 1842. It staged a two-day ‘Olympic’ games in 1844, which included the first public lacrosse match, featuring aboriginals versus non-aboriginals. However, during the nineteenth century the Scottish ‘Highland Games’ and ‘pedestrianism’ (professional athletics) may have been more influential and popular forms of multi-sport festivity (Rousseau, undated).

In Ireland and Scotland there was a long history of staging multi-sport festivities, which still exists today in the form of the Highland Games (see Jarvie 1991a). These were based on earlier Irish festivals, the Tailteann Games, which are known to date back to the twelfth century. After the years of oppression following the final defeat of the Jacobite rebellion in 1745, in which manifestations of ‘Scottishness’ such as the wearing of the plaid and the speaking of Gaelic were outlawed, the Victorian aristocracy embarked on a reinvention of Scottish tradition, in tartan-drenched form. This was given great impetus by the enthusiasm of Queen Victoria for Scotland, her acquisition of Balmoral, and the subsequent emergence of a culture Jarvie calls ‘Balmorality’. However, the reinvention and re-emergence of Gaelic traditions was already under way when the Celtic Highland Games were revived in the early nineteenth century. The thousands of Irish and Scots who emigrated to North America took these traditions with them, as marked by the staging of ‘Caledonian Games’ in Boston (1853) and New York (1856).

The Much Wenlock Games and the National Olympian Association

By the mid-nineteenth century, then, there are plenty of examples of the use of the terms Olympic or Olympian. At this point, three social themes begin to converge in the work

of a few sporting pioneers. The first is the revival of interest in Ancient Greek culture and in particular the concept of the development of mind and body in harmony. The second is the resultant cult of athleticism developed in the English public schools. The third is the growing concern within the Victorian bourgeoisie with social reform and rational recreation. The Much Wenlock Games, established in 1850 by William Penny Brookes, constituted a more organized and concerted attempt to establish a regular event. Brookes was probably the first person in this period to bring together the idea of the sport-based festivity, the term Olympic, and a revival of Greek philosophical principles. Historian David Young argues that he, rather than Coubertin, might be seen as the founder of the modern Olympics, although it is true, as Macaloon reminds us, that only Coubertin had the international breadth of vision crucial to the project (Young 1996: 12; Macaloon 1981). Hill, more cautiously, regards him as an 'intriguing footnote to world sports history in his own brand of rational recreationist intervention' (Hill 1992: 9–15).

Brookes, born in Much Wenlock in 1809, was the son of a doctor, became a doctor himself, and also, in 1841, became a Justice of the Peace. Like many middle-class gentlemen in this period, he became concerned with social reform and with encouraging rational recreation among the working classes. He founded the Agricultural Reading Society to promote 'useful information' and the 'Olympian Class' (renamed in 1860 the 'Wenlock Olympian Society') to 'promote the moral, physical and intellectual improvement of the inhabitants of the Town and neighbourhood of Wenlock'. Brookes set up the Agricultural Reading Society to encourage people to read as a way of informing their voting, after the 1832 Reform Act extended the franchise. He also wanted to discourage the local population from drinking (Hill 1992: 9). In 1850, he organized the first Much Wenlock Olympic Games. They included athletics, quoits, football, and cricket. Brookes had an interest in Greek culture, but was also possibly aware of and influenced by the Cotswold Games of Robert Dover (see Williams 2009). A classics scholar, Gilbert West, had, in the eighteenth century, written extensively about Pindar's Odes and in the course of this also wrote about Olympism. As Lee (2012) suggests, in terms of the British tradition, he comes between the seventeenth-century establishment of the Cotswold Games by Robert Dover, and the nineteenth-century establishment of the Much Wenlock Games by Dr Penny Brookes. While there are some thematic consistencies between the understanding of Olympism in the writing of Gilbert West and the understanding of Olympism by Penny Brookes, Lee is not able to establish that Penny Brookes read West – although clearly he may well have done so (Lee 2012).

The Olympian Society organized annual games, which gradually came to be more athletic and national in profile. Brookes, as a doctor, sports enthusiast, and rational recreationist, had strong views on the necessity of providing physical education in state schools, and welcomed the 1871 Act in which instruction in drill for up to two hours per week and no more than 20 weeks per year could count as part of school attendance. In the late 1870s Brookes argued for the introduction of Swiss-style gymnastics in schools, and was a vigorous advocate of the values of athletics for the masses:

The encouragement of outdoor exercise contributes to manliness of character.
I say contributes, for true manliness shows itself not merely in skill in athletic

and field sports, but in the exercise of those moral virtues which it is one of the objects of religion to inculcate.

(Cited in Hill 1992: 10)

In 1862, a Liverpool Olympic Festival had been held on the military parade ground, Mount Vernon, the first of six such annual events. The festival was promoted by John Hulley (1832–1875), a gymnasium owner and physical fitness expert, and Charles Melly (1829–1888), a Victorian philanthropist (and an ancestor of jazz singer George Melly). Hulley had been co-founder of the Liverpool Athletic Club. Melly was involved in the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, the Working Men's Improvement Society, 'ragged schools', the Unitarian Mission, and the provision of infirmaries, public parks, playgrounds, and drinking fountains for all (Liverpool Daily Post 2008).

Melly, as an ex-pupil of Rugby School, was a product of the muscular Christianity ethos. Hulley and Melly proposed to revive ideas of physical perfection, drawing on what they knew of the ancient Olympic Games, and, it was claimed, the Liverpool Olympic Festivals 'were organised on the lines of the ancient Greek ones'. According to Ray Physick (2007) around 10,000 people turned up to watch running (120 yards and 300 yards), walking (1.5 miles and four miles), high jump, long jump, pole leap, throwing the disc (discus) and the cricket ball, boxing, wrestling, and gymnastics. The following year the crowds grew to 15,000. A third event, in 1864, was marred by gambling and prostitution, prompting the organizers to move the 1865 event to Llandudno. That same year they were involved in establishing the National Olympian Association. After one more year at Llandudno the Olympic Festival returned to Liverpool for a final year in 1867, which featured over 300 competitors. After this point financial problems meant that no more were staged (Liverpool Daily Post 2008).

Meanwhile, Brookes had organized the third Shropshire Olympics that were combined with the thirteenth Much Wenlock Games (Matthews 2005: 56). Brookes and the National Olympian Association were able to stage the First National Olympian Festival in London in 1866. The first National Olympian Games were organized by William Penny Brookes, John Hulley, and Ernest Ravenstein of the German Gymnastic Society (GGS) in London. Ravenstein managed the games, and many of the several nationals belonging to the GGS took part in the games, as did cricketer W.G. Grace (Anthony 1986). A second National Olympian Games were held in Birmingham in 1867, with a third in Wellington, Shropshire the following year.

The German Gymnasium, Kings Cross, London, built by the German Gymnastic Society in 1864, was the first purpose-built gymnasium in the United Kingdom. Ernst Revenstein, an organizer of the first National Olympian Games in London in 1866, was a president of the society.

But the embryonic Olympic movement in Britain was crushed by the rise of the Amateur Athletic Club (AAC), which, concerned to exclude the lower orders, introduced the famous clause excluding 'mechanics, artisans and labourers'. The AAC opposed the National Olympics and after 1868 only the Wenlock Olympic Games continued in England (Matthews 2005: 58). After a long, drawn-out struggle between various aspirants

to control and define both athletics and amateurism, a compromise was engineered by a group from Oxford and Cambridge who persuaded the supporters of the AAC to drop the commitment to the exclusion of the working class, but to retain the concept of amateur sportsmen, excluding any form of professionalism (see Lovesey 1979). The resultant formation of the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) produced a template for the distinction between amateur and professionalism that was copied by many other sports, and came to constitute a taken-for-granted reality among the bourgeois gentlemen who formed subsequent organizations. Brookes worked hard to promote the Olympic idea from 1850 until his death, which was, ironically, in 1895, one year before the first modern Olympic Games (Matthews 2005: 57). A fourth National Olympian Games took place in 1874 in Much Wenlock, followed by a fifth in 1877 in Shrewsbury, and a final one in Hadley in 1883.

Morpeth also appropriated the Olympic name in 1883 for its annual Morpeth Games. The Morpeth Olympic Games involved Cumberland and Westmorland and featured wrestling and professional athletics. They took place regularly between 1881 and 1959, originally as a one-day event, but by 1912 popularity prompted their extension to a second day (McCusker 2008). The area in which they were staged has been marked by street names – Olympia Hill and Olympia Gardens – and a local shop called Olympia Stores, which was recently closed and converted into flats (Morpeth Herald 2010). Unlike the Olympic festivals in which Brookes was involved, this cannot be regarded as a significant forerunner of the Olympic Games. It does, however, contribute to the accumulating instances from the late eighteenth to late nineteenth centuries of the common use of the term Olympic to denote a multi-sport festival.

Greece, Soutsos, and Zappas

The politics of the soil alone would seem to give the Greeks a privileged claim to ‘ownership’ of the concept of the Olympic Games. Coubertin was alert enough to this to recognize the symbolic importance of staging the first Games in Greece, but the relationship of Coubertin and the IOC to Graecian proprietorial claims was always an uncomfortable one. Coubertin, who in the end wished to be the father of the event, paid more credit to Dr Brookes than to Zappas and the other Greek pioneers. Later, when the second and third Olympic Games were shambolic, Coubertin was grateful to the Greeks for staging an interim or ‘intercalated’ games, but had no desire to encourage a regular Greece-based event. For the hundredth anniversary year in 1996, the IOC, in the view of many, chose mammon over tradition in awarding the Games to Atlanta; subsequent guilt, Greek righteous anger, and strong lobbying prompted them to make amends by awarding the 2004 Games to Athens. The Greek attempts at revival during the nineteenth century have been the subject of contestation and debate by historians ever since.

The growing interest in Ancient Greece in general, and the Olympic Games in particular, was fuelled by archaeology and excavation of some of the key sites, including Troy, Mycenae, and Olympia. The idea of excavating to unearth the site of the ancient Olympics was mooted in the eighteenth century, and the site was discovered by excavations in 1766, with additional early excavations in 1787. There were further excavations by the

French in 1829, and a real breakthrough by German archaeologists in 1852. The first excavations on a major scale, though, did not take place until 1875 and, after a decade of extensive work, an archaeological museum was opened on the site in 1886. The 1889 'Exposition Universelle' in Paris included models of the excavations.

Young considers the idea of a Greek revival to commence with Panagiotis Soutsos, a poet, publisher, and patriot. From 1833 onward, his poems alluded to the Olympic Games. In 1835 he contacted the government to propose that 25 March be made a national holiday in celebration of the War of Independence, and that the celebration should include a revival of the Olympic Games. His proposal envisaged a four-year cycle, with the Games staged in four Greek cities. There was no immediate response, but in 1838 the town of Letrini established a committee to revive the Olympics, although no such event took place. Soutsos continued his campaign through the 1840s, but further developments were due to the work of Evangelos Zappas (see Young 1996).

Evangelos Zappas (1800–1865) was a wealthy landowner and businessman of Greek ancestry. In early 1856, he proposed a permanent revival of the Olympic Games, and offered to finance the project. The first of the Zappas Olympic Games was held in 1859. He also provided funds for the eventual restoration of the ancient Panathenaic Stadium, although this was not completed until after his death. Zappas-inspired Olympic Games were staged in Athens in 1859, 1870, 1875, and 1889, with varying degrees of success. In 1859 Dr William Penny Brookes was in contact with Greece, sending £10 to be presented to the winner of an event in the Olympian Games. Brookes, corresponding via the British Ambassador, also urged the Greek government to revive the ancient Games.

The 1870 Games in the restored stadium were the most successful of the Zappas Olympics, with over 30,000 spectators, and enthusiastic reviews in the newspapers. Members of Athens' elite then suggested that the Games should be restricted to athletes from the upper class and that the general public be banned. This social exclusion damaged the 1875 Games, which attracted only 24 athletes and small crowds. Young (1996) called the 1875 Zappas Olympics a 'disaster'. The next event in 1889 was a badly run event in a gymnasium, and in 1891 and 1893 the Pan-Hellenic Gymnastic Society took up the baton. The Zappas Olympic Games and the Much Wenlock Olympian Games were more important staging posts on the road to full revival than many of the other events, which merely utilized the Olympic word.

Coubertin, the French, and the English

So, during the nineteenth century, the term 'Olympic' was coming into more common usage, and multi-sport events were being staged, not least in the UK and Greece. Public contests, sometimes named 'Olympic', were an element of the many new national festivals spreading over Europe. For Pierre de Coubertin, these references to ancient Olympia were part of the surviving idea of the Olympic Games and he mentioned them in his writings (Borgers 2003). That Coubertin's model was ultimately the one that became dominant was due to a combination of circumstances. Coubertin's own determination, his organizational and diplomatic skills, and his social contacts were central. His early exposure to and romantic obsession with the world of English school sport, as portrayed

by Thomas Hughes in *Tom Brown's Schooldays* – which Coubertin first read in 1875, when he was 12 – was significant. All this, though, must be set in the context of social and political factors. The Olympic Games were only one manifestation of the emergence of modern organized spectator sport that had been growing for 100 years, but was by the late nineteenth century becoming a more significant form of leisure activity. Sport and the modern media began their fateful interaction around the time that the first modern Olympic Games were staged. In this sense the emergence and success of the modern Olympic Games were in part the outcome of social processes beyond the ability even of as striking a figure as Coubertin to manage. Sport acquired national and then international governance between 1860 and 1920. Regular international competitions (such as the Football World Cup) were established. It seems inevitable that some form of international multi-sport event would have evolved. Coubertin's distinctive contribution consists of the construction of this in the form of Olympism, which combined ritual, festival and spectacle, ethical principles, and a particular organizational form (see Chatziefstathiou and Henry 2012).

One needs to understand the emergence of sport in relation to modernity and capitalism, and particularly in relation to the period from 1880 to 1914. What was going on during this time? It marked the pinnacle and final moment of grandeur for the British Empire, before its challenge by new rising powers such as Germany and the USA, and its ultimate eclipse. It marked the rise of Germany, formed in 1871, and the rise of German power, provoking new alliances and rivalries in Europe. It marked the rise of American power towards its dominance of the world economy. The British historian Asa Briggs (1991) identified it as the period of the birth of mass entertainment. The spread of literacy, wireless telegraphy, development of a mass circulation popular press, and the emergence of cinema from the mid-1890s were all factors. Branded goods had become more common, distributed more effectively by the new chain stores. A revolution in advertising was bringing brand names to the domestic vocabulary.

This period fostered the birth of modern sport – the establishment of governing bodies, agreed rules, competitions, stadiums, and spectatorship. To an extent this can be seen as a process of a rationalizing modernity – bureaucratized, systematized, institutionalized, rule-governed, and subject to quantification (Guttmann 1978). In its routine separation of performer and spectator, it also established the structural bases for the commercialization and commodification of sport that became such a central part of the Olympic story from the 1970s onwards. From the late nineteenth century, sport was also in the forefront of globalizing processes – some of the first international bodies were sport-related ones such as the IOC, the IAAF, and the ILTF. National and international competitions grew in scope and ambition, most notably with the establishment of the modern Olympic Games in 1896.

But if it was a world that was becoming more globalized, it was certainly not a flat world, and this process was not a neutral one. The very technologies and infrastructures of communication inscribed the dominance of the major imperial powers. Telegraph lines linked the peripheries of empires to their core centres in Paris and London – so it was, for example, easier for Ghana to contact London than neighbouring Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso).

BOX 5.1 BARON PIERRE DE COUBERTIN

Pierre de Coubertin (1863–1937) born in Paris in 1863, the fourth child of an aristocratic Catholic family. Educated at Jesuit schools and colleges, he completed a Bachelor of Science degree in 1881. His interest in education and sport led him to his life's project, reviving the Olympic Games. He was married in 1895 to Marie Rothan, from a Protestant family (who lived until 1963, when she was 102). In later years Coubertin suffered financial problems and the family home had to be sold. He died in 1937 at the age of 74.

Sport diffusion was strongly linked to the structure of empires (cricket and rugby spread to British Empire countries and almost nowhere else). By comparison, soccer – increasingly rejected by the British bourgeoisie in favour of rugby – was spread by skilled tradesmen, engineers, etc. to South America and elsewhere but not to the British Empire countries. The old imperial rivalries between Britain and France were replayed in sport as each country sought to be a dominant organizing force, with greater success going to the French. Despite American economic power, its own sports, lacking the support of an established imperial network, did not export successfully. Indeed, the cultures of sport in the US were characterized by the establishment of a distance from Europe, and the construction of a distinctive American-ness.

The myths of origin around baseball and American football minimized and marginalized their European sources. International sporting organization was largely forged by English and French elites. So it was in this period that the modern world – the world of the twentieth century – was largely forged and, with it, modern spectator sport and the roots of media sport.

Coubertin's own youthful world was one in which a mood of national shame prevailed. The impact of the defeat of France on 1 September 1870 at the battle of Sedan, less than eight weeks after Napoleon III had declared war on Prussia, was considerable. On 4 September 1870 France became a republic again, and the following year France lost Alsace and Lorraine as Germany became a united nation and a threat of growing significance to France. Coubertin was greatly concerned at what he regarded as the physical degeneracy of French youth, especially when compared to the well-trained and disciplined German youth. His lifelong concern for education, and in particular physical education, was shaped by this formative moment.

The novel *Tom Brown's Schooldays* was to have a great influence on the growing cult of athleticism, and on the thinking of Coubertin, who read it as a boy and re-read it as an adult. According to Mangan, Coubertin was inspired not so much by the actual headmaster, Dr Arnold, as by the version of him that existed only in the imagination of Thomas Hughes. In *L'Education en Angleterre* (1888), Coubertin testified to an absolute belief in the English boarding school system (Mangan 1981: 130). The association of sport and moral education became a significant element in Coubertin's re-articulation of Olympism. It was not just an obsessive admiration for the Hughes version of Arnold,

though – more generally, Coubertin was something of an Anglophile, who was also heavily influenced by Hippolyte Taine’s *Notes sur Angleterre* (1872).

Coubertin combined, sometimes uneasily, a very real commitment to internationalism with a deep concern for France and its education system. He also had pacifist sympathies (see Quanz 1993). He was influenced by the work of social theorist Frédéric LePlay, who, concerned at the impact of class division, sought means to restore peace and harmony (see Guttmann 1992: 7). He believed that sporting competition between all the nations of the world could lead to mutual understanding and respect between individuals of different nations, races, and social positions (Charpentier and Boissonnade 1999: 32). John Macaloon, in a preface to a new edition of *This Great Symbol*, acknowledges that Dietrich Quanz demonstrates close ties between the Olympic movement and the international peace movement. He agrees with Quanz’s speculation that the organizational design of the new IOC owed something to the International Peace Bureau. Macaloon (2006a) comments that:

At a time of worry that the new IOC regime in Lausanne is turning away from formal relations with peace organizations and with universities under the pressure of or in preference to its sports business responsibilities, it is important to be reminded of how inseparable educational sport, international understanding and peace activism were at the outset for the modern Olympic Games.

Coubertin believed that the classic gymnasia of Ancient Greece (basically sports fields rather than modern enclosed buildings) enabled a triple unity: between different sporting disciplines, between young and old, and between practical and theoretical approaches (Hill 1992: 6). In turn, this last point relates to the Greek notion of developing mind and body in harmony, which also underpinned the development of athleticism in the English public schools of the nineteenth century. For Coubertin, this did not involve a unity of men and women; while in favour of greater social equality, Coubertin did not extend this to gender, and to the end he was hostile to the involvement of women as competitors.

Coubertin visited England several times during the 1880s to study the educational system. In 1883 he visited Oxford and Cambridge and also the public schools of Rugby, Harrow, and Eton. Confusingly, in England the term ‘public school’ refers to a fee-paying school, although in practice the term is reserved for the elite schools that first flourished during the nineteenth century as the means of educating the sons of the social elite. They were ‘public’ in contrast to the earlier aristocratic tradition of educating children at home. The public schools were originally largely aristocratic, but, following the reforms of the 1840s, became increasingly popular with the new Victorian bourgeoisie. Other fee-paying schools of lesser status are generally referred to as private schools. The schools that in other societies would be known as public schools are called in the UK ‘state schools’. Free state education began to develop in the 1870s following the 1870 Education Act. Throughout the twentieth century the dominant proportion of the political class in the UK were educated at public schools. After a more egalitarian shift – with the prime ministers Heath, Callaghan, Thatcher, and Major all products of state schools – the UK appears to have reverted to tradition with Tony Blair, David Cameron, and Boris Johnson all educated in public schools.

BOX 5.2 TOM BROWN'S SCHOOLDAYS, BY THOMAS HUGHES

The novel *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, by Thomas Hughes, is identified in many British sport histories as an emblematic text, representing the emergence of the cult of athleticism and the ethos of muscular Christianity. The popularity of the book led to an over-emphasis on the importance of Rugby School and of its headmaster, Thomas Arnold. The new Victorian bourgeoisie were preoccupied by the ever-present danger of lower-class unrest. Arnold was haunted by visions of mob violence, chaos, and revolution, and lay awake at night contemplating the ever-growing crowds of workers demanding parliamentary reform (Gathorne-Hardy 1977: 80–81).

Thomas Hughes (1822–1896) was the son of a paternalistic Tory who sent him to Rugby School. He became an active Christian Socialist and muscular Christian, organizing gymnastics, boxing, rowing, and cricket at the Working Men's College (Lowerson 1993: 158). His one successful novel, *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, was hugely popular with the middle-class families who were being attracted by the new reformed public schools and it had a significant influence on the subsequent growth of the cult of athleticism. In the book, Tom, reduced on his first day to a 'motionless body' by a rugby scrum, is nonetheless transformed by the end of the tale into an active and rounded person – thus boys were turned into men through the process of schooling.

Hughes' fictionalized version of Dr Arnold differs significantly from Arnold himself. There is little evidence that Arnold directly and deliberately promoted cricket and football for their educational value (McIntosh 1952: 30). He had only a mild interest in the games themselves, but encouraged them as part of his new regime of power, based on a reformed prefect and fagging system, with Christian morality and social responsibility at its core. Hughes' rather humanized and jolly portrayal of Arnold's regime was 'made rosy by nostalgia' (Birley 1993: 209–210). However, the masters and prefects under his influence took to athleticism with a growing enthusiasm (Holt 1989: 80), although Mangan establishes clearly that the real seed-bed of athleticism was at other public schools, such as Uppingham (Mangan 1981). By the 1860s, Birley suggests, sport was seen as 'the great character-builder on which the nation depended to train its leaders' (Birley 1993: 286). The 1860s saw the introduction of games masters, professional coaches, and inter-house and inter-school competitions. Mangan suggests that parents and masters alike subscribed to the ethical value of games as a source of good sense, noble traits, manly feelings, generous dispositions, gentlemanly deportment, and comradely loyalty (Mangan 1981: 132).

Many accounts of the period emphasize the commitment to developing sound minds and healthy bodies, and its roots in classical Greece. Yet in *Tom Brown* we also see the traces of an English philistinism – a lack of interest in the cultivation of the intellect. Social Darwinism – in which life is conflict, strength comes through

struggle, and success is the prerogative of the strong – became more influential in the second half of the nineteenth century. There was a gulf between the constructed image of the schools and the brutality of existence within them (Adapted from Whannel 1999; see also Mangan 1987: 139–142).

By 1887 Coubertin had also gained knowledge of Winchester, Wellington, Marlborough, Charterhouse, Coopers Hill, Westminster, and Christ's Hospital. He contrasted the lack of physical education in French schools with active physical activity in English schools. He became an ardent campaigner and lobbyist, visiting the UK and US to produce reports for the French government on physical education. His report on the US represented America as a place where the gymnastic systems of Jahn and Ling were being rejected in favour of British team games (see Coubertin 1890 for an account of Coubertin's trip to the US, and American education). In the light of his passionate advocacy of the British system, this perspective cannot be taken as neutral, balanced, or dispassionate (see also Coubertin 1917, which contains material on English education, Arnold, and sport).

Coubertin knew and understood diplomacy, and made elaborate manoeuvres to build political allies. A keen rower, Coubertin visited Henley Royal Regatta. He was impressed by the Henley organization, which he described as 'three concentric circles' – the nucleus, the nursery, and the façade. This distinguished those who were deeply committed, those who could be educated to the cause and those whose position and influence could be useful. This model was used as the basis of the IOC constitution (Anthony 1997) and indeed still serves as a characterization of the way the IOC operates today. When planning the Paris Congress that established the IOC, Coubertin was politically astute enough to include dignitaries from Scotland, Wales, and Ireland as well as England.

In 1881 Brookes visited France and was so taken aback by the physical degeneracy of the population that he wrote to the French government on the subject (Hill 1992: 11). In January 1890 Brookes wrote to Coubertin, they commenced a correspondence and in October Coubertin visited Brookes in Much Wenlock (Hill 1992: 11–13). Brookes was then aged 80, while Coubertin was only 26. Brookes and Coubertin continued to correspond, Brookes lending his support to the Olympic project. In 1890, Coubertin wrote in *La Revue Athlétique* that, 'If the Olympic Games that Modern Greece has not yet been able to revive still survives today, it is due, not to a Greek, but to Dr W. P. Brookes.' (www.wenlock-olympian-society.org.uk/william-penny-brookes/wpb-book.shtml (last accessed 12 August 2010)).

Coubertin invited Brookes to the 1894 Congress but he was too ill to attend and died the following year, missing his dreamed-of Olympic revival by just one year. It is also clear that Coubertin knew of the work of Zappas. According to some assessments, Coubertin subsequently tended to gloss over and minimize the role of his predecessors, Zappas and Brookes. He did, though, write an obituary of Brookes for the *New York Review of Books*, in which Brookes is described as his 'oldest friend' (Anthony 1986).

In England, the fears of the bourgeoisie of the threat from the 'lower orders' and their desire to maintain social distinction had led to the development of a sharp division between amateur and professional sport. In governing bodies for sport, professionals were either excluded altogether, as was the case with athletics, rowing, and tennis, or had their inferiority marked, as was the case with golf and cricket. Only the Football Association, faced with the huge popularity of professional football and the threat of a breakaway, had been forced to compromise and admit professionalism. Rugby, by contrast, ended by splitting into two distinct sports, one professional and one amateur. Coubertin was certainly concerned about the commercialization of sport, which he saw as a threat, and he shared the values and orientations of the world of aristocratic links and gentlemen's clubs in which amateurism was a taken-for-granted feature of sporting contestation. However, he never regarded amateurism as the most vital issue. Nevertheless, the modern Olympic Games inherited and enshrined for the next 90 years a concept of 'amateur' born of class discrimination. It was during the presidency (1952–1972) of Avery Brundage that the issue came to a head, and only in the 1980s, when the widespread payment of athletes could no longer be ignored, did the IOC move to neutralize the issue by making it a concern of the individual sport federations rather than of the IOC.

At the same time that Coubertin's plans for the IOC and the first Olympic Games were beginning to crystallize, so were plans for a multi-sport event linking British Empire countries. This scheme, with roots in imperial power and racism, was developed by John Astley Cooper, who began proposing a Pan-Britannic Festival in print in 1891. This idea was overtaken by the modern Olympic Games, but it sowed the seeds of the idea that resurfaced as the 'Empire Games'. Indeed, Cooper and Coubertin met in the early 1890s to discuss these matters, but Cooper's essentially racist and imperialist vision cannot have appealed to Coubertin. Cooper's ideas combined:

several important aspects of life – culture, industry and athletics in a grandiose festival celebrating the British race. The concept implied, but did not explicitly state, that the race was superior; Cooper asked if Britons were ready to undertake 'actions for the benefit of mankind which may make the name of England to be sung for all time as an example to races yet to come'.

(Moore 1987: 146)

It is clear, according to Moore, that Cooper's idea was intended to include 'only adult males from the so-called white Dominions – Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa as well as those subjects eligible in Great Britain' (Moore 1987: 148). In the event, the Empire Games were first staged in 1930 in Hamilton, Ontario, at a moment when the relationship between the UK and the old 'white' Empire countries was being reshaped. Historian Richard Holt commented that 'the loosening bonds of Empire came at the same time as new economic pressures were being placed upon the relationships between the Dominions and Britain' (quoted in Phillips 2000: 5).

The subsequent trajectory of the Empire Games makes an interesting contrast with the Olympic Games – the very title of the event, unlike that of the World Cup or the Olympic Games, had to keep changing to match contemporary political realities. Until 1950 it was

the 'British Empire Games', after which it became the 'British Empire and Commonwealth Games'. In 1970 the embarrassment of 'Empire' was dropped, and the games became the 'British Commonwealth Games'. Four years later, in a symbolic deterritorialization, 'British' was dropped and the event became the 'Commonwealth Games' (see Moore 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991). The huge success of the Olympic Games and subsequently both the World Cup and football's continental championships has reduced the status of the Commonwealth Games immensely – but none of this could be foreseen in 1890.

The 1889 exhibition, the 1894 congress, and the 1896 Games

During the 1880s, Coubertin's commitment to educational reform, his research into physical education and his interest in the concept of reviving the Olympic Games were converging. The international exhibition of 1889, in many respects a republican festival of the centenary of the French Revolution, with a combination of civilized nationalism and internationalism, served to inspire Coubertin. It contained the nucleus of the Olympic idea: persisting individual efforts, integrated in a civilized nationalism, displayed in an international festival that is controlled by an independent organization (Borgers 2003). Coubertin organized the first Congress on Physical Exercises at the 1889 exhibition, and subsequently was sent to the United States by the French Government athletic organizations. It was on this trip that he is believed to have mentioned for the first time his plan to revive the Olympic Games (Borgers 2003). The first International Peace Congress was also staged in Paris in this period, and there were close links between late-nineteenth century peace campaigners and Coubertin's nascent Olympic project (Borgers 2003).

In the last decade of the nineteenth century the long gestation of Coubertin's thinking came to fruition. At a conference at the Sorbonne in 1892, he spoke with eloquence about the project of re-establishing the Olympic Games (Charpentier and Boissonnade 1999: 29–33). Coubertin utilized the fifth anniversary of the Union des Sociétés Françaises de Sports Athlétiques (USFSA) in 1892 to propose the project of reviving the Games. He ensured that at the 1893 General Assembly, the society would stage a congress to discuss the project further (Hill 1992: 18). He then discovered a general lack of enthusiasm for the revival of the Games and was forced to recast the proposed congress as being primarily about amateurism, with the Olympics as a side issue. He was, however, able to recruit two strong supporters, Charles Herbert, the secretary of the English AAA, and Professor William Sloane of Princeton University (Hill 1992: 19–20). In the event, the 1894 Congress established the IOC and instigated the planning of the first modern Olympic Games, to be staged in Athens in 1896. The choice of Athens is the subject of considerable confusion. Evidence from the minutes suggests that delegates favoured London. Young suggests that Coubertin, having himself determined in advance upon Athens, manoeuvred to ensure this outcome (Young 1996: 100–105).

The 1894 Congress was attended by 79 delegates, representing 49 organizations from 12 countries (Mandell 1976: 86). The meeting was, not surprisingly, heavily European, with Australia and the US the only non-European countries represented. In the event, the first IOC had 13 members, all male. There were two each from Great Britain and France, and one each from Italy, Greece, the Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary, Norway–Sweden,

and Bohemia. There were three non-European members, from the US, New Zealand, and Argentina. The IOC was established as a body whose members did not represent any external body, nor were they answerable to any external institution. The IOC alone was the owner of the Olympic Games, and the custodian of 'Olympism'. It determined to have regular congresses every few years, along with annual meetings referred to as 'Sessions'. The IOC's rules call on it to guide modern sport into desirable channels and promote the development of those fine physical and moral qualities which are the basis of sports.

The heart of Coubertin was entombed in a monument in Olympia, which has become another site of Olympic pilgrimage. Students and their professors from all over the world attend the annual International Olympic Academy, and a visit to the Coubertin memorial is obligatory.

CONCLUSION

In the establishment of a new regular event, symbols, myths, narratives, and an imagined history are all important. From the start, certain traditions were invented. There was an opening ceremony, with a key ritualized opening phrase. Winners got a silver medal and an olive wreath, and runners up a copper medal and a laurel wreath. National flags were hoisted at victory ceremonies. Coubertin derived the 'Faster, Higher, Stronger' motto from an 1891 speech by the Dominican priest Father Henri Didon. The Olympic Oath taken by competitors was first written by Coubertin in 1906, but was not utilized until 1920. The Olympic Village, the Olympic flame, and the Olympic torch relay did not appear until much later. That there was a substantial mythologizing of the Ancient Greek Games has long been clear. Where blemishes in Olympic 'purity' are acknowledged this is often ascribed to the malign and decadent influence of the Romans in the later period of the ancient Games. An English Olympian, Theodore Cook, manages, with patrician grandeur, to link the supposed commercialism of the Romans with late nineteenth-century sporting professionalism:

But we may at least remember that the ancient Games of Greece were only ruined by the professionals of the late Roman Empire, that there was once a time when athletic energy did not imply limited liability companies, when first-rate games did not depend on gate money for their existence.

(Cook 1908: x)

In Athens in 1896 there were 81 athletes from 12 countries, and another 230 athletes from Greece, in nine disciplines and 43 events. The Games also included the marathon, devised by the French philosopher Michel Breal shortly after the Congress of 1894 (Durry, undated). There were nine sports: cycling, fencing, gymnastics, lawn tennis, shooting, swimming, athletics, weightlifting, and wrestling. So both the organization and the Games were almost entirely European, but Coubertin was keen to get his show on the road. Coubertin did not expect the Greeks to be capable of staging the Games but was convinced by Dimetrias Bikelas that it could be done. In the event, once the Greeks secured the Games, they tended to sideline Coubertin, who was upset not to be more involved.

He was further put out when the official account only mentioned him once, although he retaliated by proclaiming of the Olympics, in his own introduction to the report: 'I claim its paternity with raised voice.' The King of Greece wanted to have the Games permanently sited in Greece and Coubertin had to utilize his diplomatic skills in proposing a separate Pan-Hellenic Games, spaced between the Olympics. In the event this only happened in 1906 (Hill 1992: 20–25). By the 1920s Coubertin had come to believe that his project to promote moral education through sport had not been successful: in a 1928 speech to the International Bureau of Sports Pedagogy at the University of Lausanne he blamed educators for failing to use sport to create a moral culture (Brown 2012: 160).

The question of whether Coubertin, Brookes, Zappas, or indeed others have the best claim to be the key figure is in the end not crucial, although clearly Coubertin has by far the strongest claim to have formed and shaped modern Olympism. The modern Olympics came into being because of the energetic work of all these figures, but the project was successful because the combination of circumstances was favourable. Indeed, it seems inevitable that some form of international sporting event would have been created. What is of greater interest is the particular manner in which this happened, allowing the IOC, itself a very peculiar organizational form, ownership over such a powerful symbolic cultural event.

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CHAPTER 6

INTERNATIONALISM AND NATIONALISM AT THE OLYMPICS

INTRODUCTION

The Olympic Games were conceived partly as an international meeting ground, and the first International Olympic Committee (IOC) contained several figures who also played an active role in international peace organizations. Yet, from the start, tensions and rivalries between nations disrupted the internationalist aspirations of Olympism. Indeed, from the earliest years, for a combination of pragmatic, political, and cultural reasons, national-based structures, practices, and rituals began to develop. National flags, teams, uniforms, anthems at the victory ceremonies, and the ‘unofficial’ medal tables in the media all contributed to an image of the Olympic Games as a symbolic contest between nations. A good example is a page from the *Daily Mirror* (27 July 1908) published at the end of the first ‘Summer Olympics’ held in London that contained an image of ‘The Olympic Ladder’ and the caption:

How the nations stand in the Olympic contests which have taken place both at the Stadium and elsewhere may be seen at a glance from the above ladder. The hands of the athletes are grasping the rungs corresponding with the number of events in which their countries have been victorious. Thus the United Kingdom leads with 38 wins, followed by the United States with 22.

(Reference courtesy of The British Library, London)

Hanging on in third place with ‘7 wins’ was Sweden. In fact, during the 1908 Games there were several acrimonious disputes between British and American officials. The 1936 Games became notorious as the ‘Nazi Olympics’, and in the Cold War era the Games became a symbolic battleground between East and West, communism and capitalism. The IOC also had to manage divided societies in Germany, Korea, and China; Middle East tensions associated with the establishment of Israel and displacement of the Palestinians; the impact of decolonization and establishment of emergent independent nations; and the demands for the isolation of South Africa over apartheid. This chapter examines the inherent contradictions between internationalism and national organization, outlining the development and management of political tensions by the Olympic movement.

Since the end of the Second World War, being a *nation* in the modern world has come to be signified by two things: belonging to the United Nations and marching in the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. However, it is clear around the world that the status

of nations and states is subject to contestation. Ireland, Catalonia, the Basque country, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the two Koreas, Palestine, and Belgium provide diverse examples of the disputed nature of national boundaries and state authority.

What constitutes a 'nation'? In different contexts (the League of Nations, the UN, the IOC) different criteria and definitions of nation have been applied. Interestingly, the IOC has a longer list (206) than the UN (193): currently 13 'nations' are included in the IOC but not the UN. Many of these can be seen as unresolved issues in decolonization. These include British territories (Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands); US territories (American Samoa, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Virgin Islands); one Dutch territory (Aruba), and one New Zealand territory (Cook Islands). Of the remaining, two are linked to China (Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong) and the others are Palestine and Kosovo. Indeed, achieving IOC recognition can be seen by some nations as a step on the road to full independence. A nation, Benedict Anderson famously argued, is an imagined community – not a natural product of geographical boundary, or linguistic unity, but a construction by practices of mapping, naming, identifying, and narrativizing (Anderson 1983). Although the nation-state is now generally taken for granted as the primary legal entity into which the world is divided, the primacy of the nation-state is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Over the last few centuries, empires controlling multiple nations have been a significant element in geopolitical organization and before that city-states had considerable power in many parts of the world. The rise of the nation-state took place during the nineteenth century and is neither permanent nor unchallenged.

The apparent fixity of nation-states is an illusion. Many nations that now exist did not have national status in 1896, and some that existed then, do not now. Even in supposedly stable Europe the pace of change has been dramatic. Germany and Italy are less than 150 years old, and Germany was a divided nation between 1945 and 1990. The Soviet Union welded a set of diverse nations together between 1922 and 1991. After both world wars in the twentieth century the boundaries of Europe and the Middle East were redrawn by the victorious powers. Some nations disappeared, others came into being. The collapse of empires (the Austro-Hungarian, the Ottoman, and the British) produced new independent nations. Some nations (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) have been created *and* ceased to exist since 1918. The re-Balkanization of the last two decades has seen the return to statehood of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia. Around the world, national boundaries are under challenge, from regional and local forces, from competing national, linguistic, ethnic or religious forces. In countries such as South and North Korea, Ireland, and Belgium, separate and competing visions of nation remain unreconciled. By contrast, some nations once divided by war (North and South Vietnam) have become reunified. In some countries, regional demands for independence are strongly asserted, such as in Spain (Catalonia, Basque) and China (Tibet). In some countries there are strong antagonisms between the main nation-state and a former part of it that has become independent (China and Taiwan). Some 'nations', such as Kosovo, have declared their status as nation-states, but have yet to achieve wider recognition or legitimacy.

It could be argued that the IOC has been not simply reflecting this process, but playing an active role as constructor – not least because appearance as a nation on the Olympic

stage helps advertise an identity and confer a legitimacy. The German Democratic Republic and Cuba, for example, had explicit policies to utilize the Olympic Games to buttress their visibility and legitimacy on the world stage. The battle to isolate South Africa focused on the Olympic Games because of the event's global prominence and symbolic power. The presence of Palestine as an Olympic 'nation' carries a powerful message to the world, while Israeli authorities have tried hard to undermine its legitimacy.

The IOC has from the start been caught within tensions of its own making, between its internationalist aspirations and its nation-based structures and rituals. Indeed, despite his internationalism, Coubertin's own ambitions were also shaped by the humiliation inflicted on France by Germany in 1870–1871, when Alsace Lorraine was annexed. Coubertin's interest in physical education was not unconnected to the need to rebuild French power. Yet Coubertin's vision was also internationalist. The IOC was one of the earlier organizations with global aspirations. Once the IOC was established, many other sports acquired governing bodies during the subsequent two decades (for example IAAF, FIFA, ILTF). The IOC has always been opposed to, and has never endorsed, the concept of medal tables, ranking nations by success. However, the media have always offered such tables and seek to dramatize the Games as a contest of prowess between nations. Indeed, national belongingness and national identity constitute prime means by which audiences around the world engage with the Games.

Conceptions of the world do not exist independently of power relations. From the fifteenth century, voyages of exploration by the dominant nations of Europe enabled, in Europe, a Eurocentric mapping of the world, which contributed to Western constructions of their own global imaginary. The aspiring colonial powers conceived of the rest of the world as territory to plunder, and peoples to exploit and enslave. Closely linked to the expansion of territory through empire-building, the religions – especially Christianity and Islam – had always sought to expand their base of adherents, and developed visions of a global reach, built through evangelical activity. During the eighteenth century, new and challenging ideas developed: about the rights of man and rights of woman, universal brotherhood and republicanism, symbolized in the French revolutionary slogan 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity'. So while trade and colonization had already recognized and demarcated the world, it is not altogether surprising that some of the first impulses to develop internationalist links were associated with the development of socialism. The International Workingmen's Association, founded in 1864, became known as the 'First International'. Its founders, recognizing that capitalism was an international system, sought to build international links between trade unionists and other organized workers around the world.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, other early international organizations were those associated with the establishment of conventions and practices that might assist trade, such as the Universal Postal Union, the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, and the International Sanitary Conference. In 1851 the Great Exhibition in the UK preceded a whole series of international exhibitions, later dubbed 'World's Fairs' – one of the first cultural forms to specifically name the 'world' as its scope. The rise of the nation-state in the nineteenth century had in turn produced new forms of contestation, in which the great empires of Europe negotiated a complex set of secret treaties, while

fighting for colonial dominance of the rest of the world. The culmination of this process in the First World War persuaded powerful nations of the need to impose some international order by means of an international organization – the League of Nations was established in 1919, and, following its collapse and the Second World War, the United Nations was formed in 1945.

So the establishment of the IOC needs to be seen in the context of the emergence of a diverse set of international organizational forms between 1850 and 1950. We have become familiar with a range of global organizations – the Boy Scouts, the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, the World Bank, UNESCO, the International Monetary Fund. Many are not really global but have global aspirations. In this context, four features of the IOC are striking: first, that it was founded relatively early in the context of international organizations; second, that it was almost the first real sporting international body; third, that it has succeeded, perhaps more than any other organization, in being genuinely global in its reach; and fourth, that it has survived for over 100 years without significant split, schism, or challenge to its authority.

It is salutary to remember that in 1896, Germany was only 25 years old as a nation-state, and Italy only 35. Given the extent to which the IOC was a club dominated by European aristocracy and nobility, and the relative difficulty of international travel, it was predictable that the first Olympic Games were a largely European affair – only a dozen nations were represented, all but three European (they were the US, UK, Germany, Australia, France, Denmark, Greece, Sweden, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Chile). From the start, the Games featured the symbols and rituals of nation – national flags were hoisted during the victory ceremonies. The first Games could not be said to be a genuine competition between nations as many of the teams had an ad hoc character – being made up of friends and acquaintances of the organizers, tourists who happened to be in Athens (see McFee 1990) and, in one case, students of a member of the NOC. While the first Games were neither national nor international, the stage was set for this key tension around which the Games developed. During the next 12 years the Games struggled to survive, being staged as a sideshow to international trade fairs (the Exposition Universelle in Paris in 1900, the World's Fair in St Louis in 1904 and the Franco-British Exhibition in 1908). In one contemporary description, the Franco-British Exhibition was at Shepherd's Bush and the Olympics 'took place alongside the enormous site' (Cook 1908: 14).

There were significant tensions in 1908 between the US and the UK. The cause of Irish Home Rule was important to many Irish Americans, including those in the American Olympic squad, and the American team refused to dip their flag as they passed the Royal Box at the opening ceremony. The officials were all British, and after they had disqualified an American runner, the Americans were quick to accuse them of bias. The ensuing bitterness continued after the Games, and before the 1912 Games the IOC decided that in future there would be an international team of officials and judges.

It was already becoming abundantly clear that the spectacle of the Games constituted a site for symbolic contestation around concepts of national belongingness. In 1912 Finland was under the control of Russia, but the Finnish team refused to march under the Russian flag and the IOC allowed them to march behind the Finnish flag, to the huge delight of the crowd. At first the growth pattern of the Games appears erratic, with an

<i>General organizations</i>	<i>Sport organizations</i>
1815 Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine	
1838 Conseil supérieur de santé	
1840 World Anti-Slavery Convention	
1844 Young Men's Christian Association	
1851 International Sanitary Conference	
1861	First English cricket side to tour Australia
1863 International Committee of the Red Cross	
1864 First Geneva Convention	
1864 International Workingmen's Association	
1872	First international football match
1865 International Telegraph Office	
1874 Universal Postal Union	
1875 International Bureau of Weights and Measures	
1881	International Federation of Gymnastics
1886	International Rugby Football Board
1892	International Rowing Federation
1894	International Olympic Committee
1896	First modern Olympic Games
1899 First Hague Convention	
1900	Union Cycliste Internationale formed
1904	FIFA, world governing body of football
1906	FINA: International Swimming Federation
1912	IAAF (athletics)
1913	ITLF (tennis)
1919 League of Nations	
1919 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	
1920 World Organisation of the Scout Movement	
1930	First Football World Cup staged
1945 World Bank	
1945 International Monetary Fund	
1945 United Nations	

Table 6.1 Year of formation of selected international organizations

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of nations</i>
1896	12
1900	22
1904	9
1908	26
1912	28

Table 6.2 Nations competing in the Olympic Games, 1896–1912

especially low turnout in St Louis in 1904, largely for geographic reasons, but by 1912 it was clear that the Olympic Games had become established as a recurrent ritual practice of growing significance.

BETWEEN THE WARS: COMMUNISM AND FASCISM

The growing tension between Germany, Russia, Britain, and France during the build-up to 1914 had its impact on the IOC, especially as Berlin was awarded the 1916 Games. When the First World War broke out, Theodore Cook, a British IOC member, demanded the expulsion of German members, and when this was rejected, he resigned. By contrast, Coubertin opted to protect the IOC by moving its headquarters to neutral Switzerland, where it has remained ever since (Guttman 1992: 37). The 1920 Games were awarded, rather pointedly, given that Belgium was the first victim of the war, to Antwerp. The IOC maintained its own policy of inclusion by leaving the invitations to the organizing committee, and Germany was not invited to the Games of 1920 or 1924. The first multi-sport festival of winter sports, which subsequently became regarded as the first Winter Olympics, was held in 1924 in Chamonix in France (see Chapter 8).

The IOC's finely tuned sense of international diplomacy means marking the claims of rising powers by awarding them Games. The cancelled 1916 Games would have been in Berlin, and the 1940 Games would have been in Tokyo. More recently, the rise of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) has been registered: China's economic dynamism and growing political significance was finally rewarded with a Games in 2008; the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi in Russia; the 2016 Olympics were in Rio; and one might expect a South African and an Indian Olympics in the next 30 years. It is also worth noting that neither Berlin 1916 nor Tokyo 1940 happened, due to world conflicts in which the proposed host nations were deeply involved. After both major wars, organizing committees responded to anger and political sensitivities by withholding invitations to the defeated nations.

The early years of the Olympic Games constitute an interesting case study in the invention of tradition, in which both the internationalist and nationalist aspects of the Games were buttressed by ritual. The gold medal was first bestowed in 1904. The Olympic Charter and the march of competitors in the opening ceremony were introduced in 1908. The Olympic oath-taking ceremony and the Olympic flag were introduced in 1920. An Olympic hymn, different each time, was used until the Rome Olympics, after which the 1960 version became the permanent Olympic Hymn. White doves were first released during the opening ceremony in Paris in 1924, and the first Olympic village was constructed (see Charpentier and Boissonnade 1999: 118). The Olympic flame was first lit in the stadium in 1928, national anthems were first used in victory ceremonies in 1932, and the torch relay was introduced in 1936. The Olympic oath illustrates the tensions neatly – taken on behalf of all the competitors as an international group, it nevertheless commits them to competing 'for the honour of our country and the glory of sport'. The nationalist dimension was ritualized by the establishment of medal ceremonies, the raising of national flags, the playing of national anthems and the parading in of national teams in the opening ceremony.

The impulse to internationalism has led to a continuous recruitment of new nations, yet national rivalries and political tensions have also meant exclusion for some nations. The newly communist Russia was not invited to the 1920 Games. Countries held responsible for the 'Great War' were excluded from participating, so athletes from Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey were relegated to bystander status. Indeed, Germany was not re-admitted until 1928. The scope of the Games continued to grow in the inter-war era, despite a dip in numbers of nations for Los Angeles in 1932.

The inter-war years in Europe were characterized by political instability, stemming from the poorly conceived settlements imposed by the victors of the First World War, the rise of fascism, and the establishment of Soviet communism. Financial crises contributed to instability, from the rampant inflation that wrecked the Weimar Republic, through the Wall Street Crash of 1929 into the Depression of the 1930s. There was a social revolution in manners and morality, less deference to the aristocracy and greater emancipation of women. During this period, the Olympic movement faced its most significant challenge to date, in the workers' sport movement, and the first real tarnishing of its image in the 1936 Games.

In the aftermath of the First World War (1914–1918) and the Russian Revolution (1917), the workers' sports movement developed rapidly, and a whole series of workers' sports events or 'workers' Olympics' were staged during the 1920s and 1930s as an alternative to the official 'nationalistic' and 'bourgeois' Olympics (Kruger and Riordan 1996; Kuhn 2015: 21–49) (see Chapter 8). During the 1930s, the period of the Popular Front, uniting communist and socialist parties across Europe, was unable to halt the rise of fascism and Nazism, and just a year after the Antwerp Workers' Olympics of 1937, effectively the last one, Hitler's German troops marched into Austria. The staging of the official Olympic Games in Germany had already provided Hitler with a huge public canvas on which to paint a disturbing image of Nazi power. The 1936 Games proved to be the last for 12 years.

Berlin 1936: the 'Nazi Games'

Although nationalism was already written into Olympic ritual, the 1936 Games, which became notorious as the 'Nazi Olympics', elevated the foregrounding of national power to a dramatic new level (Kruger and Murray 2003). The 1936 Games constituted the moment when the aspirations of Olympism for internationalism and peace were forced, dramatically, to confront the realities of national power and its associated symbolism. The rise to power of the Nazis came amidst growing concern around the world over the treatment of German Jews. Hart-Davis (1986) argues that Germany attempted to produce the appearance of a normal society during the Games. The concentration camps, established from 1933, were known about, and US and British ambassadors relayed critical information back to their governments but it was not taken seriously enough. Hart-Davis outlines the ways in which, from 1933, Jews were gradually excluded from organized sport. The IOC endeavoured to extract a promise that this would not be so, and the Germans agreed to a statement that they would abide by Olympic principles, but had no intention of reversing the anti-Jewish sport policies.

During the three years before the 1936 Games there were extensive efforts to promote a boycott, especially in the UK, US, and France. In 1934 in New York, there was a mock trial of Hitler that attracted 20,000 people to Madison Square Gardens (Hart-Davis 1986). In 1935, Supreme Court Judge Jeremiah T. Mahoney published a pamphlet entitled 'Germany has Violated the Olympic Code', which contained specific and detailed instances of discrimination against German Jews in the context of sport. By 1935, according to one opinion poll, 43 per cent of Americans were in favour of a boycott (Guttman 1984: 72). IOC leaders, however, were inclined to accept reassurances from the German organizers at face value, and showed little willingness to investigate more carefully. There was also, demonstrably, a degree of anti-Semitism within Olympic circles.

Avery Brundage (president of the United States Olympic Committee, vice-president of the IAAF and a future president of the IOC) privately referred to the 'Jewish proposal' to boycott the Games, and claimed that every boycott call was 'obviously written by a Jew or someone who has succumbed to Jewish propaganda'. In fact, Guttman suggests, although many American Jews did play an active role, Catholic organizations and individuals were prominent in leading the boycott campaign (Guttman 2006). Sigfrid Edstrom (president of the IAAF and vice-president and future president of the IOC) wrote, in a letter to Avery Brundage, 'they [Jews] are intelligent and unscrupulous. Many of my friends are Jews, so you must not think that I am against them, but they must be kept within certain limits'; and Baillet-Latour (IOC president 1925–1942), also in a letter to Brundage, wrote that he was not personally fond of Jews. But Baillet-Latour at least made some attempts to get the Germans to honour their pre-Games pledges of no discrimination against Jewish athletes in German team selection (Guttman 1992: 53–71). Brundage, by contrast, for the rest of his life insisted, against all the evidence, that there had been no such discrimination. Guttman, rather generously, argues that it was Brundage's fight against the boycott that turned him anti-Semitic (see Guttman 1984: 72–73). Brundage, like other right-wing Americans of the period, came to blame many of the problems of the world on Jews and communists, who were, in some ill-defined way, in league. He was an active isolationist during the early 1940s, associating with aviator Charles Lindbergh, who was suspected of pro-Nazi views. After the war he corresponded with Swedish IOC member Count von Rosen, one of whose letters to Brundage proclaimed that Jews were responsible for all the world's troubles, and that communism was the political form of Judaism (see Guttman 1984: 92).

The one IOC member who opposed the Games and supported the boycott, American Ernest Lee Jahncke, was expelled from the IOC, to be replaced by Brundage (Guttman 1992: 53–71). Baillet-Latour, IOC president from 1925 to 1942, was succeeded by Edstrom (1946–1952), after which Brundage became president and served from 1952 to 1972. Samaranch, who became president of the IOC in 1980, serving till 2001, was an active supporter of Spanish fascism and served as Spanish Ambassador to the Soviet Union under Franco. The fact that four of five presidents, between 1925 and 2001, had either anti-Semitic or fascist tendencies should prompt speculation about, and enquiry into, the cultural climate within the IOC during most of the twentieth century.

Of the 70 IOC members in 1936, here are some examples. After the Games, Count Baillet-Latour became an honorary member of the Nazi sports organization. Count Clarence von Rosen (Master of the Horse to the King of Sweden) and his brother played a leading role in the Swedish Nazi movement (Aftonbladet 2000; Nilsson 2000). Lord Aberdare opposed the boycott and claimed he had never heard of any Olympic athlete being boycotted or impeded because of his non-Aryan origin (Hart-Davis 1986: 131). Sir Noel Curtis-Bennett said those advocating a boycott were a lot of well-meaning busybodies who try to mix sport and politics (Kruger and Murray 2003: 75). Dr Karl Ritter von Halt became Sports Minister in the Third Reich from 1943–1945 (Walters 2006: 316). Marquis Melchior de Polignac was involved in collaborationist organizations with the Nazi occupiers during the Second World War. (*L'Ouest-Eclair*, 29/3/41, quoted in Fugain 1992: 234). Francois Piétri was the Vichy ambassador to Spain from 1940 to 1944 (Piétri 1954). Jewish labourers from a local concentration camp worked on estates in Austria owned by the family of Prince Francois-Joseph von Liechtenstein (Rennie 2005). William May Garland was a founder member of the exclusive Jonathan Club in California, which excluded Jews, and did not admit men of colour until 1987, nor women till 1975 (Siegel 1976; Martinez 1985). In 1935, Coubertin allowed himself to be nominated by the Nazis for the Nobel Peace Prize (Guttmann 1992: 59). Manifestly, in the inter-war years, the IOC was awash with anti-semitism and fascism, and full of members who chose to accept or turn a blind eye to such extremism.

The Berlin Games were not simply used as a propaganda platform, as is sometimes asserted; indeed, the Nazi authorities went to some lengths during the Games to mask the true nature of the ideological transformation they had brought about. Nevertheless, the general desire to celebrate Aryan might have inflected the presentation of the Games, not least in the innovation of the torch relay. Berlin Olympic organizer Carl Diem had a scholarly interest in Ancient Greece and found support from Hitler, who admired Doric architecture (Hart-Davis 1986: 52). The torch relay, mythologized as a return to Ancient Greek roots, was utilized by the Nazis as a symbol of Aryan power. The Ancient Greeks did have relays carrying torches, but there is no evidence that they ever did so in connection with the Olympic Games. Diem suggested a relay, referring to ancient vases for authority. Hitler was persuaded that the Third Reich ought to sponsor the current excavations at Olympia. Coubertin supported the idea, as it seemed to help legitimate the link between the ancient and modern Games. Krupp, the German arms producer, created and sponsored the torches. The Nazi anthem, the 'Horst Wessel Lied', was played in ancient Olympia when the flame was lit. The song contains the line 'Already millions are looking to the swastika, full of hope'. It was also sung at the opening ceremony. 'Altars were set up along the way for semi-religious ceremonies in the tradition of the ancient fire cults, which had been prevalent in Ancient Greece as in ancient Germany' (Kruger and Murray 2003). Arguably, this was the point at which the embryonic neo-paganism underpinning some Olympic rituals was consolidated.

In Vienna, 10,000 Austrian Nazis greeted the torch with cries of 'Heil Hitler' and demonstrated against the Jewish members of the Austrian Olympic team, shouting 'Perish Judah'. Five hundred had to be arrested (Walters 2006: 193). The ceremony in Vienna was used by the Austrian Nazis as a demonstration of their power, whereas the one in

Prague resulted in street fighting between Sudeten Germans and Czechs. Hart-Davis says of the events in Vienna surrounding the torch relay, 'The message of the evening was clear. In a place as politically volatile as Vienna, the Olympic Games were an explosive subject' (Hart-Davis 1986: 137). As the torch relay was under German jurisdiction rather than that of the IOC, it could be used for unabashed Nazi ceremonies (Kruger 2003: 32–33). The ritual of the relay, and its version in the Leni Riefenstahl film of the Games, was to make explicit the supposed link between Germany and Ancient Greece. The Reich was portrayed as the repository for Ancient Greek virtues. The president of the organizing committee, Lewald, said that the Olympic torch created 'a real and spiritual bond between our German fatherland and the sacred places of Greece founded nearly 4,000 years ago by Nordic immigrants' (Walters 2006: 193). The whole ceremony in Olympia was, of course, an invention, but the version in the Riefenstahl film was a further reconstruction of an invented tradition – she worked on it in take after take, eventually insisting on a naked male runner (with whom she subsequently had an affair) rather than the man in modern gym shorts who was the original choice (Graham 1986: 61). Ironically, of course, the nakedness was a more historically accurate rendition of the Ancient Greek customs. When the flame was finally lit in the stadium, the BBC commentator gasped in shock before pronouncing, 'I don't think anyone expected such a big flame', inadvertently producing in the process a rather chilling metaphor for the rise of the Nazis (BBC Sound Archives, 1936, Berlin Olympics: live broadcast of the Opening Ceremony).

Hart-Davis says that in the lighting ceremony in Olympia in 1936, a 'ridiculously long' message from Coubertin was read out (Hart-Davis 1986: 133). Walters (2006) suggests that Coubertin was, in effect, blackmailed by the Nazis after he stupidly accepted a secret donation from them. The last public statement from the ageing Coubertin praised the 'grandiose games' that, he asserted, magnificently served the Olympic ideal (Guttman 1992: 70). Although the Games were, on a technical level, a great success, it was not a proud moment for the Olympic movement, with its aspirations for peaceful internationalism. Having been established as a routinized and cyclical ritual by this time, the cancellation of any Olympic Games marks the dramatic disruption of diplomatic relations by global conflict. The 1940 Olympic Games, scheduled for Tokyo, and the 1944 Games, scheduled for Helsinki, did not take place.

THE NEW WORLD AND THE COLD WAR

After the Second World War the Olympic Games resumed their growth trajectory, despite a small drop in numbers for the Melbourne Games of 1956, which were affected by boycotts. However, the end of the war did not mean a return to peace or to the world of the 1930s. Rather, a profound new geopolitical environment came into being as the European map was redrawn by the US and the Soviet Union. The next few decades were dominated by the economic, political, and cultural contestations between capitalist America and communist Russia. While the possession by both of nuclear weapons prevented direct military confrontation, nevertheless, around the world the struggles of peoples and nations were strongly influenced by the respective regional influences of the dominant superpowers.

In 1979, Richard Espy (1979: vii) wrote ‘The Modern Olympic Games symbolize the struggle between man’s ideals and the reality within which he must live.’ The notion is suggestive of the era of the Cold War and the symbolic contestation that framed the Olympic movement from 1945 to 1989. In the first Olympic Games after the war, the defeated nations Germany and Japan were not invited, although Italy was, and the Soviet Union did not compete. During the 1930s the Soviet Union, after the revolution, had largely abstained from international sport, not being part of IFs or the IOC, and instead fostered the development of the RSI (see Riordan 1984). After the Second World War, however, they adopted the strategy of entering international competitions in order to demonstrate the superiority of the communist system. In 1948, though, the USSR had not sought recognition from the IOC and did not have an NOC. The American vice-president of the IOC, Avery Brundage, a strong anti-communist, was opposed to accepting communist individuals as members of the IOC, but did not favour excluding countries from the Olympic movement on the grounds of their political system (Espy 1979: 28). China had intended to compete, but the successful culmination of the communist revolution in 1947 put an end to the plans. In 1948, the opening ceremony in London took little more than an hour and consisted of a presentation of VIPs and the teams marching in. The elaborate spectacle of the ceremony, as we now know it, has evolved since, largely for television.

Germany, East and West

In 1952 the Soviet Union entered the Games for the first time since Russia competed in 1912. Developments in post-war reconciliation allowed Germany and Japan to compete. After the conclusion of the Second World War, Europe was, effectively, divided into two spheres of influence, the western half dominated by the USA, and the eastern half by the Soviet Union. Germany was divided into Soviet, American, British, and French zones, and Berlin itself, lying in the eastern (Soviet) part of Germany, was also divided. The continued Western occupation of half of Berlin was to prove a provocation to the Soviet Union for the next 35 years. A Soviet-inspired blockade of Berlin during the late 1940s was broken by a massive airlift of goods from the West. In 1961, the East Germans constructed the Berlin Wall, which succeeded as a physical barrier, but provided the West with an enormous symbolic victory in propaganda terms.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of nations</i>
1948	59
1952	69
1956	67
1960	84
1964	94
1968	113

Table 6.3 Nations competing in the Olympic Games, 1948–1968

In 1950 the IOC gave provisional recognition to the West German Olympic Committee. However, a parallel East German NOC began seeking affiliation to international sport federations. An intense debate developed within the IOC, commencing at the Vienna session of 1951. Some members argued that an NOC had to be part of a legitimate state (and East Germany was yet to seek or gain recognition). Some members wanted to emphasize the remit in the charter to bring the youth of the world together, recognize both NOCs, and hope for future reunification, while others believed this would merely emphasize the division. The IOC tried without initial success to promote the idea of two NOCs but a joint German team (see Hill 1992: 34). In 1952 a German team comprising only West German competitors featured in the Games, with the East Germans withdrawing (see Espy 1979: 35–36). Deteriorating relations between the IOC and the East German NOC led to a vote against recognition. In 1955 the Soviet Union released East Germany from its status as the ‘Soviet zone’ of Germany, and recognized it as an independent state. The East German NOC was then formally recognized but only on condition that it cooperated in forming a single team (see Hill 1992: 34–37).

While the IOC was, as so often, driven by pragmatism, many of the European aristocrats were hostile to the communist cause, as was the American millionaire Avery Brundage (IOC president 1952–1972). Despite West German opposition to the recognition of East Germany, the two NOCs were able to enter a joint team in the Games between 1956 and 1964. The competitors shared a flag, emblem, uniform, and lodgings (see Hill 1992: 38). Such rapport was remarkable, given that this was the period of heightened Cold War tension. In the 1960 Games in Rome, as in Melbourne, the two Germanys competed as one team, with victories being marked by Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’ from the Ninth Symphony, rather than the national anthem of either (Charpentier and Boissonnade 1999: 293). In August 1961 the Berlin Wall was constructed and, in retaliation, the Western countries began denying visas to East German sportsmen and women for skiing and hockey tournaments (Espy 1979: 77).

During the 1960s it became clear that the existence of East Germany was an established fact that warranted international recognition. The majority of IFs were accepting East Germany as a separate nation and the IAAF allowed separate East and West German teams in the European Championships of 1966. The IOC agreed to recognize two NOCs, although, in the case of the eastern one, the resolution referred to ‘the geographical area of East Germany’. In Mexico City in 1968, two Germanys competed for the first time, and the IOC agreed to accept the name ‘German Democratic Republic (GDR)’ (Hill 1992: 39). By the 1970s the West German government developed its Ostpolitik, which aimed at peaceful coexistence, with the hope of eventual reunification. The GDR had immense Olympic success during the 1970s and 1980s, although suspicions of systematic use of performance-enhancing drugs were amply confirmed after 1991, when the East German archives became accessible to researchers.

China and Taiwan

China had been involved in the Olympic movement since the 1920s. The first Chinese IOC member was elected in 1922 and the IOC had recognized the Chinese NOC (Hill 1992: 40–45). After the communist revolution, many nationalists, including some

NOC members, fled to Formosa (now Taiwan), but the NOC retained recognition. Avery Brundage later argued, with considerable disingenuousness, that the NOC had simply changed its address! However, Lord Killanin (president 1972–1980) later stated that there was no trace at Lausanne of any such change of address having been recorded (Hill 1992: 40–45). In 1952 the People's Republic of China (PRC) informed the IOC that it had an established body, the 'All China Athletic Commission', and wished to apply for recognition as an NOC. The Formosans were also seeking recognition and an invite to the 1952 Games. This placed the IOC in a quandary once again. They opted to accept teams from both, in advance of considering recognition for China's NOC (Hill 1992: 42). Despite this diplomatic pragmatism, the Formosans declined to acquiesce and although the China team set off, they reached Helsinki too late to participate (see Espy 1979: 36–37).

In 1954 the IOC recognized the NOC of the PRC while maintaining its recognition of Formosa's. The China committee was known as the 'Olympic Committee of the Chinese Republic' (changed in 1958 to 'Olympic Committee of the People's Democratic Republic of China'). The Formosa committee retained the title the 'Chinese Olympic Committee'. The IOC resorted to the rather slippery claim that it was recognizing territories under the control of an NOC and not as nations (Hill 1992: 40–45).

By 1956, the IOC had, on the one hand, successfully persuaded the two German nations to enter one team, but on the other agreed to recognize NOCs from both China and Formosa (see Espy 1979: 44–45). This time a more assertive China objected and did not compete in 1956. At the start of 1956 the third Chinese IOC member, Shou Ti-Tung, elected in 1947, requested that the Formosa Olympic Committee be expelled. Brundage was dismissive. Later in the year, the PRC withdrew from Melbourne in protest and in 1958 it withdrew from the Olympic movement and from all IFs (Hill 1992: 42). After a period of relative openness ('Let a hundred flowers blossom'), China had entered a period of tougher ideological stance (the 'Great Leap Forward') and isolation from 'imperialist' organizations, denouncing Avery Brundage and withdrawing from the IOC (Espy 1979: 63). Chinese IOC member Shou Ti-Tung resigned, dubbing Brundage a 'faithful menial of US imperialists' (see Hill 1992: 40–45).

The IOC attempted to resolve the issue, by insisting that the Formosa committee could not go on purporting to represent China, but must reapply, choosing a name that reflected the territory that it actually controlled. This fairly moderate proposal led to a storm of controversy in the US in which Brundage, who was (falsely) represented as having expelled Formosa, was bitterly criticized (Espy 1979: 65). In 1960 the Formosa NOC proposed that it be known as the Republic of China, in accord with its UN recognition. The IOC accepted this but insisted that at Rome they compete as Formosa. The team carried a sign reading 'Formosa', but displayed a placard reading 'Under Protest'. In 1968 the name the 'Olympic Committee of the Republic of China' was reaffirmed by the IOC (Hill 1992: 40–45). In the 1970s, US foreign policy pursued rapprochement with China, and President Nixon visited China in 1972. In 1971 the UN recognized the PRC and expelled Formosa/Taiwan, giving its seat on the Security Council to China. The IOC resolved that China would be welcomed back if it accepted Olympic rules and the continued presence of Taiwan (Hill 1992: 40–45).

From the mid-1950s, then, the IOC was beginning to experience greater difficulties with managing national contestation, and in 1956, in the evocative words of Charpentier and

Boissonnade, ‘heavy clouds darkened the Olympic sky’ (1999: 259). It was a year of dramatic political events: the escalation of the Algerian war of independence (1954–1962); Russian tanks on the streets of Budapest to crush the local more liberal-minded regime; and the English and French invasion of Egypt in response to Colonel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. Spain, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, Iraq, and Egypt announced their withdrawal from the Games. Israel, its troops mobilized, sent only a symbolic delegation of three (Charpentier and Boissonnade 1999: 259). A water polo match between Hungary and the USSR turned into a grudge match with, according to some witnesses, the water turning red with blood. Against this backdrop of national contestation there was one positive internationalist development – the closing ceremony featured, instead of competitors marching in teams, as in the Opening, 500 representatives of the 4,000 competitors who ‘marched as a single cavalcade’ (Espy 1979: 58). North Korea sought to enter a team for 1964, but the IOC insisted on a joint Korean team. The North agreed but the South refused. The IOC then threatened that in that case it would admit North Korea. The South remained intransigent – so North Korea was admitted as a separate team (Espy 1979: 82–83). It seems clear that the IOC did not merely reflect political decisions taken elsewhere, but was actively interventionist. It operated, though, not so much in accord with high principle, or in relation to clear constitutional principle, but rather with pragmatic responses to specific circumstances.

Decolonization and newly emergent nations

In the post-war era, the last great European empire, the British Empire, was dismantled. A UK weakened in the wake of the war was unable to combat movements for independence. While independence for India (1947) was seen as the watershed, the process of decolonization was to be long and drawn out. The Bandung Conference in 1955, organized by the Colombo group of countries (Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan), brought together representatives from 24 African and Asian countries to discuss shared economic objectives and the end of colonialism (Espy 1979: 47). In 1962 Indonesia, the host of the Asian Games, refused visas to Taiwan and Israeli competitors. The following year the IOC suspended the Indonesian NOC, which withdrew from the Olympic movement. Indonesia’s President Sukarno took the initiative in establishing the proposed Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFo). An initial conference, with delegates from Cambodia, China, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Pakistan, North Vietnam, the UAR, and the Soviet Union, and observers from Ceylon and Yugoslavia, drew inspiration from the 1955 Bandung Conference (Espy 1979: 81). China is believed to have been the driving force behind these proposals.

The first GANEFo was staged in 1963 with a second scheduled for Cairo in 1967. Part of the geopolitical substructure of this, of course, was the impact of the Sino-Soviet split which meant that China and the Soviet bloc were competing with each other as well as with the West for influence in the ‘Third World’ (Lutan and Hong 2005). A session of the GANEFo council was held in Beijing in 1965 and it was decided to hold an Asian GANEFo at the same time as the Olympic-approved Asian Games (Espy 1979: 109). Cairo pulled out of staging the next GANEFo in 1967 for financial reasons. The IOC took seriously the threat of GANEFo and its ability to win regional support in Africa, and manoeuvred carefully to protect its power base (Gittersos 2011). The IOC was particularly keen to avoid any splits, and as early as 1964 the Indonesian NOC had been reinstated (Field 2011, 2016).

China, during the cultural revolution, became more inward looking and, in Espy's words, 'GANEF0 died a quiet death' (1979: 110). After this brief episode in separatism, Third World countries became more focused on the Olympic Games, utilizing the event as a symbolic opportunity to announce their independent presence on the world stage – and the number of NOCs rose steadily to reflect these aspirations. The numbers of competing nations grew steadily up till 1976, with a dip in 1980 caused by the US-led boycott. In recent years virtually every nation has been represented at the Summer Olympic Games.

Apartheid and South Africa

A 'cultural boycott' played a significant role in the isolation and stigmatization of the South African apartheid regime. The sports boycott of South Africa led the way, giving the issue a high profile and encouraging the extension of the boycott into other areas. Although it also required well-directed pressure from campaigning individuals, organizations, and countries, it could be argued that the IOC was a leading force in the sporting boycott.

South Africa first competed in 1908 in London and had sent a team to every Games since then. No black competitors were ever chosen by the exclusively white South African Olympic Committee. This appears not to have been an issue for the IOC, which in the 1950s had no African members. It was only in 1959 that campaigning began within the IOC, led by the Soviet Union member, Alexei Romanov (Ramsamy 1984: 45). In 1961, South Africa became a republic and began to introduce additional laws enforcing segregation. In 1963 the IOC met with the African NOCs who insisted that no invitation be issued to South Africa for the 1964 Games. The IOC asked the South African NOC to make a public statement opposing racial discrimination; when there was no response, the South Africans were excluded from 1964. Fighting back with a diplomatic offensive, which involved rallying its supporters within the IOC and offering some rather vague and meaningless conciliatory statements, South Africa was able to secure an IOC invitation for 1968. However, a campaign to fight back was mounted by the Supreme Council for Sport in South Africa (SCSA) and the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC), with the support of black African states and black activists in the US, led by Harry Edwards. The threat of a boycott by around 40 countries forced the IOC to make a U-turn and ban South Africa. The arrogant response of South Africa, warning the IOC not to meddle in its domestic affairs, was sufficient to alienate the support that it still had in the IOC, and in 1970 South Africa was expelled from the organization (Ramsamy 1984: 45–48).

At the start of the 1960s, the IOC had been seeking, in vain, reassurance from the South African NOC that apartheid in sport did not exist, or would be eradicated. The South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC) seemed unable or unwilling to oppose the South African government publicly and so South Africa was not invited to take part in 1964 (Espy 1979: 87). Although many on the IOC were not crusaders against racism, the organization nonetheless deserves some credit for being one of the organizations to outlaw South Africa. The whole story highlights the growing symbolic power of the Olympic Games, and presages the era of boycotts and political protests. In 1966 the SCSA was formed – largely to campaign against South Africa. Some compromise proposals from SANOC, involving a mixed team at the Olympics, persuaded the IOC to readmit them. This triggered a huge reaction in the NOCs and elsewhere, with many countries and

individuals threatening to boycott. The IOC was forced into constructing a face-saving formula for getting the South Africans to withdraw. South Africa was expelled from the IOC in 1970, and only re-admitted in 1991, after apartheid came to an end.

Palestine, Israel, and the Middle East

Up until the Second World War, Palestine had an Olympic Committee, although, as a ‘mandate’ territory, it competed under the British flag. So Palestine was invited to compete in 1948. However, the United Nations had recommended the partition of Palestine, and the State of Israel was declared in 1947. The Palestine NOC became the Olympic Committee of Israel, with the intention of competing under the Israeli flag, although some Arab nations objected to the ‘Zionist’ flag. Under the threat of a boycott, the IOC, once again opting for a short-term pragmatic, if not pedantic, solution, declared Israel ineligible. It argued that as the original Olympic Committee had been given recognition under the national designation of ‘Palestine’, and as this Palestine committee no longer existed, and since ‘Israel’ had not applied for recognition, it was ineligible (Espy 1979: 29; and see Trory 1980: 18). Israel’s new NOC was subsequently recognized and an Israeli team competed in 1952 in Helsinki. In addition to the PRC, six more countries boycotted the Melbourne Games: Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, to protest the Soviet invasion of Hungary; and Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq, to protest Israel’s invasion of the Sinai and the Gaza Strip.

Palestine was accepted as a member of the Olympic Council of Asia in 1986, and the IOC recognized Palestine as a nation for Olympic purposes in 1993, both events triggering reactions of outrage in Israel and among Zionists worldwide. Fighting a rearguard action, Israel attempted, in 1996, to persuade the IOC to bar the use of the word ‘Palestine’, suggesting instead ‘Palestinian Authority, Palestinian Autonomy or Palestinian Delegation’. Palestinian teams have participated in the Olympic Games since 1996. In 1996 a reception hosted by Andrew Young brought together Israel and Palestine Olympic delegates. The Palestine and Israel Olympic Committee delegations were filmed by the world’s media exchanging greetings (see www.meor1996.org). In 2004 the Palestinians observed a truce during the 2004 Olympic Games.

Just before the 2016 Rio Games, Israeli authorities withheld the Palestinian Olympic team’s uniforms and equipment, forcing Palestinian participants to travel to Brazil without their gear (*Palestine Chronicle* 2016). An NBC report titled ‘Israeli Occupation Transgressions against Palestinian Sports’ disappeared from the NBC website after Israel’s sports and culture minister objected to the word ‘occupied’, despite the fact that the phrase describes the internationally recognized legal status of the Palestinian territories (Beaumont 2017).

In Tokyo in November 2018, the president of the Palestinian Olympic Committee urged the IOC president to take quick and swift action to put an end to Israeli violations against Palestinian sports (Wafa 2018). In December 2018 Israeli troops raided the Palestine Olympic Committee’s offices, supposedly in search of a perpetrator of terrorism (Haaretz 2018). According to IMEMC (2018), the raid was an attempt to retrieve the tapes of surveillance cameras. Since the death of Arafat in November 2004 and the rising power of Hamas in Palestine, and the right wing in Israel, attitudes have hardened considerably, and Palestine’s Olympic identity remains under pressure from Israel.

CONCLUSION

Given the complex issues that the IOC had to manage during the twentieth century, it is a considerable achievement that the movement has never split, or suffered any significant defections. Indeed, it may be because of the peculiar construction of the IOC – dominated as it has been by European aristocracy – that its very closeness to the dominant classes of powerful nations has enabled it to function at times as an alternative (if self-serving) form of diplomacy. Nor is this influence limited to Western Europe. After the division of Europe and the emergence of communist nations in the East, the IOC was able to absorb and clasp to its bosom the new apparatchiks of Eastern Europe, who had influence within their countries. By the mid-1970s, though, the apartheid issue and the Cold War were to trigger a wave of boycotts in which, in the television era, the huge symbolic force of the Games became clearer and more dramatic than ever before. It is striking that it was in this period that the appointment of Juan Antonio Samaranch as IOC president was made. Samaranch was the most ambassadorial of presidents, using his own diplomatic background and delicate utilization of the art of public tact and private pressure to preserve and enhance the power of the IOC. He was also to be responsible for a ruthless IOC revolution, removing the obstacle of the term ‘amateur’ from the constitution, dispensing with long-serving secretary Monique Berlioux and working with Horst Dassler of Adidas to transform the system of selling sponsorships and broadcasting rights. The new president had doubtless learned about ruthlessness in the pursuit of political ends in his earlier career. In November 1967 he had been on his knees in front of the fascist General Franco, taking the oath of office prior to becoming a national councillor (see Boix *et al.* 1994, picture on rear cover). Samaranch, it appears, was a loyal supporter of the Spanish fascists and remained so right up to Franco’s death in 1975, just five years before he assumed the presidency of the IOC (see Jennings 1996; Jennings and Sambrook 2000). In the 2000s the IOC has become less European-dominated, and more Asian-facing, attuned as it is to the shifting power dynamics of global geo-politics. However, with the single exception of American Avery Brundage, the IOC has yet to appoint a non-European president.

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CHAPTER 7

POLITICS AND THE OLYMPICS

INTRODUCTION

It is often thought that the English journalist and author George Orwell condemned sport outright as simply ‘war minus the shooting’ (see Davison 1998: 442). He certainly did not think it was a great means by which to solve problems in international relations. But he also recognized that it was not the cause of such problems: ‘big scale sport is itself, I think, merely another effect of the causes that have produced nationalism’ (Davison 1998: 442–443). Orwell was writing just after Moscow Dynamo (a football team of Soviet soldiers) had played a series of matches in Britain, in 1945, shortly after the end of the Second World War. His closing point was that ‘you do make things worse by sending forth a team of 11 men, labelled as national champions, to do battle against some rival team, and allowing it to be felt on all sides that whichever nation is defeated will “lose face”’ (Davison 1998: 443). Whether we entirely accept his analysis or not, we can see that Orwell was acutely aware of the *symbolic* politics of sport.

Despite Rule 50.2 in the 2019 version of the Olympic Charter, which states that ‘No kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas’ (IOC 2019a: 90), the modern Olympic movement has had to contend with wars, boycotts, protests, walkouts, and even a terrorist attack (Boykoff 2016b; Goldblatt 2016). As the Olympics have become a global televisual event, it has become more available for symbolic political action. From the late 1960s onwards the Olympic Games have been caught up in symbolic politics, taking two main forms: the *promotional* opportunities offered by the Games to enhance reputations – by competing, winning medals, and hosting them, as well as refusing to participate in them through different forms of boycott – and the opportunity to *protest* about a perceived social injustice by ‘seizing the platform’ that the Games offer through such a globally mediated mega-event (Price 2008). In addition, the Games have developed amidst changes in economic ideologies – from state-led, mixed economies to privatized neo-liberal economic orthodoxies.

As the previous chapter indicated, in the period between 1968 and 1984 the Olympic Games became the site of more highly focused symbolic political contestation in which the boycott became a significant political weapon.¹ This chapter examines the promotional and protest politics of the Games by focusing on four main trends: the emergence of boycotts and political theatre, particularly between the 1960s and the end of the 1980s; the growth of national and place promotion as a form of reputational politics; the growth of

the Olympics as an economic investment opportunity, as neo-liberalism increasingly became the ‘common sense’ of international political economy from the 1980s onwards; and since the 2000s the growth of transnational movements contesting these developments, and especially the hosting of mega-events. These trends are in tension and overlap, so that, for example, the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles can be seen to illustrate each of the first three trends, and the forthcoming Olympics in 2028 is being hotly contested by a NOlympic movement. At the same time, focusing initially on events such as the Black Power salutes in the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico which triggered a period of boycotts and political theatre (in 1976, 1980, and 1984), we highlight the process whereby that form of politics largely became marginalized in favour of promotional politics in later Games. This chapter thus continues to explore the international political and economic context that shaped the politics of the Games from the 1960s onwards, while also identifying the development of the politics of legacy and sustainability mentioned in earlier chapters.

POLITICS AT THE GAMES

It is possible to describe the politics at the Olympic Games in terms of a number of different contrasts and features. According to Toohey and Veal (2007: 87–118), for example, there have been several different forms of political *interference* in the Olympic Games: *internal politics* within the nation where the Olympics are being staged; *international rivalries*, based on either different political or ideological disputes and the use of the Games to advance national agendas; competitors using the Games as a forum for *political demonstrations* against their national governments; non-participants using the Games to *further their political causes* (see for example Keys 2018); participating nations trying to equate Olympic success with their *social, economic, and political superiority*; and *politics within the IOC* impacting on Olympic policy. It is easy to illustrate these.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Games awarded to Berlin in 1916 provided the earliest example of the second type of political situation facing the Olympic Games. When the First World War began in 1914, pressure was exerted by the Allied powers to move the Games. As the Games could not be relocated to an alternative site they were cancelled, for the first time in the history of the modern Games, although they continue to be counted officially by the IOC as part of the sixth (VI) Olympiad. Berlin in 1936 was the location of the infamous ‘Nazi Games’. Problems stemmed from the issue of discrimination against Jews in Germany under the Nazi regime. To compensate for the growing world opposition, the Nazis spared no effort in their preparations.

The 1936 Olympic Games were intentionally awarded to Berlin so that Germany could show that it had regained its status among European countries (see Chapter 6). With the Nazis in power, however, Adolf Hitler used the event as a platform to demonstrate his theories about racial superiority. Although the ‘Nazi Games’ were a very powerful propaganda exercise, the attempt to claim Aryan superiority through athletic performance failed, as African-American Jesse Owens became the hero of the Games, winning four gold medals. During the long jump competition, Owens’ German rival, Luz Long, publicly befriended him in front of the Nazis. Long was killed during the Second World War, but Owens kept in touch with his family for many years after the war.

Following the war, the 1948 Olympics in London took on a greater political significance as participation came to symbolize political recognition and legitimacy. Germany and Japan were not invited to London because of their wartime roles, while the Soviet Union was invited but did not participate. Though there had been much debate as to whether or not to hold the 1948 Olympic Games, and there was concern about the outcome, they turned out to be a popular success. Approximately 4,000 athletes participated, representing 59 countries.²

In 1956, Egypt withdrew from the Melbourne Games due to the Suez Canal conflict. The same year, there were revolts in Poland and Hungary against the regime in Moscow, which led to Soviet troops firing on unarmed crowds in Budapest – and fights breaking out between Hungarian and Soviet athletes in Melbourne.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the first Asian country to host the Olympics, Tokyo in 1964, spent \$3 billion rebuilding the city to show off its post-war success. Yoshinori Sakai, who was born on the day that Hiroshima was destroyed by an atomic bomb, was chosen as the final torchbearer. Sporting success is often tied to nationalistic attempts to promote social, economic, and/or political superiority. Here Olympic medal tables take on the role of describing the outcomes of a proxy war. The basis for this had been laid in the 1930s as Keys (2006) demonstrates. The rising prominence of the medal tables during the 1950s and 1960s was fuelled by the Cold War, the absence of real, all-out conflict between the USA and the USSR, and a consequent need to find an ideological means of marking the supposed superiority of capitalism over communism (and vice versa). How successful this is in actually convincing populations of national supremacy or developing national pride is subject to some dispute, however (see Hilvoorde *et al.* 2010).

Finally, the internal make-up and politics of the IOC have impacted on Olympic Games outcomes. The IOC is a self-elected, self-regulating association and, until 1981, it consisted virtually entirely of men. After evidence of corruption in the 1990s, the IOC felt obliged to investigate the claims. The main reform measures that resulted – to do with the organization, sport, and athlete issues; the host city selection process; financial control and transparency, and membership – are discussed in Chapter 9. The political debate then and since is nicely summed up in the titles of two books published in the 2000s: *The Olympic Turnaround* (Payne 2006) and *The Great Olympic Swindle* (Jennings and Sambrook 2000). On the one hand, the IOC is shown as efficient, reformed, and recovered. The IOC has not split or faced a serious challenge from any rival body in over 125 years, which suggests the existence of a very shrewd organizational structure, which is well protected from coups and rivals. On the other hand, it can be portrayed as remaining manipulative, promotional, and not fundamentally reconstructed at all.

FOUR TRENDS IN THE POLITICS OF THE GAMES

In this section we attempt to classify the politics of the Olympic Games in the past 50 years. Broadly speaking, we discern four trends: the use of boycotts as a form of political theatre – to abstain, as an individual or group, from engaging with the Olympics or some related organization as an expression of *protest*; the use of the Olympics for reputation *promotion* (for a cause, a socio-political or economic ideology, or a host city, region or

national location); the development of *neo-liberalism as the common-sense* context for the staging of the Olympic Games; and the growth of protest against hosting the Games. Table 7.1 outlines recent Olympic Games in terms of their best fit with each of these trends. The rest of this chapter explores the trends and identifies features of each of the Games that illustrate them.

Boycotts and political theatre at the Olympic Games³

Boycotts have occurred at the Olympic Games for three main reasons: as part of the Cold War; because of apartheid, ‘race’ or imperialism; and in terms of nations being divided by political or ideological differences. As Bairner and Molnar (2010: 163) suggest, however, ‘the number of boycotts associated with the Olympics is somewhat ironic as one of the original ideas behind the establishment of the modern Games was to create a free international sporting community that no nation-state would manipulate to its political advantage’. They add: ‘Clearly, this aim has not been realized so far.’

As we saw in Chapter 6, it was the Helsinki Games in 1952 that marked the beginning of Cold War tensions. Capitalist West Germany participated for the first time, and the USSR participated in the Olympics for the first time since the Russian Revolution of 1917. The USSR initially planned to house its athletes in Leningrad and fly them into Finland each day. In the end, separate housing facilities for communist/Eastern bloc athletes were set aside. East Germany was denied its request to be included, and a German team made up entirely of West German athletes attended. From 1956 to 1964 the two Germanys were forced to reach their own Olympic truce and compete as a joint team.

As mentioned above and also in Chapter 6, three separate protests affected the Melbourne Games in 1956, each in its way related to differences between capitalist and communist countries. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) withdrew after the IOC recognized Taiwan, and would not return to the Olympic movement until 1980. Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon protested at Israel’s invasion of the Sinai Peninsula, while Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands boycotted the Games over the Soviet invasion of Hungary. The conflict between the USSR and Hungary erupted during the Games when they faced each other in the water-polo semi-final. The referee abandoned the game after a fierce exchange of kicks and punches. Hungary, leading at the time, was credited with a victory. The match became known as the ‘blood in the water’ match.

<i>Boycotts and political theatre</i>	<i>Promotional and reputational politics</i>	<i>Neoliberalization of the Games</i>	<i>Protest as the ‘new normal’</i>
1968 Mexico	1972 Munich	1976 Montreal	2008 Beijing
1980 Moscow	1992 Barcelona	1984 Los Angeles	2012 London
1984 Los Angeles	2000 Sydney	1996 Atlanta	2016 Rio
1988 Seoul	2004 Athens	2012 London	2020 Tokyo
	2008 Beijing		2024 Paris
	2016 Rio de Janeiro		2028 Los Angeles

Table 7.1 Four trends in the politics of the Summer Olympic Games, 1968–2028

<i>Olympics</i>	<i>Boycott</i>	<i>Explanation/other issues</i>
London 1948		The two major Axis powers of the Second World War, Germany and Japan, were not invited; the Soviet Union was invited but did not send any athletes.
Helsinki 1952	People's Republic of China (PRC)	The PRC was protesting at the Republic of China (Taiwan) being recognised by the IOC — the PRC did not return to Olympic competition until the 1980 Winter Games. The Soviet Union attended for the first time, but East Germany was denied its request to be included and a Germany team made up entirely of West German athletes attended.
Melbourne 1956	Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon (Suez Crisis); Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland (Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary); People's Republic of China (Taiwan) being allowed to compete (under the name 'Formosa').	Egypt was invaded by Israel, the United Kingdom, and France after Egypt nationalised the Suez canal; the political frustrations between the Soviet Union and Hungary boiled over during a men's water polo semi-final – the 'blood in the water' match.
Tokyo 1964	Indonesia and North Korea (after the IOC banned teams that took part in the 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces).	South Africa expelled from IOC due to apartheid. SA would not be invited again until 1992.
Mexico City 1968		'Black Power' salute performed by Tommie Smith and John Carlos, African-American athletes who came first and third in the 200m race, during the medal award ceremony. The Tlatelolco massacre, 10 days before the Games began – more protesters were shot by government forces.
Munich 1972		Munich massacre – members of the Israeli Olympic team were taken hostage by the Palestinian terrorist group Black September.
Montreal 1976	Tanzania-led boycott of 22 African nations.	IOC refused to bar New Zealand, despite the New Zealand rugby union team's tour of South Africa.
Moscow 1980	US President Jimmy Carter issued a boycott of the Games to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and a total of 62 eligible countries failed to participate.	A substitute event, titled the Liberty Bell Classic (also known as the 'Olympic Boycott Games'), was held at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia by 29 of the boycotting countries.
Lake Placid 1980	The Republic of China (Taiwan) refused to compete under the name of 'Chinese Taipei'.	To date, the only case of boycotting the Winter Olympic Games.
Los Angeles 1984	The Soviet Union and 14 of its allies; Iran and Libya also boycotted the Games.	The Eastern bloc organised its own multi-sport event, the 'Friendship Games'.

<i>Olympics</i>	<i>Boycott</i>	<i>Explanation/other issues</i>
Seoul 1988	North Korea, Albania, Cuba, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Nicaragua and the Seychelles.	North Korea was (and still is) technically at war with South Korea.
Sochi 2014	In August 2008, the government of Georgia called for a boycott of the 2014 Winter Olympics; in late 2013 rights activists also called for a boycott on the basis of new Russian legislation related to 'non-traditional' sexual relations.	In response to Russia's participation in the 2008 South Ossetia war. Sochi is within 20 miles of Abkhazia, a disputed territory claimed by Georgia.
Tokyo 2020		Host nation's use of politically sensitive cultural symbols (flag, anthem) in East Asian context.

Table 7.2 Boycotts and political issues at selected Olympic Games, 1948–2020

Sources: Adapted from Bairner and Molnar (2010); Hill (1996); Toohey and Veal (2007).

Over 60 nations, including West Germany and Japan, boycotted the Moscow Games in 1980 to protest at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The American-led boycott reduced the number of participating nations from 120 to 81, the lowest number since 1956. Countries such as Britain and France supported the boycott, and the UK government under Margaret Thatcher placed enormous pressure on British athletes not to take part. Because the British Olympic Association (BOA) had no direct government funding it was able to resist and allow athletes to participate if they wished. Partly due to a lack of competition, the Moscow Games became quite successful for the British athletes, who finished ninth overall. The exact number of boycotting nations is difficult to determine, however, as a total of 62 eligible countries failed to participate, but some of those countries withdrew due to financial hardships, only claiming to join the boycott to avoid embarrassment. A substitute event, titled the Liberty Bell Classic (also known as the Olympic Boycott Games), was held at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia by 29 of the boycotting countries.

Following the Western boycott of the 1980 Games, the USSR led a boycott by 14 socialist nations of the 1984 Games based in Los Angeles (see Chapter 3). The absentees claimed the Los Angeles Olympic Committee was violating the spirit of the Olympics by using the Games to generate commercial profits. The Eastern bloc organized its own multi-sport event, the Friendship Games, instead. For different reasons, Iran and Libya also boycotted the Games. US media tycoon Ted Turner launched the Goodwill Games following this period. The first Goodwill Games, held in Moscow in 1986, featured 182 events and attracted over 3,000 athletes representing 79 countries. The Games were later bought from Turner by Time Warner Australia, who organized the Brisbane 2001 Games, before announcing that it would be the last.

For the first time since the 1972 Munich Games, there was no organized boycott of the 1988 Olympics in Seoul. North Korea stayed away as it was still technically at war with South Korea, and it was joined by Albania, Cuba, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Nicaragua, and the Seychelles. Otherwise the Games went on with little interruption, and their success

represented a major milestone on the journey from dictatorship to democracy for South Korea. IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch seemed to manoeuvre very cleverly to avoid a boycott in 1988 – stringing the North Koreans along with largely empty promises of shared events – for example, the marathon run across the demilitarized zone. With Samaranch appearing as the great conciliator, North Korea appeared to lose most of the support it had.

The 1980s thus saw the second peak of Cold War politics during the Reagan years, and the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the decade. The boycotts of 1980 and 1984 required the politicians to struggle quite hard to get support. Hence in 1980 the BOA, not having government funding, was able to resist the pressure of Margaret Thatcher to a certain extent. Similarly in 1984 the Soviets were not able to carry the whole communist bloc with them as they sought to boycott the Los Angeles Games. Arguably this began to discredit the boycott as a weapon – because the Games go on, and no one remembers who was not there.

The Rome Games in 1960 marked the end of South African participation in the Olympic Games for 32 years. The 1960 Olympics also saw the coming to prominence of African-American athletes, such as Wilma Rudolph and Cassius Clay (later to change his name to Muhammad Ali) and also marathon-runner Abebe Bikila, running barefoot, who became the first black African Olympic champion. Free of other major political disruptions, the Rome Games became a showcase for Italy, attracting a record 5,348 athletes from 83 countries. In the 1960s many countries had curtailed their sporting links with South Africa and Rhodesia because of their apartheid policies. In 1963 South Africa was expelled from the Olympics due to apartheid. It would not be invited again until the 1992 Olympics. This expulsion did not, however, immediately apply to the Paralympic Games. South Africa made its Paralympic Games debut in 1964 and continued to compete until 1976.

Despite the existence of boycotts prior to it – for example in 1964, Indonesia and North Korea both withdrew from the Tokyo Games after the IOC decision to ban teams that took part in the 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) – arguably it was the Mexico City Games in 1968, and the Black Power demonstration that took place there, that triggered a sustained period of boycotts as political theatre at the Olympics for the next two decades (including 1976, 1980, and 1984).

Before the Mexico City Olympics in 1968, many Mexicans believed that spending large amounts of money in the name of sport was unjustified. Many argued that the money should have been spent on housing or welfare resources instead. Then, ten days before the opening ceremony, the most violent response to a demonstration by students about government policy occurred. The Tlatelolco massacre involved more than 200 protesters being shot by government forces. The Mexico student murders, although largely neglected at the time in the mainstream media and since in most books about the Games (certainly compared to the massive prominence given to the Munich hostage story, see below), contributed to the sense that the Olympics was a politically useful platform that could be ‘seized’ (Price 2008).

The year 1968 was one of global unrest: Europe was rocked by student protests, the Vietnam War raged on, Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy were assassinated, and the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile at the Olympics, East Germany competed

BOX 7.1 THE TLATELOLCO MASSACRE, MEXICO CITY, 1968

The Tlatelolco massacre, also known as the ‘Night of Tlatelolco’, was a government massacre of student and civilian protesters and bystanders that took place during the afternoon and night of 2 October 1968, in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in the Tlatelolco section of Mexico City. While at the time government propaganda and the mainstream media in Mexico claimed that government forces had been provoked by protesters shooting at them, government documents that have been made public since 2000 suggest that the snipers had in fact been employed by the government.

New declassified information about the massacre is available thanks to a collaboration between *Proceso* magazine in Mexico and the US National Security Archive. The National Security Archive has investigated the Tlatelolco massacre since 1994 through records obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and archival research in both Mexico and the US. At the time, Mexico was still ruled by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and absolute secrecy continued to surround the tragedy at Tlatelolco.

Although estimates of the death toll range from 30 to 1,000, with eyewitnesses reporting hundreds of dead, the Archive’s Mexico Project Director Kate Doyle has only been able to find evidence for the deaths of 44 people. At least information about who died as a result of the ferocious violence unleashed by government forces in the Plaza of the Three Cultures in October 1968 is now available.

(Source: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB201/index.htm; last accessed 17 November 2010)

separately for the first time. Tommie Smith and John Carlos, who finished first and third in the 200m, gave the Black Power salute during the US national anthem as a protest against racism in the US. White Australian Peter Norman, who finished second, also wore a badge supporting the same cause as Smith and Carlos, but has mostly been written out of the history of this moment (Osmond 2010).

The Olympic Games as promotional opportunity: from boycotts to boosterism

The largest Games staged to date at the time was the 1972 Olympics in Munich, West Germany. Twenty-seven years after the Second World War, the Games were supposed to represent peace. Despite the iconic architecture, and with competitions well under way, the Munich Games are most often remembered for the terrorist attack that resulted in the death of 11 Israeli athletes. With five days of the Games to go, eight Palestinian terrorists belonging to the Black September group broke into the Olympic village, killing two Israelis and taking nine other members of the Israeli Olympic team hostage. The Palestinians demanded the release of 200 prisoners from Israel. In an ensuing battle, all nine Israeli

BOX 7.2 THE BLACK POWER 'SALUTE'

On 16 October 1968, Tommie Smith won the 200-metre race in a world-record time of 19.83 seconds, with Australia's Peter Norman second and John Carlos in third place. The two US athletes received their medals shoeless. Smith wore a black scarf and Carlos had his tracksuit top unzipped. All three athletes wore Olympic Project for Human Rights badges. Both US athletes intended to bring black gloves to the event, but Carlos forgot his. It was Peter Norman who suggested that Carlos wear Smith's left-handed glove, this being the reason for him raising his left hand, as opposed to his right, differing from the traditional Black Power salute. When the US national anthem – 'The Star-Spangled Banner' – played, Smith and Carlos delivered the salute with heads bowed, a gesture that became front-page news around the world. That such a relatively small gesture could create such a response paved the way to the Olympics becoming a major platform for the playing out of political theatre for at least the next two decades (for more details see Carlos with Zirin (2011); Waller *et al.* (2012); Harvey *et al.* (2014: 72–76)).

hostages were killed, as were five of the terrorists and one policeman. IOC president Avery Brundage took the decision to continue the Games after a 34-hour suspension. Seventeen people were killed in total, but it is still unclear what actually happened in the shoot-out. Key questions still remain unanswered satisfactorily, including: who killed the Israeli hostages? The police or the hostage-takers? IOC president Brundage was pilloried for stating that 'the Games must go on', but could he have done otherwise? What would another IOC president do in similar circumstances?

In Montreal in 1976 around 30 African nations staged a last-minute boycott after the IOC allowed New Zealand to compete. Some of the teams withdrew after the first day. New Zealand's All Blacks rugby team had recently played in the racially segregated South Africa, which had been banned from the Olympics since 1964. The controversy prevented a much anticipated meeting between Tanzanian Filbert Bayi – the former world-record holder in both the 1,500m and the mile – and New Zealand's John Walker, who had surpassed both records to become the new world-record holder. Walker went on to win the gold medal in the 1,500m.

Taiwan also withdrew when communist China pressured Canada (its trading partner) to deny the Taiwanese the right to compete. In Montreal in 1976 the high cost and construction of facilities for the Games attracted criticisms. The event began and concluded with many unfinished facilities. Partly in response to this the internal politics of the Olympics in Canada have been hard fought ever since. In Toronto a group opposing a bid, Bread not Circuses, was formed and became one of the strongest anti-Olympic organizations in the world. It lobbied against Toronto's 1996 and 2008 Olympic Games bids and the Vancouver bid for the 2010 Winter Games. Bread not Circuses argued that the perceived profits from the event were only short-term 'economic steroids'. Some local politicians argued that Toronto should apply to host the 2024 Summer and Paralympic Games in the wake of hosting the 2015 Pan American Games. When the deadline for submitting bids

passed in September 2015, however, Toronto was not among the bidding cities and the city mayor cited ‘other priorities’ (BBC Sport 2015).

The period 1988–1992 was a watershed in the shift from boycott to ‘boosterism’ at the Olympic Games. Barcelona in 1992 was and continues to be seen as a huge success, especially for urban redevelopment, thus inaugurating the idea of (and emphasis on) the Games as a tool for boosterism – urban promotion, (re-)design, and legacy. The 1992 Barcelona Games also marked the first Olympic Summer Games since the end of the Cold War. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia fielded separate teams, while the rest of the former Soviet Union competed as the ‘Unified Team’. Germany competed under one flag for the first time since 1964, while post-apartheid South Africa (including Nelson Mandela) was invited, ending a 32-year ban.

The neo-liberalization of the Games

In many ways, the Los Angeles Games of 1984 were the tipping point in the shift to the next phase of the politics of the Olympics. The 1984 Games figure in two columns in Table 7.1 under ‘boycotts’ and ‘neo-liberalization’. After Montreal in 1976 a critique of quasi-Keynesian government policy approaches in the advanced capitalist economies, including sports mega-events, began to develop. A new economic orthodoxy began to emerge – referred to in the UK as Thatcherism and in the US as Reaganomics – which emphasized the failure of state-produced solutions to social and economic problems (including the staging of Olympic Games) and which instead valorized the hosting of more privatized Games (Gruneau and Neubauer 2012). Explicitly ideological, this approach impacted on the 1984 Games in a way which made popular capitalism and neo-liberalism the common sense of the rest of the 1980s and since. The collapse of ‘actually existing socialism’ and the demise of the USSR by the end of the 1980s complemented this development. Rather than reprise the old Cold War antagonisms, the politics of hosting the Olympics now revolved around boosters and sceptics involved in debates over the branding and promotion of cities as ‘world class’ destinations, and the politics of environmental sustainability and legacy. Critics and sceptics now had to find different ways of seizing the platform. The Los Angeles Games were not only a pivotal moment in the evolution of the Olympics, they also helped to legitimate a sweeping neo-liberal political project in the US, with influences that have been felt across the globe since then (Gruneau and Neubauer 2012).

While the bombing of electricity pylons was undertaken in an attempt to interrupt the Barcelona opening ceremony, nevertheless the 1992 Games are always heralded as a success. They presented the idea to the world that the Olympics could be used to channel the aspirations of other cities and regions to redevelop and refashion huge parts of their territory. The age of urban and regional ‘boosterism’, linked to notions of legacy, environment, and sustainability, was born. Based upon ideas that the collective public interest would best be served by urban entrepreneurialism and wealth creation via trickle-down economics, the politics of redistribution gave way to a politics of recognition, or identity politics. The neo-liberalization of cities, matched by a similar political and economic development in the hosting of the Olympic Games, involves urban restructuring and illustrates well what Harvey (2004) has called ‘accumulation by dispossession’. As local

communities are displaced, and their right to the city threatened, resentment and anger against corporate power and wealth can develop. How this manifests itself, though, is not predictable (Watt 2013).

The neo-liberalization of the Olympics has involved: governance structures bypassing local municipal political structures; indirect public subsidies going to the IOC – since national public resources have to be spent in support of and with the promise of showcasing ‘world class’ events; and other attempts to enhance the reputational status and attractiveness of host locations, while cutbacks have occurred elsewhere in public spending and investment. The IOC retain control of the newly commercialized Games while OCOGs and national governments bear the risk, especially the financial and security risks. Cities bid to host the Games as a means of public diplomacy, and national governments use the opportunity to operate forms of soft power.

It was in this way that the Atlanta Games in 1996 were held without any governmental support. This led to a commercialization of the Games and the extensive involvement of corporate money in it was ‘ambivalently perceived’ (Bairner and Molnar 2010: 155). In addition, a pipe bomb exploded in Atlanta’s Centennial Olympic Park on 27 July 1996, during the Games, killing two people and injuring a further 110. Although the incident was referred to as a terrorist bomb, the motive or group responsible was never determined. Approximately 10,000 athletes participated in Atlanta, representing 197 countries (including Hong Kong and the Palestinian Authority). The choice of Atlanta saw the commercially driven modernizers/neo-liberalizers win out over tradition. The problems with Atlanta, and then with corruption, appear to have led to a shame-faced IOC voting to give the 2004 Summer Olympics to Greece.

The Sydney Games in 2000 were the largest ever, with 10,651 athletes competing in 300 events. Despite its size, the event was well organized and renewed faith in the Olympic movement after the 1996 Atlanta bombing. The Australians chose Aboriginal athlete and national hero Cathy Freeman to light the Olympic torch. In 2004 the Olympic Games returned to its origins when Athens hosted the XXVIII Olympiad. Greece was the birthplace of the ancient Olympic Games more than 2,000 years ago, and Athens staged the first modern Olympic Games in 1896. However, 2004 was the most guarded Olympic Games in history and the biggest – and most expensive – peacetime security operation ever (see Chapter 12 for a discussion of security at the Olympics).

The 2008 Games, staged in Beijing, provoked outrage from human rights groups who said that allowing China to host the Games legitimized its repressive regime. Protesters also claimed that China would use the Games as a propaganda tool. Supporters of the Games argued that the Olympics would accelerate the progress of social liberalization in China. Taiwan government officials strongly supported the Beijing Games, believing that the event would reduce the risk of China using force against its neighbour. Arguably, the choice of Beijing as host was over-determined by political and economic judgements – Tiananmen Square may have happened in 1989, but by the 2000s China was a very big and growing market.

Ironically it was the attempt to use the Olympic torch relay as a global rallying call – and at the same time as an opportunity for sponsors to be seen to be associated with the Olympics – that proved most costly to the image of the Beijing Olympics. The torch relay

opened the door for conflict and thus brought back political theatre to the Games (Horne and Whannel 2010). While in Beijing the organizers of the Games were using ‘One World One Dream’ as one of their key slogans, around the world the torch was followed by protests – about human rights in China and the relationship between China and Tibet – as shown in the photographs.

Sport mega-events and political contestation

We described the build-up to Rio 2016 and the aftermath of London 2012 in the second edition of this book (Horne and Whannel 2016). Both Games illustrated the different forms of political contestation that the contemporary Olympics attract (Horne 2017). These range from the politics of rights – of workers and citizens to the city – to debates about the politics of legacy discourse. The politics of public opposition and political activism to London 2012 and other recent Olympics have been considered elsewhere (Sadd 2014; Giulianotti *et al.* 2015b; Boykoff 2014a, 2014b). The growing disinclination to act as hosts for the Olympics and other sports mega-events since then has led many academic and journalistic commentators to ask where sports mega-events are going.

In a series of articles edited by John Lauermaann and Dennis Pauschinger contributors discussed ‘Protest and the Games’- see key reading at the end of this chapter. Lauermaann and Pauschinger (2019) argue that there is, as yet, no single global anti-mega-event movement as such. Rather there is a globalized and globalizing way of protesting against them. In November 2018 citizens of Calgary in Canada thus joined those of 13 other cities that had successfully opposed the hosting of an Olympics between 2013 and 2018. The success of these campaigns can be down to two factors: organizing early on in the event bidding phase, and the eclectic mix of interest groups involved – from long-term movements engaged in political causes relevant to local projects, such as housing developments, to those making broader demands for more equal cities. Debt, displacement, and the militarization of cities have become powerful battle cries for those protesting the hosting of Games. In Rio, for example, the creation of the theme of ‘os jogos da exclusão’ (‘the exclusion games’) for the 2016 Summer Olympics provided an alternative label for protesters to stage workshops, demonstrations, and advertise to visitors to the city (for details see <https://www.boell.de/en/2016/07/26/rio-2016-olympics-exclusion-games> (last accessed 24 September 2019); and Figure 7.1).

While sports mega-events, such as the Olympics especially, may appear superficially as credible tools of social and economic development, many scholars, politicians, and citizens have come to realize that they do so in ways that do not challenge inequalities or neo-liberal policies. As Zimbalist (2015: 122) writes: ‘Hosting sports mega-events, then, tends to reinforce the existing power structure and patterns of inequality.’ In fact, the hosting of sports mega-events may have been a most convenient shell for the promotion of neo-liberal agendas, since they do not deviate from top-down notions of economic and social development.

The shift of the two biggest sports events organizers, the IOC and FIFA, towards holding mega-events in the ‘global South’ (South Africa in 2010, Brazil in 2014, and Rio in 2016) and developing market economies (Russia, the Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014 and hosting the Football World Cup in 2018) connects with recent attempts to link sport



Figure 7.1 An alternative vision of Rio 2016: os jogos da exclusão ('the exclusion games').

and social development.⁴ But mega-events in the South are compromised by the weaker position of the host countries to bear the burden of hosting and the opportunity costs being relatively much higher than in the advanced economies (Darnell and Millington 2016). In this way they highlight the contradictions of the contemporary politics of the Olympic Games.

Much recent writing on sport has shown how the three main features of contemporary capitalism – globalization, commodification, and inequality – shape and contour contemporary sport and sports mega-events, such as the Olympics. Featherstone (2007: xviii) has noted that 'if there is an emergent global culture, consumer culture has to be seen as a central part of this field'. For Featherstone, in these circumstances consumption cannot be seen as an 'innocent act', but rather as 'part of the chains of interdependencies and networks which bind people together across the world in terms of production, consumption and the accumulation of risks'. Studying sport and especially sports mega-events under such circumstances focuses on the way they have become transnational cultural forms in and through which consumer culture is fuelled. With sports mega-events, two features of consumer culture are highlighted: *transformation* and *consumerization*. Mike Featherstone (2007: xxi) remarks that central to consumer culture is the transformation of 'lifestyle, living space, relationships, identities, and, of course, bodies'. It was noticeable that 'transformation' was a key element in Rio's bid to host the 2016 Olympics. We argue that consumerization – the process of the construction of people with consumer values and outlooks – has impacted on personal and collective identities and the development of new lifestyles (Horne 2006).

Consumer culture itself has a developmental history of transformations, and as Lee (1993: 135) suggests, the growing importance of cultural and service markets since the 1970s has represented a dematerialization of the commodity form and the growth of 'experiential commodities' including cultural events, heritage attractions, theme parks, commercialized sport, and other public spectacles. Echoing Harvey (1989), Lee concludes that the rapid growth of these experiential commodities represented a 'push to accelerate commodity values and turnovers' (Lee 1993: 20) and 'make more flexible and fluid the various opportunities and moments of consumption' (Lee 1993: 137). Hence the last two decades of the twentieth century saw the restless search for novel ways to expand markets in the advanced capitalist economies and develop new ones elsewhere. Lee (1993: 131) suggests that this explains the spread of consumerism to the rest of the world, the development of a vast children's market and 'the deeper commercial penetration and commodification of the body, self and identity'. Sport has been part of this transformation and sports mega-events have been transformed in turn.

CONCLUSION

The crisis of capitalist financial regulation in 2007 and 2008 – in which vast sums of public money were used to support banking and other financial institutions floundering after the poor judgements of and speculative dealings by private financiers – is a useful reminder that government intervention to support and maintain capitalism is not an aberration. Whether it is more appropriate to describe this new phase in the development of neo-liberalism as 'disaster capitalism', based on the 'shock doctrine' (Klein 2007; Loewenstein 2015) or 'celebration capitalism' (Boykoff 2014a), it is undeniable that economic regimes of the contemporary era increasingly use, or formulate, crises to reshape the economy in the interests of business.

The Olympic Games clearly provide a positive, uplifting, even inspiring diversion during times like these and some would argue therefore that there should be more serious and pressing topics for a social scientist to research. Boykoff (2014a) argues that the processes and politics of hosting sports mega-events are precisely a manifestation of a globalized 'celebration capitalism', whereby public resources are made available to private interests and for private benefit. Darnell and Millington (2016) suggest, however, that there are important points of continuity between neo-liberalism and celebration capitalism. The notion of celebration capitalism helps to explain the successful re-inscription of neo-liberal development philosophy in the new millennium. If the logic and policies of neo-liberalism have retained their hegemonic status despite events such as the 2008 financial crisis, this is likely due to a reinvention of neo-liberal logic in ways that have built consent within the current context. Celebration capitalism through sports mega-events may therefore signal less of a break from neo-liberalism, and more the latest, 'improved', version of neo-liberal policy.

As this chapter (and the book as a whole) suggests, the Olympic Games are a global spectacle attracting vast audiences, but also a deeply political phenomenon. Researching the costs and benefits of sports mega-events is itself a political activity. It can involve researching the powerful – the elite of business leaders and government officials – as well as leaders of sports organizations who gather together to formulate hosting bids or to stage

events after a successful bid has been made. It can also involve research into the ongoing activities of organizations more sceptical of the benefits of the event which are themselves investigating the claims made by mega-event promoters or ‘boosters’.

It is difficult to accept that the politics of the Olympic Games should be understood as a continuing form of imperial power, as Brohm (1978) once suggested. Today, the politics of the Olympics revolves around such issues as containment – terrorism, security, surveillance, and civil rights associated with restrictions on freedom of movement and expression – and human rights and rights to freedom from eviction and to adequate housing (Harvey *et al.* 2014; Kuhn 2015). Such issues came to prominence during the Beijing Olympiad – for example, the protests surrounding the torch relay in 2008 (Horne and Whannel 2010) – but have continued to involve thousands of people in London, Rio, PyeongChang, Tokyo, Paris, and Los Angeles associated with the other Games and will continue to do so into the 2020s.

NOTES

- 1 At the same time American athlete Leahseneth (‘Lacey’) O’Neal coined the less widely used term ‘girlcott’. Speaking for black women athletes, she advised that the group would not ‘girlcott’ the Olympic Games as they were still focused on being recognized (www.sports-reference.com/olympics/athletes/on/lacey-oneal-1.html [last accessed 24 October 2019]).
- 2 See, for example, this newspaper report from 1948: www.guardian.co.uk/politics/1948/jul/29/past.comment [last accessed 24 October 2019].
- 3 As with much of this book, the focus of this chapter is on the Summer Olympic Games, but see Chapter 8. The Winter Olympics have not had so many instances of boycotts, although at the 1980 Winter Olympics, Taiwan (referring to itself as the Republic of China, ROC) refused to compete under the name of ‘Chinese Taipei’. It is the only case of boycotting the Winter Olympic Games. In August 2008, however, the government of Georgia called for a boycott of the 2014 Winter Olympics, held in Sochi, Russia, in response to Russia’s participation in the 2008 South Ossetia war. Sochi is within 20 miles of Abkhazia, a disputed territory claimed by Georgia. In 2013 and 2014 calls were also made to boycott the Sochi Olympics on the basis of new legislation in Russia placing restrictions on expressions of non-heterosexual sexual preferences (see Boykoff 2016a for further discussion).
- 4 On the IOC webpage ‘Olympism in Action’ promises to build ‘a better world through sport’ (www.olympic.org/olympism-in-action [last accessed 25 September 2015]).

FURTHER READING

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- Lauermann, J. and Pauschinger, D. (2018/2019) ‘Protest and the Games’, https://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2018/0529_protests-and-the-games-article-series/ [accessed 24 September 2019].

CHAPTER 8

THE OTHER OLYMPIC GAMES

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we examine the many quadrennial and peripatetic multiple-sport festivals that have been developed. We typically talk of the Olympic Games, and yet, generally, are referring just to the Summer Olympic Games. Since 1924, the Olympics were augmented by the Winter Olympics, and, as is much less well known, by the Deaflympics. In recent years the Paralympics has grown in profile and status immensely, and now is routinely staged in the same city as the Summer Games and Winter Games respectively. Regional multi-sport Games are now staged in all five continental areas. In an effort to hold onto the younger audience, the Olympic portfolio has more recently been further expanded by the addition of the World Youth Games.

Considering it was designed in the late nineteenth century, the organizational structure of the IOC has proved remarkably resilient. It has not changed that much since the 1900s, it has not been threatened by major splits within, nor by the rise of significant competitor organizations from outside. Right from the start Coubertin based the Games upon a model, adapted from Ancient Greece, of a quadrennial multi-sport festival, which he insisted should be peripatetic, staged by a different host each time. This model has been so extraordinarily resilient that it has come to be the template for many international sporting festivals, both single sport and multiple sport.

Of course, while the IOC held the copyright to the ‘Olympic’ term, they did not have a monopoly on the concept of a multi-sport festival. There have been and are many other multi-sport festivals – the Gay Games, the Commonwealth Games, the Workers Sport Movement, and, as of 2019, the Urban Games and the World Beach Games. In the first section of this chapter we will concentrate on the Olympic Family of events, and in the second we will turn our attention to other multiple-sport festivals. It should be noted that this division is, though, not a rigid and absolute one. There are many links in personnel between the Olympic Family and other events such as the Commonwealth Games and the various regional multiple-sport federations. The international federations for single sports play a significant role in linking the Olympic movement and other organizations that stage quadrennial sport events.

Indeed, the various regional games established since the Second World War, that all developed under different circumstances within their own regional cultures and histories, seem to

have been effectively nudged, over the years, to the point they now all operate in very similar ways. The Asian Games (1951), Pan-American Games (1951), African Games (1965), Pacific Games (1963), and European Games (2015) all feature the same tri-partite model as used by the Olympic Games – an overall association, which brings together the member countries, the international sport federations, and the organizing committee. Typically the associations that run these games are committed to the Olympic model, values, and Charter, and are recognized by the IOC. By contrast the British Empire Games, first staged in 1930, in Hamilton, Canada, originated in imperial power and racism. John Astley Cooper began proposing a Pan-Britannic Festival in print in 1891. This idea was overtaken by the modern Olympic Games, but it sowed the seeds of the Empire Games. It is clear, according to Moore, that Cooper's idea was intended to include 'only adult males from the so-called white Dominions – Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa, as well as those subjects eligible in Great Britain' (Moore 1987: 148). The very title of the event, unlike that of the World Cup or the Olympic Games, has had to keep changing to match contemporary political realities. Until 1950 it was the British Empire Games, after which it became the British Empire and Commonwealth Games. Only in 1970 was the embarrassment of 'Empire' finally dropped, and the Games became the British Commonwealth Games. Four years later, in a symbolic deterritorialization, 'British' was dropped and the event became the 'Commonwealth Games'. In the process it has become more like a second tier version of the Olympic Games model. In the first part of this chapter we commence by discussing those events closest to the IOC, such as the Winter Olympics and the Paralympics. We then outline the other Special Olympics, before turning our attention to the Youth Games and other attempts to enlarge the youth audience being developed by the Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC) and the Global Association of International Sports Federations (GAISF; previously SportAccord) – the umbrella organisation for all (Olympic and non-Olympic) international sports federations as well as organisers of multi-sports games and sport-related international associations.

In the final section of this book we examine those events set up in opposition or as alternatives to the mainstream Games, such as the Workers Sport Movement, the Women's Olympics, and the Gay Games.

THE IOC PORTFOLIO

The relation between the IOC and the various multi-sport events discussed here is a complex one. Some events, such as the Winter Olympics and the World Youth Games, are directly run by the IOC. Others such as the Paralympics are visibly close to the Olympic movement, and are staged in the same city, but have their own governing body. The various regional games have their own regional governing bodies, but utilize the Olympic model and have IOC recognition. There are recently established events that have been set up by bodies such as GAISF (World Urban Games, Combat Games) and ANOC (World Beach Games) which work closely with the IOC. However, ANOC and GAISF are independent bodies that may well pursue their own agendas, and seek to carve out turf for themselves. It certainly seems to be the case that the World Youth Games (IOC), the World Urban Games (GAISF), and the World Beach Games (ANOC) are at least potentially battling each other for the youth audience. Lastly there are those multi-sport events that are simply independent (the Commonwealth Games), that were specifically refused the right to use the 'Olympic' word (the Gay Games),

or were precisely conceived in opposition to the ‘capitalist and imperialist’ Olympic Games (the Workers Sport Movement of the 1920s and 1930s). In this section we concentrate on those with some form of direct association with the IOC, the Winter Olympics, the Paralympics, the other forms of sport events for people with disabilities, and the World Youth Games

Winter Sport, Tourism, and the Winter Olympic Games

It seems to be a characteristic of the British to take a perfectly ordinary, even juvenile amusement, and convert it into a highly organised competitive sport.

HRH Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh (Seth-Smith 1976)

The Winter Olympics is a significant mega-event in its own right, which generates significant sums for the IOC in television revenue and sponsorship. The sports of the Winter Olympic Games would probably not exist were it not for the alliance of travel and tourism organizations and would not have subsequently flourished to the same degree without television. The majority of these sports have a relatively small participant base, restricted largely to the elite affluent social classes of Europe and North America, although in recent decades they also have increasing appeal for the new elites of south east Asia.

The Olympics and the travel industry

There is a close association between winter sports and the travel industry. So the travel industry works hard to promote Winter Olympic sites, such as PyeongChang, 2018. The organization Roadtrips describes itself as ‘the world leader in international sports travel experiences, backed by nearly 20 years of experience’ and invites clients to ‘relax, enjoy and immerse yourself in one of the biggest sporting event experiences in the world’ (Road Trips undated). Sportstraveller suggested that the combination of the Winter Olympics and South Korea would prove attractive to tourists in 2018 (SportsTraveler undated). Roadtrips refers to ‘PyeongChang’s picturesque landscape and towering mountains’, ‘majestic mountains...unspoiled natural beauty’ (Road Trips undated).

The stress on the ‘picturesque landscape and towering mountains’ the ‘majestic mountains’ and ‘unspoiled natural beauty’, is interesting in that winter sports grew out of mountain climbing and mountain walking. In turn these activities developed out of the Enlightenment interest in understanding the natural environment, the grand tours of the eighteenth century, and unfolded especially in the context of romanticism and the sublime landscape epitomized in the work of painters such as Caspar David Friedrich. By the mid-nineteenth century, clubs, established by the Victorian haute bourgeois, promoted winter sport in the context of rational recreation, Christian fellowship, and the institutionalization of sport. In contradiction and uneasy relation to this social formation of gentleman amateurs, were the new emergent modernizing forces of enterprise, marketing, and branded goods.

British climbers formed the Alpine Club in 1857; climbed many Alpine peaks and took a lead in organizing climbing as a sport. They were also active in self-mythologizing – Holt refers to ‘the story of vigour and resourcefulness which the British told themselves about themselves’. British skaters made a significant contribution to the codifying of skating,

especially of figure skating, establishing ‘probably the first skating club in Edinburgh in 1742’, and founding the first National Skating Association, in 1879 (Holt 1992: 421).

St Moritz in the Alps had been a spa town since the sixteenth century, attracting visits from aristocratic families (Flower 1982: 15). The regime was quite Spartan and even by the mid-nineteenth century it was still undeveloped. In 1856 Johannes Badrutt acquired a small lodging house, the Pension Faller, in order to build a large and luxurious hotel. He began promoting winter holidays there (Flower 1982: 20–23). Four Englishmen provided a warm endorsement:

They made our winter quarters so comfortable that we were loath to leave them when the spring came...On an average we were out four hours daily, walking, skating, on the lakes, sleighing or sitting on the terrace reading...The brilliance of the sun, the blueness of the sky and the clearness of the atmosphere quite surprised us. The lake affords the opportunity to those who love the art of skating to do so without the interruption for five months.

(quoted in Flower 1982: 24)

The St Moritz resort first staged curling in 1880, the first European Ice Skating Championships in 1882, and built the Cresta Run in 1884. In 1889 they staged their first golf tournament. Winter holidaying grew rapidly from the mid-1860s, once facilities were provided. In 1865–1866 Davos had only two winter visitors and in 1873–1874 it had over 300 (Flower 1982: 30). Skating was popular in St Moritz (Flower 1982: 30). At Davos tobogganing became popular, and the first luge races were between visitors and locals. Davos Tobogganing Club organized a downhill race from Davos to Klosters in 1883 (Flower 1982: 31). In response Badrutt planned and built what became known as the Cresta Run, featuring banked turns with ice. (Flower 1982: 33)

Badrutt utilized sport to provide entertainment for his guests. But no one skied and even when it was introduced in the late nineteenth century the skaters of St Moritz tended to look down on it, referring to the skiers as plank-hoppers (Flower 1982: 59). The building of the Cresta Run in the 1880s prompted the development of the new sport of bobsleigh (Holt 1992: 421). Switzerland became a favoured destination for the growing numbers of affluent British middle-class tourists in the later nineteenth century (Holt 1992: 423).

Sir Henry Lunn (1859–1938) and his son Arnold (1888–1974) played a significant role in the growth of winter sport tourism. Sir Henry established Co-operative Educational Tours in 1893, organized his first tours to Switzerland in 1902, and co-founded the Hellenic Travellers Club in 1906. Lunn was astute enough to see that there would be a snobbery against travel agents, and so established the Public Schools Alpine Sports Club – a club being far more acceptable than an agent (Flower 1982: 86)!

to encourage winter sports parties for upper-class people, who on no account wanted to mix with those taking the kind of organized tours associated with the name of Thomas Cook. By setting up a private club restricted to those who had attended public schools and their families, he was able to create something of the

atmosphere of a country house party on the Swiss slopes. It was in this congenial, exclusive world that Lunn discovered skiing. Here he was able to combine business with pleasure, helping to organize skiing parties.

(Holt 1992: 423).

Sir Henry Lunn did much to introduce winter sports to the English upper classes, and his son Arnold ‘was to become the high priest of British skiing for a full sixty years’ (Flower 1982: 88). But skating remained the dominant sport of St Moritz right through the twenties (Flower 1982: 88). When Sir Henry established the Alpine Ski Club in 1908, his son was one of eight founder members. The son, Arnold Lunn, according to Holt was regarded by the Swiss as “‘the father’”, even “‘the Pope’” of alpine skiing’ (Holt 1992: 422). Nordic skiing – travelling along relatively flat country, has a long tradition, but Alpine skiing depended on technological investment and only really began to develop rapidly during the 1920s when the growing establishment of ratcheted railways, funiculars, and ski lifts obviated the need for long and tedious climbs to the top of runs.

In 1921 Arnold Lunn, chairman of the Federal Council of British Ski Clubs, organized the British Ski Championship, the first national championship to be decided on a downhill race. (Holt 1992: 425). The Swiss skier, Walter Amstutz, said that ‘the modern slalom is in my opinion the unique invention of Arnold Lunn’ (Holt 1992: 426–427). Lunn also fostered women’s skiing, ‘encouraging the setting-up of the first women’s club in 1923 and organizing the first women’s races’. And Holt points out that ‘if skiing was to be a country house party in the Alps, it could hardly be an all-male affair’ (Holt 1992: 427).

The Polytechnic and the Polytechnic Touring Association

During the nineteenth century, another British institution, The Polytechnic (later the Royal Polytechnic Institution), was formed in 1838 and was based in Regent Street, London. A gymnasium and swimming pool were installed in Regent Street during the 1880s – and a sports ground at Chiswick was established in the 1900s (see Clapson 2012). The Polytechnic became famous for its sporting and social clubs, including the Polytechnic Harriers who organized the 1908 London Olympics opening and closing ceremonies. ‘Olympic athletes from all over the world used the swimming pool and gymnasium at 309 Regent Street as practice facilities for the Games’ (University of Westminster, undated). During the 1880s the Regent Street Polytechnic organized travel and foreign holidays for staff, students, and members of the Polytechnic clubs and of the school established by the Polytechnic. This included trips to Switzerland, where the Director of Education of the Polytechnic had acquired chalets by Lake Lucerne. Around the start of the twentieth century they established the Polytechnic Touring Association, based on Polytechnic premises in Regent Street, with Switzerland as its primary destination. It became independent in 1911, although it retained links, and continued to donate money to Polytechnic activities. In 1958 it changed its name to Poly Travel (see Glew *et al.* 2013).

The birth of the Winter Olympics

The first multi-sport festival of winter sports, which subsequently became regarded as the first Winter Olympics, was held in 1924 in Chamonix in France. It was originally known

as the 'International Winter Sports Week' (Girardin 2018). Before the Winter Olympics, there was figure skating at the London Olympic Games in 1908 but not in 1912. Figure skating and ice hockey were both included in the 1920 Olympic Games in Antwerp.

The first foreign travellers to write about the area of Chamonix were William Windham and Robert Pococke, who visited in 1841, and painted a romantic picture of sublime landscapes. Chamonix, with its dramatic views of Mont Blanc, became a European Grand Tour destination. During the nineteenth century, the growth of the railways and new hotel development was fuelling a nascent tourism industry. Chamonix set up a tourist board in 1912 and the 1913 edition of Bradshaw's *Continental Railway Guide* was highlighting its appeal, as a centre for winter sports. In 1921, the local council decided to rename the town Chamonix-Mont-Blanc, to boost tourism (Girardin 2018). The year 1924 was what Arnold Lunn called the 'annus mirabilis' of modern skiing. As part of his drive to establish the new forms of skiing, he helped to set up the Kandahar Ski Club at Murren in January 1924; that same month the Federation Internationale du Ski was founded in Oslo and that year, too, Nordic skiing was included in the first Winter Olympics held at Chamonix. (Holt 1992: 427–428). The Chamber of Commerce were alert to the economic advantages of staging the Games (Essex 2011: 57).

Winter sport, the Winter Olympics, the hotel trade, and the travel industry became bound up in a synergistic relationship, each feeding off the growth of the other components. St Moritz, one of the earliest winter sport resorts, was to host the Winter Olympic Games in 1928 and 1948. 'In 1928 the Games in the Swiss resort of St Moritz were led by the local authority and assisted the consolidation of the resort as an international winter sports destination' (Essex 2011: 58). The construction of a ratcheted railway, conveying people to the higher snow fields, enabled a growth of downhill skiing in time for the 1928 Winter Olympics, held at St Moritz (Flower 1982: 97). A group of rich and mostly aristocratic men set up an exclusive club at the top of the funicular, the Corviglia Ski Club (Flower 1982: 102). According to Seth-Smith (1976: 129) the Games had their critics and 'doubts were expressed that the Olympics were a colossal mistake and a gross waste of money'.

As a young graduate from Vienna, Erna Low advertised for people to join her on a skiing holiday, as a way of financing her own trip. From 1922, the endeavour turned into a travel company, specializing in Alpine trips and skiing holidays. One of her innovations – the house party – for which she rented large English houses and boarding-schools and invited paying guests to stay in an informal atmosphere and meet each other, was a forerunner of the chalet holiday. In the early fifties, Erna Low became the first tour operator to offer this as a holiday option for skiers (Erna Low website, <https://www.ernalow.co.uk> undated).

Relations between the interests of hoteliers, transport operators, and travel agents were key to the development of resorts that then staged the Olympic Games. Bidding for the Olympic Games provided a means by which private interests could leverage public investment in infrastructure. In the late 1920s the owners of the Lake Placid Club, who had developed winter sports in the area, lobbied for it to be chosen as a Winter Olympics site, which it was in 1932. Mussolini encouraged Giovanni Agnelli to build the Sestrières resort in Italy. Sun Valley, near Ketchum Idaho, was developed after W. Averall Harriman, wanting to boost the takings of the Union Pacific Railroad, commissioned an

Austrian expert to find a site on his line (Flower 1982: 135). The 1956 Olympic Games transformed Cortina into a much more famous resort. The developers of Squaw Valley, California, modelled it on European winter sports resorts. For the 1968 Winter Olympics in Grenoble the authorities constructed a new airport, town hall and motorways.

By this point the scale of the Games and the needs of accommodation tended to be beyond the longer requirements of smaller communities. During the 1950s the travel companies of Lunn and of the Polytechnic, both born out of a Christian philanthropic endeavour to promote rational recreation, converged in the context of the beginnings of the jet age, cheap package holidays, television, and the commercialization of sport. The airline British Eagle, a pioneer of cheap package holidays, which had acquired an interest in both Sir Henry Lunn Travel and the Polytechnic Touring Association (since 1958 Poly Travel) merged them, in 1965, forming Lunn Poly, which became one of Britain's largest travel agents.

Television and the Winter Olympics

In 1960 the television rights for the Winter Games brought in a mere \$50,000, but by 1968 they sold for \$2.6 million. Part of the television appeal lies in thrills and spills but with television's close up lens and tendency to personalize, allied to the distinct patriotic focus, the presence of domestic stars with medal potential became important. In 1985, selling the USA TV rights for the 1988 Calgary Games, the IOC ran a sealed bid auction. ABC executives, desperate to retain their self-branding as 'the network of the Olympics', ended up paying an unprecedented \$309 million – around \$50 million more than they were authorized, and as it turned out at least \$50 million more than they were able to recoup in advertising. It was a turning point for ABC sports, whose budget was then restricted and their dominance of both Summer and Winter Games was at an end, with NBC becoming the network who typically won the rights. From the 1980s the IOC became far more successful at maximizing television and sponsorship revenue.

In 1986 at an IOC Session, it was decided (prompted by ABC), to opt to split the Summer and Winter Games, which up till then had been staged in the same year. After 1992, the two events would be separated, while remaining on a four-year cycle. The new alternation system ensured that television rights continued to rise, to the benefit of the IOC. The rights for Nagano in 1998 raised \$514 million and those for Vancouver in 2010 broke through the billion barrier, raising \$1280 million. NBC alone paid \$775 million for the USA rights to 2014 Winter Games in Sochi, Russia, and \$963 million for the 2018 Winter Games in PyeongChang, South Korea (Crupi 2011).

In the twenty-first century is the Winter Olympics skating on thin ice? Are there clouds on the horizon? Every cloud may have a silver lining, but if the sun is shining on the Games it will start to melt the snow. All that is solid might melt into air. What might a risk analysis tell us? Sochi 2014 was not a great tourism success (Chipkin 2014). The fear of terrorism, and a hostility to the perceived homophobia prevalent in Russia were factors but some reports also identified 'the distance, the cost, the lack of quality accommodations and negative perceptions of Russia in winter'. Tour operators anticipated that US spectator attendance at the 2014 Winter Olympics would be low. High costs, lack of luxury accommodation, and rumours of poor internet access were also factors. Robert

<i>Year</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>TV rights</i>	<i>Per cent increase</i>
1960	Squaw Valley	0.05	
1964	Innsbruck	0.93	1,760
1968	Grenoble	2.6	180
1972	Sapporo	8.5	226
1976	Innsbruck	11.6	37
1980	Lake Placid	20.7	78
1984	Sarajevo	102.7	396
1988	Calgary	324.9	216
1992	Albertville	291.9	-10
1994	Lillehammer	352.9	21
1998	Nagano	514	46
2002	Salt Lake City	738	44
2006	Turin	831	13
2010	Vancouver	1,280	54
2014	Sochi	1,289	0.7

Table 8.1 Winter Olympic Games: Revenue from Television Rights Payments

Source: Adapted from IOC Olympic Games Marketing Fact File, 2015.

Figures in million US dollars, figures over \$10m rounded up to nearest million.

Tuchman, President of Goviva in New York, said interest in the Sochi Olympics was ‘extremely limited – probably the least amount of business we have run in the past 20 years’ (Chipkin 2014). So fewer cities wished to incur the large expense of staging the Games; Oslo, Stockholm, Lviv, and Krakow all withdrew from the 2022 Games, leaving only Beijing and Almaty, in Khazakhstan, Beijing being the final winner. The costs are a big deterrent – Vancouver’s 2010 Winter Games cost \$6.4 billion, and Sochi, a venue created almost from scratch, cost \$51 billion.

Environmental issues are becoming higher up the agenda in IOC circles, but promises are not the same as delivery. There were protests in South Korea over plans to build a ski slope through a 500-year-old protected forest and public concerns over the costs and possible ecological damage at the revered mountain (Voice of America 2015). But climate change might be a bigger issue for the Winter Games. According to one report, across the United States, winter temperatures have warmed 0.16 degrees Fahrenheit per decade since 1895; the rate of warming has more than tripled to 0.55 degrees Fahrenheit per decade since 1970. The proportion of total winter precipitation is falling as snow has decreased in the north-eastern and western United States, with concurrent decreases in snowpack in both regions. Visitors to skiing areas can drop by as much as 30 per cent in years of low snowfall (Burakowski and Magnusson 2012). The estimated \$12.2 billion US winter sports industry has already felt the direct impact of decreased winter snowpack and rising average winter temperatures. The strongest winter warming trends have occurred in the northern half of the United States, where snow plays an important role in their winter season. Snow depths could decline in the west by 25 to 100 per cent. The length of the snow season in the north-east could be cut by half (NRDC undated). So the complex, contradictory, and unstable equilibrium that has sustained the Winter Olympics

through almost six decades of growth may be beginning to fail. The tourist trade is not resilient; not many towns and cities are enthusiastic about mounting bids to stage future events; climate change threatens the reliability of snow covered slopes. In changing times, the old aristocracy of the ski-slopes, and the permanent floating party of the Eurotrash rich kids has come to seem a little archaic. However, the new kids in town want snow-boarding, and the Winter Olympics is reshaping itself to attract this market.

The Paralympics and other sport for people with disabilities

The Paralympic Games is not the only event for athletes with disabilities or impairments – the First International Silent Games took place in 1924, became the World Games for the Deaf and then the Deaflympics from 2001. Other games include the Invictus Games (for injured and impaired military personnel), the Asian Para Games, the Parapan Games (associated with the Pan-American Games), and the Special Olympics, for those with intellectual impairments. Yet provision for disability sport, both for the physically disabled and the learning disabled, has been limited in all nations until relatively recently. It is interesting to contrast the latter with the key developments and evolution of the Paralympic Games.

Sport for the physically disabled was first developed after the First World War and more fully after the Second World War, especially in the context of attempts to improve the lives of those with spinal injuries. The Games began at Stoke Mandeville Hospital in Aylesbury in 1948, on the same day as the start of the London Olympics, at Wembley Stadium 35 miles away. The first international Games took place in 1952, when a team from the Netherlands also participated. The Winter Paralympics began in 1976. Since 1988 (summer) and 1992 (winter) they have taken place a few weeks after the Summer and Winter Olympics.

The idea of sport as a means for improving the health, self-esteem, and general well-being of those with learning disabilities was not taken up until the founding of the ‘Special Olympics’ Movement in the United States in the 1960s (Harvey *et al.* 2014: 83–84). In 1971 the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) gave the Special Olympics organization official approval to use the name ‘Olympics’ in the USA, and in 1988 the International Olympics Committee also endorsed use of the name worldwide. Organized through clubs taking part in national and international competitions the Special Olympics is based on the Olympic format of opening and closing ceremonies, the awarding of gold, silver, and bronze medals, host cities and a four-yearly cycle of the major international events. At the time of writing, for example, the next Special Olympics World Winter Games will be held in Are and Ostersund, Sweden, in February 2021 and the next Special Olympics World Summer Games will be held in Berlin, Germany in June 2023 (<https://www.specialolympics.org/our-work/world-games> [accessed 24 September 2019]).

Unlike the Special Olympics, the Paralympic Games, which includes some events for the learning impaired, has become a component part of the Olympic Games mega-event spectacle. The number of countries involved has grown from 21 to nearly 160, and from less than 400 Paralympic athletes in 1964 the number has increased to 4,328, competing in 22 sports for 528 medals at Rio in 2016 (Darcy *et al.* eds. 2017). Hence the prefix

‘para’ in Paralympics today refers to its parallel status; that is, an event running alongside the Olympic Games. The detailed story of the Paralympic Games can be found in several sources (see for example Bailey 2008; Brittain 2012; and Howe 2008). The International Sports Organization for the Disabled (1964) became the International Coordinating Committee of World Sports Organizations in 1982, and then the International Paralympic Committee in 1989. The International Paralympic Committee (IPC) has a general assembly, governing body, management team, 11 committees, eight technical committees, and an Athletes’ Council. The general assembly comprises IFs, NPCs, regional organizations and the International Organization of Sport for the Disabled. Originally for wheelchair athletes with spinal cord injuries, the PGS now includes athletes with ten eligible impairments. These are then organized into different classes of impairment to equalize competition by grouping athletes together with similar limitations. This can lead to controversial issues – over classification, misrepresentation of the severity of the impairment, and clarity of competition (Darcy *et al.* eds. 2017).

Howe (2008: 15–37) describes three stages in the development of sport for the disabled. As we have noted sport provision was initially designed to aid in the *rehabilitation* of war wounded service personnel, and thus reintroduction into a productive (working) life. This certainly was the main impetus behind the German Jewish neurologist Dr Ludwig Guttmann establishing a National Spinal Injuries Unit at the Ministry of Pensions Hospital in Stoke Mandeville in the UK in 1943.

The second phase in the development of sport for the disabled developed from this in terms of the recognition that *participation* in sport could be beneficial to disabled people in wider terms than simply their employability. Athletes in different impairment groups – those with spinal cord injuries, the visually impaired, the hearing impaired, cerebral palsy, and amputees – became organized through the International Organization of Sport for the Disabled (IOSD). The IOSD introduced a systematic classification system to create equal conditions for athletes to compete with these different impairments.

The third phase in the development of sport and the disabled involved the development of *high-performance achievement* sport, organized through the IPC, which was first established in September 1989. It was from this time on that Howe (2008: 16) suggests we can talk about a ‘Paralympic Movement’ as the forming of the IPC brought together a number of different organizations that had previously represented sport for the various impairment groups.

The term ‘Paralympic’ is now understood to refer to the fact that sports events for disabled people take place alongside (or ‘parallel’ to) the Olympic Games, although initially it was considered that the word combined ‘paraplegic’ and Olympic, but this was not accurate as people with disabilities other than paraplegia participated in the Paralympic Games. Use of the name ‘Mandeville’ by the local organizers for one of the two mascots for the London Olympic and Paralympic Games of 2012 deliberately sought to establish the (then) 64-year inheritance (Brittain 2012). However the first generally recognized Paralympic Games was held in Tokyo in 1964 (Frost 2012). It was here for the first time that the term Paralympic was used, although the event was officially titled the ‘Thirteenth International Stoke Mandeville Games for the Paralysed’, and Rome in 1960 had used some of the same locations as the Olympic Games. Formal recognition and use of the term by the IOC, however, did not occur until the Seoul Olympics in 1988.



Figure 8.1 Poster for the Tokyo 1964 Paralympic Games.

The roots of ‘prolympism’ as a concept underpinning the movement are thus embedded in the history of both the rehabilitative and participatory models, but truly became focused on *high-performance* sport after 1988. As Howe (2008: 19) remarks, ‘Guttmann’s lasting legacy is the fact that physical activity and sport are widely acknowledged to be central to contemporary rehabilitation for traumatic and congenital impairments.’

In London in 2012 both the Paralympic Games opening and closing ceremonies were spectacular, and drew attention to the diversity of human-kind and even featured performances referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The connection between this

and other major international sports events for disabled athletes and the disabled majority is questionable, however. After London 2012 some journalists suggested that the 2012 Paralympic effect was a positive one and enquiries from people with disabilities in the UK to get involved in sport rose. Other authors suggest however that there has been no significant impact on the lives of ‘ordinary’ disabled people (Ryan 2019). For the development of a positive impact to be sustained, amongst other things, the sports infrastructure needs to be in place to support an increase in demand from people with disabilities, should there be one.

For various reasons disability rights activists have been wary of and somewhat distanced from the sport for disabled ‘movements’ over the past 60 years. First, disability sport relies upon medical classification and evaluation on the basis of impairment in order to create the different classes of sport, whether it is participatory or competitive. Yet the disability rights movement developed a major critique of the medical model of disability, and thus it has not wanted to engage fully with practices that rely so much on such forms of medical scrutiny and classification. Second, another aspect of the politics of the disability rights movement has been to develop organizations that avoid paternalistic relationships between the able-bodied and the disabled. Yet the main organizations for sport for the disabled, including the SO, the IPC, and the IOSD, can be seen as expert-led, rather than collective and self-organized bodies, that in some ways treat athletes as ‘charity cases’ (Howe 2008: 36). This links to the third reason why the disability rights movement and the main international sports for disabled movements have not shared common ground. The practice of high-performance sport is not an inclusive activity. As Howe (2008: 34) puts it, both the Olympic and Paralympic Games ‘exclude the (dis)abled or, to put it another way, “those who can’t”’. Sport, particularly high-performance sport, is fundamentally underpinned by the ‘ideology of ability’.

Possibly because of this, media representation of the Paralympics is considerably less than for the Olympics – for example there were 400 accredited American journalists and photographers at the 2016 Rio Olympics but only 29 at the 2016 Rio Paralympics (Houghton *et al.* 2017). But there is some evidence that media coverage is increasing, and representations of Paralympians are changing (McGillivray *et al.* 2019).

The Special Olympics is the world’s largest sports organization for children and adults with intellectual disabilities and physical disabilities. The organization gained official recognition from the IOC in 1988. The Special Olympics World Games are now held every four years. They were first held in 1968 in Chicago. Around 1,000 athletes, largely North American, participated. A winter version, first staged in 1977, in Colorado, is also staged every four years.

The Special Olympics grew out of a day camp (Camp Shriver) for children with intellectual and physical disabilities, established by Kennedy family member Eunice Shriver in 1962, at her Maryland home. The purpose of the camp was to give children with disabilities opportunities to compete in sport. President Kennedy subsequently established a panel on ‘mental retardation’, and panel member Kennedy Shriver lobbied to make sporting opportunities available to people with physical and intellectual disabilities. The Kennedy foundation commenced dispensing funds to establish camps modelled on Camp Shriver. In 1971 the US Olympic Committee granted the Special Olympics the right to use the Olympic word, and this was followed by IOC recognition in 1988.

France provided the first competitors from outside North America for the second Special Olympics World Games in 1970, and ten nations were represented at the third event in 1972. The year 1986 was declared ‘the year of the Special Olympics’ by the UN. The Special Olympics has come to emphasize the importance of bringing their athletes together with non-disabled competitors, in a concept that has become known as Unified Sports. The organization has been criticized for not utilizing enough people with disabilities in organizational roles, and for using sponsors who have not promoted sufficient in their own companies (see Storey 2004).

The Deaflympics

There were regular multi-sport events for people with hearing issues a long time before the Paralympics were set up. The International Games for the Deaf (now the International Silent Games) were first staged in Paris in 1924, and have been held every four years since, having visited 17 different countries. Of course, deafness does not constitute a significant impediment in many sports, such as athletics. Indeed deaf people do not necessarily perceive themselves as having a disability. The arguments for separate games for deaf people are partly social and to do with the exclusion that deafness causes. The deaf athlete is always excluded from the group. At the Deaf Games, or any other event at which deaf people meet, deaf athletes can usually communicate with other deaf athletes, regardless of which country they may be representing (<https://ukdeafsport.org.uk/deaflympics/> UK DeafSport).

INAS: the International Sports Federation for Persons with Intellectual Disability

This organization was set up in 1986 by Dutch professionals working with people with mental disabilities. Their organization became a member of the IPC. More than 80 countries belong to INAS. It staged its first games in Sweden in 1989, and followed this with an event immediately after the Barcelona Paralympic Games of 1992. In 2019 it staged its largest event yet, in Brisbane, Australia.

In Pursuit of Youth

One of the concerns amongst the long established organizations of world sport has been the danger that the established sports are losing their appeal to young people. New sport activities, variously dubbed adventure sport, extreme sport, and lifestyle sport (see Wheaton 2004) have won adherents. The dominance of social media in the 2000s has taken the attention of many young people away from sport in general, with the exception of gaming and e-sports. In response there has been a dramatic growth in multi-sport events aimed at winning young people – such as the World Youth Games and more recently the Urban Games, the Combat Games, and the World Beach Games.

The Youth Olympic Games, first discussed by the IOC in 2001, under the presidency of Jacques Rogge, are evidence of an IOC concern that not only were IOC members ageing, but so was the image of many Olympic sports as well. The original idea for a Youth Olympics was proposed in 1998 by an Austrian, Johann Rosenzopf, who was concerned

about falling participation and rising obesity rates amongst the young, So the IOC set out to attract younger Olympians, and an audience for young people's sport (hence the recent incorporation of skateboarding and breakdancing, rather than squash and judo) (See Gomez 2011). The idea was subsequently regarded as fitting the principles of Agenda 2020. The Youth Games had a predecessor in the World Youth Games, and indeed other multi-sport events aimed at young people (see Wong 2011: 1831–1851).

The Youth Games are open to people aged between 14 and 18. The first Summer Youth Games were held in 2010 in Singapore, followed by Nanjing (2014), Buenos Aires (2018), and Dakar (2022). The first Winter Youth Games were in Innsbruck in 2012, followed by Lillehammer (2016). In 2020 the Winter Youth Games were staged in Lausanne, the first time any Olympic event has been held in the base city of the IOC. It is clear from the programme that the event is being used to trial possible innovations in the main Olympics. New sports include karate, breakdancing, climbing, and roller speed skating. The cycling section includes BMX and mountain bike, but no track cycling. Volleyball and handball have been replaced by beach variants of those sports. Field hockey has been replaced by its indoor version, hockey5s. Synchronized swimming and water polo are omitted from the aquatics programme.

One problem with such events is that while the expenses are considerable, the revenues are much lower. Broadcasting organizations are not prepared to pay significant sums for rights, and sponsors are not likely to offer large sums either.

The IOC pays the costs of travel and accommodation for competitors and officials, but expect the costs associated with venues and infrastructure to be paid by the host city. The cost to a host city can, therefore, be considerable. The Youth Games marks a strategy to attract the youth to the Olympics by changing it. Like capitalism itself, the Olympic Games are remarkably adaptable.

The World Urban Games was established by GAISF (the General Assembly of International Sport Federations) seemingly as a means of incorporating new and emergent street sports in the form of global multi-sport competitive events. The first World Urban Games were staged in Budapest in 2019, and featured just six sports, including BMX freestyle cycling, and 3x3 basketball, both also in the main Olympic programme for Tokyo 2020. Four cities bid, and the original choice of Los Angeles was dropped after disagreements with GAISF, who then gave the event to Hungary. It is possible that Budapest will also be the host for the next Games, in 2021.

GAISF has also revived the Combat Games, and is considering reviving the World Mind Games. Many of these plans, though, were being pushed by GAISF president Patrick Baumann, who, sadly, died in 2018, in Buenos Aires, aged 51, while attending the 2018 World Youth Games (Butler 2018). Since the death of Baumann, GAISF may have become a little less proactive. The new president, possibly wanting to avoid upsetting the IOC, has warned against 'unnecessary' future expansion. Staging events outside the established set of internationally organized sports can produce problems of governance. The International Gymnastics Federation (IGF) includes parkour as a new gymnastics discipline, but has been denounced by rival organization Parkour Earth as lacking credibility, legitimacy, and authenticity and having no validity (Smith, Matthew 2019).

The World Beach Games, established by the ANOC, was first staged in Doha, Qatar in 2019. The sports include Aquathlon, 3x3 basketball, bouldering, beach handball, karate kata, kitefoil racing, skateboarding, and beach soccer, and in addition, open water swimming, beach tennis, beach volleyball 4x4, waterski, wakeboard, and beach wrestling. The World Beach Games were originally awarded to San Diego. However, by May 2019 the city had been unable to raise sufficient private funds, and at short notice the Games were moved to Doha (Pavitt 2019a). On the face of it, it is possible that tensions will develop between GAISF, ANOC, and the IOC over their parallel and possibly competing pitches to the youth market.

THE 'OTHER' OTHER GAMES

The Workers Sport Movement

The various multi-sport events considered above have all shared and bought into the broad Olympian values and the Olympic Games template for staging events. By contrast, right from the start, the Workers Sport Movement was founded in a trenchant critique of the Olympic movement as a bourgeois cultural form. It proposed instead to establish an autonomous workers sport organization.

As Barbara Keys (2006: 49) writes, by the 1920s a division of labour had been established in international sport that has persisted more or less until today. The IOC – an undemocratic as well as Eurocentric ‘club’ dominated by rich European men – determined the programme, location, and general philosophy governing the Olympic Games, while the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) oversaw participation and the International Federations (IFs) set the technical regulations and made final judgements on the eligibility of athletes to take part. Along with other international sports organizations – such as FIFA – the IOC helped to establish sport as an international and now global regime – a form of governance without government, based on the rules and norms not of localities but of sport. Sport developed increasingly popular festivals that provided a physical and temporal locus for the sporting ‘imagined world’ (Keys 2006: 184). Rites and symbols were constructed which in turn provide a sense of sport as a global force. It is this that has given sport a feeling of autonomy from ‘ordinary’ life and social contexts. Of course, as we have shown in this book, sport is not really so distinct from its social, political, economic, and cultural contexts. The development of the Olympics as a major, if not the premier, sports mega-event was accomplished through accommodations and struggles.

Before the Second World War, Olympic or ‘bourgeois’ sport had powerful rivals – in Europe, workers’ sport and gymnastics; in the rest of the world, traditional games and contests, as Eichberg (1998), among others, has shown. Workers’ Olympics, women’s sports events, and the professional Football World Cup all developed and waned in particular socio-historical conditions. Sport’s central position in contemporary conceptions of ‘physical culture’ is a historically contingent outcome, not the product of some natural evolution.

Before the Second World War, the Left critiqued sport on the grounds that it was ‘bourgeois sport’. From this perspective, it was seen as a form of bread and circuses, devised to

Year	Olympic Games	Workers' Olympics	Women's Olympics	Football World Cup	Empire Games	Soviet Games
1920	Antwerp					
1921		Prague				
1922			Paris			
1924	Paris					
1925		Frankfurt				
1926			Gothenburg			
1927		Prague				
1928	Amsterdam					Moscow
1930			Prague	Uruguay	Hamilton	
1931		Vienna				
1932	Los Angeles					Moscow
1934			Prague	Italy	London	
1936	Berlin	(Barcelona)				
1938			(Vienna)	France	Sydney	

Table 8.2 Selected major international sports events, 1920–1938

Source: Adapted from Roche (2000: 101).

distract workers from their real interests. Workers' sport promoted instead collectivism, mass participation, gender equality, and internationalism. Strongest in Germany, workers' sports organizations existed in most European countries. Tens of thousands of participants and hundreds of thousands of spectators were involved in the events in Vienna in 1931, for example (Riordan 1984). In addition to workers' events there were the Soviet Games and women's Olympics (Hoberman 1995: 7; Harvey *et al.* 2014: 27–41). Table 8.2 outlines a few of the alternative events in existence between 1920 and 1938.

Gradually, however, policy changed in the Soviet Union. Engagement with, rather than the establishment of alternatives to, bourgeois sport became the means by which it was thought internal and external legitimacy could be secured for the alternative economic system. In the same manner, although alternatives to sport existed – such as the Turnen movement in Germany, which highlighted processes rather than products or results – they gradually became co-opted by sport. From being an alternative to sport they became an alternative sport among many (Keys 2006: 182–183). International competitive sport became the playing field – and the surrogate battlefield between ideological systems – as we discuss in the next chapter.

In the aftermath of the First World War (1914–1918) and the Russian Revolution (1917), the workers' sports movement developed rapidly, and a whole series of workers' sports events or 'workers' Olympics' were staged during the 1920s and 1930s as an alternative to the official 'nationalistic' and 'bourgeois' Olympics (Kruger and Riordan 1996; Kuhn 2015: 21–49) (see Chapter 8). The workers' sports movement grew out of the foundation, in Germany in the 1890s, of the Workers' Gymnastic Association. This was established to provide an alternative, and opposition, to the German Gymnastic Society, which had become an intensely nationalistic organization. Similar groups developed all

<i>Year</i>	<i>Venue</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Organizers</i>	<i>Participants</i>	<i>Spectators</i>	<i>Countries</i>
1921	Prague	Unofficial 'Workers' Olympics'	Czechoslovak Workers Gymnastic Association			13
1925	Frankfurt	First Workers' Olympics	Lucerne Sports International		150,000	19
1928	Moscow	First Workers' Spartakiad	Communist Sports Organisation	4,000		14
1931	Vienna	Second Workers' Olympics	Lucerne Sports International	80,000	100,000	23
1932	Berlin	Second Workers' Spartakiad	Communist workers	Banned by German authorities		
1936	Barcelona	Third Workers' Olympics	Joint socialist and communist organisers	Spanish fascists stage putsch on morning of opening ceremony	Many would-be competitors remain to fight in International Brigade	
1937	Antwerp	Rescheduled Third Workers' Olympics	As above	27,000	50,000	17
1943	Helsinki	Planned Fourth Workers' Olympics	As above	Not staged due to outbreak of war in 1939		

Table 8.3 Mass-participation workers' sports events, 1921–1943

Source: Adapted from Riordan (1984: 98–112); information included about numbers where available.

over Europe, varying in type, but with a shared intention to provide working-class people with healthy exercise in a socialist context (Riordan 1984: 99). At first the focus was on less competitive, exercise-based activity, but after the First World War the orientation shifted towards competitive sports. The movement was split by the divergence, following the successful Russian Revolution, between socialist and communist organizations. The socialists remained with the Lucerne Sports International (LSI), while communists broke away to associate with the Red Sports International (RSI), sponsored by Russia.

Riordan singles out four ways in which these movements challenged the IOC Olympics. First, while the bourgeois Olympics encouraged participation in national teams, the workers' Olympics stressed internationalism. Second, unlike the IOC Olympics, which imposed minimum standards of performance and limits on numbers per event, the workers' games emphasized mass participation. Third, the IOC Games were seen as largely confined to the sons of the rich and privileged (amateurs, almost entirely male) and the IOC itself was seen as an aristocratic body while the workers' games opposed chauvinism, elitism, racism, and discrimination. Fourth, the workers' movement did not believe the Olympic spirit of true amateurism and international understanding could be achieved

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of nations</i>
1920	29
1924	44
1928	46
1932	37
1936	49

Table 8.4 Nations competing in the Olympic Games, 1920–1936

in a bourgeois-dominated movement (Riordan 1984: 103). The opening ceremonies at the workers' games dispensed with 'nationalist' flags and anthems, and competitors and spectators sang revolutionary hymns such as 'The Internationale'. The movement climaxed in 1936 when, with thousands of would-be participants already in Barcelona, the Spanish fascists staged a putsch, triggering the start of the civil war. Many of those who had come to compete ended up enlisting in the International Brigade (see Murray 1987; Steinberg 1978; Wheeler 1978). Meanwhile, Coubertin's Olympic Games, even if not yet truly global, grew steadily during the 1920s and 1930s (see Table 8.4).

The Women's Olympics

The place of women in the early Olympic Games was severely limited. Many members were opposed to women competing at all. Indeed Coubertin maintained this attitude for his whole life. However, as early as the 1900s, the rise of a worldwide women's movement was beginning to struggle against these patriarchal views. In 1921 Alice Milliat, a French rower, swimmer, and hockey player, founded the *Fédération Sportive Féminine Internationale* (FSFI), which immediately resolved to stage Women's Games. The first of these was in Paris in 1922, followed by Gothenburg (1926), Prague (1930), and London (1934), with participants coming mostly from North America, Western Europe, and Japan. Paris in 1922 attracted competitors from five countries in 11 events and more than 20,000 spectators on the first day.

Partly as a result of this rival event, the Olympic Games began, from 1928, including more women and more women's events, although it still took around 80 years to get anywhere near proper equality (see Chapter 11). In 1936, the FSFI ceased to function, but it had been responsible for the first big advances in the cause of women in sport. (see Hargreaves 1984; Boykoff 2016b).

The Gay Games

The Gay Games was established in 1982 in San Francisco by the Federation of Gay Games, formed by athlete Tom Wadell. It utilizes Olympic-style ritual such as the lighting of a flame at the opening ceremony. Wadell originally attempted to use the title 'the Gay Olympics' but was sued by the IOC and by the USOC, who had exclusive rights to the 'Olympic' word in the USA. The lawsuit was perceived by people in the gay community

as homophobic, as no similar moves had been made against other uses of the Olympic word. The IOC, though, has a long history of acting to protect its trademark. The first Games had 1,350 competitors in 16 sports, but the number of competitors grew and the range of events expanded over subsequent Games. Six of the first nine events were held in North America, the exceptions being Amsterdam 1998, Sydney 2002, and Cologne 2010.

The sports on offer at the first Gay Games were: basketball, billiards, bowling, cycling, diving, golf, marathon, physique, powerlifting, soccer, softball, swimming, tennis, athletics, volleyball, and wrestling. The event has often encountered opposition, for example in Vancouver in 1990, the governor publicly opposed the event and refused funding, and religious groups campaigned against the Games, warning of an invasion of sodomites. In recent years the awarding of sites has become the occasion for a bidding race similar to that of the Olympics.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As we have said elsewhere in this volume, the IOC has been extraordinarily successful in devising what turned out to be a highly popular global ritual, in a four-year format that has not changed, and proved to be a great generator of income. In addition, the IOC has kept control of its intellectual property and has not been subject to significant internal rifts, or external challenge. So, it is not surprising that the template has been repeated in so many forms, particularly in recent years when television revenue has become the central funding source. Imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery, but there is also a danger of the market being flooded with too many similar products. Clearly the original is still considered the best – biggest, strongest, richest – but whether all the recent additions to the field will thrive as well is far less certain.

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PART III

RUNNING THE GAMES



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CHAPTER 9

THE IOC, GOVERNANCE, AND THE BIDDING PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

A broad division exists between ‘romantic idealists’ and scathing critics of Olympism. The romantic idealists tend to believe that the Olympic Games can bring about greater internationalism, peace, and fraternity; they refer to it as a movement or a ‘family’ and treat Olympism as a quasi-religion or civil religion. The scathing critics believe it encourages organizations and individuals – whom they see as corrupt ‘chancers on the make’ to line their own pockets – inducing potential hosts to spend millions of dollars to bid and persuade just over 100 people to vote for them, all amidst a prevailing lack of transparency. As Jennings (2012: 461) and Chatziefstathiou (2012) suggest, Baron Pierre de Coubertin can thus be understood as ‘the Renovator’, ‘visionary’, ‘social marketer’ or ‘skillful manoeuvrer’ behind the foundation of the modern Olympics, depending on your perspective. As Jennings (2012: 461) also notes, in the 1890s, ‘it was the titled and wealthy bourgeois, today the multinationals seeking a Trojan horse to penetrate and subdue new markets’ that perhaps benefit from the global spread of Olympism.

This chapter examines the nature of the IOC and its relationship to the other components of international sport, the political economy of the Olympic movement, and the changing politics of the bidding process. The chapter places specific Olympic Games in relation to the structure of the Olympic movement and the various institutions of international sport. It provides an overview of the finances of the Olympic movement, and it analyses the peculiarly contradictory nature of the IOC in terms of its historical formation, its awkward adjustments to modernity and enterprise, and its extraordinary commercial success with one of the world’s strongest brands. This chapter explores and explains the Olympic Games – and the IOC in particular – by positioning them in their social, cultural, economic, and political contexts. As Gruneau and Neubauer (2012: 154) suggest, we believe that just as ‘broad political and economic forces and local issues’ shape each Olympic Games, so too does the organization of the IOC have to respond to changing circumstances. The minutiae of the IOC and the Olympic movement, however, are dealt with in detail elsewhere (see, for example, Chappellet and Kubler-Mabbott 2008; Girginov and Parry 2005; Girginov 2010; Toohey and Veal 2007).

The chapter is in two main parts. First, we consider the relationship of the IOC to other components of international sport, the nature of the IOC and its origins, and argue that it experienced a contradictory formation – having to adjust to both modernity and capitalist

enterprise. In the past 30 years this involvement with more commercial stakeholders – sponsors and media corporations especially – has raised issues of ‘governance’ that will continue to influence the future of the IOC and the Olympic movement more generally (see Girginov 2013 for discussion of some of the intricacies of Olympic governance). The changing political economy of the Olympic Games is covered in more detail in Chapter 10 – especially the 1980s and the relationships between João Havelange (president of Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)), Horst Dassler (CEO of Adidas) and Juan Antonio Samaranch (president of the IOC) – but we outline the origins of the arrangements that have come to shape the Olympics over the past three decades. Here, we seek to establish the kind of organization that the IOC is, and how it is similar to and different from other sporting organizations – including how its members and Olympic cities are chosen.

Second, we discuss various issues confronting the IOC and how they have been dealt with – especially candidate cities and the bidding process, and relationships between National Olympic Committees (NOCs), International Federations (IFs), and individual members of the IOC. Since the first edition of this book, a new IOC president, Thomas Bach, has attempted to deal with some old and recurring problems for the organization, including greater reluctance on the part of the citizens of some nations to host or even bid for the Olympics, especially the Winter Games, doping, and lingering concerns about corruption, social responsibility, and equity. In December 2014, following a year-long consultation process, 40 (20 + 20) recommendations were unanimously accepted by the IOC at its 127th Session in Monaco.¹ These formed the basis for what was called a ‘strategic roadmap’ for the Olympics for the next 15 years, ‘Olympic Agenda 2020’. The ‘New Norm’, as it is also sometimes referred to, has continued to develop and mutate (see, for example, IOC 2018). This, and the celebration of the 125th anniversary of the founding of the IOC in June 2019, provides an opportunity to offer consideration of the politics of IOC members, especially the presidents, many of whom seem to have been largely right-wing, with some fascist sympathizers (see Chapter 6). Avery Brundage (IOC president 1952–1972) has been rightly criticized by many, mostly for his hard line on amateurism rather than his anti-communism, and this has made the others appear rather apolitical and saintly by comparison – but whether this is accurate needs exploring.

WHAT IS THE IOC AND HOW DID IT DEVELOP?

There have been three main phases in the development of the Olympic Games according to Alan Tomlinson (2005a: 60):

- 1 1896–1928: ‘a grand socio-political project with a modest economic profile’;
- 2 1932–1984: ‘a markedly political intensification of the event at the heart of international political developments’;
- 3 1984 onward: ‘fueled by the global reach of capital...in the international economy of a global culture’.

It is this last phase that we focus on in this chapter – since the mid-1980s – when funding of the Olympics and the Olympic movement have derived mainly from the sale of

broadcasting rights and worldwide exclusive sponsorship arrangements (see Chapter 10). As the only candidate city for the 1984 Games, Los Angeles Olympic organizers ‘were able to negotiate unprecedented concessions from the IOC, including control over all aspects of Olympic planning and the right to keep all media and sponsorship revenues’ (Gruneau and Neubauer 2012: 147). Furthermore, they argue that no ‘local Olympic organizing committee has since had the monopolistic control over revenue production enjoyed by the LAOOC’ (Gruneau and Neubauer 2012: 155). The IOC has ‘been the overwhelming beneficiary of Olympic commercialism, reaping windfall profits from sponsorship and media revenues over the past two decades while allowing local organizing committees to bear all the financial risks’ (Gruneau and Neubauer 2012: 155). As such, sports mega-events like the Olympics and the men’s Football World Cup have become franchise operations, similar to the fast-food corporation McDonald’s, one of the major sponsors of both (Bose 2012; Stewart 2012). Gruneau and Neubauer (2012: 134–135) also suggest one of the most significant (unintended) legacies of the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 was the legitimization of ‘a sweeping neoliberal political project in the United States, with repercussions that have been felt across the globe’ ever since. In this respect the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics ‘have left an indelible mark on the international political landscape’ (Gruneau and Neubauer 2012: 156).

Over the course of the 125 years since the IOC was formed, various symbols and ceremonial features have been developed. These include the five rings symbol (the Olympic Symbol), arguably the most widely recognized logo in the world, which dates from 1913. These rings may represent the five continents, but they have no ancient Olympic Games connection. The Olympic Flag was created in 1914 and first used at the Antwerp Games in 1920. There is some speculation about how the flag, generally handed from host city to host city, got from Berlin in 1936 to London in 1948.

The Olympic motto – *citius, altius, fortius* (faster, higher, stronger) – was derived from 1886 and the credo of Pierre Didon, a Dominican priest whom Coubertin knew. The Olympic anthem derives from a Greek poem: ‘Ancient, eternal and immortal spirit’, put to music by Spyros Samaras. First performed in 1896, it was only officially adopted in 1958. Olympic emblems and mascots (since 1972) are designed for each Games. The Olympic flame, while appearing to have great lineage, only dates from the Amsterdam Games in 1928, and the torch and relay from the Nazi Olympics in 1936. Also from 1936, the flame was said to be lit at Olympia from ‘the sun’s rays’. The torch relay to the host city became a major event but, following 2008, it is unlikely that it will ever follow such an international route again (Horne and Whannel 2010). Despite the rise and fall of the torch relay in terms of distance and countries covered (see Table 9.1) it has become a major way in which sponsors can associate their brand with the otherwise commercially untainted Olympic ‘brand’.

Once it has arrived at the Olympic stadium the flame burns throughout the Games. Medal ceremonies in their current format were introduced in 1932 at the Summer Games in Los Angeles and Winter Games in Lake Placid. These involved medals awarded at ceremonies ‘on site’ at the events and the use of the three-level podium. Finally, the Olympic Order mimics national honours systems and is for individuals who have either achieved remarkable merit in the sporting world or rendered outstanding service to the Olympic movement.

In the past 30 years, protecting the ‘brand’ and image of these ‘properties’ has become of paramount importance. As the revised Olympic Charter (IOC 2019a: 23) states:

The Olympic Games are the exclusive property of the IOC which owns all rights relating thereto, in particular, and without limitation, all rights relating to (i) the organisation, exploitation and marketing of the Olympic Games, (ii) authorising the capture of still and moving images of the Olympic Games for use by the media, (iii) registration of audio-visual recordings of the Olympic Games, and (iv) the broadcasting, transmission, retransmission, reproduction, display, dissemination, making available or otherwise communicating to the public, by any means now known or to be developed in the future, works or signals embodying audio-visual registrations or recordings of the Olympic Games.

Hence the symbol, flag, motto, anthem, identifications (including but not limited to ‘Olympic Games’ and ‘Games of the Olympiad’), designations, and emblems, flame, and torches are collectively or individually referred to as ‘Olympic properties’. All rights to any and all Olympic properties, as well as all rights to the use thereof, belong exclusively to the IOC, including but not limited to the use for any profit-making, commercial, or advertising purposes. These rights are protected by law, particularly in Olympic Games host countries.

In addition to broadcasting partnerships the IOC manages The Olympic Partner Programme (abbreviated to just TOP) covering world-wide sponsorship and the IOC official supplier and licensing programme. Since 1985, when TOP started, the financial health of the IOC has been secured by the first two sources – television rights payments and global sponsorship deals. As an article in *The Economist* put it ahead of the Atlanta Summer Olympics in 1996, ‘The zillion dollar games’ have developed because ‘the power of corporate hype linked with global television is a marvellous machine for promoting sports’. As outlined in more detail in the next chapter, the IOC refers to its financial operations in terms of an ‘Olympic quadrennium’ – a four-year period. Television rights account for slightly less than 50 per cent of IOC revenue. Despite increasing attention being paid to digital and social media, it is likely that television income will continue to increase and thus the majority of Olympic income will come from corporate sources.

<i>Year / Host City</i>	<i>Distance travelled (in kilometres)</i>	<i>Number of torchbearers</i>
1992 Barcelona	6,307	9,849
1996 Atlanta	26,875	12,467
2000 Sydney	45,693	13,400
2004 Athens	84,600	11,300
2008 Beijing	137,000	21,800
2012 London	15,775	8,500
2016 Rio	28,235	12,950

Table 9.1 Summer Olympic Games Torch Relays, 1992–2016

Source: adapted from IOC (2017) *Torches and Torch Relays of the Summer Games from Berlin 1936 to Rio 2016* Lausanne: Olympic Studies Centre (available online at <https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Factsheets-Reference-Documents/Games/Torches/Reference-document-Torches-and-Torch-Relays-of-the-OG-from-Berlin-1936-to-Rio-2016.pdf> [last accessed 26 September 2019]).

The IOC provides TOP programme contributions and Olympic broadcast revenue to the OCOGs to support the staging of the Olympic Games and Olympic Winter Games. Long-term broadcast and sponsorship programmes enable the IOC to provide the majority of the OCOG's operational budget well in advance of the Games, with revenues effectively guaranteed prior to the selection of the host city. The two OCOGs of each Olympic quadrennium share approximately 50 per cent of TOP programme revenue and value-in-kind contributions, with approximately 30 per cent provided to the Summer OCOG and 20 per cent to the Winter OCOG. The OCOGs in turn generate substantial revenue from the domestic marketing programmes they manage within their host country, including domestic sponsorship, ticketing, and licensing. NOCs – of which there are over 200 – receive financial support for the training and development of Olympic teams and Olympic athletes. The IOC distributes TOP programme revenue to each of the NOCs throughout the world.

Although there appear to have been many positive developments since the Los Angeles Olympics, many academics at the time (see the contributors to Tomlinson and Whannel 1984) and since have been critical of the increasing commercialization of the Games and the likely impact this has had on the event (e.g. Donnelly 1996; Whitson 1998). Portrayed as 'gloom merchants' and 'naysayers' by those involved with the Olympics and associated sports federations, these criticisms are not simply voiced by people who want to put an end to the Olympics. With the increasing involvement of powerful global brands as Olympic sponsors has come attendant commercial rights legislation – to provide exclusivity to their association with the Olympic symbols (the interlocked rings, the name of the Games, etc.) and to avoid 'ambush marketing', which is the unauthorized commercial connection of a company with the Olympics, which the corporations pay millions of dollars to obtain. Yet this is seen as overly restrictive by smaller businesses and organizations. The Olympic Games also provide a major attraction to sponsors at a national level and thus drain resources from other non-Olympic sports and cultural activities during the build-up to the event. Criticisms of the IOC as an organization have impacted on its practices, as can be seen by the 20 + 20 recommendations and Agenda 2020 'roadmap'. This is most evident in the changes introduced to the bidding process and Olympic host city selection since the late 1990s, in 2015 and yet again in 2019, which we discuss in the second part of this chapter.

As an organization the IOC is the leader of the Olympic movement, comprising itself, International Sports Federations (IFs), and NOCs. Today it can contain up to 115 members, comprising 70 individual members, 15 athlete members, 15 IF presidents, and 15 NOC presidents. The IOC was and remains an extraordinary association; not representative of nations, but with a membership that chooses its own members by the rules and within limits set by the organization itself. The IOC remains a club based on the eighteenth-century aristocratic notions of membership associated with a gentlemen's club. This involves procedures such as the self-selection of members, the potential blackballing of applicants who wish to become members (that is, non-selection on the basis of objections by a few rather than by a majority) and clubability (that is, new members have to fit in socially). In all these ways the cohesion of the group, club, or association was forged. Occurring at the end of the nineteenth century, 'The universalism and humanism of the concepts and ideology of Coubertin and the Olympic movement...made

the movement's interests and institution building appear compatible and convergent with broader processes of international institution building' (Roche 2000: 108). In many ways the IOC helped in the process of the invention of traditions, nation building, and the imagining of communities. The IOC, for example, was interested in associating itself with the League of Nations formed after the end of the First World War.

The organization was not a disinterested party in the formation of nations, however. Hoberman (1995: 16ff.) suggests that the fact that the Scouting and the Olympic movements (in contrast with the Esperanto movement and the Red Cross) sought aristocratic affiliations and royal patronage indicates the degree to which they were ideologically interested in reconciling social classes (see Table 9.2). In 1908, 'European nobility made up 68 per cent of the membership of the IOC, a figure which had declined to 41 per cent by 1924' (Hoberman 1995: 16). He argues that during the 1930s the Olympic movement was essentially 'a right-wing internationalism effectively co-opted by the Nazis and their French and German sympathisers' (Hoberman 1995: 17).

At the time of writing (October 2019) the IOC currently has 105 members, 45 honorary members and two honour members (the former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger and the former Senegal minister of sport Youssoupha Ndiaye). The previous president, Jacques Rogge, is also an honorary president.¹ The IOC appoints its own members, and members represent the IOC in their countries and are not their country's delegates in the IOC ('Members of the IOC represent and promote the interests of the IOC and of the Olympic movement in their countries and in the organisations of the Olympic movement in which they serve' – IOC 2019a: 33). Table 9.3 illustrates the composition of IOC membership in 2019.

The geographical distribution of the IOC membership reflects the European origins of the organization.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Member</i>	<i>President</i>	<i>Country</i>
Pierre de Coubertin	1894–1925	1896–1925	France
Ernest Callot	1894–1913		France
Demetrios Bikelas*	1894–1897	1894–1896	Greece
Alexander Butowsky	1894–1900		Russia
Viktor Balck	1894–1921		Sweden
William M. Sloane	1894–1925		USA
Jiri Guth-Jarkovsky	1894–1943		Bohemia
Arthur Russell, Lord Amptill	1894–1898		UK
Charles Herbert	1894–1906		UK
Jose Benjamin Zubiaur	1894–1907		Argentina
Leonard Cuff	1894–1905		New Zealand
Comte Lucchesi Palli	1894–1895		Italy
Comte Maxime de Bousies	1894–1901		Belgium
Riccardo Carafa, Duke d'Andria	1894–1898		Italy

Table 9.2 Founder Members of the IOC in 1894

Source: adapted from Guttman 1984: 263; Toohey and Veal 2007.

*Sometimes rendered in English as Vikelas.

Voting members:
 105 members, of which there are
 35 women
 10 royal or aristocratic titles
 35 participated in at least one Olympic Games
 28 have won Olympic medals

Geographical distribution:
 Europe 40 per cent
 Asia 20 per cent
 America (North and South) 17 per cent
 Africa 16 per cent
 Oceania 6 per cent

Plus 45 non-voting 'honorary members'
 5 royal or aristocratic titles
 3 women

Table 9.3 The IOC Membership in 2019

Age limits have often been the subject of debate among IOC members. The average age in 1894 was just over 38 years...The age limit was raised to 75 in 1975. By 1980 the average age of IOC members was over 67 years, with the eldest member 94 years old. The age limit was raised again to 80 in 1995. From the 110th Session of the IOC in 1999 the age limit was reduced to 70 for all newly appointed members. At the 127th Session of the IOC in December 2014 one of the recommendations accepted unanimously was to allow 'a one-time extension of an IOC member's term of office for a maximum of four years, beyond the current age limit of 70', for a 'maximum of five cases at a given time'.²

Since formation there have been just nine IOC presidents (see Table 9.4). Initially, Coubertin had sought to alternate the presidency according to host city, but after the Paris Olympic Games in 1900 he was elected for a longer term and retained the presidency until 1925. The Olympic Charter published in 2014 (and ratified without change in 2015) stipulated a maximum term of eight years of office, with the possibility of one renewable

<i>Name</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Country</i>
Demetrios Vikelas	1894–1896	Greece
de Coubertin, Baron	1896–1925	France
Henri de Baillet-Latour, Count	1925–1942	France
J. Sigfrid Edstrom	1942–1952	Sweden
Avery Brundage	1952–1972	USA
Michael Morris, Lord Killanin	1972–1980	Ireland
Juan Antonio Samaranch, Marquess	1980–2001	Spain
Jacques Rogge, Count	2001–2013	Belgium
Thomas Bach	2013–2021*	Germany

Table 9.4 The Nine Presidents of the IOC, 1894–2021

Source: adapted from Toohey and Veal, 2007: 49; Chappelet and Kubler-Mabbott 2008: 23.

*with the possibility of an additional four-year term.

period of four years. Hence the present incumbent, in office since 2013, Thomas Bach, will step down in 2021 – unless there is an extension to his period of office for four more years.

The IOC took its basic organizational shape during the inter-war period. The executive board of the IOC, originally founded in 1921, currently consists of the president, four vice-presidents, and ten other members. All the members of the executive board are elected at an IOC session, by secret ballot, by a majority of votes cast, for a four-year term. Among many responsibilities today, the IOC executive board oversees and approves the marketing policy developed and proposed by the IOC Marketing Commission at the IOC session. As mentioned earlier, the IOC has always been self-recruiting, and views members as champions for the Olympic movement in their own nations, rather than as representatives of their countries at the IOC. Meanwhile, NOCs organize national teams for games events, and where they are hosts, they take a leading role in organizing events, although they are not formally represented on the IOC.

The Olympic Foundation is chaired by the IOC president, while an IOC Olympic Museum in Lausanne, which former president Juan Antonio Samaranch established, acts as a universal repository of the written, visual, and graphic memory of the Olympic Games. It cost \$70 million to build, but over 80 per cent of the funds came from donors or sponsors, including a massive donation from the then richest man in the world, Japanese property tycoon Tsutsumi Yoshiaki (Downer 1995, 393–396). As the Olympic Games are a multi-sport event it also required an international level of organization in the constituent sports. Some IFs had already been established, such as the International Federation of Gymnastics in 1881, the International Rugby Football Board in 1886, and the International Rowing Federation in 1892. The IOC connected ‘nationally powerful national level governing bodies of sport and permitted internationally standardised rules and regulations for international events to be developed, recognised and diffused’ (Roche 2000: 109).

These networks began to emerge after 1896, but especially following the 1908 Games held in London when the organizers – the British Olympic Committee (now the British Olympic Association (BOA)) and the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) – were accused of bias by the Americans. The International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) was established the year after the Stockholm Olympics in 1913.

During the 1918–1939 period the IOC ‘established itself as the primary authority and actor concerned with international sport, its games event became the pre-eminent sport event and its four-year calendar structured world sport’ (Roche 2000: 109). Roche acknowledges that it also ‘retained class-ist, sexist and racist attitudes from its late nineteenth century origins’ (Roche 2000: 110). Roche asserts that, since the Second World War, the Olympic movement has ‘on balance, been a significant force in the promotion of a genuine universalist humanistic ideology’, showing a great deal of adaptation to ‘pressures generated in its international political environment’ (2000: 110–111).

The first version of the Olympic Charter appeared in 1908. The latest revised version was published in June 2019, and can be downloaded from the IOC website ([https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document per cent20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-Olympic-Charter.pdf](https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-Olympic-Charter.pdf) [last accessed 26 September 2019]). The charter sets out the

‘fundamental principles and values of Olympism’ and defines the ‘rights and obligations of Olympic organisations’, which are ‘required to comply with the Olympic Charter’ (see Box 9.1).

Olympism is the ‘philosophy’ and movement devised by Coubertin. It refers to ‘a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind’. It attempts to blend ‘sport with culture and education’ and promote a way of life based on ‘the joy found in effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles’. Such a combination of humanistic ideals with the celebration of physical activity was unusual in the Western philosophical tradition until the English public school developed athleticism. The Olympic movement is unique in sport, comprising a philosophy and a *movement* that encompasses organizations, athletes, and other persons who agree to be guided by the Olympic Charter. The criterion for membership is recognition by the IOC. The Olympic movement therefore seeks to transcend sport and contribute to world peace and human rights. It also has the implication that since the Olympic movement has a *moral* stance based on its ideals/standards, it is open to criticism when it deviates from its own standards. As sport historian and Olympic scholar Bruce Kidd (2010: 158) writes more generally, ‘the moral claims of sport legitimize it as a site of struggle’. This is very true of the Olympic movement, Olympism, and the IOC.

BOX 9.1 THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES (AS STATED IN THE OLYMPIC CHARTER, JUNE 2019 VERSION)

Pierre de Coubertin, on whose initiative the International Athletic Congress of Paris was held in June 1894, conceived modern Olympism. The IOC constituted itself on 23 June 1894. The Olympic Charter is the codification of the Fundamental Principles, Rules, and Byelaws adopted by the IOC. It governs the organization and operation of the Olympic movement and stipulates the conditions for the celebration of the Olympic Games. The following are extracts from the revised ‘Fundamental Principles of Olympism’, as stated in the Olympic Charter that came into force from 26 June 2019:

- Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind.
- The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.
- The Olympic movement is the concerted, organized, universal, and permanent action, carried out under the supreme authority of the IOC, of all individuals and entities that are inspired by the values of Olympism. It covers the five continents. It reaches its peak with the bringing together of the world’s athletes at the great sport festival, the Olympic Games. Its symbol is five interlaced rings.

- The practice of sport is a human right. Every individual must have the possibility of practising sport, without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity, and fair play.
- Recognizing that sport occurs within the framework of society, sports organizations within the Olympic movement shall apply political neutrality. They have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport, determining the structure and governance of their organizations, enjoying the right of elections free from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good governance be applied.
- The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Olympic Charter shall be secured without discrimination of any kind such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political, or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
- Belonging to the Olympic movement requires compliance with the Olympic Charter and recognition by the IOC.

(IOC 2019a: 11–12)

The Olympic Games involves around 36 different sports: 26–28 in the Summer Games and seven to eight in the Winter Games. The IOC sits in the middle of a complex network or system. On one side there are the IFs of individual sports, representing about 200 national governing bodies. On the other there are 205 NOCs. Formal negotiations between the IFs and the NOCs and the IOC take place through bilateral meetings. IOC members are just that – members of the IOC; they are not representatives or delegates of a particular sport or country *to* the IOC.

Cultural non-governmental organizations (NGOs) first developed in the last third of the nineteenth century. The international cultural NGOs that developed then were fragile international networks and associations. As Roche (2000: 97) remarks, the creation of specialized governing bodies or IFs for different sports occurred:

in tandem with the development in the 1890s of a generalist and pluralist international sport movement, namely the Olympic movement, led by Coubertin and the IOC and oriented to the promotion of its sport ideology and the development of its multi-sport games event.

In the period between the two world wars (1918–1939) the Olympic ‘model’ was important in generating alternative visions of international sport ideology, multi-sport movements, and events. These included the Workers’ Olympics, Women’s Olympics, and the British Empire Games (since 1978 called the ‘Commonwealth Games’), although the first two of these did not last longer than the inter-war period (on the Workers’ Olympics see chapters 6 and 8; on the founder of the Women’s Olympics, Alice Milliat, see Carpentier 2018).

Many IFs allied with the Olympic movement and organized world championships within the Olympic Games event. The FIFA, formed in 1904 in Paris, helped the Olympic Games organizers (the Olympic Games host NOC and the host city) to stage international football world championships in each Olympic Games until the 1920s. Conflicts between FIFA and the IOC over the size and professionalism of the sport led to FIFA's decision to stage its own 'world cup' from 1930, 'intermediate to the Olympic four-year cycle' (Roche 2000: 97).

Unlike the international expositions from which the Olympic Games event had emerged (see Chapter 5; Horne and Whannel 2016, chapters 6 and 7), the processes of formalization, rationalization, and bureaucratization occurred much more rapidly. Rituals also became a feature of Olympic events during the inter-war period. The main stadium, according to Roche:

effectively becomes 'diplomatic territory' and a de facto 'sacred site' for the duration of the games. The stadium contains the Olympic flame, the Olympic flag, the flags of the other nations and...no advertising or commercial imagery to detract from the impact of the Olympic symbols.

(Roche 2000: 98)

As we noted above, the IOC has only had nine presidents since its inception in 1894, and four of them account for nearly 90 years in office. Most have come from small European countries (Brundage was the exceptional non-European). Five of the nine have belonged to nobility, although Samaranch and Rogge received their titles after taking up office. In an IOC handbook produced for sponsors of the Olympic Games in the 1990s, the many different forms of address for the then 89 IOC members were listed. Indicative of the unrepresentative nature of the IOC membership, these included: 'Monsieur le President/Dear Mr President' (Samaranch), 'Dear General', 'Dear Colonel', 'Your Excellency', 'Professeur', 'Your Royal Highness', 'Your Serene Highness', 'Altesse', 'Monseigneur', as well as 'Dear Mr', 'Madame', and one 'Dear Ms' (Anita Defrantz, former Olympic athlete and IOC executive board member).

Founded by Coubertin in 1894, the IOC is the 'supreme authority' of the Olympic movement with the mission 'To promote Olympism throughout the world and to lead the Olympic movement'. With its headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland, the IOC as an organization has expanded considerably since the 1980s to more than 400 staff (Chappelet and Kubler-Mabbott 2008: 27–34). The IOC benefits from the low taxation regulations in Switzerland that enable it to keep more of its income than it would in any comparable country. The headquarters of FIFA and UEFA are also in Switzerland for similar reasons. The IOC has adopted several roles relating to various aspects of sport: ethics in sport, the education of youth through sport, encouraging the spirit of fair play, encouraging/supporting sport and sports competitions, the promotion of women in sport, the fight against doping in sport, protecting the health of athletes, placing sport at the service of humanity to promote peace, ending any form of discrimination affecting the Olympic movement, promoting the social and professional future of athletes, sport for all, sustainable development in sport, and a positive legacy for host cities and countries, blending sport with culture and education and supporting the International Olympic Academy (IOA) in

Olympia, Greece, and other Olympic education projects. A year after Coubertin's death (1938) and following his own wish, his heart was placed inside a commemorative stele in Olympia. This rekindled the idea for the establishment of a centre for the Olympic Games in Olympia, and the IOA was officially inaugurated on 14 June 1961. Today, some 40 different events take place every year on the premises of the IOA in Olympia.

To oversee these roles the IOC operates a number of 'commissions' (Toohey and Veal 2007: 54). In 2015 these were overhauled as part of the Agenda 2020 reforms. President Bach introduced changes that saw an increase in the number of places taken by women, rising to 32 per cent, and the number of chairpersons from Africa and Asia increasing to 34 per cent.³ The former Sport and Environment Commission was renamed the Sustainability and Legacy Commission in line with the growing influence of these two words in mega-event discourse. The former Culture and Olympic Education Commission was split into two separate commissions – the Olympic Education Commission and the Culture and Olympic Heritage Commission. The Medical Commission was renamed the Medical and Scientific Commission but still assists in the implementation of the Olympic Medical Code regarding the policing of prohibited drug use. A new Communications Commission was established to support the promotion of Olympic values. A new Olympic (Broadcast) Channel has been created as a result and an Olympic Channel Commission was also established to support it. The International Relations Commission was renamed the Public Affairs and Social Development through Sport Commission, reflecting the growth of interest in linking with the United Nations to promote sport and Olympism for social development purposes. The Women and Sport Commission that focused on the promotion of equal opportunities for girls and women to participate in sport and physical activity was renamed the Women *in* Sport Commission (see Chapter 11 for one of the projects this commission has undertaken).

Several commissions remained unchanged: the Coordination Commissions for the Olympic Games still provide the link between the IOC and host city OCOGs, IFs, and NOCs; the Ethics Commission, which establishes ethical rules for IOC and Olympic activities; the Finance Commission still oversees accounting and finance of the IOC; and the Marketing Commission advises the IOC on sources of 'financing and revenue' as well as on marketing. The Athletes' Commission represents the views of athletes to the IOC and is composed of retired and active Olympic athletes. The Olympic Solidarity Commission is charged with overseeing the distribution of IOC funds to NOCs in less wealthy countries. The newest commissions, 'Future Host Commissions', for both Summer and Winter Olympic Games, introduced and approved in June 2019, are discussed in the next parts.

THE BIDDING PROCESS AND HOST CITY SELECTION

Following the Salt Lake City bid scandal and subsequent reforms in the late 1990s, technically the procedure for bidding and selecting an Olympic host city appeared quite straightforward (see Chapter 12 for more about the Salt Lake City scandal). If more than one city within a country wished to bid to host the Games, the country's NOC selected one. Cities then submitted bids to the IOC eight or nine years in advance of the Games. An Evaluation Commission (EC) was appointed that reported to the IOC on the bidding

cities and progress (only EC members could visit bid cities to prevent corrupt practices, such as bribery). The IOC then selected a successful bidder seven years in advance of the Games – so in 2017 the IOC voted on the Summer Games of 2024 (and unprecedentedly 2028), and in 2019 it voted on the Winter Games of 2026. As we have seen in other chapters, especially chapters 1 and 7, however, all was not well. This model also created problems for the IOC: specifically it gave those wishing to contest hosting in their cities time to develop campaigns against bids.

The IOC remains a private organization, which only accepts invited members. As John Hargreaves (2000: 47) wrote, ‘the IOC is no different from many other international organisations...in having skeletons in its cupboard, in departing from its ostensible aims and behaving in a self-interested manner’. Yet, as he also noted, ‘The IOC has compromised with, and responded to, the influence of quite different and opposed political forces, because its prime objective, like that of most long-lasting organisations, is self-preservation and self-interest’ (Hargreaves 2000: 50). It thus remains open to accusations of lack of transparency and hypocrisy while it claims to be a movement and a ‘family’ based on a philosophy beyond politics (Lenskyj 2012; Jennings 2012). Alongside the myths and ideology of Olympism – with elements such as the creed and the motto borrowed from Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism) – it is not surprising that quasi-religious claims are often made, such as upholding the ‘spirit’ of the Games. On the other hand, critics prefer to portray the Olympics nowadays as an ‘industry’, a ‘machine’, and even a ‘disease’ that creates a blight on the cities and their populations that act as its hosts. These discursive differences have created the context for the changes implemented by President Bach, which we consider next.

OLYMPIC AGENDA 2020 IN CONTEXT

Since his election as president in 2013 Thomas Bach has overseen several developments in the IOC and the Olympic movement. The Olympic Agenda 2020 – ‘a strategic roadmap for the future of the Olympic movement’ – was adopted in December 2014 at the 127th IOC Session in Monaco with 96 out of the then 100 IOC members in attendance. Related revisions to the Olympic Charter were adopted with effect from 8 December 2014. In May 2015 changes to the IOC commissions, with nearly one-third of commission members being women, were announced. In June 2019, on the 125th anniversary of its founding, several more changes were approved at the Olympic Session, as well as the official opening of the new headquarters, Olympic House, in Lausanne, Switzerland (Morgan 2019).

Announced as the ‘evolution of the revolution’ by Vice President John Coates, three developments in particular stand out (IOC 2019c). First, the seven-year timeline between a Games being awarded and it taking place was formally scrapped. This principle had already been introduced in practice since Los Angeles was awarded the 2028 Summer Olympics 11 years in advance. Second, the option was announced for places bidding to host the Games to include other cities, regions, or even countries in a single bid. Again this was a confirmation of developments that had already been accepted in Agenda 20/20. Third, two new Commissions were created. The Future Host Commissions for the

Summer and Winter Olympic Games would be responsible for seeking out and identifying prospective hosts and recommending them to the IOC for ratification. This gives each of the FHCs, and because he appoints the chairs and other people to the Commissions, the president, greater power over where the Games will be held in future.

Several of the Agenda 2020 reforms were a response to growing criticisms of the staging of sports mega-events in general, and not just the IOC, that have left the allure of hosting sports mega-events somewhat tarnished. These include: scandals associated with alleged vote rigging in FIFA, that actually involve some members of the IOC; continuing allegations of widespread doping and inaction on the part of IFs to investigate it, including in track and field athletics, for some the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the Summer Olympics; abuses of human rights by nations hosting sports mega-events, in contravention of the IOC Charter; and the long-standing concern over ‘white elephants’ and the costs of staging sports mega-events at a time when many governments are pursuing ‘austerity’ economic and political policies.

Given the increasing reluctance of urban populations in democracies to host sports mega-events, it is evident that the analyses of academics and journalists on the politics of sports mega-events, informed by and informing the work of activists, has had some effect (Lenskyj 2008; Boykoff 2014a, 2014b). Lauermaun (2016) identifies two recent ‘trends in the urban politics of mega-events’. First has been the role of academic and non-academic critics of mega-events who have attempted to counter bids and ‘contest the ways in which the professionalization of the industry impacts local decision-making’. Second has been the impact of questions raised by anti-bid activists, not just about the division of costs and benefits of mega-events, but also about ‘the legitimacy of event-led development models’ on cities contemplating bidding for them. These developments help to explain the declining interest in hosting both the Winter Olympic Games (four European cities withdrew from the bidding to leave only Beijing and Almaty as the remaining candidates for the 2022 edition; five cities withdrew from the contest to host the 2026 edition) and Summer Olympic Games.

Hence a number of the 40 recommendations in Agenda 2020 related to these concerns: for example, complying with the basic principles of good governance, supporting autonomy and increasing transparency, shaping the bidding process as an invitation, reducing the cost of bidding, and including sustainability in all aspects of the Olympic Games. Other elements in Agenda 2020 included the fostering of gender equality, and strengthening the sixth ‘Fundamental Principle of Olympism’ to include sexual orientation and addressing the IOC membership age limit (Gibson 2014). Other changes agreed included the launching of an Olympic Channel, the reviewing of the scope and composition of IOC commissions and the setting out of a framework for the Olympic programme that would allow more flexibility into the programme for hosts wishing to include sports popular in their country.

The debate between economists about the costs and outcomes of hosting continues to revolve around the calculation of costs and cost overruns. The costs of preparing a hosting bid – let alone staging an Olympic Games – are considerable (Toohey and Veal 2007: 131–132, after Preuss 2004). Nonetheless, Olympic economist Holger Preuss (2004: 275) calculates that every Summer Games since 1972 has made a surplus: ‘When investments

are eliminated from the final balance sheets of the OCOGs and operational expenditures are set against OCOG revenues, it can be stated that all the OCOGs under review [1972–2008] succeeded in making a financial profit.’ Preuss operates with a ‘decision model’ that differentiates between ‘Games-related and non-Games-related costs for facilities used during the Olympics’. On that basis, he argues ‘an OCOG *should* only have to cover the costs for temporary facilities, overlay and rent’ (Preuss 2004: 275, emphasis added). He can only do this by discounting as an Olympic cost many substantial infrastructure projects that have taken place at the same time as or preceding an Olympics – such as a refurbished airport, transport links, and other forms of urban redevelopment. This separation of operational from capital investment costs associated with the Olympic Games results from a conventional economist’s approach to modelling. As Toohey and Veal state:

The arguments concerning apportionment of investment costs can also be raised in relation to sporting venues, since they also will continue to be used for other sporting events and by local citizens long after the Olympic Games are over. Thus the overall capital costs of sporting infrastructure investments should *ideally* be excluded when estimating the cost of running an Olympic Games event.

(Toohey and Veal 2007: 133, emphasis added)

With this method of economic modelling, the \$2.2 billion deficit for Montreal in 1976 can be transformed into a \$0.64 billion surplus (Preuss 2004: 277). This economic approach makes two further important assumptions: (1) the venues will be used and (2) local citizens will use them. This is ‘ideal type’ modelling. But what about real-world opportunities, costs, and impacts? Criticisms of this approach have come from two main sources: economist Andrew Zimbalist (2015) and mega-projects analyst Bent Flyvbjerg and his colleagues at Oxford University (Flyvbjerg *et al.* 2016).

Mega-events such as the Olympic Games provide multiple meanings for different groups of people – as they happen, when they have taken place and, perhaps especially, as they are being bid for. Hence, we know that advocates of hosting the Olympics will deploy a range of discursive strategies to win over public opinion. The main issues around which the hosting of the Olympics has been debated involve the burden of the costs and the distribution of the benefits. Research points to the uneven impacts of the Olympics. Despite much media acclamation, and the accolade ‘the best Games ever’ being proclaimed at the closing ceremony by the outgoing IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch, the 2000 Olympics in Sydney generated substantial negative impacts on local residents and the environment – giving evidence to the claim that there is potential for conflict between economic and social benefits realized from hosting sports events. Since the late 1970s (and the Montreal Olympics in 1976 especially), a major concern in considerations of the Olympics has been this gap between the forecast and the actual impacts on the economy, society, and culture. That there is likely to be such a gap is now fairly predictable. Prohosting advocates tend to gather and project optimistic estimates, while anti-hosting groups articulate concerns. More generally there has been an over-estimation of the benefits and an under-estimation of the costs of mega-events (Flyvbjerg 2014; Zimbalist 2015).

Ever since the early 1990s, when investigative reporting by journalists and social researchers uncovered details of corruption in the Olympic movement, and such news began to damage the reputation of the IOC, the organization and OCOGs have engaged public relations (PR) companies and spin doctors to assist in managing media messages and the global and local image of the Olympics. News and image management, spin doctoring and PR have become key features in any major public policy development in the UK and throughout the rest of the world. Events like the Olympic Games have remained a highly attractive instrument for political and economic elites who have thus been encouraged to continue to participate in the bidding game (see Table 9.5).

Compared with this conventional – or dominant – view of the Olympic Games and the Olympic movement, a different series of conclusions are worthy of consideration. The Olympics can be seen as a tool used by business corporations and governments (local, regional, and sometimes national) to develop areas of cities or the countryside (Shaw 2008; Schmidt 2007). They permit corporate land grabs by developers. Host city populations face increased taxes to pay for the ‘party’. The poor and the homeless face criminalization and/or eviction as downtown areas are gentrified (improved to appeal to more affluent visitors or full-time residents). The hosting of such a mega-event skews all other economic and social priorities and means the loss of the opportunity to do other things with public resources spent on the Games. The IOC markets sport as a product, pays no taxes, and demands full compliance with its exacting terms and conditions, including governmental guarantees about meeting financial shortfalls. The end results are ‘fat-cat’ projects and media spectacles benefiting mostly the corporations that sponsor the Games, the property developers that receive public subsidies, and the IOC – which secures millions of dollars from television corporations and global sponsors. These ideas were summed up by Boykoff (2014a), who argues that the Olympics have helped develop a distinctive form of capitalism: ‘celebration capitalism’.

Similar criticisms have been made about the 2016 Summer Olympics staged in Rio de Janeiro (see the contributions to Zimbalist 2017). In October 2009, when Rio was awarded the right to host the 2016 Summer Olympics it was heralded by the then Brazilian President Lula as a sign that his country had moved from being a second-class to a first-class nation (Horne and Silvestre 2016). But the opportunities that the successful bid created for specific construction industry corporations in Brazil to develop parts of the Rio infrastructure, and the impacts this has had upon local communities, are now evident, as we discussed in the second edition of this book (see Horne and Whannel 2016, Chapter 1). Clearly, when considering the politics of the Olympic Games the role and impartiality of the researcher can be called into question, as the writer Manuel Vázquez Montalbán once suggested in his novel *An Olympic Death*, set in Barcelona just before the 1992 Summer Olympics, ‘In this city, you were either working for the Olympics, or you were dreading them – there was no middle ground’ (Montalbán 2004 [1991]: 34). Researchers interested in the Olympic Games may also find that there is no middle ground.

Despite Preuss’ economic modelling, hosting the 1976 Summer Olympics resulted in huge losses and debts for the city of Montreal. The debt incurred on the interest for the loans to build what turned out to be largely ‘white elephant’ sports infrastructure was only finally paid off in November 2006 – costing Montreal’s taxpayers well over CA\$2 billion in

<i>Year</i>	<i>Host</i>	<i>Other bidders</i>
<i>Summer Games</i>		
1976	Montreal	Los Angeles, Moscow
1980	Moscow	Los Angeles
1984	Los Angeles	
1988	Seoul	Nagoya
1992	Barcelona	Amsterdam, Belgrade, Birmingham, Brisbane, Paris
1996	Atlanta	Athens, Belgrade, Manchester, Melbourne, Toronto
2000	Sydney	Beijing, Berlin, Istanbul, Manchester
2004	Athens	Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Istanbul, Lille, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, San Juan, Seville, Stockholm, St Petersburg
2008	Beijing	Istanbul, Osaka, Paris, Toronto
2012	London	Madrid, Moscow, New York, Paris
2016	Rio de Janeiro	Chicago, Madrid, Tokyo
2020	Tokyo	Istanbul, Madrid
2024	Paris***	Budapest, Hamburg, Rome **
2028	Los Angeles	Budapest, Hamburg, Rome **
<i>Winter Games</i>		
1976	Innsbruck	Denver*, Sion, Tampere/Are, Vancouver
1980	Lake Placid	Vancouver-Garibaldi**
1984	Sarajevo	Sapporo, Falun-Goteborg
1988	Calgary	Falun, Cortina d'Ampezzo
1992	Albertville	Anchorage, Berchtesgaden, Cortina d'Ampezzo, Lillehammer, Falun, Sofia
1994	Lillehammer	Anchorage, Oestersunde/Are, Sofia
1998	Nagano	Aoste, Jacca, Oestersunde, Salt Lake City
2002	Salt Lake City	Oestersunde, Quebec City, Sion
2006	Torino	Helsinki, Klagenfurt, Poprad-Tatry, Sion, Zakopane
2010	Vancouver–Whistler	PyeongChang, Salzburg
2014	Sochi	PyeongChang, Salzburg
2018	PyeongChang	Annecy, Munich
2022	Beijing	Almaty
2026	Milan/Cortina-D'Ampezzo	Are/Stockholm

Table 9.5 The Olympic Summer and Winter City Bidding Game, 1976–2028

Source: adapted and updated from Roche 2000: 150–157.

* Awarded to Denver but rejected following citizens' plebiscite in 1972.

** Withdrew before final vote.

*** An unprecedented decision to award hosting for the next two editions of the Summer Olympics to the only two remaining candidates, Paris and Los Angeles.

capital and interest costs, without anything like commensurate benefits. Rather than experiencing a post-Olympic boom, the economy of Montreal in the mid-1970s went into a steep decline that would last for almost two decades. No wonder, then, that when the Los Angeles Olympics took place in 1984 there had been no other city seriously bidding to host the event (Whitson and Horne 2006). Today, established cities in advanced capitalist societies and cities in developing economies alike still line up to consider the possibility of hosting the Olympic Games. At any one time, then, several cities are anticipating hosting

an Olympics and many others are waiting to discover if it will be their turn. The changes introduced in 2019, and specifically the establishment of Future Host Commissions, may create the suspicion that there will be opportunities for more backstage negotiations and less openness surrounding future bids to host the Olympics, which could store up more problems for the IOC in the future (Livingstone 2019a).

CONCLUSION: CRITICS, CRITIQUES, AND CHALLENGES

Since the 1980s, critiques of the Olympics have developed and its contradictions have been exposed by both academic scholars and investigative journalists who have sought to promote greater transparency in sport. The credibility and integrity of the IOC and other international sports organizations (especially FIFA) have been further challenged following proven allegations of doping, physical, and psychological violence and corruption. Revelations of doping (perhaps reaching a nadir in 1988 with Ben Johnson and the 100m final – see Chapter 12), bribery and opaque IOC procedures created the environment for serious challenges to the IOC. The romantic idealists (for example Kidd 1992; MacAloon 1981) faced the scathing critics (such as Hoberman 1995; Krüger 1993; and Lenskyj 2000, 2002, 2008).

Different types of criticism have been made about the Olympics. It has been criticized for the rise of excessive commercialism, for hypocrisy and the betrayal of Olympic ideals, and for the promotion of excessive nationalism. Andrew Jennings was an early journalist critic of corruption in the bidding process, the suppression of negative drug test results, bribery in individual contests, the manipulation of press coverage, President Samaranch's links with the fascist Franco regime in his native Spain, the IOC members' acceptance of lavish gifts, and the general impact of increased commercialization. In the academic sphere French Marxist critic Jean-Marie Brohm was joined by Rick Gruneau, Alan Tomlinson, and Garry Whannel in the 1980s.

Local opposition to the Games has also developed on the basis of concerns over the huge amount of public expenditure for a very brief athletics and sport festival; persons displaced by development; rent increases; environmental and social impacts; and the lack of public consultation or ability to participate in decisions. So the Olympics have shifted from being seen as a movement (Coubertin) to an industry (Lenskyj) and more recently as a system (Chappelet). Based on an idealistic ideology, as a movement the Olympics are seen as an organic, functional, civic religion. Conceived of as an industry – commercial, dysfunctional, and corporate – materialist critics consider the ideals of the Olympic movement to be compromised by the growth of involvement with corporate sponsors and media organizations. Viewed more pragmatically as a system – a network of distributed parts, hubs, and switches, but also unstable – the Olympics can be seen as continuing to exhibit contradictory tendencies.

Talk about legacies across various dimensions has become an established part of Olympic hosting as we discussed in previous chapters. Hence economic benefits (direct and indirect), improvements to the built environment (non-sporting, e.g. transport infrastructure), information and education (concerning sport and culture), public life, politics, and culture, sport, elite performance, mass participation, the 'trickle-down' effect, financial

support, the built sporting infrastructure, and sporting symbols, memory, and history are all considered as potentially positive aspects of hosting an Olympics or other mega-event (Cashman 2006). Yet critics still ask if the response of the IOC and the Olympic movement was to treat the problems of the 1980s and 1990s as a crisis of communication rather than as a crisis of ethics and morals (Jennings 2000). Two birthday greetings tweeted on 23 June 2019 (the 125th anniversary of the founding of the IOC) illustrate the current diversity of opinion about the Olympics:

'HAPPY BIRTHDAY @Olympics! 125 YEARS of friendship through sport! We put smiles and snickers (sic) to celebrate with Olympians and Friends. Great day for all sport lovers.'; *'Here's to 125 Years of gift, displacement, ethnic cleansing, environmental degradation, militarization, athlete abuse, nationalism and fascism.'*

Perhaps the 'Transnational Anti Games' movement that has developed since the 2010s will require more than changes in the governance of the IOC to meet its criticisms. That is, to what extent has the Olympic movement lost its integrity and distinctive role in world sport? To what extent will the changes the IOC has made in 2019 make any difference to the outcomes of hosting an Olympic Games and to the challenges it faces from critics (Livingstone 2019b)?

NOTES

- 1 <https://www.olympic.org/ioc-members-list> (last accessed 26 September 2019).
- 2 See Recommendation 37, page 19, www.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic_Agenda_2020/Olympic_Agenda_2020-20-20_Recommendations-ENG.pdf (last accessed 28 August 2015).
- 3 www.olympic.org/news/olympic-agenda-2020-triggers-significant-changes-to-ioc-commissions-president-bach-nominates-more-women-and-broader-geographical-representation/246159 (last accessed 3 August 2015).

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CHAPTER 10

OLYMPIC ECONOMICS AND SPECTACLE

TELEVISION, ADVERTISING, SPONSORSHIP, AND 'NEW' MEDIA

INTRODUCTION

The Olympic Games could never have attained global impact without television. The Games, as they now exist, are a product of television's power to produce and distribute live global spectacles. Indeed the Games are perhaps *better* understood as a television event than as a sporting one. Of the Olympic sports, only athletics, tennis, football, basketball, and boxing have any significantly large spectator following outside the Olympic Games – and in the case of tennis, football, basketball, and boxing, the Olympics is only a minor part of their sporting calendar and competitive format. The Olympics aside, athletics cannot compete for popularity or financial strength with the major commercialized sports such as football, basketball, golf, tennis, motor racing, and American football. The majority of people who watch the Olympic Games do not otherwise follow regularly even the sports that are most prominently featured on Olympic television – athletics, swimming, and gymnastics. Nor can the Olympic sports, for the most part, claim a broad base of participants.

So the Olympics does not appear to be popular because of the regular following of its major sports either as spectators or as participants. Rather, it is because it is a spectacular television show, with the badge of being the world's best. Indeed, football's World Cup has a far stronger claim to have a non-television basis to its popularity, with millions around the world involved both as spectators and participants. So, we would argue, it is primarily as a spectacular television event that the Olympic Games can be productively understood. It is the convergence of star, narrative, national identity, 'live-ness' and uncertainty that give the Olympic Games this unique power as a cultural event.

Television has brought a huge income stream to the Olympic movement, initially dependent on the USA, but since 1988 sponsorship and television income from the rest of the world have become significant too. As such, it has been shaped by the forces of commodification, globalization, and digitalization; it is increasingly shaped by the convergence of the once distinct technologies of television, computers, and the internet; and is having to come to terms with the rise of streaming of content via the internet. This chapter first outlines the financial relations between television, sponsorship, and the Olympic Games. Next, it presents a periodized historical outline of the relations between the Olympic Games and the media. Then, we examine the relations between the Games

and its sponsors. Finally, we consider the challenges confronting this established business model by the rise of the (now, not so) new media and the increasing reluctance to bid to host the Games.

OLYMPIC FINANCES

Capital demands its own reproduction. Money left in a tin is losing the opportunity to gain interest or to accrue profit. The logic of capital is reinvestment. But, as Marx argued, and indeed demonstrated, there is a systematic tendency for the rate of profit to decline (Marx 1981). This has two consequences. First, it produces a considerable pressure to rectify the situation, by forcing wage rates down – by casualization, unemployment, or de-unionization, sourcing cheaper materials and promoting the product in new markets, or more vigorously in existing markets. The second effect is that capital is constantly seeking new areas to colonize, seeking to monetize areas of human endeavour hitherto not based around profit generation. The development of spectator sport and professional sport can be interpreted in part as instances of capital penetrating and colonizing new areas – the experience economy.

IOC revenues

The Olympic Games have become an enormous event, not least in terms of their global reach via television, their massive revenues from commercial sources, and their huge costs. The Games produce four main sources of revenue – ticket sales; sale of television rights; sponsorship; and licensing and merchandising. The IOC collects television rights payments and international sponsorships and redistributes these funds to the Organizing Committee, the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), and the International Federations (IFs). On the most recent figures, just over 80 per cent of the revenue comes from broadcasting rights payments.

The IOC distributes 90 per cent of its own revenue to the Olympic ‘family’ and retains around 10 per cent to cover its own running costs, which include the IOC administration in Lausanne, and the travel and accommodation expenses available to IOC members.

	<i>Revenue (USD million)</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Broadcasting	4,157	81
Sponsorship	1,003	19
TOTAL	5,160	

Table 10.1 IOC Revenue for the Quadrennium (four-year period of the Olympiad), 2013–2016

Source: adapted from IOC Marketing File 2019 (All figures have been rounded to the nearest million US dollars. As with subsequent figures, the source of the statistics is as cited, but the presentation, juxtaposition, and calculation based on these statistics to produce extra information, such as percentages, is that of the authors).

Local sponsorship and merchandising revenue goes to the Organizing Committee. The IOC also contributes some of the television and sponsorship revenue to the Organizing Committee. The IOC insists on a key distinction in Olympic funding between running costs and infrastructural costs. The cost of running the Games is budgeted to break even – with state support, sponsorship, licensing, and ticketing revenue supplemented by IOC funding. The infrastructural costs involved in building new facilities, and renovating existing ones, transport enhancement, and security are met by the host city and nation.

Broadcasting revenue: Table 10.2 demonstrates a consistent rise in total revenues since 1993. Despite a long-term strategy to diversify revenue sources, the dominant proportion provided by broadcasting rights has remained consistently between 75–80 per cent. Only very recently is there some evidence that the percentage of IOC revenue coming from the TOP sponsorship programme is beginning to rise (see Owen 2019a). During the 1980s, the American networks began to complain that they were providing the lion’s share of the global rights payments, that it was time for the rest of the world to provide more, and that Europe in particular was getting ‘a free lunch’ (Personal communication with ABC Executive 1986).

From 1997, as shown in Table 10.3, broadcasting revenues in the major geographic areas have continued to rise. In recent years (see Table 10.4) the percentage coming from

	1993–1996	1997–2000	2001–2004	2005–2008	2009–2012	2013–2016
Broadcasting	1,251	1,845	2,232	2,570	3,850	4,157
TOP	279	579	663	866	950	1,003
Sponsorships						
TOTAL	1,530	2,424	2,895	3,436	4,800	5,160
% increase		58	19	19	40	8
% from	82	76	77	75	80	81
broadcasting						

Table 10.2 IOC revenue from Broadcasting and Sponsorship, 1993–2016

Source: adapted from IOC Marketing File 2019.

* All figures in USD million.

	North America	Central, South America, and Caribbean	Asia	Middle East/Africa	Europe	Oceania	TOTAL
1997–2000	1,124	14	208	12	422	65	1,845
2001–2004	1,397	21	233	13	514	54	2,232
2005–2008	1,579	34	274	25	578	80	2,570
2009–2012	2,154	106	575	41	848	126	3,850
2013–2016	2,119	326	663	46	941	61	4,157

Table 10.3 Revenues from broadcasting rights by region (Figures in Million USD)

Source: adapted from IOC Marketing Fact File 2015 and 2019.

the USA has dropped from 60 per cent to 51 per cent. The percentages provided by Asia and Latin America have risen, whereas the percentage provided by Europe has remained remarkably stable at around 23 per cent

In terms of rate of growth in each region (see Table 10.5), the most rapid percentage growth has been occurring in the Latin American region, which grew substantially between 2006–2008 and 2013–2016. The growth rate in Asia has also increased, but nonetheless, over half the broadcasting revenue still comes from the USA.

Sponsorship revenue: The Olympic Partnership programme (TOP), first introduced in 1985, was based on a limited number of sponsors who would have exclusive rights within their product category (such as soft drinks). In order to be able to establish this as a global programme, all the individual NOCs had to be persuaded to relinquish their own rights in this field.

Revenues have continued to grow since the inception of the programme, but in the 2000s, the percentage rate of growth has decreased significantly (see Table 10.6). This could, of course, simply be due to the maturation of a programme that was innovative in the 1980s but has since become a standard element of most sports mega-event marketing.

	<i>North America</i>	<i>Central, South America, and Caribbean</i>	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Middle East/ Africa</i>	<i>Europe</i>	<i>Oceania</i>
1997–2000	61	1	11	1	23	4
2001–2004	63	1	10	1	23	2
2005–2008	61	1	11	1	22	3
2009–2012	56	3	15	1	22	3
2013–2016	51	8	16	1	23	1

Table 10.4 Percentage of total broadcasting rights payments in each quadrennium by region

Source: adapted from IOC Marketing Fact File 2015 and 2019.

PERCENTAGE GROWTH OVER TIME

	<i>North America</i>	<i>Central, South America, and Caribbean</i>	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Middle East/Africa</i>	<i>Europe</i>	<i>Oceania</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
2001–2004	24	50	12	8	22	–17	21
2005–2008	13	62	18	92	12	48	15
2009–2012	36	212	110	64	47	58	50
2013–2016	–2	208	15	12	11	–52	8

Table 10.5 Percentage growth in broadcasting rights payments by region

Source: adapted from IOC Marketing File 2019.

<i>Quadrennium</i>	<i>Venues</i>	<i>Partners</i>	<i>NOCs</i>	<i>revenue</i>	<i>% increase</i>
1985–1988	Calgary / Seoul	9	159	96	
1989–1992	Albertville / Barcelona	12	169	172	79
1993–1996	Lillehammer/Albertville	10	197	279	62
1997–2000	Nagano / Sydney	11	199	579	108
2001–2004	Salt Lake City / Athens	11	202	663	15
2005–2008	Turin / Beijing	12	205	866	31
2009–2012	Vancouver / London	11	205	950	10
2013–2016	Sochi / Rio	12	205	1003	6

Table 10.6 Growth of TOP Programme since its inception, showing venues in the quadrennium, number of sponsors, number of NOCs signed up to the programme, and percentage growth since previous quadrennium

Source: adapted from IOC Marketing File 2019.

Organizing committee revenues

So far we have been examining revenue made directly by the IOC, but each host country also receives its own revenue from sponsorship, ticketing, and licensing of goods and services.

Generally, 90 per cent of the revenue for an Organizing Committee comes from ticketing and domestic sponsorships (see Table 10.7). Licensing income is relatively small. There are considerable fluctuations between Games in the amount that comes from ticket sales.

Ticketing revenues go to the local Organizing Committee (the main sources of revenue that go directly to the Organizing Committee are ticket sales, local sponsorships, and licensing deals). The amount of revenue obtained from ticket sales fluctuates considerably (see Table 10.8). These fluctuations are accounted for by local factors; the price of tickets, the numbers available, and the percentage sold vary from Games to Games. In the last three Games considerable efforts were made to ensure every seat was filled, and in some cases this required last minute discounting, and some free distribution of tickets. The average ticket price also varies considerably, partly in relation to the scale of the economy and cost of living in the host country. The tickets in Beijing were much cheaper, on average, than those in London. The average ticket price in London was high, but there was also a great range, with high premium prices for events with major appeal, balanced by £20 tickets for many other events; there was also a wider range of prices within stadia. The number of tickets available also fluctuates according to stadium size and organization of the programme. Organizers can seek to maximize ticket revenue by breaking up the performance day into a number of sessions, by scheduling events over more days, or utilizing more venues. For example, the number of tickets available in Atlanta 1996 was much greater than for the other seven Games in Table 10.8 but they sold a smaller percentage of them than in three of the four Summer Olympic Games since 1996.

	1993–1996	1997–2000	2001–2004	2005–2008	2009–2012	2013–2016
Domestic Sponsorship	534	655	796	1,555	1838	2,037
Ticketing	451	625	411	274	1,238	527
Licensing	115	66	87	185	170	74
TOTALS	1,100	1,346	1,294	2,014	3,246	2,638
per cent growth		22	-4	56	61	-19
PERCENT OF TOTAL						
Domestic Sponsorship	49	49	62	77	57	77
Ticketing	41	46	32	14	38	20
Licensing	10	5	7	9	5	3

Table 10.7 Organizing committee revenues by amount and percentage

Source: adapted from IOC Marketing File 2015 and 2019.

<i>Olympic Games</i>	<i>Tickets available (millions)</i>	<i>Tickets sold (millions)</i>	<i>% tickets sold</i>	<i>Average price (USD)</i>	<i>Revenue million (USD)</i>
1984 Los Angeles	6.9	5.7	82%	27	156
1988 Seoul	4.4	3.3	75%	11	36
1992 Barcelona	3.9	3.021	77%	26	79
1996 Atlanta	11	8.318	75%	51	425
2000 Sydney	7.6	6.7	88%	82	551
2004 Athens	5.3	3.8	71%	60	228
2008 Beijing	6.8	6.5	96%	28	185
2012 London	8.5	8.2	97%	120	988
2016 Rio	6.8	6.2	91%	51	321

Table 10.8 Ticket revenue from the Olympic Games, 1984–2016

Source: Adapted from IOC Marketing File 2015, 2018, 2019.

IOC Expenditure

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the IOC distributes 90 per cent of its revenue to organizations throughout the Olympic movement in order to support the staging of the Olympic Games, and to promote the worldwide development of sport. It retains 10 per cent of Olympic marketing revenue for the operational and administrative costs of governing the Olympic movement (IOC). It makes a contribution to Organizing Committees, which is not a fixed amount or percentage, but seems calculated to ensure that the running costs (as distinct from the infrastructural costs) are met (see Table 10.9).

The 90 per cent of its revenue that is redistributed by the IOC includes, as well as the above sums in Table 10.9, disbursements to the NOCs and the IFs (see Table 10.10).

<i>Summer Olympics</i>	
Athens 2004	965
Beijing 2008	1,250
London 2012	1,374
Rio 2016	1,531
<i>Winter Olympics</i>	
Salt Lake City 2002	552
Turin 2006	561
Vancouver 2010	775
Sochi 2014	833

Table 10.9 IOC contribution to Organizing Committees (in USD millions)

Source: adapted from IOC Marketing File 2019.

<i>IOC Contribution</i>	<i>to NOCs</i>	<i>to the IFs</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Summer Games</i>			
Athens 2004	234	257	491
Beijing 2008	301	297	598
London 2012	520	520	1,040
Rio 2016	540	540	1,080
<i>Winter Games</i>			
Salt Lake City 2002	87	92	179
Turin 2006	136	128	264
Vancouver 2010	215	209	424
Sochi 2014	199	199	398

Table 10.10 IOC contributions to NOCs and IFs

Source: adapted from IOC Marketing File 2019.

THE OLYMPICS AND THE MEDIA: A BRIEF HISTORY

How did this global spectacle develop? In this section, we chart its emergence and growth over four periods: the pre-television era between 1896 and 1935; the emergence of television as a new technology between 1936 and 1967; the technological perfecting and globalization of television between 1968 and 1987; and the era of digital transformation from 1988 to 2000. Developments since 2000 are examined in the final part of the chapter.

Mediating the Games: 1896–1935

The modern Olympic Games were established in the late nineteenth century just as a modern mass communication system also began to develop. The combination of photography, wireless telegraphy, a reading public, and entrepreneurial investment gave birth

to the modern popular press. The first cinemas emerged in the closing years of the century, and until television, cinema newsreels were the only way, other than presence at the event, that people could observe sport performance. Not entirely coincidentally, the last decade of the nineteenth century was also a period in which the growth of branded goods and chain stores triggered substantial growth in advertising. Scenes at the 1896 Games in Athens were filmed, but the earliest surviving Olympic footage seems to be from 1908. During the early years of the twentieth century, cinema spread rapidly around the world, and in the 1920s the first radio broadcasts were made (see Whannel 2002). Photographs of the 1912 Olympic Games were traded commercially. The 1924 Games were the first to be broadcast by radio. In 1932, newsreel cameras were used to determine the winner of the 100 metres.

In 1932, around 1,500 amateur radio operators offered to help broadcast news of the Games internationally (Yalin 2007). Shen Yalin's work on the historical development of the Press Centre is a valuable resource for this account of Olympic press and radio. A total of 2,328 radio reports of the Berlin Games of 1936 were sent by 105 radio reporters from 41 foreign broadcasting companies (*Official Olympic Games Report 1936*). Radio covered the 1948 Games in 40 languages (*Official Olympic Games Report 1948*).

The emergence of television technology: 1936–1967

Before the Second World War, only four countries (the US, UK, France, and Germany) had developed television technologies. For the Olympic Games, the television era began in Berlin in 1936. Pictures were not broadcast, but relayed to 28 local halls, attracting an audience of around 150,000. The image quality was described variously as 'excellent' to 'unsatisfactory' (Terramedia 2015).

The year 1948 saw the first television broadcasting of an Olympic Games. Pictures could only be received in the London area, by about 100,000 households. Around 70 hours were broadcast (Terramedia 2015). The Games gave great impetus to the technological development of television. Television technology spread slowly and until 1960 fewer than 25 countries had launched regular television services. The 1952 Olympic Games in Helsinki were only televised in two countries. At the 1956 Melbourne Games closed circuit television was installed in the Press Centre, relaying results and events (Yalin 2007). In 1960, for the first time, significant fees were paid by television companies to acquire the rights to broadcast (see Table 10.11). The Rome Games were relayed to 12 countries on the Eurovision link. The American network CBS paid around \$380,000 for the rights, and daily recordings were flown across the Atlantic. A total of 21 countries saw some Olympic material. The audience potential of the Games was clear when CBS reported a 36 per cent audience share, heralding the start of competitive bidding that would push rights payments rapidly up over the next few decades (see Table 10.11). New communication satellites (e.g. Telstar, Syncom 3) enabled the first intercontinental live broadcasts for 1964 and 1968, and the Olympics were seen in colour for the first time. Television was coming of age, and it was about to transform sport in general and the Olympic Games in particular.

Year	City	TV rights	Percentage increase	Year	City	TV rights	Percentage increase
1960	Rome	1.2		1960	Squaw Valley	0.05	
1964	Tokyo	1.6	33	1964	Innsbruck	0.93	1760
1968	Mexico City	10	52.5	1968	Grenoble	2.6	180
1972	Munich	18	80	1972	Sapporo	8.5	226
1976	Montreal	35	94	1976	Innsbruck	11.6	37
1980	Moscow	88	151	1980	Lake Placid	20.7	78
1984	Los Angeles	287	226	1984	Sarajevo	102.7	396
1988	Seoul	403	40	1988	Calgary	324.9	216
1992	Barcelona	636	58	1992	Albertville	291.9	-10
1996	Atlanta	898	41	1994	Lillehammer	352.9	21
2000	Sydney	1332	48	1998	Nagano	514	46
2004	Athens	1494	12	2002	Salt Lake City	738	44
2008	Beijing	2739	16	2006	Turin	831	13
2012	London	2569	48	2010	Vancouver	1280	54
2016	Rio	2868	11.6	2014	Sochi	1279.5	0.03

Table 10.11 Revenue from television rights payments (\$ million)

Source: adapted from IOC Marketing Fact File 2015, 2019.

Figures over \$10 million rounded up to the nearest million.

Perfecting the picture: 1968–1987

The rise of television sport was most closely associated with the BBC in the UK and ABC in the US. ABC developed a commitment to focusing on the drama, and the stars, epitomized by their two best-known slogans, ‘Up close and personal’ and ‘The thrill of victory, the agony of defeat’. ABC’s style featured close-ups, graphics, and microphones placed to pick up the sound of the action. In 1968 ABC scheduled 48 hours of coverage (live and recorded), a three-fold increase on 1964 (Television Museum 2015).

Communication satellites and the spread of television around the world were making the Games a global television event (see Table 10.12). This, in turn, gave it enormous potential as a platform for symbolic political acts (see Chapter 7). The 1984 Summer Games went to 150 countries and the Winter Games to 100. By the early 2000s the Games became global and universal in reach. In recent years, the very centrality of television to major sport has made live stadium viewing seem slightly inadequate – with the action a long way away, and no replays. As a result, modern stadia, with their giant screens and hyped up presentation, have begun to adjust. Cairns (2015: 734) makes the interesting argument that the impact of television sport on stadium design is such that ‘its architecture has mutated into a semi-real, semi-virtual phenomenon in which the difference between the physical structure and its mediated image has definitively blurred’.

The era of boycotts (see Chapter 7) did not diminish the popularity of the Games, now well established as a ratings winner, and a valuable platform for the US to promote

<i>Summer Games</i>			<i>Winter Games</i>		
<i>Year</i>	<i>Site</i>	<i>Countries</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Site</i>	<i>Countries</i>
1936	Berlin	1			
1948	London	1			
1952	Helsinki	2			
1956	Melbourne	1	1956	Cortina	22
1960	Rome	21	1960	Squaw Valley	27
1964	Tokyo	40	1964	Innsbruck	30
1968	Mexico City	n/a	1968	Grenoble	32
1972	Munich	98	1972	Sapporo	41
1976	Montreal	124	1976	Innsbruck	38
1980	Moscow	111	1980	Lake Placid	40
1984	Los Angeles	156	1984	Sarajevo	100
1988	Seoul	160	1998	Calgary	64
1992	Barcelona	193	1992	Albertville	86
			1994	Lillehammer	120
1996	Atlanta	214	1998	Nagano	160
2000	Sydney	220	2002	Salt Lake City	160
2004	Athens	220	2006	Torino	200
2008	Beijing	220	2010	Vancouver	220
2012	London	220	2014	Sochi	220

Table 10.12 Countries broadcasting the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, 1936–2014

Source: adapted from IOC Marketing File 2015, 2019.

autumn schedules. During the 1980s, the Games became the stake in an intense battle between the US networks (see Table 10.13). The potential for big summertime, daytime, and late evening audiences attracted additional advertising revenue. However, the escalation in rights payments was outstripping the level of advertising revenue. The 1988 Winter Olympics were scheduled for Calgary, a perfect site for American television, as events could be transmitted live in late afternoon or peak time on both coasts. Consequently the bidding was especially intense. ABC's determination to retain their 'Olympic Network' tag led them to bid \$309 million for the 1988 Winter Olympics, at least \$50m more than could be recouped in advertising revenue. ABC Television was acquired by Capital Cities, and new budgetary restraints on sporting rights meant ABC ceased to be a significant Olympic broadcaster (see Billings *et al.* 1998). At the 1986 IOC Session, prompted by ABC, the IOC decided to put Summer and Winter Games in separate years. This protected the American networks from the need to cover the cost of two Olympic events in the same year. The ever-growing numbers of countries who wished to have their own broadcasters on site prompted the introduction in 1988 of a separate International Broadcasting Centre, distinct from the Press Centre, with commentary, production, and editing facilities (Official Olympic Games Report 1988: 689–706).

The global reach of the Olympic Games grew throughout the 1980s. Claims of audiences of between 1 and 2 billion were characteristically made, but although the audiences undoubtedly are large, and the reach great, there are reasons to doubt the accuracy of global audience figures. Television audience figures are gathered by a combination of meters on

	<i>Summer</i>	<i>Winter</i>	<i>Total</i>
1960	0.39	0.05	0.44
1964	1.50	0.59	2.09
1968	4.50	2.50	7.00
1972	7.50	6.40	13.90
1976	25.00	10.00	35.00
1980	87.00	15.50	102.50
1984	225.00	91.50	316.50
1988	300.00	309.00	609.00

Table 10.13 US network payments for Olympic television rights (\$ million)

Source: adapted from IOC Marketing File 2015, 2019.

sets and diaries maintained by households. A panel of a few thousand households provide information over a period of months. Such methods are utilized in 54 countries. These countries contain 75 per cent of the world's population, and 90 per cent of the world's TV households. Relatively reliable statistics are augmented by estimates for the rest of the world, for public viewing, and new media viewing. There are no accurate means of assessing the numbers who watch in bars and other public places.

The standard television industry unit of audience statistics is the average programme audience (based on those who watched the whole game/match/event), but sport organizations have used other means. They quote the peak figure (the maximum size of the audience at some point during the event), which is generally around 1.5 times greater, or the 'reach', which includes anyone who watched for at least three minutes, generally twice the size of the average audience. In addition, to provide an audience figure for a whole competition, they aggregate the reach to obtain a cumulative audience, resulting in the claim that, for example, 26.29 billion viewers watched the 2006 World Cup competition, clearly both ludicrous and meaningless. Another form of aggregation is derived by multiplying the duration of the programme by the number of viewers in the audience. Such figures, especially where based partly on estimates, are demonstrably of little statistical value or accuracy.

Commercial Interlude: Globalization, Sponsorship, and the Development of 'Sportsbiz'

Aware of the danger of dependence on a single revenue stream the IOC, in conjunction with Horst Dassler of Adidas, developed the blueprint for a globalized sponsorship system. Television transformed the Games, brought commercialism, an end to amateurism, and a heightened intensity of focus, which encouraged massive investment to prove and display national prowess – and fostered the use of performance-enhancing drugs. It made the Games part of the global promotion strategies of cities for industry, trade, and tourism. The heightened visibility of the Olympic Games, the fitness boom of the 1970s and 1980s, and the ruthless competitiveness of the sport and leisure-goods industry combined to make the Olympic Games an attractive proposition for sponsorship. As the global

event par excellence, the Olympic Games offered one of the first and still one of the few opportunities for global marketing and global visibility.

There is a major paradox in Olympic marketing. Normally, advertisers and sponsors are primarily interested in gaining television exposure. But the Olympic Games allow no arena advertising (apart from the trademarks of equipment suppliers). Ironically, the ban was introduced in 1928 as a response to fears that the Games were becoming too commercial! The only other major event to bar advertising is the Wimbledon Tennis Championships. So sponsors do not get television space, and are instead buying into association with the world's most recognizable symbol, the five rings, a symbol that connotes world excellence. The only way they can gain television exposure is to buy advertising separately. The paradox is that it is the impression of being 'above' commerce produced by a 'clean' stadium that contributes significantly to the aura of uniqueness of the Games and hence enhances their marketability. Indeed, so important is this aura of being above commerce that the legislation a country must introduce if it is hosting the Games specifically prevents any advertising within range of the cameras at the Olympic sites.

Mega-events like the World Cup, the Olympic Games, and a few others had enormous potential to raise more from advertising and from sponsorship, given the right structures. Until this point the major commercial activity associated with sport was the sports goods business. Following his first Olympic involvement in 1956, Horst Dassler of Adidas became very adept at making deals, first with individual athletes and then with national teams. He was an inveterate networker, keeping track of dozens of rising sports officials around the world and nurturing their friendship, knowing that they would be the decision-makers of tomorrow. In particular, he developed close links with Havelange, who became head of FIFA in 1974, and Samaranch who became IOC president in 1980. He was also friends with Sepp Blatter who succeeded Havelange in 1998 (Payne 2006: 14). Two events, the World Cup of 1982 and the Olympic Games of 1984, helped transform the sponsorship business.

Until 1985, all sponsorship revenue was raised locally by the Organizing Committees. The organizers of the 1984 Los Angeles Games, forced by a public vote to rely only on private finance, showed how effective the principle of limited product categories with a monopoly sponsor in each one could be (see Ueberroth 1985; Reich 1986). The alliance of Adidas boss Horst Dassler and FIFA president João Havelange had already reshaped the World Cup using similar principles (see Wilson 1988; Aris 1990; Whannel 1992; Sugden and Tomlinson 1998). Dassler, backed by the Japanese advertising agency Dentsu, established International Sport and Leisure (ISL). ISL was set up as a broker to negotiate television and sponsorship deals. It was hired by the IOC, controversially, without public tender, to establish the TOP programme. Thanks to the Dassler links, by 1986 its executives boasted, with false modesty, 'we are a small company – we only have three clients – the Olympic Games, the World Cup and the World Athletics Championship' (Conversation with ISL executive, 1986).

The IOC established TOP, and after the 1988 Olympic Games the IOC also assumed a much greater degree of central control over the key negotiations on television revenue and sponsorship (see Larson and Park 1993). Limited product categories with sponsor

exclusivity meant by 1992 there were just 12 TOP sponsors, but they brought in \$10–20 million each (see Barney *et al.* 2002). Dassler was now reaping his reward in power, influence, and money. He was the central figure in a web of mutually linked interests, and his power was considerable. He died in 1987, but the transformation he wrought is still with us. Supported by television and sponsorship, only around 15 per cent of total IOC revenues come from ticket sales. A large proportion of tickets go to the Olympic ‘family’ – sponsors, corporate hospitality, and the media. For some major sport events less than 60 per cent of tickets have been available to the general public. Both Adidas and ISL lost their way after Dassler died in 1987, and ISL drastically over-extended itself, partly in the payment of inducements, contributing to its bankruptcy in 2001, with debts of £153 million.

The TOP sponsors are given a range of privileges, including substantial numbers of tickets, and protection against ambush marketing via special laws that host countries are required to enact. The TOP programme is global and is organized centrally. Each Organizing Committee may also sell local sponsorships, but cannot make deals with competitors of the TOP sponsors and so must generally avoid the main product categories of the TOP programme.

Digital transformations: 1988–2000

Ever since 1988, the digitalized, computerized, and globalized internet dissemination of the Games has begun to emerge. Olympic computer-use has a long history. At the 1964 Tokyo Games an electronic computing system was designed by the Organizing Committee and IBM to report, record, and transmit text data of the sports events (*Official Olympic Games Report 1964 Tokyo*, Volume I: 372–374, cited in Yalin 2007). At the 1976 Montreal Games, television was linked to the central computerized results system (*Official Olympic Games Report 1976 Montreal*: 175, cited in Yalin 2007). The growth of the internet and the emergence of the world wide web provided the IOC with both an opportunity and a threat. The net offered a radical new means to promote the Games, the sponsors, and Olympism; but also threatened to become a new means of dissemination that could potentially steal television’s audience while not replacing its revenues.

From the end of the 1980s, deregulation, multi-channel television, the internet, and digitalization began to pose new challenges to the cosy relationship between the IOC and television. Just as the IOC had, in the 1980s, assumed greater central control of the negotiation of rights and sponsorship deals, during the 1990s it determined to take greater control of the international feed, the television pictures provided by the host broadcaster to the rest of the world. By 2001 it had established OBS (Olympic Broadcasting Services) to organize the televising of the Games. The OBS is a committee that commissions established broadcasters and production companies from around the world to provide aspects of the coverage. In Beijing 2008, for example, a cooperative joint venture between OBS and the local Organizing Committee (BOCOG) created Beijing Olympic Broadcasting (BOB), the on-site host broadcaster for the 2008 Games (OBS 2015). More recently it has set up the Olympic Channel.

Due to its established business model rooted in broadcasting, the rapid growth of the internet continues to trouble the IOC. In 1996 in Atlanta the first Olympic Games website received 189 million hits. It was introduced in April 1995, and attracted around 10,000 visits per day, growing to 400,000 per day by the time of the Games. In addition, 12–15 per cent of all tickets were purchased online (Yalin 2007). Just two years later, the Nagano website got 634 million hits, while in 2000 the Sydney website got a staggering 11.3 billion hits. For NBC and the IOC, the internet is a threat in that, without tight content controls, it could potentially cause a significant audience migration from television without producing the revenue flows to compensate.

One symptom of these fears was a dramatic shift in the sale of television rights, allowing NBC to acquire the rights to several Games in advance. In December 1995, the biggest ever broadcast deal to that date was announced, with NBC paying \$2.3 billion for the next three Games. In less than five months, NBC had committed over \$3.5 billion in Olympic rights fees. Payne (2006: 50) commented that ‘the face of the Olympic TV market had been changed forever. The other networks were left speechless.’

During this period the IOC had constantly flirted with Rupert Murdoch to encourage others, and especially the EBU, to bid higher sums. This policy has recently borne fruit, with the European TV rights for the Olympic Games from 2022 onward sold to the US channel Discovery, which owns Eurosport. The longer contracts, Payne (2006: 55) argued, gave broadcasters a vested interest in building the Olympic brand, meaning they could concentrate on the overall production and promotional style without having to worry about bidding every two years. NBC sport boss Dick Ebersol managed to buttress NBC’s huge investment by bringing NBC parent company, General Electric, into the Olympic corporate sponsorship programme (Payne 2006: 62). The *Washington Post* said the bid was a ‘risky but potentially rewarding go-for-broke attempt by a network to hold on to mass viewership events in an era when cable broadcasters are eroding network clout’ but pointed out that NBC would utilize its own cable networks – MSNBC, CNBC, and Bravo – to broadcast Olympic events, maximizing advertising dollars. It was the commitment of General Electric that helped secure the deal for NBC (*Washington Post* 7 June 2003).

The long-term link between the IOC, NBC, and General Electric meant that NBC were prepared to spend more on promoting the Olympic brand and itself as the network of the Olympics. The willingness of NBC to conclude deals for the 2012 Olympic Games two years in advance of the choice of site would also seem to suggest that the choice of site is no longer seen as a crucial element in determining the value of the rights (For studies of the power of US television networks in relation to the Olympic Games, see Spence (1988), Wilson (1988), McPhail and Jackson (1989), O’Neil (1989), and Real (1989); for studies of sport and the media see Moragas *et al.* (1996b) and Rowe (1996, 1999)).

The ‘new’ social media era

The so-called ‘new media’ generated by the internet and digitalization began to make an impact in the 1990s. Email started to become a common feature of working life around 1993. The growth of texting took mobile phone developers by surprise between 1995

and 1998. Amazon was established in 1994 and eBay in 1995, but Google did not appear until 1998 and Wikipedia started in 2001. It was, however, the development of more structured forms of interaction, under the rubric of Web 2.0, which gave rise to social media. MySpace was launched in 2003, Facebook in 2004, YouTube in 2005, and Twitter in 2006. Andy Miah (Miah *et al.* 2008) referred to Beijing in 2008 as ‘the first Web 2.0 Games’.

Given uncertainties about the future of television as a medium of delivery, as Wi-Fi and high-speed broadband hastened the convergence of television and the internet, it is not surprising that the major US networks were keen to secure television rights for future Olympic Games; nor that the IOC was keen to arrange such a deal.

Despite the caution over the speed of internet developments, gradual controlled use of the internet and pay-for channels has allowed American viewers a greater range and depth of coverage. Developments in the technology of digital ‘geo-blocking’ have made it possible for digital rights management systems to prevent digital streams being accessed from other countries or duplicated on other websites. A joint internet monitoring project run by the Chinese and the IOC discovered over 4,000 cases of illegal broadcasting during the 2008 Games (Marshall *et al.* 2010). Generally these broadcasts were rapidly shut down once detected, but peer-to-peer streaming using BitTorrent proved a bit more problematic. A major torrent website, Pirate Bay, had millions of downloads of the Opening Ceremony, and although the IOC requested Swedish government assistance, Pirate Bay remained defiant and the Swedish were unwilling to enforce IOC demands. The IOC were more successful in preventing unauthorized recycling of Olympic material on YouTube, but did also authorize YouTube to establish an Olympic channel available in countries outside the major regional television contracts (Marshall *et al.* 2010).

For the Beijing Olympic Games of 2008, for the first time NBC also utilized its own internet site (nbcolympics.com) to stream events. Possibly as a result of this new, more comprehensive coverage, NBC attained its highest ever Olympic Games ratings and largest advertising sales (Sportsbiznews 2008).

In Beijing 2008, internet use and video streaming rose dramatically. The NBC website recorded an estimated 1.3 billion page views, 53 million unique users, 75.5 million video streams and ten million hours of video consumption during the Games. The EBU delivered 180 million broadband video streams. In Latin America, Terra’s Olympic site reported 29 million video streams and 10 million video-on-demand downloads (Hutchins and Mikosza 2010). In China in 2008, live streaming was offered online, with viewing audiences of 53 million watching the Olympics on personal computers (Marshall *et al.* 2010). According to BBC Olympics Director Roger Mosey, there was more video streaming in the first day of the 2008 Beijing Olympics than in the whole of the 2004 Athens Olympics. In total the BBC had 2.6 million video streams in Athens and 38 million video streams in Beijing (Mosey 2010).

There are no technological reasons why a centralized internet provider (the IOC itself, for example) could not provide comprehensive coverage. Two factors militate against this. First, television advertising, organized on national lines, is still the most effective business model when it comes to generating income. As long as this is the case, the internet is likely

to be used as an adjunct, allowing fuller coverage of those events with less viewer appeal. Marshall *et al.* (2010) point out that the need to ensure primacy of broadcast television meant that NBC's website offered heavily mediated highlights packages rather than live streaming of major events. Second, it may be that audiences tend to prefer Olympics coverage geared to their own national belongingness, focusing on their own favoured sports, competitors and medal prospects, framed within a narrative of national specificity. In 2008, Whannel watched Olympic television coverage in China, France, and the UK and the different focuses were striking. In France, for example, the handball (a sport barely visible on the BBC) became more and more prominent as the French team progressed towards triumph. Even in 2019, streaming is still not as stable a medium as broadcast television, and any buffering, unsteadiness, or freezing of live sport is especially aggravating.

The BBC's coverage of the London Games was the first to be entirely digital. Streamed video via the BBC website was a significant part of the offer. The BBC website was central to this process. Up to 21 events could be streamed at the same time. While the BBC also used message boards and blogs, interactivity through social networking remained relatively marginal to its core coverage (Mosey 2010). The LOCOG website received 431 million visits from 109 million unique users. London 2012's social media sites, including Facebook, Twitter, and Google+, attracted 4.7 million followers. The IOC's website, olympic.org, attracted more than 16 million unique visitors during the Games, (IOC 2012). The growth of social media has caused the IOC to become highly concerned about the maintenance of its positive image. Tight control on athletes is imposed by Rule 40, which effectively prevents athletes from tweeting anything the IOC might be unhappy about, which in effect prevents athletes from posting anything negative at all (Boykoff 2014b: 146).

In 2014 the IOC extended its partnership with NBC, and signed a \$7.5 billion contract that runs till 2032, the longest advance deal to date. In 2015 the IOC sold the European rights for the Games from 2022 to the US broadcaster Discovery, which owns Eurosport, for 1.3 billion euro. There is a link with the proposed IOC-owned Olympic Channel, which Discovery will help gain a Europe-wide reach. In the past the BBC have obtained their rights through the EBU. Discovery has confirmed that they plan to sub-lease some of the rights, which leads the BBC to believe they can acquire some level of access. However, Discovery, through Eurosport, also has their own free-to-air channel in the UK. The IOC currently insists on at least 200 hours of the Summer Games and 100 hours of Winter Games being shown on free-to-air television, so there could be a combination of leasing – some material on pay TV, some free-to-air on Eurosport, some prime events on BBC (Gibson 2015e).

Technological innovations have always been closely linked to sports mega-events (Real 1996). Digitalization and the resultant rise of social media have become a big factor in the sport media terrain (Creedon 2014; Widholm 2016; Whannel 2014). As the guardian of the Olympic movement, the IOC has had to come to terms with the challenge this may pose to its established business model (Barney *et al.* 2002). According to Nielsen (2017), major commercial trends in the media sport industry include: the emergence of new sporting powers, such as China; intellectual property owners taking greater control; greater fusion of sports and entertainment; rising importance of social media; fan involvement producing new revenue streams; the growing significance of data; and the rise of e-sports.

The ease of digital replication has made control of intellectual property rights and image rights very important, prompting friction between the IOC and major stars in big TV sports like basketball. Athletes and their agents may favour direct fan engagement, without the intervention of the restrictive hand of governance. In the battle for audience attention, commercialized shortened versions of sports, such as 20/20 cricket, are proving successful, as are entirely new sport forms such as drone racing (Horne 2009). The interactive social media provide for new forms of engagement, that the established sport and media organizations are not necessarily good at, although NBC, during Rio 2016, did roll out a dedicated app and launched a partnership with BuzzFeed for Snapchat content. The new key concept here is CRM—Customer Relationship Management. As simulation becomes ever more sophisticated, e-sports could prove a challenge to the established television sports. The rapid growth in the collection and processing of big data means that sponsors now take decisions on ROI (Return on Investment), using sophisticated data analyses to link purchase decisions to promotional strategies. Quantifiable tracking is becoming more important to sponsorship decisions (Nielsen 2017). It is not clear that either the IOC or their major television partner, NBC, have yet worked out how to come to terms with these developments in social media and multi-platforming (Nee 2015).

Hutchins *et al.* (2019) recently argued that the growth of over-the-top (OTT) internet and mobile video streaming services is a major development in the distribution, transmission, and consumption of global media sport. These developments are impacting on rights negotiations, and changing how live sport is experienced and shared across platforms. The shift from linear broadcasting to the provision of view-on-demand streamed content produces new conventions for both accessing and curating content.

Evens *et al.* (2013) have already argued that streaming platforms are altering the structure of rights markets and media systems that have long been built around national and regional territories. Hutchins *et al.* (2019) suggest that while live sport might appear to be a bulwark against such developments because of its linearity, streaming services introduce a whole new range of options – multiple live events, integrated live statistics, interactive features, and online marketplaces. The massive volume of content, screens, and platforms is a key feature of major media sport events, transmitting live content unavailable during the broadcast era (Hutchins *et al.* 2019). Much of this material is data enriched, a form Hutchins *et al.* call ‘data-tainment’.

It is not yet obvious which provider might constitute the primary challenge to live sport on broadcast television. Red Bull Media House specializes in short and long-form video. Netflix has stated that it has ‘no plans’ to bid for live sport rights. Amazon Prime Video is focused on linking audiences into its broader marketplace in content. Internet-based services provide a means of breaking out beyond ‘national’ territories, and are hard to regulate fully.

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE OLYMPIC BUSINESS MODEL

Along with the challenge of the internet, though, the Olympic Games faces a new challenge in the declining numbers of cities willing to bid to host. Their revenue end is still working well, although it may not do so forever. A recent analysis of Olympic revenue

(Owen 2019a) compares the results obtained in 2017 and 2018, the year of the Pyeongchang 2018 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games, with 2013 and 2014, the year of Sochi. Olympic revenue so far in the current Olympiad is £2.28 billion, an increase of 44 per cent over the same point in the 2013–2016 cycle. In 2013–2014, broadcasting rights accounted for 65 per cent of the total; whereas in the current Olympiad, this has fallen to 50 per cent as revenue from sponsorship has grown much more rapidly.

While the IOC business model is holding up, sport is having to confront image problems associated with corruption by officials and the use of performance-enhancing drugs by competitors (see Chapter 12). Perhaps the greatest problem, though, is the task of finding cities prepared to bid and able to stage an Olympic Games. Costs are undoubtedly a major issue. The Olympic project has always been prone to excessive expenditure. Preuss *et al.* (2018) argue that organizational costs are generally covered by revenues, but this is only possible because of the way in which Olympic accounting separates running costs from infrastructural costs, such as stadium construction. The authors acknowledge that these costs are prone to escalate, but they maintain, no more than other (non-sporting) mega projects. By contrast, though, a study of data from 1960–2016, by the Saïd Business School (University of Oxford), found that the average cost overrun of hosting the games was 156 per cent, the highest of any mega-project (*The Economist* 16/3/17).

Beijing spent more than \$45 billion on the 2008 Games, and Russia spent over \$50 billion on the 2014 Winter Games in Sochi. The 2016 Games in Rio de Janeiro cost \$20 billion, and the 2018 Winter Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea cost almost \$13 billion, up from the original estimate of \$7 billion. Simply bidding for the Games is expensive – Tokyo spent \$150 million on its failed 2016 bid, and about half that much for its successful 2020 bid, while Toronto decided it could not afford the \$60 million needed for a 2024 bid (McBride 2018). The costs of staging the 2020 Games in Tokyo are already four times the original estimate (*The Economist* 16/3/17).

Sochi was the second-most expensive Olympics ever in terms of sports-related costs and the most expensive Olympics in terms of cost per event. A total of 96.5 per cent of funding was from public funds, the highest proportion of any Olympic Games on record (Muller 2014). It seems much easier for non-democratic countries such as Russia and China to commit huge sums, without fear of public repercussions or opposition. There are substantial legacy costs too. Sydney's Olympic stadium costs the city \$30 million a year to maintain. Beijing's 'Bird's Nest' stadium requires \$10 million a year to maintain, and sits mostly unused. Almost all of the facilities built for the 2004 Athens Olympics, whose costs contributed to the Greek debt crisis, are now derelict. The 2018 Winter Games is predicted to cost South Korea \$8.5 million in the upkeep of unused facilities (McBride 2018).

After 2016 the State of Rio needed a \$900-million bailout from the federal government to cover the policing costs. Since 2016, most venues are abandoned or barely used. The Olympic Park is closed, with most of its facilities overrun with waste and infested with insects and rodents. The nearly 4,000 apartments of the athletes' village sit vacant. At least 77,000 people were evicted from their homes in the course of construction, and the city has suspended its promised programme to clean Rio's deeply polluted waterways (McBride 2018).

Despite the reforms instigated in the 1990s, the Olympic bidding process continues to be vulnerable to corruption. There were bribery scandals associated with the 1998 Nagano and 2002 Salt Lake City Games. In 2017, the head of Rio's Olympic committee was charged with corruption for allegedly making payments to secure the Brazil Games, and allegations of illegal payments surfaced in the 2020 Tokyo selection (McBride 2018). It does not help the sense cities have of the vast costs they will incur, that the IOC retains an ever-greater share of television revenues: in 1992 it gave Barcelona 69 per cent, whereas more recently, it gives less than 30 per cent (*The Economist* 16/3/17).

John Varano (2017) argues that staging a major sporting event involves immense financial commitment and great risk. The 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil incurred a cost overrun of 75 per cent and at US\$15 billion was the most expensive in FIFA history. For the 2016 Rio Summer Olympic Games costs overran by about 50 per cent. Consequently, in the context of growing inequality and economic fragility since the global financial crisis, tax-payers are wary of expensive vanity projects. 'Both Russia and Qatar are hoping they will end up projecting an image of modern and advancing nation-states, but for now they are still saddled with the negative impression created by corruption and bribery accusations' (Varano 2017). Baade (2016) argued that the Olympics are a money-losing proposition for host cities; and the cost-benefit proposition is worse for cities in developing countries than for those in the industrialized world (Baade 2016).

So cities have become reluctant to bid. In 1972, Denver had become the first and only chosen host city to reject its Olympics after voters passed a referendum refusing additional public spending for the Games. Cities have become focused upon the dangers of a bid being stopped and work hard on building support. Many felt that the failure of Tokyo's bid in 2016 was due to limited public enthusiasm, while public opinion was more supportive for the eventually successful 2020 bid. A Munich bid to host the 2018 Winter Olympics was opposed on ecological grounds (Mackay 2013). Four referenda were held over bids to host the 2022 Winter Olympics, expenditure was the major issue, and only the Oslo referendum approved the bid (Coates 2014). Cities who persist with bids usually have strong motivations. For example, Istanbul, which applied to host the Olympic Summer Games for 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2020, has been doing so as part of a scheme to present Turkey as an emerging political and economic power (Deniz and Rebeggiani 2016).

In 1995, there were nine candidates for the 2002 Winter Games, and in 1997, 12 cities had bid to stage the 2004 Summer Games, eventually held in Athens. By 2011, only three cities bid for the 2018 Winter Games, and of the bidders to stage the 2024 Games, Boston, Toronto, Budapest, Hamburg, and Rome all withdrew, leaving only Los Angeles and Paris. In the case of Hamburg, the respondents to a referendum apparently believed that the negative legacies outweighed the positive legacies (Scheu 2016). After lots of cities bowed out of the competition for the 2022 Winter Games it was again left with two options: Almaty, Kazakhstan and Beijing, China. *The Economist* (16/3/17) suggested that 'The business model for the Olympic Games is running out of puff', and the *Japan Times* (Samuelson 2018) asked, 'Will the Olympics go bust?'

There is a clear need for a new business model but can the Olympics reinvent itself?

Chappelet (2014) argued that growth in scale was ‘making the Games increasingly difficult to stage and has greatly reduced the number of cities capable of hosting them’. The number of events rose from 257 at Barcelona to 302 (+17 per cent) at Beijing and London. The accreditation categories that have expanded the most are the media (+85 per cent), volunteers (+102 per cent), and security personnel (+95 per cent) (Chappelet 2014). The IOC devised the *Olympic Agenda 2020*, which recommended reducing the cost of bidding, allowing hosts more flexibility in using already-existing sports facilities, encouraging bidders to develop a sustainability strategy, and increasing outside auditing and other transparency measures. According to a study in *The Economist* in 2017, Agenda 2020 would not work and makes little difference (*The Economist* 16/3/17). As we have seen in the previous chapter, adjustments keep needing to be made by the IOC.

Alternative ideas included adjusting the existing model to give a larger share of revenues to the host city, or covering a portion of a city’s cost overruns. A more decentralized hosting model has been proposed, with different Olympic events taking place in cities around the world with the right sports infrastructure. This would increase broadcasting costs, and lose the communal aspects of the Games-in-one-city model. A more radical proposal, supported by, among others, Christine Lagarde, then managing director of the International Monetary Fund, is to designate one or a few permanent host(s) (*The Economist* 16/3/17). Economists Baumann and Matheson argue that developing countries should be spared the burden of hosting and the IOC should instead ‘award the games to rich countries that are better able to absorb more of the costs’. Author and Olympic critic Andrew Zimbalist also favours one city as the permanent host, allowing for the reuse of expensive infrastructure (McBride 2018). Zimbalist argues that, ‘Los Angeles already has a full complement of sports arenas and stadiums...the need for new construction is modest’ (Samuelson 2018).

Former International Olympic Committee (IOC) marketing director Michael Payne has claimed that the bid process for the Olympic Games has become ‘toxic’ and requires significant change. However, Payne believes much of the problem stems from mixing the capital, infrastructural costs, and the actual operating costs of hosting the Games, and so seems to blame the grandiose infrastructural projects for inflating the costs and putting other cities off. He also blames the social media for, in effect, enabling anti-Olympic movements to develop! Payne wants the IOC to do even more to detach itself from responsibility for infrastructural costs, arguing, ‘It’s an infrastructure for re-building the region and the IOC should have banned the use of the word “Olympic” to do with anything on infrastructure’ (Etchells 2017a). This then is the dilemma the IOC faces: how to reconfigure a business model that has been so extraordinarily successful while maintaining its basic viability. It is a task that will not be made any easier by the continuing problems elite sports and mega-events have with corruption, drug use, and, not least, the climate emergency.

CONCLUSION

The dilemma for the IOC is that it wishes to utilize all the new media resources of the internet and social networking sites to promote the Olympic brand, while remaining in

control. But as Hutchins and Mikosza (2010) argue, there is a shift in the ‘media sport content economy’ from the comparative scarcity of television channels to the ‘digital plenitude’ of the new media environment in which online media challenge both market-driven logic and central control. As they graphically put it, ‘the carefully designed and fertile “media garden” tended by the Olympic Movement over the past 25 years was sporadically beset by weeds – uninvited, unpredictable, socially driven, participatory digital media’. Top sport stars now are the point of intersection between the global spectacle of the Olympic Games and the celebrity-dominated media culture, and star image has become a promotional tool. The issue of sport actuality as intellectual property poses a contradiction – the IOC is selling the images of performance, but the performers receive nothing for this – how long will they be content with this situation? In an era in which top sport stars have agents to oversee their interests, their intellectual property and image rights could become the site of a legal challenge to the current structure of Olympic finance. The great paradox at the heart of the Olympic Games is that this commodified and hugely lucrative global spectacle is owned and run, not by a private corporation with shareholders, but by what is in effect a combination of trust and an eighteenth-century gentlemen’s club. So far this situation, combining the archaic and the entrepreneurial, has survived, and arguably thrived, despite – indeed perhaps partly because of – its internal contradictions.

FURTHER READING

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CHAPTER 11

OLYMPIC LEVEL PLAYING FIELDS

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games sociologist Kath Woodward (2013: 2–3) wrote:

the Olympics and Paralympics have generated excitement and massive interest, and the athletes who have taken part have become heroic figures in the public arena. It has all worked way beyond the dreams of the organizers and the scepticism of many critics and political activists. The legacy of the games remains uncertain but the duration of the events...has been an undisputed success... The Paralympics and its athletes have generated as much interest and support as has the Olympics which preceded them; so-often socially inflected embodied differences have become ordinary and pass unremarked...London 2012 has offered a celebration of the ordinariness of many of the differences between and among people and downplayed the markers of inequality...This is not to say that the games themselves were not marked by inequalities, which also operated routinely.

There are a number of complexities being communicated here. The excitement of the event is captured in combination with recognition that inequalities persisted during and after the sporting party had taken place. This chapter examines issues of access and equity at the Olympic Games at different times in this light. It considers: the composition of the IOC; inequality at global, regional, and national levels marking the relationship between affluent and poor countries that compete at the Olympics; social class and the exclusion of professionals; the involvement of women in the Olympics; 'race' and racism; disability sport and the Paralympic Games; and relates these to other forms of social inequality that provide a context within which the Olympic Games take place. It examines the contrast between the rhetoric and the practice of Olympism.

As we have seen in Chapter 9, despite reforms since the 1990s, the governance of the Olympics is still dominated by European men, often with an aristocratic social background. The commitment to amateurism, only abandoned since the early 1980s, gave the Games a distinct social class character. The first black member of the IOC was invited to join in 1963; the first women members were accepted in 1981. Women were excluded

entirely from the early Games, and only since the 1980s has the full programme of events begun to be opened to them. The Paralympic Games, despite a long struggle for inclusion, are still staged as a separate event. Through ‘The Olympic Partner’ programme (TOP) major corporations, most notably NBC and its parent company General Electric, are in a position to exercise a shaping influence on the development of the Games. This chapter poses an underlying question: ‘Who are the Games for?’

Maurice Roche (2000: 41) outlined four ways in which sports mega-events, such as the Olympic Games, ‘provided opportunities and arenas for the display and exercise of “civil society” in addition to “the state” both at national and international levels’ at the turn of the nineteenth century. Specifically focusing on the modern Olympic Games and the IOC, established in 1894, Roche argues that the Games were connected to four developing ideas about global citizenship: *universal citizenship* and the associated discourse on human rights; *mediatized citizenship* and the right to participate in the Olympics as a media event; *movement citizenship* and the right to participate in the Games as a sports organization and a movement; and *corporate citizenship* or the position of the IOC as a collective actor in global civil society.

Here we primarily focus on the first and third of these forms of citizenship – the extent to which the Olympics offer a level playing field to those who wish to participate, and thus contribute to the expansion of human rights. As a ‘movement’, the IOC claims to be quite different from other sports organizations and their mega-events. The problem is that – even if the Olympics were seen by progressives and reactionaries alike as a positive cultural innovation 125 years ago – this was essentially a dream built upon a particular set of values and relationships (embodied in the ideology of nineteenth-century amateurism, and based on Western, masculine and (upper) social class-based moral conceptions) that simply no longer apply.

Members of the IOC today, and many sports people and physical educators, still believe that sport has a higher social and moral purpose, but elite sport has also become a more integral part of capitalist consumer culture, and mega-events such as the Summer Olympic Games are its commercial spectacles. The Olympics uses its difference as a ‘movement’ with an ideology (Olympism) different from other world cups and commercial events (such as the FIFA World Cup, or Cricket or Rugby Union World Cups) to provide it with its own distinctive ‘brand’.¹ Anti-commercialism can thus enhance commercial value. However, the IOC faces two main challenges – around democracy and fair play.

Under siege since the 1990s over its undemocratic procedures, it remains ‘a self-recruiting and secretive elite international club, directly accountable and accessible to nobody but itself’ (Roche 2000: 207). As we noted in Chapter 9, despite the establishment of an ethics commission and various other sub-committees attempting to bring about Olympic reform, since the 1990s, the IOC has had difficulty, beyond those people ready to accept its ideology, in convincing others that it is operating according to the highest standards of democratic governance. This situation has not been aided by the increase in revelations of cheating in sport, and especially the use of performance-enhancing drugs, in a context where the chasm between the rewards from success and the anonymity derived from losing has widened considerably. This and other contemporary challenges for the Olympics are considered in more detail in the next chapter.

In order to assess whether there can be a levelling of the playing field through the Olympic Games, this chapter will outline the four key social divisions that underpin the world of sport and the Olympics specifically: social class, 'race', gender, and disability/para-sport. Clearly the odds are stacked against anyone becoming an Olympian. For example in 2012 statisticians in the USA estimated the odds of becoming an Olympian athlete at a Summer Games. For men the highest probability was in equestrian events (1 in 67); for women it was in handball where they had a 1 in 40 chance. Basketball presented the most difficult for both men and women: only 1 in 45,000 female basketball players in the USA made it to Rio (Schultz 2018: 108). According to one commentator, you were 'much more likely to win the lottery, or to get sizzled by a bolt of lightning' than become an Olympic swimmer on the US team at the Rio Olympics in 2016 (Poirier-Leroy undated).

Sport, fairness, and a level playing field are also difficult to achieve since inequalities in material conditions give rise to massive disparities in resources between nations, which tables showing medals per capita or GDP reveal, and which media constructions of valiant but ultimately unsuccessful athletes such as 'Eric the Eel' portray. Media portrayals of Olympic athletes are generally positive, viewing athletes as trying hard despite the odds, but the reality is that over half of participating nations and their athletes do not obtain a medal of any colour.

First, though, we want to briefly consider the way the IOC has positioned itself with respect to global inequalities. With the recognition that social and economic inequality has been growing at global, regional, and national levels (Piketty 2014; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009), a consensus developed among the member countries of the UN to adopt declarations to reduce poverty, hunger, gender inequality, illiteracy, child mortality, and environmental degradation. These were made tangible in the 'Millennium Development Goals' (MDGs) that operated from 2000 to 2015. The UN held a Sustainable Development Summit in New York in September 2015 and adopted 17 broad follow-up 'Sustainable Development Goals' (SDGs) and 169 specific targets to run from 2016 until 2030.

The idea, or mythology, of using 'sport for good' has a very long history, but especially since the 1990s 'sport for development and peace' has increasingly been adopted by academics and practitioners as a novel approach and also influenced policy makers at the UN (Darnell *et al.* 2019). Sport has increasingly been seen to be able to make a contribution to enduring global problems, including the challenges associated with health, education, gender equity, and the promotion of peace (Darnell 2012). The IOC gained status as a Permanent Observer to the United Nations in 2009, which means the IOC's representatives can attend sessions and the work of the UN General Assembly as well as maintain permanent offices at UN Headquarters. This position has undoubtedly contributed to the growth of the view that UN goals could be assisted through links to sports programmes (see Keys 2019). At the UN Summit in September 2015, President Bach addressed the members and pledged wholehearted support for the '2013 Agenda for Sustainable Development', while thanking UN member states 'for recognising the contribution of sport to sustainable development and to advancing the Sustainable Development Goals'.² In particular, Bach identified sports contribution to health, educational opportunity, gender equality for women and girls, the promotion of peace, and the strengthening of global partnerships.

In the most economically developed countries, meanwhile, nationalism spurs on the search for gold medal success via the production of elite athletic bodies and highly specialized athletes. The cost of Olympic gold medals has been growing (Donnelly 2009). The Olympics cannot escape from the social context (including existing beliefs and ideologies) of their formation or of their current manifestation. Olympic change through time tends to reflect, rather more than refract, wider social changes, although it can send out strong messages that help construct certain beliefs about sporting abilities and opportunities. Generally, though, the IOC follows social change – economic, political, ideological, and cultural – rather than leading or promoting it. But this is not a criticism of the Games alone since arguably sport and sports institutions generally are more conservative rather than forces for progressive social change. The next sections focus on the four main social divisions and areas of political debate in this light.

SOCIAL CLASS: OLYMPIC SPORT AS A VEHICLE FOR OVERCOMING CLASS HOSTILITY AND DIFFERENCES

Social class has played a major role in influencing the construction of, organization of, consumption of, and participation in modern sport (Gruneau 2017). Class was central to the formation of modern sports culture, and the Olympics were part of that. Class position (of origination) and class of destination are linked through ideas about social mobility. Sport is a powerful symbol of mobility and change in social status. Class has an important influence on sport participation and the character of specific sport cultures. For the first 80 years, the IOC upheld the notion of amateurism and outlawed professionalism in Olympic sport. This partly reflected the social background of Coubertin and his other IOC members, who largely viewed their position as one of being social class conciliators. Sport offered a means of ‘calming’ proletarian ‘bitterness’ (Coubertin 2000 [1920]: 225). As sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1978) once noted, sport has been ‘an object of struggles between the factions of the dominant class and also between the social classes’. Nowhere is this more apparent than in inclusion and exclusion at the Olympic Games and in the Olympic movement.

As we have discussed in Chapter 5, Coubertin arrived at his view of sport and physical education from studying the English public school system. This was a highly elitist system based on the wider British class structure. During the nineteenth century the use of organized athletics and ‘athleticism’ as an educational ideology ‘became established as the ‘essence of school life’ (Simon 1975: 8; Mangan 1981). Key features of this ideology were anti-intellectualism, anti-individuality, and conformity. Athleticism was thus a form of character training, developing physical and moral courage, loyalty and cooperation, and the ability both to command and to obey (Mangan 1975). Dunning (1975) argues that mid-nineteenth century public school reforms in Britain, including an emphasis on athleticism and muscular Christianity, represented a compromise between rising industrial bourgeois and declining aristocratic interests. Reform led to the ‘incipient modernization’ of team games (especially association football or ‘soccer’) into modern sports by stimulating the development of codified rules designed to ‘civilize’ the games and equalize participants. Who played whom in the games fixtures, however, became one of the key indicators in defining not just the status of schools, just as it did in the ‘Ivy League’ in

American universities, but also the structure of the public school network as a whole. As de Honey (1975: 27–31) noted, by 1902 there was a relatively close community of 64 boys' schools which interacted with each other in two or more activities, including rowing, athletics, gymnastics, rifle shooting, cricket, rugby, association football, racquets, and fencing. Interaction in activities with differential prestige attached to them created different social levels of schools.

Rather than signalling the embourgeoisement (or downward cultural mobility) of the aristocratic elite, it can be said that the reformed public schools were thus able to capture middle-class talent (Gruneau 1981: 355). In this way English public schools came to play a formative role in the reproduction and 'promotion of gentry-class power' (Wilkinson 1964: ix) in the nineteenth century. Wilkinson identified public schools as a political system with a political role: 'maintaining order by ethical restraint rather than by law' (1964: ix). The English (and Scottish) public schools selected and reinforced certain values and created a specific public school ethos, as well as a social stratum, that prided itself on public service, among other things. The aim was to create a boy who was capable of loyally obeying 'his supervisors and who at the same time could command a regiment or head a government' (Arnstein 1975: 236). According to Bertrand Russell, 'the concept of the gentleman was invented by the aristocracy to keep the middle classes in order' (Arnstein 1975: 235). By 'capturing' the nouveaux riches within the category of gentlemen, the public school 'acted as an "escape-valve" in the social system' (Arnstein 1975: 235). It was this elitist social class context that most influenced Coubertin (as we discuss in Chapter 5).

It is well known that there are social class differences in leisure, and a reasonable expectation or hypothesis would be that they have been exacerbated by the recession that followed the banking crisis of 2008–2009 (Roberts 2015). Two surveys of leisure activities benefitting from state funding in the UK, *Taking Part* and the *Active People Survey*, revealed that overall sport participation remained stable between 2005–2006 and 2011–2012, with just over half the adult population (age 16 and over) taking part at least once in the four weeks preceding interviews (Roberts 2015: 135–136). Yet when social class is taken into account it is evident that 'wider economic class inequalities have led to wider social class differences in leisure' (Roberts 2015: 145). To what extent does social class influence who plays, who competes, and who wins gold medals in elite sport and Olympic sport today?

Despite a longstanding sports policy rhetoric about securing 'Sports for All' in the UK and the successful Olympics bid presentation in 2005, which placed such a lot of emphasis on inspiring more people, especially young people, to participate in sport, overall participation rates in recreational sport in the United Kingdom did not significantly alter then, or since (Girginov and Hills 2008: 2097–2100). Ten years after winning the bid and near the third anniversary of London 2012, the former Olympics minister Tessa Jowell declared that the situation was 'back to where we started in 2002' (quoted in Gibson 2015c: 7). Ever since the implementation of spending cuts by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010 there had been a growing concern about the Olympic Games participation legacy. Six months after the coalition's formation in 2010, the education department announced plans to close 450 school sports partnerships that

had linked primary and secondary schools to encourage the sharing of facilities and the funding of specialist coaches. Although there was a reaction by educationalists and parents that saw some of these arrangements saved, by 2015 Sport England revealed in its half-yearly *Active People Survey* that there had been a fall of 220,000 in the number of people of all ages taking part in sport for half an hour each week. The number of people swimming regularly had dropped by three-quarters of a million. The decline in sports participation was most marked among the poor and pointed to a post-Olympics legacy failure (Williams 2015).

Prior to the London bid, data cited by academics such as Holt and Mason (2000: 6–9), the Office for National Statistics (1998), and sportscotland (2002) all showed the continuance of stratified sports cultures in Britain. Rowe and Moore (2004) suggested three reasons for the decline in participation since the 1990s: people had competing demands on their time; people had a greater number of leisure choices, many of which promoted more sedentary behaviour; and the quality of the sports infrastructure (for participants) had been declining. As a consequence of lack of investment over the previous 30 years, some 500 recreational sports centres had been closed, and local authorities estimated that they required £500 million to upgrade existing facilities.

Research conducted in the past 25 years confirms the continuing relationship between independent schools, elite sport performance, and social class (Evans and Bairner 2012; Horne 2006: 146–149; Horne *et al.* 2011). A research project on *The Development of Sporting Talent 1997* (English Sports Council 1998) interviewed 924 (approximately 500 men and 420 women) of Great Britain’s top sportsmen and women in 11 sports – athletics (track and field), cricket (male and female), cycling, hockey, judo, netball, rowing, rugby league, rugby union (male and female), sailing, and swimming. Athletics produced the ‘most typical elite sports people’ – someone educationally well qualified, from a higher socio-economic group, who had had a family member involved in sport (see Table 11.1).

In rowing, over 50 per cent of elite athletes were educated at independent schools, compared to only 5 per cent of the GB population as a whole. While rugby league had the most manual/working-class profile (67 per cent were C2, D or E), in rugby union 41 per cent of male players and 24 per cent of female players were educated at independent schools. Of elite sailing athletes, 24 per cent were educated at independent schools; 61 per cent were from AB, 22 per cent were from C1, 17 per cent were from C2, and none came from D or E social class backgrounds. Swimming contained the most ‘upper-class’ profile of all the

<i>Social Class</i>	<i>Percentage – Athletes</i>	<i>Percentage – GB Population</i>
Professional and managerial social class (AB)	29	19
Clerical and non-manual class (C1)	32	34
Skilled manual (C2)	28	21
Semi-skilled and unskilled manual classes (DE)	12	25

Table 11.1 The Social Class Background of Selected GB Athletes in 1997

Source: adapted from *The Development of Sporting Talent 1997* (English Sports Council 1998).

sports – 21 per cent had attended independent schools, 69 per cent were from AB, 24 per cent were from C1, and only 6 per cent were from C2, D, or E social classes.

The authors of the report summarized the data as follows:

a precociously talented youngster born in an affluent family with sport-loving parents, one of whom has (probably) achieved high levels of sporting success, and attending an independent/private school, has a ‘first-class ticket’ to the sporting podium. His or her counterpart, equally talented but born in less favoured circumstances, at best has a third-class ticket and at worst no ticket at all.

(English Sports Council 1998: 13)

This conclusion was further underscored after the Sydney Summer Olympic Games in 2000, when a survey suggested that 80 per cent of British medal winners at the Games went to independent schools (*Guardian* 21 August 2004).

At the Beijing Games in 2008, ‘Team GB’ secured 47 medals across 12 sports disciplines – athletics (track and field), boxing, cycling, equestrianism, gymnastics, kayaking, pentathlon, rowing, sailing, swimming, taekwondo, and windsurfing. As many were team events, there were 70 individual athletes in total who were medal holders. Five athletes won more than one medal: Chris Hoy (cycling, three gold); Rebecca Adlington (swimming, two gold); Jason Kenny (cycling, one gold, one silver); Tim Brabant (kayaking, one gold, one bronze); and Tina Cook (equestrianism, two bronze). Of these, 41 per cent (28 athletes) were educated at independent schools, 13 per cent (nine) were from religious or faith (voluntary-aided) schools and 46 per cent (32) were from state comprehensive schools (also referred to as ‘maintained schools’). This compared nationally with approximately 7 per cent of school pupils in the independent sector and 93 per cent in the state ‘maintained’ sector. Former independent school students were clearly over-represented among the medal winners in Team GB: they took 31 per cent of the gold medals, 44 per cent of the silver medals and 45 per cent of the bronze medals. A similar disproportionate number of Team GB medal winners in 2012 – 37 per cent – had previously attended private schools (Smith *et al.* 2013). Research by the Sutton Trust (2019) suggested that athletes who attended independent schools were still massively over-represented among the state-educated gold medal winners relative to their proportion in the population: 35 per cent of Team GB medalists in 2012 went to independent schools, while the proportion decreased slightly to 31 per cent at the Rio Games in 2016.

We know that models of the potential for behaviour to change resulting from people’s exposure to sports mega-events, such as the Olympic Games, need to be improved to properly understand the complexity of motivations to participate in sport and physical activity (Coalter 2004). Rather than ‘trickle-down’ or ‘role model’ speculation, Coalter suggests that participation change agents may need to be ‘embedded’ and/or involved at the grassroots level. Research by Mackintosh *et al.* (2015) and Such (2014) suggests that the messages about ‘active’ participation stemming from major sports events need to be examined in terms of their transmission through families. Such (2014) concludes:

The effects of sport mega events do not, as other research has shown, ‘trickle down’ to the general population and get us out of our armchairs, but ‘diffuse’

or ‘trickle through and around’ our relational everyday lives. It is my suggestion that it is through family and peer networks that sport legacy policy could lever longer-term outcomes.

Horne *et al.* (2011) and Shilling (2007) pose similar questions about the existence of multiple social capitals (especially cultural, symbolic, and physical capital; that is *embodied* cultural capital) related to social class operating in and through families and schools that impact on the propensity of individuals to participate in sport. Related to these capitals, or resources, are the body pedagogics (Shilling 2004) that frame and shape physical capital. Future research will be needed to explore these questions in order to investigate the participation legacies of the Olympic Games, and other major sports events.

‘RACE’ AND THE IOC: OLYMPIC SPORT AS A VEHICLE FOR TESTING ‘RACIAL’ DIFFERENCES

Bairner and Molnar (2010: 3–4) identified three main forms of the politics of ‘race’ associated with the Olympics. First, there is institutional racism among member nations, which was particularly evident in the Games of 1904 (St Louis and the Anthropology Days) and 1936 (Berlin and the attempt to assert the superiority of the Aryan ‘race’ and the Nazi regime). Second is the opportunity to protest/demonstrate overcoming racism – 1968 (Mexico City) stands out here, as we have mentioned in Chapter 9. Third is the relationship between ethnicity, ‘race’ and sports performance. The 1904 Anthropology Days, for example, were essentially racial contests set up to measure and demonstrate ‘race’ as an explanation of performance (Brownell 2008; Gems 2008). But this ‘science’ of differences has not disappeared despite declarations since the Second World War about the imprecision in using the concept of ‘race’, and within sport it remains a debating point to this day (see, for example, Entine 2000; Hoberman 1997).

Carrington (2010: 15) consciously avoided discussing what he calls the ‘rather obvious markers that readers might have expected to encounter’ in a book about ‘race’ and sport: for example Muhammad Ali, the failed boycott of the 1968 Olympics, and the political protests staged at them. In attempting to think about ‘race’ and sport ‘beyond *Beyond a Boundary*’ (the widely acclaimed book written by C.L.R. James in 1963), Carrington argues that analysis of sport in ‘an age still marked by the historical scars of Empire and racial exclusion’ remains an essential task, especially to consider the ‘importance of sporting spectacles’ in shaping national identities (Carrington 2010: 163–165). He hoped that the London Olympics in 2012 might provide ‘an important public space within which to re-imagine the national story’. Rather than ignoring it, acknowledging the history of racism and ‘race’ in Britain in all its complexity in shaping the present could be valuable. He hoped that the 2012 Olympics ‘might just signal the revival of a truly multicultural nation finally at ease with itself’ (Carrington 2010: 165).

In the event, the Summer Olympics of 2012 ‘came to London in the context of a national debate over race and multiculturalism which both questioned what it means to be British and identified sport as a way to shore up and provide substance to Britishness’ (Carrington 2013: 107). Some commentators, such as Winter (2013), noted that while London

2012 was promoted as a progressive, inclusive, multicultural project, it did not set out to address the ‘social, political and economic realities of the most disenfranchised’ members of the black and minority ethnic (BME) communities. Instead he argues that the Games sought to discipline marginalized communities and individuals who did not comply with or aspire to the collective celebration. Similarly Hylton and Morpeth (2012: 387) suggested BME communities in the neighbouring ‘Olympic Boroughs’ were caught in the contradiction of both being promoted as ambassadors and stakeholders of London 2012 and as problems to be fixed by it: ‘reified by Olympic stakeholders as fragmented and disadvantaged, therefore requiring an Olympic makeover to manage these social issues’. Carrington (2013: 108–109) also suggests that while the London 2012 opening ceremony designed by film-maker Danny Boyle did ‘serve to reinvigorate a sense of the lived realities of contemporary multiracial Britain’, it did so *without* providing ‘any account of Empire’: ‘imperial British history without Empire, blacks arriving from the colonies in a story without colonisation’. While sport appears to have the capacity to create social bonds and identifications that cut across racial, ethnic, and religious divides – think Nicola Adams, Mo Farah, and Jessica Ennis – it is not evident that London 2012 sparked a new, sustained, inclusive Britishness. Seven years on from 2012, and austerity, populism, a moral panic over immigration, the EU referendum, and resultant political tensions, appear to have produced a markedly less tolerant society, including the way in which the Home Office policy of creating a hostile environment appears to have led directly to the appalling treatment of ‘the Windrush generation’; people perfectly entitled to be in the UK, but unable to furnish definitive ‘proof’, despite having employment, taxation, and National Insurance records easily accessible to the state (on the Windrush scandal, see <https://www.bl.uk/windrush/articles/perspectives-on-the-windrush-generation-scandal-a-response-from-david-lammy> [accessed 13 October 2019]).

Evidence gathered in the past 25 years by public agencies and academic researchers in the UK points to some of the issues and challenges ahead. UK Sport estimated that 10.3 per cent of its funded athletes were from BME groups, which compared favourably with the 7.9 per cent of the 2001 UK population from such communities. Analysis of the GB Team that represented Great Britain at the 2008 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games showed that 7 per cent of the athletes in the GB Olympic squad and 3.6 per cent of athletes in the GB Paralympic squad were from BME groups. UK Sport estimated that 16 per cent of the coaches who were part of the GB Olympic Team for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games were from BME groups (Long *et al.* 2009). Yet research into the relationship between black and Asian people and sport since the 1990s has demonstrated the historical and contemporary extent of racism in various British sports – athletics, basketball, cricket, rugby league and rugby union, football, hockey, boxing, and others (for example, see the collections edited by Carrington and McDonald 2001 and Jarvie 1991b).

Few systematic studies into non-white people’s participation in sport at grassroots level have been undertaken. It is apparent that levels of participation in sport are not equal for all ethnic groups. In 1996, 46 per cent of white adults had participated in one activity (excluding walking) during the previous four weeks, compared with 41 per cent of black people, 37 per cent of Indians, and 25 per cent of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (Sport England 1999a). Ethnic minorities remain under-represented in their use of local authority swimming pools (Sport England 1999b).

Analysis of sports-specific participation by ethnic minorities has not been possible due to the small sample sizes, but in 2000 Sport England published *Sports Participation and Ethnicity in England National Survey 1999/2000*. This was the first large-scale survey (with 3,000 non-white adult respondents) focusing on England. It found that 49 per cent of ethnic minority men compared with 54 per cent of white men had participated in sport in the previous four weeks. Of ethnic minority women, 32 per cent, compared with 39 per cent of white women, had participated in sport in the previous four weeks. The survey found that 39 per cent of black Caribbean and Indian people, 31 per cent of Pakistani people, and 30 per cent of Bangladeshi people participated in sport. Compared with the general population, few ethnic minorities declared walking as a physical activity (e.g. only 19 per cent of Bangladeshi women compared to 44 per cent of the total population). The findings showed differences between the participation of men and women. Swimming had a low priority, whereas football involvement among men was about the national average (10 per cent).

Such research into the physical activity of BME people – in Britain as elsewhere – has tended to focus on two main themes. On the one hand are *equity issues*; to do with what Coakley (2003) calls the ‘sports opportunity structure’, the preserving of prejudices despite black excellence in sport, and ‘stacking’ – the over-representation of black athletes in certain positions in team sports deemed to require less intelligence. While the presence of stacking in British sport, especially association football compared with American Football, has not been as clearly demonstrated, various anti-racism campaigns (for example, ‘Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football’ in 1993/1994, now renamed ‘Kick it Out’, ‘Hit Racism for Six!’ in cricket in 1995 and ‘Football against Racism in Europe’ (FARE) in 2002) have developed in response to these issues. On the other hand, research has begun to look at *resistance to or accommodation with* racism through the consumption of sport. While some black people have used sport as a route to black cultural resistance to racism and positive identity formation (Carrington and McDonald 2001), others, especially male youth in the US, have been enticed into following their ‘hoop dreams’ (Brooks-Buck and Anderson 2001).

The mass media play a major role in the creation of such aspirations. According to Brookes (2002: 107ff.), the increasing commodification of sport has affected the way black people are represented in the sports media and targeted as consumers. These ideas relate to developments in the theoretical conception of personal and social identity which have emerged in the past 25 years, especially the idea that identity is an ongoing process. This last idea questions the value of the concept of stereotype and suggests instead that ‘racial identity is not stable, essential or consistent; it is dynamic, complex and contradictory’ (Brookes 2002).

Similarly, Carrington (2010) argues that it is useful to ‘read the politics of sport and race diasporically’. Cassius Clay’s performance in boxing at the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome placed the African-American at the centre of attention (Hylton 2009: 18–19). When in the 1960s the civil rights movement in the US was at its height, John Carlos and Tommie Smith promoted the Black Power movement to a global audience in Mexico City in 1968 (Hylton 2009: 11). In this way, ‘black’ national stars have acquired global significance through involvement in sports events that have been mass mediated. Several

other of the most ‘iconic moments in African-American sporting history occurred *outside* of the United States’ – Jesse Owens in Berlin in 1936 and Wilma Rudolph in Rome in 1960. Hence, Carrington argues, ‘African-American athletes are associated more with international geographical markers than with American ones’ (Carrington 2010: 58).

Yet these accomplishments also promote an expectation of performance by black athletes. Hylton (2009: 81–82) describes how he showed a photograph of Kostas Kenderis winning the 200-metre sprint final at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games to students. He asked them what was wrong with the photograph. The consensus of his students was that a white sprinter had actually finished ahead of black athletes. If black achievement in track and field has become the conventional wisdom, so too has under-performance in other Olympic events. Hence Eric Moussambani’s swim in Sydney made him a universal representative of black Africans in water in the British media (as ‘Eric the Eel’). By contrast, Eddie Edwards’ ski-jumping performance in Calgary in 1988 (nicknamed ‘Eddie the Eagle’) did not get reduced to deficiencies in his biology or make him a representative of an entire continent (Carrington 2004: 89).

Media coverage of the 2012 Olympics, and all Olympic Games subsequently, needs to be examined in terms of the racialized construction of potential and previous Olympic champions. As Carrington (2010: 137–140) notes, media discussion after both the decision to award London the hosting of the 2012 Olympics (on 6 July 2005) and the bombing of London Underground trains and a bus the following day (on 7 July 2005, often referred to as ‘7/7’) raised the issue of multiculturalism in Europe. If 6 July involved a positive and strong celebration of multiculturalism and the development of a tolerant, open, and diverse city, media reaction to the events of the following day suggested that multiculturalism had fanned the flames of intolerance, segregation, and ethnic tension. Both reactions also demonstrated the potential power of sport to influence, aid in, or even thwart the creation of ethnically diverse communities in the UK.

GENDER: OLYMPIC SPORT AS A VEHICLE FOR THE DEMONSTRATION OF GENDER DIFFERENCES³

‘The inclusion of women at the Olympic Games would be “impractical, uninteresting, unaesthetic, and incorrect”’ (Coubertin 1912 cited in Donnelly and Donnelly 2013a: 12). Coubertin’s views about the role and place of women in sport, and those of many of his fellow members of the IOC, have thrown a shadow over the Olympic movement since its inception. Struggles over women’s right to participate, equality in the number of events available to them and the organization of the Olympic movement more generally have taken place (Harvey *et al.* 2014: 42–66; Hargreaves 1984, 1994, 2000; Bandy 2010). Despite this, as Hargreaves (1994) also demonstrated, some men have supported the inclusion of women in sport and the Olympics in particular. Inclusion has involved debates about the number of female participants, the number of events, and the leadership opportunities open to women.

Schultz (2018) shows how the Olympics resisted including women in team sports, long-distance events, and disciplines associated with strength, and hence there are

considerable gaps between the dates when opportunities for women caught up with men in sports such as water polo (2000 v 1900), soccer (1996 v 1908), field hockey (1980 v 1908), ice hockey (1998 v 1920), handball (1976 v 1936), and basketball (1972 v 1936). The IOC had no women members until as recently as 1981, but has been attempting to catch up since. By 1995 still only seven out of 107 IOC members were women. It established a 20 per cent threshold goal for the inclusion of women in National Olympic Committees (NOCs), National Governing Bodies (NGBs), and International Federations (IFs). As noted in Chapter 9, overall today the IOC contains up to 115 members, comprising 70 individual members, 15 athlete members, 15 IF presidents, and 15 NOC presidents. It was 1981 before two women joined the IOC, 1990 when a woman joined the IOC executive board, and 1997 before a woman was elected IOC vice-president (Anita DeFrantz). In 2016 of the 92 members of the IOC, 23 were women (Schultz, 2018: 87–88). In 2016 there were 28 Summer Olympic IFs and seven Winter Olympic IFs and women held 13 per cent and 19 per cent respectively of all IF executive board positions. In 2016 athletes representing 206 NOCs competed in Rio, including the Refugee Olympic Team. Women made up just over 10 per cent of leadership positions in the NOCs, although 80 per cent (162) had no women in leadership positions.

Initiatives to increase women's involvement have included: since 1991 any sport seeking inclusion must include women's events; in 1995 the IOC established a Women and Sport Working Group, which in 2004 became a commission advising the president and IOC executive on policy; in 1996 the IOC established a Women and Sport conference, to be held every four years. The IOC Women in Sport and Athletes' Commissions launched a Gender Equality Review project report in February 2018 that contained 25 recommendations about how to achieve parity in five areas (WSF 2018).

Women's sporting participation at the Olympic Games has, as a result, recently shown greater improvement (Donnelly and Donnelly 2013a). At the opening ceremony of London 2012 President Rogge declared that the Games represented 'a major boost for gender equality' with three milestones reached: a higher percentage of women athletes than any previous Summer Olympics; women competitors in every sport; and no countries preventing women from participating. Only three NOCs did not send any female participants to London 2012 (Schultz 2018: 99). At London 2012 the 26 Olympic sports were organized into 36 different competitions (for example, cycling had four competitions or disciplines as they are described in the Olympic Charter – BMX, mountain bikes, road and track races). These 36 competitions were organized into 302 events for which medals were awarded (for example, there were ten boxing events for men and three boxing events for women). There were 136 women's events and 166 men's events (Donnelly and Donnelly 2013a: 16). Table 11.2 outlines the changes in women's participation at the Summer Olympics from 1900 to 2016.

Despite the fact that London 2012 was hailed as the 'Women's Games' – in so far as it featured female athletes in nearly every national team, women's competitions in every event, the introduction of women's boxing as an Olympic discipline, and the first-ever (knowingly) pregnant Olympic competitor (Harvey *et al.* 2014: 42) – as Donnelly and Donnelly (2013a: 5) suggest in a *gender equality audit* of London 2012, it would be incorrect to assume that gender inequality in participation at the Olympics is a thing

<i>Year</i>	<i>Host</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women's sports/events</i>
1900	Paris	22	975	4/2
1904	St Louis	6	645	1/1
1908	London	37	1,971	1/2
1912	Stockholm	48	2,359	3/6
1920	Antwerp	65	2,561	2/6
1924	Paris	135	2,954	5/11
1952	Helsinki	519	4,436	6/25
1960	Rome	610	4,736	6/29
1972	Munich	1,059	6,075	8/43
1980	Moscow	1,125	4,238	12/50
1988	Seoul	2,194	6,197	17/86
1996	Atlanta	3,512	6,806	21/108
2000	Sydney	4,069	6,582	25/132
2008	Beijing	4,637	6,305	26/137
2012	London	4,835	6,068	26/136
2016	Rio de Janeiro	5,059	6,179	28/145 (45%)

Table 11.2 Gender and participation at selected Summer Olympic Games: 1900–2016

Sources: Donnelly and Donnelly (2013a); IOC (2018); Toohey and Veal (2007: 199).

of the past. There remain at least four areas of inequality still evident between male and female athletes and teams: differences in funding and sponsorship; differences in publicity and media representation; the re-emergence of sex-testing for female athletes; and gender-based structural and rule differences that exist in sports and the Olympic programme. Additionally, since financial resources and population size play a big part in who participates in the Olympic Games ‘larger, wealthier nations have more resources to devote to athletic development, training, infrastructure and travel’ (Schultz 2018: 99). Hence some delegations are male only.

It is worth considering how we got to this point. Women were first included in the 1900 Olympic Games in Paris. According to the IOC, at those Games there were 22 female participants, or 2.3 per cent of the total number of competitors (IOC 2010a). In Beijing in 2008 the 42 per cent participation rate for women was a record, up from less than 12 per cent in 1960 (Rome), 22 per cent in 1980 (Moscow), and 38 per cent in 2000 (Sydney). In London in 2012 there were 140 women’s events and 166 men’s events. Of these, 48 events were gender exclusive, 39 events were open to men only (23.5 per cent of men’s events), and nine events were open to women only (6.6 per cent of women’s events). In total 1,233 more men than women competed in London (Donnelly and Donnelly 2013a: 6).

Despite Coubertin’s view that, ‘If some women want to play football or box, let them, provided the event takes place without spectators, because the spectators who flock to such competitions are not there to watch as sport’ (Coubertin 2000 [1928]: 189), in August 2009 the IOC agreed to the request from the International Amateur Boxing Association (IABA) to allow women to take part in boxing. Hence in London in 2012 women’s boxing took place for the first time at the Summer Olympics (Woodward 2014b). In April 2011, the IOC also announced that for the first time women’s ski

jumping would be permitted to take place at the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi (Russia) in 2014. The International Ski Federation, the world governing body, supported the inclusion of this event, while the IOC appeared to resist. What is also noteworthy about this attempt to gain approval for another (women's) event at the Olympics is that a Canadian judge ruled in 2009, ahead of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, that although the women were being discriminated against, the issue was an IOC responsibility and thus not governed by Canadian laws. The court further ruled that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms did not apply to VANOC, the Organizing Committee of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games.

Women's participation in sport in general still attracts debate in many countries (Lenskyj 2013; Kietlinski 2011). Some scholars suggest that over 100 years after its formation, modern sport is a 'rather less reliable ally of hegemonic masculinity' (Rowe 1995: 130). Others argue that sport, via its links with consumer culture, continues to play a part in the assertion and affirmation of specific hegemonic ideals of masculinity (Day 1990). Fischer and Gainer (1994), for example, analysed a range of research studies investigating the relationship between gender and sport and concluded that:

the consumption of sports is deeply associated with defining what is masculine and, concurrently, what is not feminine. It has been noted that participating in and watching sports lead to a range of masculinities, and each of them relies for its definition on being distinct from femininity.

(Fischer and Gainer 1994: 101)

Their conclusion is shared by historical studies that have emphasized how sport was a gender-distinguishing activity, related to a changing gender order – for example, in the US between the 1840s and 1890s, and in the UK between the 1820s and 1880s (Burstyn 1999; Whitson 1994). The 'gendering' of sport by men involved various techniques, including definition, direct control, and ignoring and/or trivializing women's sport or their involvement in sport. For men, sport was a primary socializing experience – into masculine identities, hierarchical social bonding, and various forms of masculinity. Hence women faced marginalization in their consumption of sport. The macho (or 'fratriarchal') culture of sport is repeatedly reinforced with every media report of the sexual misbehaviour of young male elite athletes or men associated with the administration of the sport. Only analysis of the social meanings and interactions of specific subcultural groups, the media portrayal of women as athletes and the gendered consumption of sport (for example, Wellard 2002; Fleming 1995) can reveal the nature of women's and men's practices and settle these kinds of questions with respect to the Olympic Games.

Vertinsky *et al.* (2009) use a framework developed by McDonagh and Pappano (2008) to examine the history of women's ski jumping, and document the modes of regulation which have developed around female participation in ski-jumping competitions and women's historical exclusion from the Olympic Games. Vertinsky *et al.* approach sport as a socially constructed space and system, which over 100 years since its establishment still privileges the male body as superior. Sport therefore is viewed as not simply

reflecting social and gender realities, but as playing a key role in constructing them. Hence in their view:

a central problem with organized sport has been the way that sport-related policies – especially those enforcing sex segregation – have codified historical myths about female physical inferiority, fostering a system which, while offering women more opportunities than ever before, has kept them from being perceived as equal athletes to men.

(Vertinsky *et al.* 2009: 44)

From this approach, sex segregation in sport does not reflect actual sex differences in athletic ability, but instead helps to construct and enforce the premise that males are inherently athletically superior to females. This premise has been built on three assumptions (which Vertinsky *et al.* call the ‘three Is’), which have their origins in nineteenth-century beliefs about the female sporting body and women’s proper role in society: female *inferiority* compared to males; the need to protect females from *injury* in competition; and the *immorality* of females who compete directly with males.

Challenging these assumptions, they suggest – following McDonagh and Pappano (2008) – requires moving through a four-stage process: (1) challenging the prohibition of women from participating in certain sports activities; (2) allowing women to participate in sports activities on a sex-segregated basis; (3) accommodating women in sports programmes on a sex-integrated basis; and (4) permitting women to choose whether they prefer a sex-integrated or sex-segregated context for their sports activities (i.e. on the basis of voluntary, rather than coercive, sex segregation). The problem is that it is not a straightforward process, but one based on struggles that can mean setbacks as well as forward momentum (Hofmann 2011; Hofmann and Preuss 2005).

A report for the Women’s Sports Foundation (WSF) in 2017, the fifth in a series on women in the Olympics sponsored by the WSF, concluded that while the situation has been improving there remains ‘much work to be done on the participation, leadership and media fronts’ (Houghton *et al.* 2017: 3). For example, analysis of international newspaper coverage before and during the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens demonstrated that the media still tend to focus on women’s appearance and bodies rather than their athletic performance (Markula 2009). Women competitors in more ‘feminine’ sports – such as archery, badminton, swimming, diving, gymnastics, and volleyball – tended to attract more attention than women in ‘masculine’ ones that exhibit size, power, strength, speed, and contact.

The report (Houghton *et al.* 2017: 2) added that while the IOC had recently ‘made noteworthy attempts to support the inclusion of greater numbers of women in leadership positions in the international sporting scene’, changes have been less far-reaching in the NOCs, the IFs, and the International Paralympic Committee. The WSF report considered that most of them still ‘struggle to meet the IOC’s request that women hold at least 20 per cent of leadership positions’ (Houghton *et al.* 2017: 2).

The need to encourage women to be involved in leadership positions and organizations – from the grassroots levels to the upper echelons of competitive Olympic and Paralympic

sport – remains ongoing. One of the barriers to this is that the marketing of exercise – evidenced in health and fitness magazines as well as mainstream women’s magazines – is often not for physiological fitness or psychological health, but in pursuit of physical perfection or sexual attractiveness. Women are more likely to engage in exercise – non-competitive physical activity – rather than sport. Image-making and commercialization of the sexual body in sport has developed for women athletes, but increasingly in the last two decades for men also (Whannel 2000). Is the impact on men and women the same?

Research by Sassatelli (1999) and Fishwick (2001) suggested that some women are able to find in exercise and health clubs an important space for self-development lacking in other parts of their lives. Yet considerably fewer opportunities exist for women to work in professional sport than men. Sport offers women new ways of spending leisure time and exercising economic power. But it arguably also helps to confirm and reinforce their role and position in society. It offers both liberation and constraint, challenging some social norms or conventions while incorporating some people into others. The recent attempt to encourage women as consumers of sportswear, as well as spectators at big events, may suggest a decline in the peripheral nature of sport to women compared with men. But there are many ways that women remain on the outside of sport – and Olympic sport especially. As Lenskyj (2013: 131ff.) notes, Olympic sport still ‘privileges certain gendered, classed, raced and sexualized sporting bodies’. Lenskyj (2013: 43–44) argues that the liberal approach of achieving gender parity leaves intact problematic aspects of the Olympic movement – including corruption, hyper commercialism, and athlete exploitation. More importantly it assumes the ‘universal woman’ – what is good for western women is good for all and thus perpetuates global systems of colonialism and oppression.

The most controversial issue concerning the intersections of sex, gender, and race at present involves the debate about the testing of sex type. Such testing remains one of the most significant markers of sport, and elite Olympic sport especially, as a gendered activity (Donnelly and Donnelly 2013a: 14–15; Horne *et al.* 2013: 114–119). When Mokgadi Caster Semenya, the South African middle-distance runner and world champion, won the gold medal in the women’s 800m at the 2009 World Championships, questions were raised about whether Semenya had an intersex condition that might give her an unfair advantage over the other racers. She was withdrawn from international competition until 6 July 2010, when the IAAF cleared her to return to competition. Semenya has been at the centre of the controversy over the eligibility of women with differences of sex development (intersex) ever since (Adjepong 2019).

In April 2018, the IAAF announced new ‘differences of sex development’ rules that would require athletes with specific disorders of sex development, including testosterone levels of five nmol/L and above, to take medication to lower their testosterone, from May 2019. Due to the narrow scope of the changes, which applied to only those athletes competing in the 400m, 800m, and 1500m, many people thought the rule change was designed specifically to target Semenya. Semenya challenged the IAAF rules but on 1 May 2019, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) rejected her challenge, paving the way for the new rules to come into effect on 8 May 2019. Semenya then appealed the decision to the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland but after some delay and suspension of the CAS ruling about the IAAF rules they were approved in July 2019. For that reason, Semenya

could not compete at the World Athletics Championships in Doha in October 2019 while continuing her appeal and in September 2019, it was announced that Semenya had joined the South African SAFA Sasol Women's League association football club JvW FC.

Plans by the International Olympic Committee to introduce stricter guidelines for transgender athletes before the Tokyo 2020 Games have stalled because its panel of scientists is struggling to reach agreement about the issue. The scientists had been expected to recommend halving the permitted testosterone levels for trans women competing in elite sport. However, it was reported in *The Guardian* in September 2019 (Ingle 2019) that the IOC's draft guidelines have been parked, for now, because the whole subject is so politically charged and sensitive. Under the current IOC guidelines, issued in November 2015, athletes who transition from male to female can compete in the women's category without requiring surgery to remove their testes provided their total testosterone level in serum is kept below 10 nanomoles per litre for at least 12 months. Those guidelines, used by most sports federations to draw up their transgender policies, have proved controversial, given that women's testosterone levels tend to range between 0.12 and 1.79 nmol/l, while men's are typically between 7.7 to 29.4 nmol/l. As Ingle (2019) notes, 'just about the only thing all sides agree on is the need for more scientific research'.

DISABILITY SPORT: PARALYMPISM AS A VEHICLE FOR BLURRING DIFFERENCES

The London 2012 Games (thankfully for some people) only had two official mascots: Wenlock and Mandeville. Readers of earlier chapters will recognize where the first name comes from – Much Wenlock in Shropshire, which hosted games in the nineteenth century, and was visited by Coubertin as he was searching for models for his modern Olympics (see Chapter 6). Mandeville, on the other hand, derived from the name of the hospital that hosted the first-ever 'Paralympic' Games – Stoke Mandeville Hospital in Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, a few miles to the north of London.

Aside from Team GB athletes, such as Tanni Grey-Thompson, the undeniable poster boy of the Paralympic Games in 2012 was South African double-amputee Oscar Pistorius (Horne 2013: 119–120). His trial and subsequent conviction for killing his girlfriend, Reeva Steenkamp, in 2013 should have nothing to do with the Paralympic Games. However, such is the nature of his celebrity through association with the Games that his trial became global news. Pistorius was acquitted of murder but found guilty of 'culpable homicide' (the South African equivalent of manslaughter). In December 2015, however, South Africa's Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) overturned that conviction and replaced it with one of murder and Pistorius was sentenced to a long prison term.

It is now a requirement of potential Olympic hosts that the Paralympics and 'regular' Olympic events must be included in any candidacy file. In the past decade the IOC has embraced the International Paralympic Committee (Cashman and Darcy 2008). Do these developments mark a significant move from the two events existing in separate spheres to consecutive staging of the Games? In the future will we see a genuinely combined Games? This section marks a note of caution about these developments and suggests that

struggles over the meaning and place of para- or disability sport will continue (Brittain 2015; Smith and Thomas 2012).

Sainsbury's, the large British supermarket chain, acted as sponsor of the 2012 Paralympics, and Channel 4 (C4) covered the Paralympics exclusively and extensively on television. C4 ran a series of advertisements featuring the strap line 'Thanks for the warm up' towards the end of the Summer Olympics. Using the song 'Harder than you think' by American rap group Public Enemy as the theme tune, C4 produced almost an equal



Figure 11.1 Pearly Mandeville in the East End of London.

amount of saturation coverage of the Paralympics as the BBC had of the Olympic Games in 2012. But did this award-winning coverage on TV and in the press signal a major step forward for disabled people and athletes?

According to Colin Barnes (1992), disabled people have identified ten commonly recurring disabling stereotypes in the mass media. These are the disabled person as:

- 1 pitiable and pathetic;
- 2 an object of curiosity or violence;
- 3 sinister or evil;
- 4 super cripple;
- 5 adding atmosphere;
- 6 laughable;
- 7 his/her own worst enemy;
- 8 a burden;
- 9 non-sexual;
- 10 unable to participate in daily life.

Studies of impairment and disability representation took off in the 1980s. Disabled people were found, to a large extent, to be absent from much of the mainstream media. There were few, if any, disabled characters in soap operas or other long-running TV dramas. When they did appear, little attention was paid to the ordinary features of their lives – love, romance, or sex – and the focus was primarily on the interaction of disabled people with health and social care professionals. Drama was focused on how they managed their impairment. Television portrayals seemed to be underpinned by themes such as pity, fear, menace, loathing, innocence, and courage (Cumberbatch and Negrine 1992). They dealt with personal tragedies and special achievements.

Similar critiques have been made of newspaper coverage of disability. The press tended to focus on health, fundraising, and charity, as well as on the personal tragedy dimensions of stories about people with disabilities. Researchers identified a fairly consistent negative cultural stereotyping of people with impairments. Media representations have tended to be underpinned by cultural rules about ‘able-bodied-ness’ (Barnes 1992). Attempts to offer alternative counter-representations could run the risk of alienating the audience and producing fear. Historical research into media representations of people with disabilities reveals a fascination with what have been described as ‘spectacles of difference’. These serve to reinforce the image of a disabled person either as a tragic but brave victim of a crippling condition, or as a pitiable and pathetic individual. Reviewing research into media representations of disabled people, Barnes and Mercer (2003) identified the issue of *cultural domination* – ‘in which groups experience symbolic devaluation’ (Barnes and Mercer 2003: 88) – as a central concern. But they also suggested that there has been a change in the way disabled people are represented, with more disabled people appearing in soap operas and drama series as ‘ordinary’ (Barnes and Mercer 2003). The coverage of disabled sport may be another area where changes are under way.

Despite the acknowledgement that the mass media and other cultural representations play a constitutive role in the social definition and reproduction of meanings of disability, compared to research into the representation of women and BME people in sport, there

has been very little that focuses on the media representation of disabled athletes or people with disabilities participating in sport (Goggin and Newell 2000). As Anderson (2000: 107) notes: 'Throughout history, disabled sport has been somewhat marginalised by the media. Although as exciting and emotive as any sport, disabled sport has not received much media coverage.' In fact, film archives do demonstrate that disabled sports people were often represented as examples of 'the super cripple' (Howe 2011, 2013).

Systematic analysis of the media coverage of the Paralympic Games and disability sport in general has only recently begun to develop (see, for example, Schantz and Gilbert 2001; Schell and Duncan 1999). Thomas and Smith (2003) published an analysis of the British media coverage of the 2000 Paralympic Games held in Sydney. Their study focused on the print media and examined the language and images used to portray athletes' performances. They reached four main conclusions:

- 1 There was a tendency for the print media to provide medicalized descriptions of disability (with an emphasis placed on the athletes overcoming their medical problems).
- 2 The photographic images often hid the athletes' impairments.
- 3 Female Paralympic Games athletes were less likely to be portrayed in active poses than male athletes.
- 4 The images tended to reinforce stereotypical perceptions of disability and reaffirm notions of able-bodied-ness (through an emphasis, for example, on how Paralympic Games athletes sought to emulate able-bodied athletes).

Hence the eight British newspapers that Thomas and Smith gathered data from produced a view of disability as individualized rather than socially constructed. This, they argued, tended to trivialize disabled people's athletic performances. The portrayal of disabled people often produces an individualized account of disability. Disabled people are often viewed as dependent, reported in a way which is patronizing and objectifying, and with images that tend to direct attention away from the social factors that create disability. These tendencies are a feature of much news and documentary reporting, of which sports reporting can be considered a part. It also may be because disabled people are rarely involved in the decision-making processes in the media about what should and should not be shown or reported. When asked how she felt her sport was covered in the media, Tanni Grey-Thompson, the winner of nine Paralympic gold medals for Britain, said:

We do pretty well, for a minority sport. The coverage is still probably a bit too nice. The print media are getting bolder but there is a feeling that broadcasters don't want the criticism to seem too harsh.

(Daily Telegraph 16 September 2003)

Yet, as research has revealed, disabled female athletes have less coverage (Schantz and Gilbert 2001; Schell and Duncan 1999) than disabled male athletes, those with cerebral palsy and learning difficulties have less coverage than other disabled athletes and wheelchair athletes receive greater media attention than others – possibly because they are perceived to deviate less from cultural notions of able-bodiedness than the others.

While Thomas and Smith (2003) offer a welcome contribution to the literature, there are a number of omissions. As noted above, they focused on representations of the 2000

Paralympic Games from a selection of only eight national English newspapers (and adopted an unusual classification system that linked the *Guardian* and the *Sun/News of the World* together as ‘liberal’, and the *Daily Mail* and *The Times* together as ‘conservative’). Because of this, they ignored regional daily newspapers, the local press, and magazines (including niche sports magazines). In addition, they did not consider reporting of the 2000 Paralympic Games by television, radio, or the internet (Goggin and Newell 2000). The focus on representations, while consistent with much of the international research previously cited, ignores the production of sport as news as well as entertainment (Whannel 1992; Horne *et al.* 2013: 87–104) in the broadcast media. In addition, by failing to take into account audience reception and readings of the media messages, they ignored important developments in media analysis that have occurred in the past decade.

In a discussion of sports journalism, difference, and identity, Tudor (1998) noted that there have been three typical defences against the suggestion that sports reporting sustains patterns of inferential racism: ‘lazy journalism’; ‘reflecting society’; and ‘things are improving’. We would suggest that the twin of ‘inferential racism’ might be called ‘inferential handicapism’ and that these three defences have been deployed when accusations have been made about the marginalization of disabled people in the mainstream media and the coverage, or lack of it, of disabled sport. Yet as Tudor showed, each of these responses can be shown to be deficient. The first tends to individualize the issue when it is a more collective phenomenon. The second ignores the selecting, amplifying, and spreading role of the media – the tabloid press, for example, often tends to assume a homogeneous public in appealing to crude populist assumptions. The third, while acknowledging problems in the past, fails to consider the extent to which the media have failed to challenge racism (or handicapism) in the present. There are some examples of media coverage of people with disabilities being discriminated against in sport or in sport situations – for example, Casey Martin, the American golf player who sued the Professional Golf Association for the right to use a golf cart in tournaments, and Shelley Anne Emery, the woman in a wheelchair whose image was digitally removed from a photograph of the England cricket team celebrating a Test Match win over South Africa, published in the *Sun*. There are also examples of disabled people being praised for their accomplishments in sport. Some might argue that this is merely perpetuating a culture of pity towards the disabled. An understanding of the history of the representations of disabled athletes in the media in all its forms is an essential prerequisite for assessing the impact of these changes. Yet to date there has been very little research undertaken into the history of the mass media involvement in disability sport in Britain, or, despite its prominence in the disability sports calendar, the social significance of the Paralympic Games (on this see Brittain 2009, 2012).

With the growth of the Paralympic Games, and in the US programmes such as ‘Sporting Chance’, which provide disabled people with opportunities to participate in sport, ‘marketers are now addressing this market’, according to Shank (2002: 412). In the US, Nixon (2000: 425) notes that, ‘We have even seen athletes with disabilities on “Wheaties” cereal boxes, a site where some of the most prominent American sports heroes have been displayed.’ It can be argued that the development of the Paralympic Games has involved a transformation of their purpose from making disabled people into good worker-citizens, via participation in wholesome sport, into making them good consumer-citizens through

their consumption of the expanded sports spectacle. Sport may become a major conduit for the production of what can be termed ‘commodity disability’ or the treatment of disability as a commodity. This will be accompanied by changes in the representation of disabled athletes in the media in all its forms. Some researchers have identified how this is already under way (Duncan and Aycock 2005).

Braye *et al.* (2013) argue that while the vision of the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) to use the Paralympic Games as a vehicle to achieve a more equitable society is a laudable one, the 2012 Paralympic Games, and Paralympic sport generally, has had very little positive impact on the everyday lives of disabled people in the UK. A survey of the opinions of disability activists in the UK before 2012 found that negative views towards the Paralympics existed prior to the media coverage on C4 (Braye *et al.* 2012). Braye *et al.* (2013) argue that the more positive ‘legacy of change’ rhetoric, widely portrayed by the media after the 2012 Paralympics, did not address the sort of concerns that research discussed earlier in this section revealed, illustrating the ways in which the media itself can also contribute to undermining such positive messages. Nor, Braye *et al.* (2013) argue, did it adequately cover the barriers and inequalities disabled people face on a daily basis.

More recent research into the coverage of the 2016 Paralympics in the UK (McGillivray *et al.* 2019) suggests that, while continuities remain, there has been an increase in politicized narratives addressing government policy failings affecting the everyday lives of people with disabilities: ‘(Para) sport, facilitated a conversation about non-sporting matters’ (McGillivray *et al.* 2019: 26). This is consistent with the critical responses to ‘austerity’ policies in the UK since 2010 that have been voiced by disability activists and journalists (Ryan 2019). In the USA while there has been an increased coverage on NBC of the 2016 Paralympic Games, there was limited online coverage and, as Houghton *et al.* (2017: 8) state, the ‘overall lack of media coverage marginalized the accomplishments of both female and male Paralympians’. The Paralympics and disability sport in general remains at the centre of contradictory forces. Despite greater media coverage of the Paralympics and praise for the achievements of the Paralympians, opportunities for disabled people in Britain and elsewhere have largely been restricted, rather than enhanced by welfare and broader economic policies.

CONCLUSION

We began this chapter by referring to the mixed messages that come out of any assessment of the Olympics after London 2012. We also referred to Maurice Roche, who argued that, in addition to being a movement, the Olympics offered several other forms of global citizenship. With regard to universal citizenship, he suggested, ‘arguably the negatives outweigh the positives in the Olympic record’ (Roche 2000: 203). That within 27 years of the cessation of hostilities in 1945 all three Axis powers (Italy, Japan, and (West) Germany) had hosted at least one Olympic Games might suggest otherwise, but Roche argues that the IOC has not tended to take ‘a consistent and strong line on the human rights record’ of the host nations. Equally, the likelihood that the Olympics as a media event will become fully available to all people in the world, via the internet, is another of those arguments about new media technologies that is based as much on hope as on experience. It is difficult to imagine that the IOC will allow internet coverage of the

Games to compromise the major element in its funding – exclusive broadcasting rights revenue. Hence the media coverage of the mega-event has tended to be both commercialized and nationalized – in so far as the sports covered (the ‘feed’) tend to be determined by national TV companies’ choices in line with the involvement of its athletes and the anticipated tastes of its viewers. It is in this way that international mega-events can be transformed into forums for national(ist) introspection.

As a collective actor in global civil society, the IOC has had to deal with another two issues concerning its integrity: the process of bidding to act as host and the development of the idea of an ‘Olympic truce’. Regarding the first, as we have seen, Olympic city bidding corruption and the role of agents in helping to win bids was a focus of investigative journalism for much of the 1990s, and especially after 1998 and the revelations surrounding the bribes that enabled the success of Salt Lake City in obtaining the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. At the IOC Session in June 2019, faced with a growing global ‘Anti Games’ movement fuelling opposition to hosting, the IOC initiated several changes to the bidding process, as we discussed in Chapter 9.

The Olympic truce idea, in conjunction with the UN, is a contribution to international civil society in so far as it seeks the preservation of human life and peaceful coexistence. Yet through this the UN risks ‘being associated with an association which is committed to commercialism, global capitalism and consumer culture’ (Roche 2000: 214–215). There is certainly a long standing argument that the Olympics are primarily a vehicle for the advanced nations and even a form of neo-colonialism (Eichberg 1998). However as Roche also suggests, one of the impacts of sports mega-events is in providing time-structuring resources – both interpersonal and public. He suggests that the ‘once in a lifetime’ opportunity discourse so often associated with them is one of the main reasons for their popularity, at least among many of those who live in the cities and locations that host them. Roche (2003) argues that mega-events are socially memorable and culturally popular precisely because they mark time between generations and thus provide a link between what he calls the everyday life-world (micro social sphere) and the meso and macro social spheres. They are ‘a special kind of time-structuring institution in modernity’ (Roche 2003: 102). Sport, culture, and music events enable flows and mobilities of people and non-human entities. In the midst of these, new social identities and understandings – interlinked through social class, gender, ethnic, bodily, and national differences – may be produced, resisted, or sustained.

NOTES

- 1 The IOC Annual Report for 2014 was subtitled ‘Credibility, Sustainability and Youth’.
- 2 www.olympic.org/news/ioc-president-calls-sport-a-natural-partner-for-realisation-of-sustainable-development-goals-during-speech-to-the-united-nations/247232 (last accessed 30 September 2015).
- 3 This section, as with much of the rest of the book, focuses on the *Summer* Olympic Games. For discussion of the gendered nature of the Winter Olympics see WSF (2018) <https://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/research/article-and-report/recent-research/women-2018-olympic-paralympic-winter-games/> (last accessed 25 September 2019), Lenskyj (2013: 99–104), and Donnelly and Donnelly (2015).

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CHAPTER 12

THE 'DARK SIDE' OF THE OLYMPICS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter considers recent developments affecting the organization of the Olympics and other mega-events. The Olympic movement can be distinguished from other international sporting bodies by the manner in which, from the start, it has proclaimed its moral mission. From the time of Coubertin's concern over the fitness of youth and the need for an internationalist perspective, the discourse of Olympism began to develop. The latest version of the Olympic Charter issued in June 2019 once again announced that the Olympic movement, following the principles of Olympism, seeks to:

...create a way of life based on effort, the educational value of good example, social responsibility and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles... (and promote) a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.

(<https://library.olympic.org/Default/doc/SYRACUSE/208117/olympic-charter-in-force-as-from-26-june-2019-international-olympic-committee> [accessed 30 September 2019]).

Additionally the Olympic Charter states that 'the practice of sport is a human right. Every individual must have the possibility of practising sport, without discrimination of any kind'. As contributors to two recently published volumes have suggested whilst this ethical stance creates a powerful rhetoric it may be difficult to realize in reality (Keys 2019; Krieger and Wassong 2019).

The Olympic movement is hugely successful in that it has evolved a global mega-event that grips the imagination and signifies human aspirations – faster, higher, stronger. It also faces a series of challenges, associated with commercialism, corruption, drug-use, gambling, the environment, and security, to name only a few. Since the processes of commercialization in the Olympics began to grow more rapidly, from the start of the 1980s, the contradictions have sharpened, and the tensions heightened. Institutions taking decisions involving millions of dollars are always likely to involve a certain amount of corruption. In the case of the Olympics, even with the new host venue processes announced in June 2019, the final choice of sites, with a great deal at stake, will be taken in a secret ballot by an electorate of around 100 members, who are not answerable to anyone for how

they vote. Whole teams of people within bidding committees will still devote much of their time and money considering how best to persuade the Future Host Commissions to select them as preferred hosting locations. The Olympic ‘product’ remains, judging by the large sums paid by television corporations and sponsoring corporations to obtain the rights, a highly valuable one. Yet this brand is dependent on its image and is hence vulnerable and can be tarnished – by corruption, but also by potential scandals involving performance-enhancing drugs, gambling and the fixing of results, and over-zealous security measures that conflict with the potential festival of sport.

The Olympics maintains its environmental credentials are good, yet every Games is also accompanied by stories of displaced people, demolished housing, and environmental damage. Significant air miles are clocked up by the 30,000 or more people that, as competitors, officials, administrators, consultants, researchers, and journalists, are part of the Olympic travelling circus. And that is just before and during ‘Games Time’. In the build up to an Olympic Games, and over its entire life cycle, thousands of athletes, officials, and administrators will travel to host locations for ‘trial events’, acclimatization, and other purposes. The carbon footprint of the Olympics is often massively underestimated when its ‘green’ credentials are being claimed (Karamichas 2013).

The very success of this high-profile global mega-event has required ever-greater investment in security, to the extent that the Games have become, for the security industry, an invaluable exercise in research and development paid for by the public purse. Other technologies and businesses also seek to use the Games as an opportunity to showcase their innovations; hence Tokyo 2020 is being heralded as an opportunity to demonstrate technological solutions to future demographic trends, city living, and environmental change.

In this final chapter, therefore, we review some of the main challenges that the Olympic movement faces in the present. We offer focused consideration of three of the main concerns noted above – corruption, doping, and security at the Games – to indicate just some of the ways that the contemporary scale of mega-events can create temptations for organizers, athletes, and governments to go way beyond the Olympic ideals and enter what we call the ‘dark side’ of the Olympics, and arguably sports mega-events generally.

CORRUPTION RISKS IN THE IOC AND OTHER MEGA-EVENT ORGANIZATIONS

The hidden world of corruption in world sport, which the indefatigable investigative journalist Andrew Jennings has been unmasking for 30 years, began to unravel in 2015, as a result of an FBI investigation into FIFA. Much of this story commences with Horst Dassler, who drove the sports business through Adidas and then in the 1980s also through ISL (see Chapter 10). As a young man in the 1950s, Dassler was a pioneer in ensuring that as many sports teams and individuals as possible wore Adidas, achieved originally by giving items as gifts, and subsequently by what he used to refer to, with a wry smile, as ‘insoles’, which he made clear were payments for wearing his brand of shoes and clothing. Despite the concerns of the then IOC president, Avery Brundage, these payments became routine. In a highly competitive business, Dassler sought an edge by nurturing links

with up-and-coming officials in sport governing bodies around the world, including, for example, former FIFA president Sepp Blatter and current IOC president Thomas Bach, who was a member of his ‘international relations’ team (Jennings 2014).

Dassler was instrumental in ensuring that Havelange became FIFA president, and Samaranch became IOC president. He boosted the careers of many other sports officials including Primo Nebiolo and Sepp Blatter. A wide network of favours, inducements, corrupt practices, kickbacks, and bribes spread throughout the world of sport governing bodies. The payment of bribes to influence the vote on venues for mega-events became routine. Only recently, and partly after many years of investigative journalism by Andrew Jennings, have many of the suspicions and allegations begun to harden into proof. Although investigations into the FIFA scandal that broke in 2015 are still ongoing, several top former FIFA executives were indicted for wire fraud, racketeering, and money laundering by US federal prosecutors (for some of the details see for example <https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/world-cup> [accessed 30 September 2019]). It also brought an end to the presidency of Sepp Blatter, who at the time was also an IOC member.

The time when international sport governing bodies could turn a blind eye, drag their feet, make light of accusations, and impose minimal reprimands may be coming to an end. For the IOC, an organization with a self-proclaimed moral mission, and many members of high integrity, the record of corrupt or questionable behaviour among some of its members is not impressive. The current president, Thomas Bach, was a protégé of both Dassler and Samaranch. He was an Adidas executive and part of Dassler’s inner circle. According to *The Guardian*, a German television documentary alleged that Dassler’s circle helped place favoured candidates in influential positions in sporting federations and paid inducements to sport stars (Gibson 2013).

One of the widely covered stories about corruption involving an IOC member relates to Lamine Diack, former president of the IAAF from 1990–2015 and mayor of Dakar, capital of Senegal. In 2016 the IAAF ethics commission imposed a life ban on Papa Diack, a former IAAF marketing executive, and Valentin Balakhnichev, former IAAF treasurer. Gabriel Dollé, the most senior anti-doping official in track and field until 2014, was given a five-year ban (Ingle 2016). In June 2019, after a four-year investigation in France into doping cover-ups, extortion, and bribe-taking in world athletics, Lamine Diack was ordered to stand trial on charges of corruption and money laundering, accused of being part of a conspiracy to hide positive drug tests by Russian athletes. Diack’s son, Papa Massata Diack, a former marketing executive for the IAAF, also faces trial for complicity in corruption and money laundering, and is reported to be a fugitive in Senegal. Both will face trial in 2020 (for details see <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2019/jun/24/lamine-diack-trial-money-laundering-corruption-iaaf> [accessed 30 September 2019]).

Readers might like to investigate the alleged involvement in corruption of other people such as Guy Drut (former minister of youth affairs and sport in France), Bob Hasan (former IOC member), João Havelange (former president of FIFA), Patrick Hickey (former president of the Olympic Council of Ireland), Primo Nebiolo (another former president of the IAAF), Lee Kun-Hee (former chairman of the Samsung corporation), and Kim Un-yong (former vice-president of the IOC), who have all been IOC members (Jennings 2014).

Of course, whilst difficult, individuals are easier to identify than complex systems. This can leave the structure or system enabling corruption intact. The structure of the system is the elephant in the room; just as the ‘criminogenic environment of the financial system’ (Sayer 2015: 273) was responsible for the economic crash of 2007–2008, it is necessary to consider the problems of international sport as part of a systemic crisis. The IOC, for example, still allows members to ‘self-suspend’, rather than be automatically removed from the membership when they are the subject of criminal investigations. This section sketches some of the ways in which corruption risks entering into the planning and hosting of sports mega-events. We argue that it is important to understand that the sources, forms, and consequences of corruption vary: ‘Corruption is not an external or superficial feature but rather is embedded within political and economic systems. Its precise role and effects will depend on the configurations and dynamics of such systems’ (Williams 1999: 488).

Corruption remains a slippery concept to define precisely and discussion of it tends to create binaries: the Western and Eastern blocs of nations, developed and developing societies, democratic and authoritarian regimes, regulated and self-regulated organizations and associations (but see Transparency International 2016). The power to define corruption may be said to lie with the dominant party and usually that means that Africa, South America, and Asia are often considered to be the continents and subcontinents particularly affected by corruption. This is not of course true as consideration of the individuals listed above demonstrates.

This creates the potential for accusations of overstepping territorial jurisdiction, as has happened with respect to the role of the FBI and the US Attorney General in the crisis at FIFA (Sopel 2015) and the basis for concerns that the action taken was politically motivated against Russia (host of the 2018 World Cup) and Qatar (host of the 2022 World Cup). But this also raises the question of how BINGOs (business-oriented international non-government organizations) like FIFA or the IOC are to be regulated (Gauthier 2017).

Why should corruption matter in sport? Because sport matters: as we have argued in this book, sport in its mega-event form is used to political effect by hosts; elite sport has become a transnational multi-billion dollar industry; and it engages with the everyday lives of billions of people across the globe. However as Maennig (2005) indicates, it is useful to distinguish between two types of corruption in sport: *competition corruption* and *management corruption*. Whereas competition corruption relates to doping and match fixing, which we discuss next, this section focuses on the latter, management corruption. In sports mega-events this relates to activities such as vote rigging and the use of undue influence in elections or the selection of hosts, and embezzlement, fraud, and bribery. That is, it involves non-competition decisions made by sports officials, associations, and governing bodies.

According to Maennig (2005), corruption in sport is as old as the ancient Olympic Games. Offenders had to erect columns of shame (*zane*) at their own expense, or that of their city, at the entrance to the Olympic stadium to atone for their actions. In contemporary sport he suggests that it is no greater ‘nor more widespread than in other areas of social life’ (Maennig 2005: 215). Whether we accept this view or not, there have been two tendencies in contemporary sport that stand out: competition judges and officials have

become involved more frequently in corruption; and the number of cases of management corruption in sport has been increasing (Maennig 2005: 201). To examine this, we need to consider the context, types, and circumstances when corruption can occur in sports mega-events.

Since the 1980s, and the growth of neo-liberalism as the new economic orthodoxy and the rolling back of the social democratic consensus, rent-seeking behaviour – ‘seeking control of assets and resources that can be used to extract rent from users’ (Sayer 2015: 53) – has become the economic imperative. This has had implications for elite sport and especially its flagship mega-events, the Olympic Games, and the men’s Football World Cup. At the same time as there has been a massive growth in commercial interest involvement in sport – creating a ‘global media sports cultural complex’ (Rowe 2011: 34) in which the role of corporate media and sponsors especially has become bigger and bigger – regulatory systems and demands for greater transparency and accountability in governance have also emerged. In these circumstances, suspicions about the practices of self-regulating bodies claiming relative autonomy from local jurisdictions, such as international sports associations like the IOC and FIFA, have grown.

As the IOC and FIFA, among other sports organizing bodies, have become BINGOs, journalists and sociologists and other social scientists have sought to investigate shortcomings in their operations (Simson and Jennings 1992; Jennings 2006; Sugden and Tomlinson 1998, 2003; Tomlinson 2014). At the same time, as we have seen in this book, several features of the sports mega-events that these bodies oversee have become attractive and have been used by states for different non-sporting ends – economic, urban, and social development, nation building and signaling (by branding the nation), and to assist in economic and political liberalization. As Houlihan (2002: 194) noted, the ‘willingness of governments to humble themselves before the IOC and FIFA through lavish hospitality and the strategic deployment of presidents, prime ministers, royalty and supermodels, is a reflection of the value that governments place on international sport’.

In a relatively simplistic formula, Klitgaard (1988: 75) suggested that ‘corruption = monopoly + discretion – accountability’. Where and when can corruption in sports mega-events occur? Maennig (2005: 208) suggests that in circumstances where a sport (or sports event) enjoys high levels of popularity and attractiveness which make it capable of generating large cash flows, economic rents ‘result from the fact that...the relevant international sports bodies have a unilateral monopoly over the awarding of sporting title honours’. Hence management corruption in relation to sports mega-events can take a number of forms: for example, acquiring certain positions in sports associations, influencing the allocation of broadcasting or other media rights or fixing the allocation of construction contracts for stadium or facilities building.

As transient, ambulatory events, sports mega-events also enjoy a number of broad, if overlapping, phases in their life cycle when corruption can occur – the bid phase, the preparatory phase, the Games time phase, and the post-Games phase:

- 1 The awarding of host city/nation status – although this assumes that benefits do flow from hosting, the negative impact would stem from the loss of potential image, income, and employment ‘gains’ in those locations, mostly cities, not selected.

- 2 The production of the bid documents – the potential host can inflate expectations in order to impress the Future Host Commissions and through them the IOC membership.
- 3 The negotiation and allocation of rights (for example for broadcasting, sponsorship, and merchandise).
- 4 The awarding of contracts for the construction of sports venues and facilities by the host organizing committee and/or ‘delivery authority’.
- 5 The ‘delivery authority’ in subcontracting to, for example, small to medium enterprises to undertake work in preparation for the event.

One constant potential source of corruption is, of course, the governance (internal procedures) of international sports associations and related sports bodies involved in sports mega-events, as the crises at FIFA in 2015 and that in the IOC in the 1990s demonstrate.¹ Expanding good governance in sport requires greater transparency, accountability, integrity, and democracy. It may be possible to identify ways in which the risk of corruption could be better managed in sports mega-events (see Table 12.1). However, putting new rules into practice is difficult since changing the culture of an organization – tacit, unwritten, unofficial ways of doing things – requires changing the rituals, routines, and daily practices of the organization. Where corruption is proven, there is a need to focus on anti-corruption and cronyism in the re-engineering of an organization (Spicer 2015).

It is possible that Michael Garcia, the former US prosecutor who investigated allegations of wrongdoing with regard to the 2018 and 2022 World Cup hosting decisions, was correct when he said as he resigned from FIFA that ‘No independent governance committee, investigator, or arbitration panel can change the culture of an organization’ (cited in Affleck 2015). This may be especially the case for organizations with the distinctive characteristics of international sports associations that create the potential for corruption (Pielke Jr 2015) mixed with an enduring belief in the ‘Great Sport Myth’ – an almost unshakeable belief about the inherent purity and goodness of sport (Coakley 2015). One way forward may be to demand that sports governing bodies have to start operating as big businesses, ‘using best business practices’ (TI 2012, cited in Pielke Jr 2015), possibly using Play the Game sports governance indicators and other means of managing corruption risks. But it needs to be remembered that operating in an organizational ‘culture

1. Provide and publicize clear codes of conduct to measure behaviour and misbehaviour.
2. Reduce the surpluses potentially accrued by host cities and governing organizations to provide the wider global sports ‘family’ with a greater share.
3. Have a high degree of transparency – including detailed documentation of decision-making processes, monitoring of executive and administrative bodies by an internal auditing department to monitor staff, reducing degrees of discretion, and freedom of information legislation applicable to sport.
4. Create financial incentives to offset temptations for corruption by insiders.
5. Install systematic internal auditing and control measures in sports bodies – which should bear direct responsibility for any crimes committed by subordinates.

Table 12.1 Five means of managing corruption risks in sports mega-events

Source: Adapted from Maennig (2005) and Tanzi (1998).

of ethical failure' (Klein 2014: 334) is a systemic problem, not one of individual agents alone. If FIFA members take bribes over choice of hosts, why should it be assumed that IOC members do not?

In July 2019 an international non-governmental organization (INGO) committed to investigating corruption globally, published a list of 25 of the top cases of corruption since TI was founded (Transparency International 2019). Surprisingly the IOC did not merit a mention, although the FIFA scandal of 2015 did. Yet, the Olympics, with their strong ethos of fair play and amateurism, are not immune to corruption; in the 1990s the IOC was rife with corrupt practices (Simson and Jennings 1992; Jennings 1996; Lenskyj 2002), and this came to a head before the 2002 Games at Salt Lake City in Utah, when Marc Hodler, an IOC member, broke ranks and revealed that people had been bribed to vote for cities bidding for the right to host the Games. Salt Lake City, having failed to win their earlier bid to host the Games, realized that they would have to change tactics and offer bribes. IOC members and their relatives received benefits from city officials. The latest allegations about bribery involving the decision to award Rio de Janeiro the 2016 Olympics surfaced in July 2019 (see <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2019/jul/05/ioc-investigates-allegations-of-bribery-over-rios-2016-olympic-bid> [accessed 30 September 2019]).

The Olympics have been tarnished by these revelations of corruption, which most importantly highlights the need for reform of the governance of sport. Corruption is clearly closely linked to economic factors, given the enormous financial benefits that can accrue from sporting success or, in the case of the Olympics, from hosting such an enormous event, but the desire for economic gain is not the only factor to be addressed. There are cultural and social factors in play too. Corruption takes a variety of forms, including what Maenigg refers to as *competition corruption*.

DOPING, TESTING AND SECRECY

Doping is currently seen as a form of *competition corruption* in sport. It has not always been seen in this way, however (Dimeo and Møller 2018). Whilst drug use in sport existed prior to the post-Second World War/Cold War period, it was in the 1950s and 1960s that individuals began to pursue the use of pharmaceuticals to significantly enhance athletic performance. To understand the differing reactions to it, we have to consider the changing meaning of sport and of the Olympic Games. Three interrelated developments from the 1950s onward have shaped Olympic sport, and therefore the response to doping, according to Beamish (2010: 64–65).

First, there has been the increased professionalization of the Games' athletes – the IOC started to loosen the exclusion of professionals in 1974. Beamish (2010: 65) argues that the change of the 'eligibility code' in 1974 to allow professional athletes to compete at the Olympics, if the IFs agreed, did 'more than fundamentally change the type of athletes participating in the Games; it opened the way to athletes whose motivation, commitment and actions were directly antithetical to Coubertin's "spirit" of sport', the bedrock of Olympism. Second was the Cold War, which led to the development of heavily resourced, national, high-performance sports systems on either side of the ideological barrier. Third, there has been an increased use of science and technology in athletic

preparation, or what Miah and Garcia (2012: 96–102) refer to as the *technologization* of modern sport. So the contradiction between a transhistorical vision of sport, essentially rooted in nineteenth-century values, enshrined in Coubertin's ideas and a modernist athletic spectacle, seeking to apply rational, efficient, scientific techniques to performance, continues to exist and create issues for the Olympic movement.

As we noted in Chapter 3, the Olympic principles embedded in the Olympic Charter encompass a vast range of articles setting out approved principles and practices. Over time the Charter has expanded to accommodate change. This bureaucratic edifice is both generative and reflexive of contemporary social norms and organization, but resonates with the origins and founding principles of the modern Games and of the principles upon which they were based. What makes the governance of the Olympics distinctive is the explicitly stated ideals, Olympism, and the concept of an Olympic movement which incorporates and expresses particular sporting values, ones that originally explicitly and emphatically excluded the participation of women, and asserted the values of militaristic, white, aristocratic, masculinity (Woodward 2012).

The Olympic system involves a complex set of processes that have been modified and transformed in light of social and cultural changes, such as the wider participation of women in sport and the implementation of race equality legislation, and most notably and most recently in response to charges of corruption and deception in the late 1990s. The Olympic system came late to ethical regulation, with an Ethics Commission only being set up in 1999. In the same year the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was established in a climate of controversy and crisis for the IOC when there was not only media coverage of administrative corruption, but also revelations of drug abuse by athletes and coaches. Also in this context, and before WADA was formally set up, it was not helpful for the then President Samaranch to proclaim in 1998 that the IOC's anti-doping list should in fact be reduced because, '[d]oping is everything that, firstly, is harmful to an athlete's health and, secondly, artificially augments his performance...If it's the second case...it's not doping' (cited in Ritchie 2012: 418). WADA was eventually established, following the IOC 'World Conference on Doping in Sport' held in Lausanne in 1999. As an independent body, WADA monitors drug use worldwide, sets global standards, supports laboratory technology to improve detection and created the World Anti-Doping Code, which most countries have adopted (Ritchie 2012: 419).

Debates about doping reflect different political viewpoints and ideological positions and have occurred at different phases of Olympic history. Hence social context is important for understanding the responses to various incidents. Scholars have also taken different approaches to the subject, dealing with doping in relation to ethical arguments, policy and legal aspects, deviant behaviour, and subcultures of sport, as well as socio-historical accounts of the development of drug use in the Olympics (Ritchie 2012: 411–414). As we have seen with other aspects of the Olympics, when it comes to doping and the idea that there is, or ought to be, some direct, immutable, and unproblematic link between sport and healthy practices, we encounter contradictory premises. In this light, Mansfield and Malcolm (2015: 188, 190) critically assess the 'sport–health ideological nexus' and argue that 'Olympic sport entails considerable health costs for both participants and wider communities'.

There has been a broad shift in the past 60 years from seeing doping exclusively as outright cheating (during the Cold War period) to seeing it as bad for the image of

sport, in a period of more intense commercialization of sport (Dimeo and Møller 2018). Throughout the period two sports have faced the greatest scrutiny – road cycling, and track and field athletics. Arguably it was the death of Danish cyclist Knud Enemark Jensen, who collapsed and died during the road race at the 1960 Summer Games in Rome, that led the IOC to address the use of performance-enhancing substances, and it established its first medical committee to investigate drug use shortly afterwards. Several other memorable examples and responses to doping have taken place in connection with the Tour de France. British cyclist Tommy Simpson died in 1967 from the use of amphetamine, which led to limited drug testing at the Olympic Games in Mexico in 1968. The Festina team's use of EPO (erythropoietin) in 1998, at which there was evidence of organized doping programmes for entire teams, led to the Festina team being expelled from the Tour, and hastened the formation of WADA. More heightened concerns about cycling followed from the doping revelations about Lance Armstrong in 2012 that led to him being stripped of all the Tour de France titles he had won between 1999 and 2005. In the UK, the so-called 'Jiffy Bag' scandal saw Team Sky accused of a suspected anti-doping violation regarding a mystery package reportedly destined for star rider Bradley Wiggins in 2011. Wiggins, riding for Sky, became Britain's first Tour de France champion in 2012, and won Olympic Gold in the same year. However, a UK Anti-Doping investigation concluded without any charges having been brought (see https://www.velonews.com/2019/01/news/former-team-sky-doctor-to-face-misconduct-probe-over-doping-claims_482827 [accessed 30 September 2019]).

If it was the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) that developed systematic and scientific doping techniques during the 1950s, these techniques soon spread to the West. Soviet weightlifters were using testosterone during the 1950s, but it was an American doctor who developed an anabolic steroid that had the same benefits, but without the unwanted side-effects. By 1970 the use of steroids in sport was believed to be widespread (Moore 2012: 70). There is a history of sport governing bodies trying to turn a blind eye to the use of performance-enhancing drugs – there were, for example, no positive drug tests at Moscow in 1980. The level of positive drug test results during the 1970s and 1980s was strikingly low, and yet now, 30 years or more on, analysis of the pattern of world records from the 1970s into the era of more rigorous drug testing has revealed some performances from that time that inevitably give rise to suspicions. In 1980, after the Moscow Games, a German scientist developed a way of testing the ratio between testosterone and epi-testosterone, which could identify testosterone users (athletes stopped using steroids in time for traces to disappear but could use testosterone right up to competition). In 1982 the IOC added testosterone to its banned drugs list, and the new test was used at the World Athletics Championships in Helsinki in 1983. Again, no positive drug tests were reported at 1983, although rumours published in the Norwegian paper *VG* said that several samples had been positive (Moore 2012: 66–67). The lack of positives at 1983 led to suspicions that the IAAF were covering up positive test results. At the Pan American Games, also in 1983, paranoia spread among athletes that this time positive tests would lead to sanctions. Twelve US athletes withdrew and flew home, and many others also withdrew claiming injury (Moore 2012: 72). In the Los Angeles Olympics of 1984, 11 positive samples were reported, but another nine were discovered. The only copy of codes enabling identification of the athletes involved mysteriously disappeared from the hotel room of an IOC member (Moore 2012: 111–113).

One of the most dramatic incidents in track and field athletics, which also presented a turning point from discourses of concern for the health of the athlete to moral censure expressed in the language of fair play and its converse, cheating, was the case of the men's 100m final in the Seoul Olympics of 1988. The winner, Ben Johnson, was found guilty of using anabolic steroids, and during the Games was stripped of his gold medal. Many years later, evidence has emerged, gathered together in a book, *The Dirtiest Race in History* (Moore 2012) and subsequently made into a television documentary of the same title, that six of the eight finalists in the 100m had a record of using performance-enhancing drugs at some point in their careers. Given the common practice of ceasing to use steroids three weeks before competition, the positive test of Johnson's sample in itself remains something of a puzzle, and Johnson himself believes that the beer he drank in the testing waiting room may have been spiked (Moore 2012).

For a long time there has been a battle between drug cheats and drug testers. Every time a new mode of testing is introduced, the drug cheats manage to resort to new harder-to-detect methods. The rise in the use of steroids, which can be taken during training but then dropped before competition, led to the development of random testing away from competition and the so-called Athletes' Biological Passport, a map of bio-markers from blood samples. Additionally, the shift since 2000 from sampling athletes' urine to sampling their blood came about as drugs were being used that mimicked natural substances, making them more difficult to detect in urine.

Public censure has contributed to stronger anti-doping policies being introduced by all major sports. The introduction of year-round testing and comprehensive biological profiling of athletes has become far more elaborate, but the various pharmacological means utilized by athletes to evade the tests have also grown in sophistication. Drugs such as tetrahydrogestrinone have been developed to evade detection in use, as was demonstrated in the case of the English sprinter Dwain Chambers in 2003 (Cashmore 2005: 227–266). Some of the concerns about doping in sport are presented within a medicalized discourse of concern for the athletes involved and the health problems related to drug use. Hence Beamish (2010: 67) argues for the 'development of the best harm-reduction strategies possible'. Wider issues relate to the extent of drug abuse and the damage to world sport and the reputation and ethos of sport in general.

The IOC is not slow to trumpet its anti-drug programmes, proclaiming that the 2012 Games had the most comprehensive testing programme of any Olympic Games in history. More than 5,000 tests – 4,005 urine and 1,057 blood – were conducted during the Games, after extensive pre-Games testing by NOCs and IFs. Games tests were conducted on the top five competitors, plus two at random in each race. A WADA-accredited laboratory located in Harlow used state-of-the-art technologies. The facilities were open 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week, with a team of more than 150 anti-doping scientists from several countries (IOC 2012). London was supposed to be the cleanest Games in history, but it has turned out to be the dirtiest. By the start of 2019 the London 2012 list of failed tests was 116 long, 'an Olympic record, beating the mark of 86 set at Beijing' <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2019/jan/08/london-2012-olympics-failed-doping-tests> [accessed 30 September 2019]). With three years of testing left the final figure will be higher. Arguably had authorities been determined to catch the doping earlier, and the technology available, they might have done so.

Athletics (with all respect to gymnastics and swimming) is the central Summer Olympics sport and throughout much of the world it commands the biggest headlines and the largest TV audiences. If the credibility of athletics was to be undermined to the extent that happened with cycling in the 1990s and 2000s it would be a major problem for the sport and the Olympic Games especially. There have long been suspicions that positive test results are covered up to preserve the chances of a particular star performer or to preserve the clean image of the sport itself. Revelations first broadcast by WDR/ARD television in Germany in 2014, and subsequently published by *The Sunday Times* in the UK in August 2015, seemed to suggest a systematic cover-up of positive tests and suspicious blood patterns by the sports governing body, the IAAF.

Under the front-page headline ‘Revealed: sport’s dirtiest secret’, *The Sunday Times* report by journalists Calvert and Arbuthnott (2015: 1) was based on the leaking of 12,000 blood-test samples taken from athletes between 2001 and 2012. Analysis of thousands of test results by sport scientists suggested that one-third of medals, including 55 golds, were won in endurance events at the Olympic Games and Athletics World Championships by athletes with suspicious blood tests. Ten of the medals won at London 2012 were done so by athletes who had recorded suspicious test results in preceding years. The allegations suggested that the IAAF had not acted promptly on these findings, but this was refuted by the organization. The IAAF argued that profiling is a complicated process in which fluctuations in readings do not necessarily indicate the use of illegal performance-enhancing techniques. A subsequent WADA Commission found that the IAAF council could not have been unaware of the extent of doping in athletics and the non-enforcement of applicable anti-doping rules, and the controversy surrounding track and field athletics continues to be debated. The extent of state-sponsored doping amongst the athletes of certain countries, but especially Russia, continues to make the headlines in 2019 (<https://www.theguardian.com/sport/russia-doping-scandal> [accessed 30 September 2019]). A recent investigation by German and Austrian police into doping was the result of intelligence work made possible after a documentary, ‘Doping Top Secret: Confession – Inside the Mind of a Doper’, about the Austrian cross-country skier Johannes Dürr, was televised on German TV ARD in January 2019. The doping scandal in Russian athletics in 2014 – that led to the suspension of the Russian team from Rio 2016 and PyeongChang 2018 – was started by the whistleblowers Yuliya and Vitaliy Stepanov, and the big Sochi scandal was ignited by the former director of the Moscow anti-doping laboratory, Grigory Rodchenkov. As Selliaas (2019) suggests, ‘The picture is that we have to rely solely on whistleblowers and police to get rid of’ doping in sports. The dilemma for sport governing bodies is that rigorous testing and subsequent disqualifications can have a major impact on public confidence in any sport, especially if it plays such a central part in the Olympics or other world championships.

SECURITY, RISK, AND SURVEILLANCE

Ever since the establishment of payment for admission to enclosed arenas, the interface between inside and outside has required fences and control mechanisms to prevent those not entitled to enter from entering. In the ‘risk society’, both actual risk and the heightened sensitivity to risk have dramatically increased surveillance, boundaries, and

monitoring (Beck 1992). In the post-9/11 environment, of course, both risk and fear have become more significant. Corporate architecture has resorted to modern versions of the devices of medieval castles – the moat, the drawbridge, and the portcullis – to reduce the threat of unauthorized incursion.

The Olympic Games survived a previous period, between 1968 and 1984, when its very visibility as a global event gave it great power as a platform for symbolic political acts (as discussed in Chapter 7). The perceived threat that, once again, the Olympic Games might be utilized as such a platform has pushed security expenditure to new heights. It is not clear that these expenditures are subject to adequate scrutiny – which politician, after all, wants to be on record as having cut the security budget? Among its many other roles, as with previous Games, the London Olympics functioned as a test-bed for ‘state-of-the-art’ security technologies.

Much of the academic research on security and sports mega-events focuses on three main overlapping issues regarding:

- 1 *security legacies* of sports mega-events (e.g. Bennett and Haggerty 2011; Fussey *et al.* 2011)
- 2 *security risks* and the infrastructures and technologies used in an attempt to manage those risks (Giulianotti and Klauser 2010, 2012; Richards *et al.* 2011);
- 3 the overall *security spectacle* that characterizes sports mega-events (e.g. Boyle 2012; Boyle and Haggerty 2009, 2011; Fussey *et al.* 2011).

Each of these themes is briefly discussed in what follows.

MacAloon wrote about the vibrant presence of festival outside the stadia, which goes unwitnessed by those who do not attend and observe. He did, though, acknowledge the impact of security from as early as 1976, commenting that Montreal introduced security measures that ‘radically segregated credentialed from un-credentialed participants, and this security effect has been multiplied one-hundredfold since the 1970s’ (MacAloon 2006b: 21). Indeed the Games have always provided both a challenge and an opportunity for the cultures of control. The relevant authorities have generally attempted to ‘cleanse’ the site, the surrounding area, and indeed sometimes much of the city, of its ‘undesirables’. American writer Richard Schweid, who spent a year in Barcelona in 1991–1992, recounts that in the build-up to the Games, the municipal government cancelled all licences and permissions to work the Ramblas during the Games. ‘Officials did not want the usual horde of beggars, buskers, street musicians, mimes, jugglers, shell-game hustlers and fire-eaters asking tourists for their time and change.’ Prostitutes were moved to the Zona Franca, a warehouse district on the edge of Barcelona (Schweid 1994: 176).

The IOC makes clear that security is the responsibility of the host city, whilst ensuring that securitization does not obstruct the sporting facilities or Olympic spirit (Coaffee 2011: 118). The IOC limits its own involvement to taking out insurance against total or partial cancellation (Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012: 709). This means that in recent Games, security has become an increasing challenge as the number of people involved and the costs keep growing. Coaffee (2011: 122) noted that over 25,000 security personnel were deployed in Barcelona in 1992 and in Atlanta in 1996. In Sydney in 2000 approximately 5,000 police, 3,500 defence personnel and up to 7,000 contract security

staff were deployed (Lenskyj 2002). Security, in recent Games, has become an increasing challenge and the numbers have increased accordingly.

Immediately after the destruction of the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, major sporting events in the US were subject to unprecedented security. For the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City in 2002, a '52-mile no-fly zone was imposed around the entire Games site, and sharpshooters were placed on various mountaintop positions to protect specific competition venues' (Galily 2015). The heightened atmosphere of fear triggered by 9/11 meant that the organizing committee for Athens 2004 came under pressure from the European Union and the US to increase spending on security. In the event, Greece spent a record \$1.5 billion on security, using more than 70,000 security forces. American troops provided a training exercise, practising responses to dirty-bomb attacks and hijackings. Chemical sensors, CCTV cameras, and hidden microphones were installed, controlled by computer surveillance. Patriot missiles, fighter planes, and US battleships were deployed. O'Neill (2005: 1) argued that the city was 'under US occupation for the duration of the Games (albeit at the invitation of the Greek authorities), as both shorelines and airspace fell under the command of US and Greek troops'. There is, of course, a genuine dilemma for any organizing committee, as Cohen (2005: 6) points out:

No one wants a 'Fortress Olympics' yet both athletes and spectators need a safe environment. The danger is that risk management drives the whole enterprise and stifles the aleatory principles that alone make the games a joyful occasion worth remembering.

In the wake of 9/11, there was a much more comprehensive form of security planning for the next Summer Olympics, Athens 2004, including real-time updating and sharing of intelligence. An Olympic Advisory Group (OAG) was established, with representatives from Australia, France, Germany, Israel, Spain, the UK, and the US. Nine separate operational readiness security exercises were staged between 2001 and 2004. An Olympic Intelligence Centre operated 24 hours per day from the start of July 2004 (Hinds 2007: 23). According to Bowe and Rodriguez (2012):

One report revealed that Greek law enforcement and intelligence agencies installed more than 1,000 surveillance cameras in Athens in advance of the 2004 Summer Olympics – and then continued to make use of them for policing purposes long after athletes and spectators had packed up and left...Chinese authorities installed a whopping 200,000 cameras and employed other surveillance measures in an effort to make Beijing secure. And, in a move that drew widespread condemnation, the Chinese government ordered foreign-owned hotels to install internet monitoring equipment to spy on hotel guests.

Interestingly, despite the Internet clampdown during the Beijing Summer Olympics in 2008, one of us (GW) was able to access the website of journalist and Olympic critic Andrew Jennings from his Beijing hotel room on the eve of the Games. It is doubtful that this open access, available in accommodation for foreign visitors, extended to the population as a whole.

Security costs for the Olympic Games increased from \$179.6 million at Sydney 2000 to \$1.5 billion for Athens 2004, and the exceptional case of \$6.5 billion for Beijing in 2008 (see Table 12.2; for details see Yu *et al.* 2009). For London 2012, the original published security budget of £337 million grew to over £1 billion, but typically a lot of security spending was ‘off budget’, hidden in general police or security budgets. The UK already makes extensive use of CCTV; indeed, six years before the London Olympics, the BBC reported in November 2006 that there were already 4.2 million cameras in the UK. The British Security Industry Authority (BSIA) estimated that by 2013 there were 5–6 million of them. Robot drone aircraft had already been deployed in the UK in the Olympic context – for example, at the Olympic handover party in 2011 in the Mall. Although technical and legal issues prevented any extensive use of drones for surveillance during the 2012 Games, around 25 police authorities had acquired drone planes and their use gained ministerial approval in October 2012.² As before, the Olympic Games in London was used to test new security technologies (Tudge 2010). Predicting security costs before the 2028 Olympics in Los Angeles is difficult but the figure is likely to be ‘north of \$2 billion’ (<https://www.securitysales.com/news/security-protect-2028-olympic-games-2b/> [accessed 30 September 2019]).

In a whole range of ways, then, a culture of control has become a more prominent feature of the Olympic Games in which ordinary people – residents of local communities in the immediate host areas and visitors alike – are seen as a risk that has to be managed. Legislation prevents unauthorized use of Olympic-related words, and even allowed the London Organizing Committee right of entry to homes to search for ‘pirated’, i.e. unauthorized, Olympic goods, as well as banners for protests. Major sports events utilize the crowd, but as ‘extras’, enabling the visual card stunts that can only be seen properly on television, and channel spontaneous behaviour into regimented behaviour, such as the rituals of victory ceremonies, cup-giving, the playing of loud music. Characteristically, at major football events today, stadium anthems like Queen’s ‘We are the Champions’ are played over the public address system, drowning out and eliminating the possibility of any spontaneous responses to the joy of victory.

	<i>Number of Athletes</i>	<i>Security cost per athlete in USD</i>	<i>Tickets sold</i>	<i>Security cost per ticket in USD</i>	<i>Security cost in million USD</i>
Los Angeles 1984	6,829	11,627	5,720,000	14	79.4
Seoul 1988	8,391	13,312	3,300,000	33	111.7
Barcelona 1992	9,356	7,072	3,021,740	22	66.2
Atlanta 1996	10,318	10,486	8,384,290	13	108.2
Sydney 2000	10,651	16,062	6,700,000	27	179.6
Athens 2004	10,500	142,857	5,300,000	283	1500
Beijing 2008	10,942	607,022	6,500,000	1021	6642
London 2012	10,568	181,545	8,200,000	223	1918
Los Angeles 2028					2000+

Table 12.2 Security costs per athlete and per spectator at selected Olympic Games 1984–2028

Source: adapted from Hinds 2007; Boyle and Haggerty 2009; Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012; IOC 2014b; <https://www.securitysales.com/news/security-protect-2028-olympic-games-2b/> [accessed 30 September 2019].

In common with previous Games, festivity was contained and controlled by order and organization at London 2012. London handled security by allowing fun in delimited spaces, subject to surveillance and policing. A picnic in the Olympic Park could be very pleasant, but restrictions on items that could be brought in (for example, water) resulted in long queues at the relatively small number of free drinking water taps. The further from the intense cultures of control that must inevitably dominate the Park, the more chance the festive and even the carnivalesque has to thrive. However, the gap between the performers and spectators in the arenas and the people in the public spaces of London was always clear.

London 2012 was initially asked to provide over 15,000 police, 13,500 defence force personnel and close to 15,000 contract security staff. In the days leading up to the London 2012 Games, there was a significant addition of 3,500 defence personnel as concerns arose that G4S, the leading contract security provider, would not be able to supply the agreed number of private security staff. This increased the total number of defence personnel to approximately 17,000; almost twice the number of troops then deployed in Afghanistan (Whelan 2014). The Command Perimeter Security System (CPSS) at the Olympic Park in Stratford included:

a 17.5km, 5,000V electric fence topped with 900 daylight and night vision surveillance CCTV cameras...Wireless-capable cameras...can be quickly deployed, removed and set up somewhere else according to demand or requirement, allowing security operators to identify trouble spots and move the cameras to areas where they are most needed.

(Courtney 2012)

The needs of the Olympic Games helped enable a much greater linking up of such technology. Courtney (2012) noted that:

thousands of CCTV cameras already installed in London, many owned by either the 33 local authorities or Transport for London (TfL), are to be integrated into a single system via a specialised software set-up that uses high-speed broadband links and automatic number plate recognition software, giving the Metropolitan Police and other security bodies the ability to track any individual's progress through the city.

He added:

it seems unlikely that the systems installed for 2012 will be simply torn down again rather than assimilated into wider TfL or other local authority surveillance networks; it has been estimated that most of the 1,200 cameras deployed in Athens during the 2004 Olympic games are still in use by the authorities.

Thus it is that security and surveillance technologies:

often initially implemented in an attempt to 'secure' sports mega events, continue to function post the event in everyday life, and with the familiar logic of 'mission creep' end up being used for other purposes than they were originally developed.

(Whelan 2014: 395)

Security occurred in other ways; at its peak, on so-called ‘Super Saturday’ (4 August 2012) when ‘Team GB’ won six gold medals, BT prevented an average of 11,000 malicious requests per second.³ The number of detected malicious site visit attempts rose from around 2 million a day at the beginning of the Games to a peak of 9 million a day.⁴ Yet all this accumulated experience constituted a valuable resource for private companies to trade on in consultancy services to future hosts of mega-events. One clear legacy for the government left by the London Olympics was the enhancement of surveillance equipment and expertise. For some years, the security needs of the Olympic Games have helped stimulate research and development in the security industry.

Fussey *et al.* (2011) describe how London implemented its version of the conventional Olympic ‘total’ security model. In addition to proactive policing and intelligence efforts being directed towards potential threats, key elements of the total security model included at least three key stages. The first involved intense planning for ‘resilience’, should the goal of ‘prevention’ fail and security problems such as a terrorist attack eventuate during the Games. The second stage involved reconfiguring public and private space into security infrastructures through the development of ‘island’ security and sophisticated ‘defensible space’ techniques at key sites. The third stage concerned the deployment of advanced surveillance and real-time monitoring of people and space, much of which involved expanding the existing network of surveillance technologies in the host city.

These measures were also accompanied by an intense ‘military urbanism’ that played a crucial role in the overall ‘securitization’ of the Olympic Games and at the same time the increased securitization of urban public space. As Boyle and Haggerty (2009: 270) put it, ‘Militarization of event security also means the militarization of cities’ as security systems ‘become familiar and routinised – the increasingly normalised spectacle of security’.

Thus Boyle and Haggerty (2011) argue that security spectacles and the planning for extreme events that underpin them are largely about providing the illusion of ‘absolute security’ and an attempt to control uncertainty. In the same vein, Houlihan and Giulianotti (2012: 705–706) suggest that the recent period of the Olympics might be regarded as hyper-security, in which resources are allocated not on the basis of probability but of possibility, and intense aversion to risk. London 2012 was regularly described by politicians and security chiefs as the biggest ever security challenge for the UK. Hence we have seen the emergence of a new field of expertise around the management of unease. Security advances during work for mega-events constitutes a very tangible and commercially valuable legacy of the Games. The state-of-the-art developments around mega-events have constituted a significant field of technological and systemic innovation. The security operation for Beijing 2008 drew on experience from Athens 2004, the Winter Olympics in Turin in 2006, the 2006 Commonwealth Games and the 2006 Asian Games (Hinds 2007: 24).

At the same time, as Whelan (2014: 396) writes:

There is little doubt that many of these developments are about the ‘security spectacle’ rather than bearing a correlation to actual security risks. For example, the show of military ‘strength’ during London 2012 – involving an aircraft carrier docked on the Thames, several RAF fighters, fixed long-range surface-to-air

missiles deployed at several locations and portable missiles on the top of apartment buildings close to Olympic sites, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or ‘drones’, and the more traditional positioning of tactical teams and snipers – would be considered far beyond any probable threat to the Olympics.

Given the unpredictable nature of modern terrorist acts, security is largely a form of public show. In reality we don’t know whether to expect shooting, bombing, or suicide bombers. Nor do we really know where the attacks might come from. For a decade after 2001, Al-Qaeda was represented in the media as the main threat, until the idea of a more diffuse loose network of semi-autonomous groups became the dominant model. ISIS had not even emerged at the time of the London Games, yet now is represented in the West as the prime mover of international terrorism. Yet for all the focus on so-called Islamist radicalization, since 2005 the fringe Irish republican groups remain a threat, although no one appears to be rushing to establish deradicalization programmes for them.

Despite a range of incidents, it is not self-evident that attacking popular gatherings such as sport is a main priority among groups resorting to political violence. It does not, unlike the attack on the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel in Mumbai in 2008, offer a dramatized symbolic assault on a rich elite. It does have great potential for generating a significant backlash among the sector of the public who they may be aiming to impress. Despite this, security for mega-events can now command almost all the resources it requires. Few politicians wish to be on record as having refused a budgetary increase to security, in case something does happen. As is typical of risk assessment, there is confusion between the likelihood and the consequences of an incident. The process of thinking the unthinkable, made necessary post-9/11, is, almost inevitably, short of hard evidence.

Assessing the success of the security operation for London 2012, Robert Raine, the former Director of Olympic and Paralympic Security at the UK Home Office, argued that a ‘new benchmark’ had been set in respect of inter-agency security coordination, and that this was a key factor in ensuring that London 2012 was secure (cited in Rosemont 2015). Boyle and Haggerty (2009: 262–263) suggest that there has been a bifurcation between the mechanistic aspects of security provision and the representational dimension. Given that the elimination of all risk is impossible, the provision of an appearance of absolute security becomes important, hence the public spectacle of security. Greece saw the Olympics as an ideal opportunity to transform itself into a counter-terrorism superpower whose knowledge and technologies could be marketed internationally (Boyle and Haggerty 2009: 266). Hence we can see this as another area in which capital, seeking new ways to accumulate, is benefiting from funding from public sources; public expenditure generating private profit through the monetization of public safety.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has focused on three of the main challenges that currently confront the Olympics. We might have looked at three other aspects of the ‘dark side’ of the Games in more detail: gambling and match-fixing, commercialization, and the environment, but we have already touched on the second in the earlier parts of the book. In the build-up to the 2012 London Olympics the then IOC president Jacques Rogge was quoted as

saying that match-fixing and betting were not only embedded in football and cricket but also were a serious risk to Olympic sport. Rogge acknowledged the temptation to cheat among athletes who are not highly paid, but attributed cheating to ‘human nature’ (cited in Gibson 2011: 12).

An explanation that stresses the social processes would give greater emphasis to the networks and financial systems of gambling which permeate contemporary sport, and also the processes that facilitate the operation of betting syndicates and the proliferating cultures of gambling, rather than prioritizing a generic human condition. Temptation has to operate within the wider social field of possibilities, and gambling is ubiquitous in the culture of sport. The Olympics does face a threat from the combination of gambling and match-fixing that has already had a significant impact on football and cricket. There is nothing new about gambling, but since the rise of the internet from the 1990s onwards, online gambling has grown very rapidly to become a large and lucrative industry. The scale of online transactions is immense. In some countries de-regulation has contributed to this growth, whilst in others regulation has always been lax. In many, national-based regulatory systems have proved to be inadequate for the digital era.

A 2011 report in the Australian *Economist* indicated that, on average, every adult Australian loses just under AUD1,300 per year. Australians spend AUD22 billion per year on gambling, nearly five times the spending on foreign aid. Sports betting alone brought in AUD600 million of revenue in 2011 (Horn 2011). During the American Super Bowl there are now so many gambling options that people can even bet on the coin toss. Even where betting is restricted the spending is huge; illegal wagering on the 2005 Men’s NCAA Basketball Tournament was estimated at \$2.5 billion (Delaney 2007).

The sheer volume of transactions has led to constant innovation, especially in the form of spot betting (where gamblers wager not on the ultimate outcome but on the smallest detail of a contest) – for example, in football the time at which the first corner is conceded, or in cricket the number of no balls called within a specific number of overs. Such events have proved easy to arrange, provided a specific individual can be bribed. The normalization of gambling and the involvement of professional sportspeople in it leaves them vulnerable to pressure to abet match-fixing. A European study found that an estimated 8 million euro of betting profits was generated by match-fixing in Germany alone and at least 2 million euro was paid in bribes to those involved (Europol 2013).

The salary of top performers in many sports may seem to make them immune to such inducements, and some proven instances of match-fixing have occurred at lower levels of sports. However, most Olympic competitors are not earning huge salaries. In addition, any use of performance-enhancing drugs can render a sportsperson, however wealthy, vulnerable to blackmail. To date there have been no documented cases of the rigging of any aspects of Olympic competition. It would be naive, though, to assume that the Olympic Games are completely immune from these dangers, as IOC members are well aware.

Commercialization of the Olympic Games is so well established as to be almost taken for granted. The 1984 Olympics has become regarded as the point at which commercialization of the Games entered a new and more dramatic era (Tomlinson and Whannel 1984). The economics of the gigantic global spectacle provide two problems for the Olympic movement. The first is that it has become too big, with too much money at stake. The

second is the more intangible danger of the bubble bursting. The large revenues do not constitute a protection against loss for hosting cities. Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) suggested a link between the Athens Olympics and the economic problems now faced by Greece, and argued that ‘cost overrun and associated debt from the Athens 2004 Games has contributed to a Greek “double dip” in the financial and economic crises of 2007–2012’ (Flyvbjerg and Stewart 2012). As we have previously argued, the long-term benefits of hosting can be hard to quantify precisely, but there is growing evidence that the huge costs involved may be discouraging future bidders (Zimbalist 2015). In 2008 and 2012 tourism numbers dropped during the Summer Olympic Games. Scholarly studies suggest that there is not a demonstrable positive economic impact from hosting. Numbers of bidding cities dropped from 12 in 1997 for the 2004 Games to three in 2013 for the 2020 Games. In the Winter Olympics, too, the number of bidders has dropped from nine in 1995 for the 2002 Games in Salt Lake City to just two in 2014 for the 2022 Games (Zimbalist 2015). As we have seen, the IOC as an organization under the leadership of a former member of Sepp Blatter’s ‘international relations’ team, developing Agenda 2020, may be coming even more adaptable and adept at surviving, and has once again reviewed the bidding process.

As another part of a significant, if discreet, rebranding of the Olympic movement that has been under way since the Salt Lake City scandal broke in 1998, environmental concerns have been given a higher profile, with candidate cities expected to outline their ‘green’ credentials and plans to use renewable and sustainable resources. The IOC has some reason to be proud of the initiatives it has taken in this area and their partial successes. It was very pleased to inaugurate a new headquarters building in Lausanne and trumpet its green and sustainable credentials in June 2019 (<https://www.olympic.org/news/olympic-house-becomes-one-of-the-most-sustainable-buildings-in-the-world> [accessed 30 September 2019]). However, aside from the costs involved in producing this building whilst other host locations struggle with debt (see <https://www.thenation.com/article/the-international-olympic-committee-builds-new-headquarters-after-leaving-rio-crippled-by-debt/> [accessed 30 September 2019]), the staging of giant global events, involving the construction of expensive facilities and the travel of thousands of competitors, spectators, and media people, is inevitably questionable on ecological grounds.

Climate change could eventually threaten the very viability of the Winter Games and make the staging of the Summer Games at certain times of the year in certain cities problematic, even as soon as Tokyo in 2020 (see <https://slate.com/culture/2019/10/tokyo-olympics-2020-climate-change-extreme-heat-humidity.html>). According to one report, across the US winter temperatures have warmed 0.16 degrees Fahrenheit per decade since 1895; the rate of warming has more than tripled to 0.55 degrees Fahrenheit per decade since 1970. The proportion of total winter precipitation falling as snow has decreased in the north-eastern and western US, with concurrent decreases in snowpack in both regions. Visitors to skiing areas can drop by as much as 30 per cent in years of low snowfall (Burakowski and Magnusson 2012). The estimated \$12.2 billion US winter sports industry has already felt the direct impact of decreased winter snowpack and rising average winter temperatures. Snow depths could decline in the west by 25 to 100 per cent. The length of the snow season in the north-east will be cut in half.⁵ A study in the *Journal of Sustainable Tourism* showed that under current climate conditions 85 per

cent of all Swiss skiing areas are snow-reliable. This number would drop to 63 per cent if temperatures were to rise by 2 °C, an outcome which is currently looking hard to avoid (Koenig and Abegg 1997).

A major concern for the organizers of Tokyo 2020 is the temperatures during normal competition times, and the effect this may have on athletes, volunteers, and spectators. Tokyo 1964 started on 10 October, but the Tokyo Games in 2020 commence in July when the weather can reach very high temperatures with great humidity. This prompted the moving of the marathon and associated events to the slightly cooler climate of Sapporo in Hokkaido, northern Japan. Mega-events like the men's Football World Cup and the Olympic Games, however powerful they like to represent themselves as being, can never be free of wider processes of environmental change – as James Dorsey has commented so pithily about the two sports mega-events scheduled to take place in 2022, 'Qatar is too hot, Beijing has no snow' (Dorsey 2015).

NOTES

- 1 In the final week of May 2015, 14 FIFA officials and marketing executives were indicted by US prosecutors led by the Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch, describing alleged bribery schemes and other corruption charges. Additional charges relating to bribes allegedly known about by other FIFA officials emerged shortly after. The indictment was for corruption in the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF), one of the confederations associated with FIFA, alleging bribes and kickbacks estimated at more than \$150 million over a 24-year period. Although re-elected a few days later, FIFA's President Blatter stepped down in June as law enforcement officials in the US confirmed that he was also part of the focus of the federal corruption investigation (Borden *et al.* 2015). At the same time it was revealed that a former member of the FIFA executive and general secretary of CONCACAF, Chuck Blazer, had turned FBI informant and admitted to receiving bribes to select South Africa as the host for the 2010 World Cup between 2004 and 2011 at a trial in New York in 2013. At his testimony, which was only made public in May 2015, he pleaded guilty to racketeering, wire fraud conspiracy, money laundering, income tax, and banking offences. The New York judge hearing his testimony added to the acronym list by which FIFA is referred by describing it as a 'Rico' enterprise – a 'racketeering influenced corrupt organization'.
- 2 'Minister endorses use of drones by British police', 1 October 2012 (www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-10/01/british-police-more-drones [accessed 1 September 2015]).
- 3 Sports Video Group (<http://sportsvideo.org/main/blog/2014/10/bts-lessons-learned-at-londonolympics-provide-roadmap-for-tokyo-2020>).
- 4 'Multi-layered security provided foolproof protection for communication services at London 2012', *London 2012 Network Protection Factfile*.
- 5 'Climate Impact Changes on Winter Tourism Economy' (available online at: www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/climate-impacts-winter-tourism.asp [accessed 3 July 2015]).

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CONCLUSION

In June 2018 one of us (JH) participated in a roundtable discussion at a conference a few kilometres from the IOC headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland, with the title ‘Who still wants to organise the Olympics?’ In preparation for the discussion JH was asked to think about certain questions that would be raised by the organizer of the roundtable. This concluding part of the book offers some of these thoughts, identifies a way of comprehending the contemporary Olympics and adds suggestions for future research into them.

The simple answer to the main question is that certain groups will always want the Olympics to continue to be organized. These include the IOC, of course, but civic boosters, urban developers, some governments, possibly those that are more autocratic, believing in soft power as a way of building goodwill abroad, as an influence on foreign publics or at least the regional arena to advance foreign policy, will continue to push to host the Olympics and other mega-events. This has recently been described as ‘sportswashing’ (Slattery 2018). Another group of organizers will come from places with tradition – invented or otherwise – for sports of a certain kind. Hence at the time of writing (October 2019) it is rumoured that bids might be made to host the 2032 Summer Olympics by London, a joint North and South Korean bid, and cities on the Gold Coast in Australia. How these develop in the context of the new arrangements for agreeing future hosts (see Chapter 9) will need to be monitored carefully.

Panellists at the event in June 2018 were asked, why are the Olympics no longer seen as attractive? Why do fewer cities want to host the Olympics? How can we explain the lower interest of citizens in hosting the Olympics? Actually, debates about mega-events have been going on since the 1970s, first when citizens of Denver rejected the hosting of the 1972 Winter Olympics, and then when Montreal citizens faced 30 years of paying off the debt of the 1976 Games. Since then journalists and social scientists alike have raised issues about the opportunities versus the costs, the uneven benefits (for the few not the many), and the rhetoric of Olympic ‘legacy’ versus the reality. As US journalist Dave Zirin (2014) reiterates, often debt, displacement, privatization, and militarization of public spaces are the main outcomes of hosting the Olympics. Additionally, in the past decade – since the credit crunch/ recession of 2007/2008 – neo-liberal ‘austerity’ policies have been implemented that cut public spending and have created the basis for populist politics around the world. Coupled with this, enhanced communication via new/social media enables rapid responses, symbolic contestation and equally rapid rebuttals (including ‘astroturfing’, or the creation of fake support for some projects).

The vortextuality of the Olympics has become even more intense with the growth of social media. This in turn has heightened incentives and possibilities for counter Olympic or ‘Anti Games’ movements to develop alongside critiques of pro-event expertise, experts, and state-led neoliberal capitalism. Olympic boosters/ supporters line up against sceptics/ activists in terms of considering the Games legitimate and / or in need of improvement or revision, or on the other hand, in need of delegitimizing through popular debate, demonstrations, and education that will lead to the transformation of the Games. Those contesting the legitimacy of the Olympics are not necessarily advocates of progressive, left-liberal politics. That depends on how the Olympic Games is perceived, whether as a value driven movement based on the autonomy of sports organizations, a system, an industry/ business or an assemblage of coalitions. Those that are pro generally can be understood as part of a ‘growth machine’; those that are against, as involved in developing ‘advocacy networks’.

In the past two decades we have seen several Olympic reforms, and gradual shifts by the IOC in response to external crises and internal scandals, including Salt Lake City (2002 Winter Olympics) bribery. The concept of ‘legacy’ was invoked as a magical incantation, and then ‘sustainability’. But these attempts at reform may not have been enough, and may amount to little more than ‘greenwashing’ (Miller 2018). Did the IOC adopt new strategies, such as Agenda 2020, to regain the trust of citizens in potential host cities or to regain the trust of bidding coalitions? As a mass media spectacle, ‘Olympism has become a very lucrative branch of the world-wide entertainment industry’ but also ‘one aspect of an emergent global culture’ (Hargreaves 2000: 51, 160). In the view of journalist David Owen (2019), ‘The IOC is unique. It needs to sit in its own space, somewhere on an axis between Multinational Corporation and Parliament of Sports.’ David Goldblatt (2016: 445) sums up his view of the position of the IOC as follows:

The tragedy of Agenda 2020 is that, beneath the contorted language of corporate change – repositioning, benchmarking, leadership – Bach and his minions are operating under an illusion that they are still part of a social movement – a force for value-driven action and goals, shielded from and antithetical to the demands of economics and politics.

Goldblatt (2016: 446) concludes that no better commentary on the state of the IOC could be made than by quoting Max Weber: ‘mechanized petrification embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance’.

Another question panellists were asked in June 2018 was, why should cities continue to bid? Why they will is due to the continuing scarcity of the attribute of being an ‘Olympic host’ – it still signals that a place is a world-class destination. Whether they should bid is another matter. With environmental change and global heating especially a real prospect in the very near future, should sports mega-events with very large carbon footprints be scaled back? Hence some people have suggested that the Games should be left to a few fixed sites or only those places that can afford to put on the event with least new building of facilities required. While an attractive suggestion, there would be some places that might never have the opportunity to modify their facilities or opportunities for athletes as an Olympic host.

One final question posed was what role can and should academics play in the future of the Olympics? After 2016 the Olympic Games, Summer and Winter, entered what will come to be known as its 'East Asian' era, as PyeongChang (South Korea), Tokyo (Japan) and Beijing (China) host the 2018, 2020, and 2022 Games, respectively (see Figure C.1). Each



Figure C.1 Retro Style Poster for Tokyo as Candidate City for the 2020 Olympics (Tokyo, March 2013)

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Conclusion

of these events attracted some form of controversy, as we have seen. Although we have not discussed the Winter Olympics in great detail in this book, it is noticeable that critics identified the environment as a major fault line in the 2018 and 2022 Winter Games, while Tokyo faced problems developing an appropriate venue for the 2020 Games and utilized resources in building it that also had negative environmental consequences.

In the past, the governing bodies of world sport have not always been able to act effectively as stewards of the public interest in sport, whether it is in the area of corruption, the use of performance-enhancing drugs, commercialization, environmental protection, or the escalation of excessive security. In all these areas, the world of sport has become beset with rumour, gossip, innuendo, allegation, and refutation. These are the dark, murky areas of the Olympics and sports mega-events generally.

Sylvia Schenk (2019), Chair of the Sport Working Group of the German Chapter of Transparency International, has pointed out that while the IOC's charter defines sport as a human right and prohibits discrimination, arguably sport has a greater obligation to human rights than business does. While the IOC has made efforts to promote women in sport, involve athletes with disabilities through the Paralympics, and created a refugee team from the 2016 Olympics, one or more 'good' actions do not balance out harmful actions. Hence the much-publicized refugee team consisting of ten athletes gained more attention than the thousands of people affected by evictions from their homes in favela in Rio de Janeiro prior to the 2016 Games.

The entire life cycle of an Olympics, and other sports mega-events, has to be covered by 'good' deeds. The challenge in forthcoming years will be whether those involved with the organization of all sports mega-events will recognize this. Critical scholarship can provide insights to illuminate the way forward. The challenge for researchers will be to continue to conduct research, investigate questionable practices, articulate them, and communicate our concerns, whether they are about athletes, the environment, waste and excess, impacts on citizens of host locations, or corruption in the running of the Games.



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